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In the summer of 2014, more than a million people have been displaced and more than ten thousand 
mostly civilians have been killed by fighting in South Sudan as the country finds itself oscillating 
between civil war and an uncertain ceasefire that has already been broken multiple times by both 
sides in the conflict. As a matter of fact, the leaders of the two factions, the government on the one 
hand and the rebels on the other hand, are members of the same party, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) which has been dominating the politics of Southern Sudan since the 
end of more than two decades of fighting in 2005. President Kiir and the head of the SPLM-in-
Opposition Riek Machar and their delegates travel regional capitals to rally support and to lay out 
their version of events, the composition and function of a yet-to-be convened interim government is 
being debated in newspapers and online forums; all the while, donor conferences are held in the 
West in order to stave off a looming famine that threatens to become the continent’s worst since the 
1980s.  
Not even three years after South Sudan became the world’s newest internationally recognized state 
in the wake of a near-unanimous independence referendum in January 2011 which paved the way 
for secession from Sudan – whose Islamist regime was at the time deemed a pariah state on the level 
of North Korea – pundits from South Sudan and abroad wonder aloud whether it was a good idea for 
the United Nations, African Union and international mediators from the U.S., UK, Norway, Kenya, 
Ethiopia and several other countries to allow South Sudan into the family of nations. Yet, even in the 
midst of what are without exaggeration the depths of misery, there are many individuals, groups and 
countries that continue to have high hopes for the country and are willing to invest time, effort, 
resources and clout to see the aspiring nation-state of South Sudan succeed. Among these 
supporters of South Sudan’s statehood and collective national belonging there is however no 
agreement over what would constitute success and over how state and nation ought to look like. 
Two examples from conversations I had in Juba: 
I want South Sudan to be like South Korea. After the war with the North, South Korea was one of the 
poorest countries in the world. And look at it now! (A member of South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs)  
We don’t have one model or one country that we strive to be like. We want to take things from a 
number of countries. Personally, I believe we can learn something in the political system from the 
United States and from South Africa. And we should try to be like China and Norway in our economic 
system. (A member of the SPLM politburo) 
As this small sample of visions for the state of South Sudan indicates, hopes and expectations are not 
only high but include seemingly contradictory objectives. China and the United States have 
fundamentally different political systems and there is very little in common between the collective 
identity of Norwegians and South Africans. What these countries share, however, is that from the 
vantage point of South Sudan’s elites they represent (relative) affluence and stable functioning 
states; features that South Sudan aspires to yet clearly lacks in the present. Even before the crisis 
that erupted in December 2013, South Sudan had the world’s highest rates of illiteracy and maternal 
mortality, was set to miss all of its Millennium Development Goals and was home to several smaller 
rebellions, continuous cycles of cattle raids, persistent conflict with Khartoum and growing popular 
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disappointment with the lack of improvements to living conditions. All these challenges to the South 
Sudanese state and to the collective unity of the new state’s people have left their mark:  
You ask me what unites South Sudanese today? Nothing. (A former minister in the Government of 
National Unity) 
It is exactly this question how the state and the nation of South Sudan have evolved to date and how 
state and nation are likely to evolve in the future that drive the interest, focus and approach of this 
research endeavour.  
1.1. Research question 
What this research undertaking sets out to accomplish is to come up with answers to the questions:  
a) How do the African state and nation and the processes of statebuilding and 
nationbuilding in Africa differ from the ideal-type of the nation-state derived from the 
experience of Western Europe?  
 
b) As a late-comer to independence, how does South Sudan’s record in building state and 
nation compare to that of its African peers and what can be learnt from this comparison 
for our understanding of African nation-states and for the evaluation and likely trajectory 
of South Sudan?  
My underlying assumptions in approaching the questions and hence the hypotheses that guide the 
analysis are first of all that African states and nations – while sharing certain characteristics with 
European and Western nation-states – overall constitute a distinct class of nation-states that 
warrants a thorough typology of state and nation in order to establish a better understanding of 
developments and developmental trends in individual countries as well as continent-wide. Secondly, 
I work with the hypothesis that the anomalous case of South Sudan as a latecomer to statehood and 
nationhood can both benefit from a comparison to the typology of African nation-states (as opposed 
to an idealized European model) but also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of said typology.  
Thus, the underlying idea that inspires the comparative framework that the analysis is built around is 
twofold: (1) to shed light on South Sudan’s very recent statebuilding and nationbuilding project from 
the perspective of the not-quite-as-recent postcolonial statebuilding and nationbuilding projects in 
post-colonial Africa; (2) to reflect on established views of said postcolonial state- and nationbuilding 
in Africa from the vantage point of the anomalous case of South Sudan as a late-comer that declared 
independence not from a European colonial power but from the Northern half of Sudan.  
In other words, the analysis of theories of the African state and African nation is to guide my 
perspective on the statebuilding and nationbuilding project in South Sudan, in particular by 
highlighting and putting a spotlight on those developments South Sudan might – but need not – 
encounter in the coming years and decades. The expectation is that by applying this slightly unusual 
perspective, different aspects of African statebuilding and nationbuilding might shine up that have so 
far not been adequately appreciated. Moreover, the typology will also furnish an overview of 
theoretical approaches to the study of African states and nations as they have evolved since at least 
the late colonial period. Hence, in addition to providing this study with weather-tested perspectives, 
theoretical looking glasses that can also be applied to South Sudan, some of the gaps and omissions 
in the existing literature on African states and African nations will equally become apparent.  
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By highlighting the varying experiences of African states since independence, their struggles and 
successes, their structures and institutions (formal or informal), as well as the conditions and 
international political climates which shaped their trajectories, a clearer understanding of the 
challenges that South Sudan faces and is likely to face will be much facilitated. This is not to say that I 
will deduce some deterministic development trajectories that the South Sudanese state and nation 
cannot fail to comply with. Rather, present and recent developments in the political, administrative 
and international field that would otherwise only be interpreted as singular acts may appear in an 
altogether different light when contrasted with similar events in other parts of the continent. 
To the best of my knowledge, no such undertaking has so far been published. There are, of course, 
many academic works that have tried to address the African state and the African nation on a 
continental level. The vast majority of these analyses, however, have sought to add a specific label to 
either the African state or nation, a label that seeks to depict what sets apart the African nation and 
state from nation-states elsewhere on the globe. In fact, many of these works – by Ake, Bayart, 
Chabal, Dorman, Englebert and many more from almost every letter in the alphabet – have been 
consulted and utilized in assembling and compiling the novel typology of the African nation-state 
that is one the contributions of this research project to the academic discourse.  
With regard to South Sudan, academic production – much of which will be referenced in later 
chapters – has for a long time going back to Evans-Pritchard been dominated by anthropological 
studies. More recently, driven by war, famine and humanitarian relief, research – oftentimes carried 
out for or as part of work in and on Southern Sudan (advocacy, relief, missionary) – has focused on 
issues of refugees and displacement, on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and on 
models of economic development and reconstruction. In terms of political analyses, research has 
concentrated on the inner workings of the SPLM, relations between civilian and military operations, 
the peace process that culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the transition to a 
parliamentary democracy, the coexistence of traditional and statutory forms of governance and law 
and many reports on very specific aspects, for instance the internal make-up of the body charged 
with drafting the country’s permanent constitution.  
Regarding nationalism and collective identity, there is a large body of work dissecting the failure of 
Sudanese nationalism to win traction with the people of Sudan due to its ethnically and religiously 
exclusive and racist stance on national belonging. South Sudanese collective identity has either been 
portrayed along ethnic lines, with anthropological research generally focusing on only one ethnic 
group or sub-group (for example Dinka or Bor Dinka, Ngok Dinka, etc.) or been seen as coterminous 
with the armed struggle against successive Khartoum governments and their allies. When discussed 
at all, writers note the failure of South Sudanese political and intellectual elites to develop a vision of 
the nation that a majority of South Sudanese adhere to.  
One last preliminary remark: it would be impossible and, indeed, unnecessary to attempt to present 
and regurgitate each and every approach to the study of African states that has been published and 
discussed. Hence, I follow Locher’s guideline for the writing of universal history: “one should not 
confuse totality with completeness. The whole is more than the assembled parts, but it is surely also 
less”1. What my approach not only acknowledges but accepts is the necessarily subjective nature of 
                                                          
1
 Locher, Theodor Jakob Gottlieb. Die Überwindung des europäozentrischen Geschichtsbildes. Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner, 1954, p. 15, cited in Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. With a new prologue. Berkeley et al.: 
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the categories of analysis that arise out of the specific reading, selection and distillation of theories of 
the African nation-state that I have undertaken. Their strengths and weaknesses will be entirely due 
to my own intellectual input. 
Approaching the study of South Sudan in light of post-colonial statebuilding in all of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is inspired by an idea taken from the work of Carlo Ginzburg. Rules of a given historical time 
are best understood and illustrated by looking at anomalies: 
An object, as we saw, may be chosen because it is typical (González) or because it is repetitive and 
therefore capable of being serialized (Braudel, apropos the fait divers). Italian microhistory has 
confronted the question of comparison with a different and, in a certain sense, opposite approach: 
through the anomalous, not the analogous.
2 
At first sight, it may seem a rather odd endeavour to look at the experience of other African 
countries, or of the African state in general, for guidance and insights into the likely trajectory of the 
nascent South Sudanese statebuilding and nationbuilding project. Is not every instance of state-
formation and nationbuilding so idiosyncratic as to disallow inferences derived from previous cases? 
Even if we allow for comparisons between some ideal-type state and statebuilding process and the 
singular case of South Sudan, why should the focus be on African states, in particular? And how can 
the research plan sketched out above be realized in practice? Answering the issues raised by these 
questions will be the object of the coming section that seeks to provide a justification for 
approaching the research project from this particular angle.   
1.2. Theoretical-philosophical justification for the chosen approach  
Greece and Finland differ in so many respects in terms of their socio-economic, political and cultural 
make-up, that calling both of them European does not illuminate any commonalities except for 
geography and joint membership in a political body, the European Union. Likewise, one might 
wonder in how far comparisons or at least juxtapositions of South Sudan with, say, Angola or Côte 
d’Ivoire could broaden our understanding of the parameters of the South Sudanese state and nation3 
and our grasp of obstacles and limitations South Sudan is prone to encounter in the coming years 
and decades, any better than a comparison to Uruguay or Sri Lanka4. Sangmpam, for instance, 
suggests that instead of analyzing the African state as peculiarly African we should pursue cross-
continental analyses of ‘Third World’ states5.  
Alas, I believe there are a number of reasons why it makes perfect sense to turn our gaze to the 
experience of states and nations in South Sudan’s relative vicinity. For one, the colonial experience is 
shared by almost all African states on today’s map (Ethiopia and arguably Liberia are the lone 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
University of California Press, 2011, p. 8; in the original: “man soll Ganzheit nicht mit Vollständigkeit 
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2
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5
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exceptions) and the experience of colonialism shaped and continues to shape many aspects of 
African life, society and state. In addition, it has been argued that in contrast to the rest of the world, 
which is in the process of state consolidation, even today “*t+he vast majority of countries in Africa 
are first and foremost preoccupied with state formation”6. Effective control over territory and 
communities is still elusive for most African states, a trait that arguably sets them apart from states 
elsewhere on the globe.  
Secondly, a diverse ethnic make-up and persistent ethnic and other sub-national allegiances are a 
characteristic of virtually all African states. In contrast to states in other parts of the world that 
started off with equally heterogeneous populations, African states did not have centuries or even 
decades to integrate their citizenry and to develop a sense of national belonging. Nationalist 
movements in most African countries only predated independence by roughly a decade and 
sometimes even less. In that sense, post-colonial Africa has been a fascinating and increasingly 
bloody experiment in trying to create national citizens from scratch. The fact that borders have 
remained largely intact, i.e. in the shape of colonial administrative units, makes this even more 
intriguing and uniquely African (Latin America’s experience may at first sight seem the closest 
equivalent but given that most states gained independence from Spain in the 1820s, comparisons to 
African states whose independence dates from the 1960s would rather force the matter).  
Third, any action an individual state may consider taking is not only constrained by domestic 
considerations but also by the state system a state finds itself in. The African state system as it has 
developed over the last half century is therefore crucial to understanding the constraints that South 
Sudan faces and is likely to face. Not least because, as Alex Klein asserts for the Horn of Africa, the 
states’ porous borders “continuously crossed by people, animals, goods, and political ideas *…+ are 
wide open channels of communication that link neighbouring states in a web of mutual 
dependence”7. And it is in this sense that we will have to take a look, at least initially, at the 
European territorial nation-state as it is in some forms also instructive for our understanding of 
African nation-states. For one, all states in the world are based on the European state model, which 
is also the basis for the international state system that all contemporary states adhere to8.  
Finally, the study of the state, its evolution, rise and fall (or in Africa’s case, the preferred wording is 
‘fail’) is not only a reflection of the changing nature and environment in which states existed, it also 
sheds light on those who looked at and tried to make sense of these states and the processes of 
nationbuilding in these states at varying stages of their half century of existence. As Chabal writes: 
“The political theories that are relevant to the study of post-colonial Africa fall into distinct, largely 
chronological, categories: development, Marxist, dependency, socialist, indigenous, neo-patrimonial 
and democratic”9. While the light may be uncomfortably bright for some theoretical models which 
along with their exponents have fallen out of favour and out of fashion, reflecting on and reminding 
ourselves of our own preconceptions is, I believe, a necessary task for any academic endeavour. It is 
a truism that any thinker is by necessity a child of his or her time. Hence, the current orthodoxy in 
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the literature and (professed) practice of post-conflict statebuilding and nationbuilding, i.e. to focus 
on capacity building and empowerment of locals, justice and reconciliation, democratization and 
local government, societal cohesion and national symbolism etc.10 should not cloud our perception of 
what is actually taking place on the ground.  
This, a comparison to the reality of nation-states as they exist in Africa today, I take to be a much 
more appropriate and sensible approach for the study and evaluation of South Sudan’s statebuilding 
and nationbuilding experience than holding the latter to a standard abstracted from the West 
European experience of statehood and nationhood11 and an ideal-typical notion of the nation-state12. 
As Marx points out: “Wenn man die afrikanische Realität allein an europäischen Staatsmodellen 
misst, lassen sich die Defizite konstatieren, aber jenseits ethnozentrischer Befriedigung bleibt der 
Erkenntniswert gering”13. Thus, when speaking of African nation-states in the course of this thesis, 
the use of the term does not automatically connote the fact that African countries comply with the 
criteria necessary to satisfy theorists of European-style nation-states but that they are nation-states 
in aspiration. Hence, I fully concur with Triulzi and Ercolessi’s argument that  
Setting the standards and goals of ‘governmentability’ which Europe achieved over centuries of 
contrasts and war to postcolonial Africa fifty years after its independence is, in our view, unfair and 
misguiding. If we examine the unfolding of the state in Africa, bearing in mind the model of nation-




On the other hand, there are indeed a number of challenges for such a bottom-up approach. 
Comparing South Sudan’s statebuilding and nationbuilding experience to the overall Sub-Saharan 
African experience of postcolonial statebuilding and nationbuilding is neither coterminous with a 
search for the authentically African origins of the African and South Sudanese polity nor with the 
political convictions of its leaders. We have to acknowledge and recognize the fact that most of the 
SPLM’s leadership have spent time abroad, either in exile or as part of the campaigns to gather 
international support, and are hence influenced by conceptions of the ‘good state’ and ‘good 
governance’ that are du jour in the Western world. This point obviously also holds for many who 
have not been abroad as the presence of foreigners, NGOs as well as the increasing ease with which 
information can be accessed online (admittedly not to the same degree in all parts of South Sudan) 
mean that present-day politicians and lawmakers are not operating in a vacuum of traditional 
conceptions of rule and the state. Rather, various conceptions – traditional, modern (democratic, 
republican, etc.), amalgamates – exist parallel to each other. Hardly anybody in today’s world acts in 
isolation or ignorance of alternatives, unless they actively and vigorously choose to. 
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Moreover, the argument has been made that the attempt by developing countries to imitate 
Western institutions of governance on the surface while failing to function accordingly, what 
Pritchett et al. call “isomorphic mimicry”, is a major factor why development falls short15. This is also 
linked to the fact that “State-building – the development of international mechanisms aimed at 
addressing cases of state collapse or at shoring up failing states – is increasingly becoming the 
dominant framework for the international regulation of non-Western states”16. Nonetheless, I should 
make clear that this is not a normative undertaking that seeks to prove that the state is not the only 
form of group organization and that wants to warn against the alleged Western preoccupation of 
reconstructing the state in response to conflicts and state failure in Africa17.  
Quite the contrary, it needs to be recognized that the state and the nation-state as models and at 
least aspirational realities are here to stay: “The state is pivotal to the political future of African 
countries. Even in the most abject cases of political chaos in Africa, some institutional form of 
political and administrative organization exists which calls itself, and is recognized as, the state”18. In 
spite of reveries of a pan-African entity and a voluminous body of writing and speeches lambasting 
the failure of the nation-state to deliver the same benefits to Africans that it had done to Europeans, 
the nation-state has been the dominant paradigm for African political elites past and present and for 
the large majority of those involved in trying to build states and nations on the continent.  
Yet, some further clarifying remarks are necessary to address a certain line of thinking on African 
politics and African issues more generally. This refers in particular to the line of critique by 
postcolonial thinkers who are convinced of “the persistence of colonial forms of power and 
knowledge into the present”19. According to this reasoning, the academic production of knowledge 
of and about Africa predominantly conducted by Western scholars and institutions is part of the 
machine of (neo) colonialism that continues unabated today20. This understanding of the discursive 
formation of knowledge as an exercise of power is explicitly developed by Edward Said’s Orientalism 
according to which going back to the onset of the Enlightenment, Orientalism had become a “mode 
of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial 
bureaucracies and colonial styles” through which European culture produced the oriental ‘other’21. 
The perspective of the colonized is, in contrast, nowhere to be heard, read or seen; it is thus 
tantamount to being non-existent as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak outlined in her seminal article Can 
the Subaltern Speak? 22. These critical perspectives cannot simply be put aside and need to be 
addressed in the coming chapter on the research methods employed.  
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1.3. Research methods 
How then shall I deal with the charge that any analysis of Africa as a whole (by a European, no less) 
inevitably reeks of Eurocentric ‘othering’? For one, I do not discount the existence of discursive 
othering by Western academia and laymen and the continuing global predominance of Western 
production of knowledge. And the statement that “historians of Africa found and continue to find 
themselves in a situation in which scientific work independent of societal relations of power is 
unthinkable”23 clearly also applies to political scientists working on African issues, who ought to be 
mindful not only of their place on the globe but also of their place in the global academic power 
system. The converse view, however, that there is a genuinely African perspective on African issues 
that can be neatly juxtaposed to the Western or European perspective suffers from the same fallacy 
of othering.  
Opening myself up to the charge of stating the obvious, African views and theories of the state and 
nation exhibit a variety as large as that between different Western approaches – a binary line of 
thinking is simplistic and in the end analytically worthless24. Eurocentric perspectives, moreover, are 
no longer the exclusive domain of Western scholars and are equally present in the works of African 
academics. And to state it clearly once and for all, the objective here is not to write an intellectual 
history of African political thought since decolonization but to work out a typology of the African 
postcolonial nation-state as it has evolved and been described by thinkers from Africa, Europe, 
America, Asia and Australia. Hence, I fully agree with Bates et al.’s general contention that  
knowledge from Africa is equally as significant and persuasive as knowledge from Europe, no less – 
and no more. And knowledge produced by an African is equally as significant as that produced by a 
European, no less and no more, if it has been generated, analyzed, and assessed in ways capable of 
withstanding the analytic and methodological rigors of the author’s discipline.
25
 
The aim of the typology of the African state and nation developed in Chapters 3 and 4 as a contrast 
to the concepts of state and nation as they have been developed against the historical background of 
Western European countries and thinkers is to approach the African nation-state from afar; starting 
with a broad and general outlook on continent-wide trends and periods of post-colonial nation-state 
development and only then slowly zooming in on particular aspects of the post-colonial African 
nation-state that can with some right be generalized as typical. This summarizing and distilling 
analysis is based on a thorough if invariably incomplete reading of the existing body of academic 
writing on the African nation-state. While the typology of the African nation-state that represents the 
intermediary results of the typology is wholly of my own doing, its composite parts have been 
assembled from a wide range of prior scholarship. The second part of this undertaking diverges from 
this method in a number of crucial aspects.  
For this analysis I have employed several methods of qualitative research. First of all, much of the 
material I have scoured for information that could be utilized for the assessment of how much (if at 
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all) South Sudan fits into the typified trajectory of African post-colonial nation-statehood is second-
hand. Given the difficulties of access to many parts of the country, the substantial costs involved in 
conducting research in South Sudan, the solitary nature of this research project and the 
unfortunately well-founded danger of a resumption of violence, sources other than my own had to 
be consulted. However, in addition to academic sources, chapters 6 and 7 on the South Sudanese 
state and nation rely to a substantial degree on grey literature of varying reliability and credibility. 
Including these sources enriched the analysis so substantially as to, in my estimation, easily cancel 
out the sometimes problematic provenance.  The general method used to work with these sources is 
a critical form of document analysis that seeks to question the author’s intentions and motives26.  
A very useful tool to get information about more remote parts of South Sudan (where this was 
necessary for a fuller, more representative picture of the point I am making) are publicly available 
NGO reports about specific issues they care about (water supply, state of prisons, child marriage, 
youth development and several more) and/or specific regions, counties and even villages they 
operate in (e.g. Eastern Equatoria, Ikotos County or Aweil). A closely related type of document are 
reports by (national) development agencies such as USAID (U.S. Agency for International 
Development), GIZ (Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit) or DFID (Department for 
International Development). Furthermore, there are assessments by topical think tanks/research 
institutes with or without affiliation to national governments (Overseas Development Institute, 
Carter Center, Small Arms Survey, Rift Valley Institute, Sudd Institute, Peace Research Institute Oslo). 
Yet, there are various downsides to relying on such documents.  
For one, the very fact that they shine a light on a poorly illuminated issue or location makes it very 
hard if not impossible to corroborate their findings since oftentimes they are the only ones operating 
in a given county – part of the division of South Sudan into de facto ‘spheres of influence’ for 
different NGOs and service providers. Secondly, since many of the NGOs reporting on an issue or on 
a location are at the same time working on the issue or in the area, a conflict of interest may arise 
that can tinge or have some form of impact on the analysis. This is particularly true for aid 
organizations, both government-affiliated and NGOs, which compete in a lucrative and increasingly 
competitive market for donor funding. Even though monitoring and evaluation reports are nowadays 
often conducted by external consultants and auditors, the fact remains that collusion between an 
organization and an evaluator eager for a follow-up contract is a very real possibility. Therefore, one 
way of ascertaining the veracity or, more accurately, the probability that a given source represents a 
close enough approximation of a situation, a problem, an event, was for me to look at the 
organisation’s overall aims and objectives in relation to South Sudan. A second path was to compare 
findings with other studies (where possible), though there is also the risk that these studies partly 
copy from one another. It would have been extremely cumbersome to highlight these considerations 
every time a source of similar provenance is being referenced in the text but it played a key role in 
the process of selecting those sources that were deemed reliable enough.  
To illustrate how exactly working with the sources proceeded, I will make the process explicit by 
giving an example. There is a great paucity of public opinion surveys in South Sudan and much of the 
data has been gathered by two sources: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), both affiliated with either of the two major political parties in 
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the U.S. Seeing how the U.S. has taken a keen interest and invested substantial resources as well as 
political capital into autonomous and later independent South Sudan, it is not unreasonable to 
surmise some level of influence at least on the organisations’ research focus. Thus, for instance the 
phrasing of questions on and answers to the role of democratic values among South Sudanese 
citizens align a bit too neatly with IRI’s professed aim of fostering these very values in society. 
Impossible to verify or falsify, one way I have dealt with the inevitable grey area is by looking at other 
results that were less germane to my area of interest but that could, to some extent at least, be 
cross-checked with other sources. In the case of this particular IRI survey27, the fact that 94% of 
respondents claimed to be Christians was so clearly inconsistent with several other sources on 
denominational belonging in the country, that along with doubts about the phrasing of questions I 
have decided not to use the study throughout my thesis.  
The same if not a higher degree of caution has been directed at material published by ministries, 
committees, agencies, or other institutions affiliated with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS); 
for instance the report on the planning for the second phase of disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration for the period from 2013 onwards28. Due to the capacity deficit among members of the 
administration and the lucrative nature of such endeavours, the majority of these reports have been 
compiled and written by independent consultants, oftentimes non-South Sudanese. While it would 
be inadmissible to doubt the veracity or accuracy of these documents merely based on the fact that 
they have been written by (foreign) consultants, I do take the external nature of the expertise to be 
indicative of the lack of import and impact many of these reports, statements and even laws have 
had on political decisions and events on the ground, which is why in particular expressions of intent 
in the documents have been treated with great caution. In some cases, where this appeared to be 
both common knowledge and of relevance to my argument, the provenance of a document as well 
as its author have been made explicit, e.g. the fact that the Local Government Act has been written 
by an employee of the German GIZ.  
Contributions by South Sudanese media outlets (mostly online media for lack of access to paper 
versions with the exception of my stay in South Sudan) have been relied upon both for factual 
references (when did Minister A resign for reason Y) and for commentary and opinion pieces. The 
difficulties of dealing with (online) media sources in South Sudan are plentiful29. For one, South 
Sudan’s population has arguably the highest rate of illiteracy worldwide, which obviously limits the 
potential readership. Secondly, radio is by far the most popular news medium as internet access is 
something reserved to a small minority in the cities30, which is why I have also consulted written 
sources on the websites of popular radio stations like the UN-sponsored Radio Miraya or Radio 
Tamazuj which receives assistance from the Netherlands. 
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But even the physical daily newspapers produced in South Sudan (The Citizen, Juba Post) only reach a 
very small section of society, with the bulk being distributed in Juba and the other towns receiving a 
few hundred copies total. Whereas the online media based abroad (e.g. Sudan Tribune, operating 
from Paris) are relatively free from harassment, the freedom of the press inside the country has 
come more and more under attack during and especially after the CPA period. The low-point was 
certainly the murder of Isaiah Abraham, commentator on various websites, in December 2012. 
Intimidation is, however, commonplace as frequently documented by among others the Committee 
to Protect Journalists (CPJ). As a result, as several members of the media I spoke to confirmed, 
journalists tend to practice self-censorship to avoid harassment by security organs and refrain from 
reporting on topics ranging from the president and his family to corruption and security sector 
reform.  
Finally, arguably the greatest difference in terms of methodological approach between the typology 
of the African postcolonial nation-state and the analysis of South Sudan along the lines of the 
typology is that in October 2013, I spent about four weeks in Juba embedded as a research fellow at 
the Sudd Institute to conduct about 30 interviews with various members of the government, the 
SPLM, civil society, NGOs, international institutions, foreign diplomats and the media. While I had 
gotten in touch with some interviewees before travelling to South Sudan, the majority of the 
contacts were arranged with the help of the Sudd Institute and by snow-balling – interviewees 
recommended other people that I could speak to. These interviews (with some exceptions) followed 
the guidelines of semi-standardized problem-centred interviews31, i.e. I initially asked a fairly general 
question to get my interview partner to talk and then asked more detailed follow-up questions on 
matters that a) he or she did not mention or b) that came up during his or her initial response and 
that I wanted to know about in more detail. I generally did not intervene when the responses did not 
directly address my questions because I considered it more important to learn about what he or she 
understood as the essence of the issue at hand.  
The interviews were not recorded because I knew from previous experience working at a political 
think tank and from advice from other researchers that had worked in South Sudan and other African 
countries that placing a recording device on the table strongly inhibits the interviewee from divulging 
more sensitive information. Instead of a tape recorder, I took notes during the conversations and 
each evening went through my notes and wrote down a summary of the interview along with 
additional observations, e.g. whether a certain comment seemed forced or prompted by the fact that 
I am a European researcher asking this question. Although it would understandably be of interest to 
the readers to know the identity of each interviewee, I have decided to maintain their anonymity. In 
the tense political climate of South Sudan, being identified with opinions severely critical of the 
government or of certain individuals may have strongly negative repercussions which, in my mind, 
suffices as an explanation for withholding the names and exact titles of my interlocutors.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
What I will set out to do in the coming seven chapters in order to establish and answer the research 
questions as best I can, is to approach the issue from the general to the specific and back to the 
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general. To be more precise, the thesis will move from a historical-theoretical overview of state and 
nation in the European context to the typology of the African nation-state and then depict South 
Sudan through the prism of this typology before drawing conclusions for South Sudanese 
statebuilding and nationbuilding, the typology of the African nation-state and the study of state and 
nation more generally.  
Thus, I will start out in Chapter 2 with an overview of European concepts of the state, nation and 
nation-state that concentrates both on the historical evolution of the state and on descriptive as well 
as prescriptive theories of what the state is and ought to be like. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce, define and problematise the key concepts of state, nation and territorial nation-state but 
also to set out the arguments for why a separate typology of the postcolonial African nation-state is 
useful in addition and as a contrast to the European model.  
Chapter 3 picks up on the latter point by drawing a rough, mostly chronological historical sketch of 
postcolonial African nation-states that aims to show the conditions that steered African countries to 
the peculiar forms of state and nation that exist today. In looking at the arbitrarily drawn borders, 
systemic continuities from colonial times and ethnically heterogeneous populations, this chapter 
both establishes the necessity for a distinct continental typology and highlights the relevance of the 
territorial nation-state as the dominant aspirational model of rule in postcolonial Africa.  
Based on some of the premises developed in these two chapters, Chapter 4 presents the typology of 
the African territorial nation-state. Although state and nation are intricately linked, the two can be 
analytically disentangled which is why Chapter 4.1 discerns four constituent components of the 
typified African state whereas Chapter 4.2 depicts three components of the typified African nation. 
For the African state, these components are the hybrid quasi state, the illegitimate state, the 
privatized neopatrimonial state and the swollen centralized state. The typology of the African nation 
consists of state-driven nationbuilding in the postcolony, the resurgence of political ethnicity and the 
new exclusive nationalism. While establishing the categories for the analysis of the specific case of 
South Sudanese statebuilding and nationbuilding, 4.3 also contrasts the typology to the model of the 
European nation-state and by pointing out the similarities and differences gives backing to the 
decision to draft a typology of the African nation-state in the first place.  
Chapter 5 shifts the focus towards South Sudan and gives a brief overview over South Sudan’s 
political and social history which for most of the last two centuries was intimately tied up with the 
history of Sudan. The focus herein lies on providing some basic relevant data on the country as well 
as a grasp of the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial period leading up to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 that the reader can return to since the events of the subsequent 
period of autonomy and independence until mid-2014 will be the subject of the application of the 
typology to South Sudan.  
In Chapter 6, South Sudan’s experience in building a state is analyzed and evaluated following the 
four categories of African statehood established in Chapter 4.1, i.e. identifying based on information 
and analysis relevant to each sub-category whether and to what extent South Sudan is a hybrid quasi 
state, an illegitimate state, a privatized neopatrimonial state and a swollen centralized state and thus 
in how far South Sudan complies with or diverges from the typified African state. At the end of the 
chapter, a final section will attempt a broader comparison of South Sudanese and African statehood.   
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Chapter 7 pursues the same objective in describing nationbuilding in South Sudan in the framework 
of the typology of the African postcolonial nation from Chapter 4.2 and establishing to what extent if 
at all South Sudan’s official state nationalism, political ethnicity and politics of exclusion coincide with 
the typology of the African nation. This will be bookended by a general comparison between 
nationalism and nationbuilding in South Sudan and in the typified nation of postcolonial Africa. 
The concluding Chapter 8 will recapitulate the main findings from the comparison of African to 
European nation-states and from the comparison of South Sudan’s very recent record in 
statebuilding and nationbuilding with the typology of the postcolonial African nation-state. Thus I 
plan to show that South Sudan as a latecomer to independence follows the typological development 
in many areas yet deviates in terms of nationbuilding as the country is home to processes that are 
running parallel to each other rather than sequentially as in the typified African nation-state. Beyond 
that, possible addenda to the typology that South Sudan’s anomalous case may require will be 





2. State, nation and nation-state in European thought and history 
Approaching the newly independent state of South Sudan from the vantage point of its peers in 
postcolonial Africa cannot do without some of the core categories of state, nation and nation-state. 
These categories are essential for the understanding of the contemporary state of affairs in African 
countries because they are without exception organized in states that aspire to be nation-states. As 
the nation-state has evolved into the dominant paradigm and most sought after form of political 
territorial organization, this chapter sets out to highlight some key perspectives on its components – 
the state and the nation – as well as the composite whole. This is of great importance for the 
development of a satisfactory understanding of governance and political authority in Africa because 
it is the territorial nation-state as an ideal-typical concept that will be operationalised in the 
development of a typology of the African nation-state of the postcolonial era.  
Hence, the following three sections will seek to roughly define the concepts state (2.1), nation (2.2) 
and nation-state (2.3) based on the characteristics of the state, nation and nation-state in Europe 
where the nation-state first occurred and was first observed and described. Secondly, apart from the 
descriptive approach to what state, nation and nation-state are like, several perspectives on what 
the state, nation and nation-state ought to be like will be broached because these normative ideal-
types of state, nation and nation-state constitute, generally speaking, a blueprint for the aspiring 
African nation-states of the postcolonial era.  
2.1. The state 
In each language, the connotations of the word ‘state’ differ substantially but even when we stick to 
English there is no universally accepted definition of the state. The state being “the formula for the 
self-description of society’s political system”32, concepts and definitions of the state tend to reveal 
not only something about the phenomenological reality of the state as it exists but also about how it 
is meant to be and function. Different people have understood very different things under the label 
‘state’ depending on their times, language, ideological leanings etc. At the same time, we should be 
alert to the possibility that identical concepts of the state may be clothed in different vocabulary.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the state as follows: “the body politic as organized for supreme 
civil rule and government; the political organization which is the basis of civil government (either 
generally and abstractly, or in a particular country); hence, the supreme civil power and government 
vested in a country or nation”; or: “A body of people occupying a defined territory and organized 
under a sovereign government”33. According to the German Handwörterbuch Philosophie, the state is 
“a body politic which possesses the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence in its 
territory and which helps to impose an order enabling cooperation among citizens”34; a definition 
that owes much to the German sociologist Max Weber who, at the start of 20th century, defined the 
state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
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physical force within a given territory”35. Yet, as Weber himself recognized, this definition is far from 
universally accepted:  
Wenn wir fragen, was in der empirischen Wirklichkeit dem Gedanken ‚Staat‘ entspricht, so finden wir 
eine Unendlichkeit diffuser und diskreter menschlicher Handlungen und Duldungen, faktischer und 
rechtlich geordneter Beziehungen, teils einmaligen, teils regelmäßig wiederkehrenden Charakters, 
zusammengehalten durch eine Idee, den Glauben an tatsächlich geltende oder gelten sollende 
Normen und Herrschaftsverhältnisse von Menschen über Menschen.
36 
Hence, cognizant of this multitude of human relations and actions and forms of rule of human beings 
over other members of the same species, it is mandatory to take a look at the historical genesis of 
the state as well as at the historical genesis of thinking about the state. Theories of the state can be 
said to reach all the way back to ancient times and Greek city-states. In Republic, Plato develops the 
idea that societies are comprised of individuals that purposefully join together for mutual benefit. 
Yet, for this society to function, it requires guardians (Plato sees philosophers as best suited for the 
job) that take decisions for the whole and thus constitute the city-state37. Aristotle for whom the 
state was naturally prior to the individual likewise saw the city-state both as a creation of human 
intelligence and a natural emanation of more primitive forms of human interaction38.  
A more restrictive conception of the state, however, refutes the claim that the state is a timeless 
political entity that has existed (in admittedly changing form) from the ancients to the present and 
maintains that the state instead ought to be seen as the “historical response to a timeless 
question”39. Thus, Carl Schmitt argues that the state is a concept that is tied to a specific set of 
historical circumstances40, the age of modern stateness beginning sometime in the second half of the 
16th century as an unintended outcome of the religious civil wars that had shattered the unifying 
power of universal Christianity41 and led to the predominance of the concept of sovereignty as 
formulated in Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la république: a republic’s absolute and eternal power, 
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accountable not to the church but only to God42. Not coincidentally, Bodin’s fatherland France was 
the first embodiment of this new type of sovereign state.  
At the same time, the medieval hierarchy headed by pope and emperor was replaced by a state 
system of territorially-based equals. The evolution of the territorial state through the course of the 
15th and 17th centuries as the dominant form of political authority transformed territory into the 
foremost locus of security and protection – and thus placed the territorial state on an antagonistic 
collision course with non-territorial political actors (orders of knights, merchant guilds) with 
competing alternative loyalties and systems of finance43. This territorialisation of political authority, 
which arguably constitutes an anomaly and exception among global forms of political authority44, 
also shaped the current system of states. This system, in political science generally called the 
Westphalian state system45, is an international order in which states are the only legitimate and 
recognized actors endowed with sovereignty within a given territory, i.e. the state’s internal affairs 
are outside of the realm of interference of other actors (e.g. other states, organized religion). As the 
system lacks both a centre and a superior authority, equilibrium is established either by congresses 
or as the result of warfare46.  
Characteristic for the modern state as it evolved in Europe in the 17th and in particular in the 18th 
century was moreover that, in contrast to classical times, bourgeois civil society was no longer 
coterminous with the political dominion but stood in juxtaposition to the centralized territorial 
state47. Since religion had lost its role as the anchor of social stability, the task of reintegrating society 
was taken up by the state’s rule of law, with lawyers and jurists replacing priests as key agents of 
political legitimisation48. A key driver of further integration was moreover the regularization of 
standing armies which required higher levels of taxation and therefore a tighter grip over the 
governed49. This conception of the state as a “system of institutionalized competencies apart from 
society and outside of society’s scope of influence”50 is therefore closely linked to the rise of a class 
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of state-employees, whose loyalty, in contrast to feudal relations, was based on an impersonal salary, 
and who developed their own distinct neostoicist ethos of working for the betterment of the state51. 
The essence of the state in its European context is therefore captured in Herfried Münkler’s claim 
that “*s+tateness in the modern European sense is based on sovereignty, territoriality, and loyalty”52.  
Alongside these essentially descriptive explanations for the emergence and form of the state as it 
existed and exists today, normative and prescriptive theories of what the state ought to be like have 
multiplied since the state achieved hegemony as the preferred model of political organization. There 
is great variety amongst those modern (17th century onwards) thinkers that developed theories of 
the state as it was and as it ought to be. However, a rough divide can be said to exist between 
theories that regard the state as a safeguard, an institution that protects mankind from each other, 
and those that see the state as a joint undertaking of human beings to improve everyone’s lot.  
According to the first notion, espoused among others by Thomas Hobbes, a key rationale for a strong 
state was the necessity to protect citizens from the violence and lawlessness of the anarchical state 
of nature, which would prevail in the absence of a strong state53. Immanuel Kant, though equally in 
favour of a state charged with the enforcement of laws, based his arguments on a philosophical 
premise diametrically opposed to Hobbes’. If we accept his contention that the basis of society ought 
to be the freedom of the individual to pursue his or her happiness as long he or she does not in so 
doing impair another’s freedom to do likewise, the state’s essential role is to safeguard this freedom 
of all individuals based on universally applicable laws54.  
On the other end of the spectrum are theories of the state that are based on a social contract. John 
Locke’s concept of the state, for instance, is that men and women in the state of nature explicitly 
consent to form a body politic under one government in order to safeguard their life, wealth and 
well-being. Given the voluntary nature of the contract, citizens of such a state also have the right to 
cancel the contract and depose the government55, which makes Locke’s idea of the state the classical 
formulation of the liberal parliamentary state based on the rule of law56. Rousseau, for his part, 
argues in The Social Contract (1762) that men come together to exert the ‘general will’ (as opposed 
to the ‘will of all’) to the benefit of all, and this “passage from the state of nature to the civil state 
produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct”57.  
What this very cursory overview of some historical concepts of the modern state is meant to show is 
that the two sides of the state’s utility in providing for what Isaiah Berlin called ‘negative freedom’ 
from interference and violence and ‘positive freedom’ to attain a common goal of whatever shape 
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and form58, that these two sides can be combined in varying degrees to create, for instance, either a 
police state or a communitarian state. It is, however, of critical importance for the contrasting 
analysis of the African state that in the case of contemporary (Western) Europe, the telos of this form 
of statebuilding has been the liberal welfare state.  
All things considered then, Weber’s concise definition is, in my mind, a particularly good and suitable 
starting point for an analysis of the African state (even if only as a contrasting paradigm to realities 
on the ground) because it encapsulates the notion of the state that came to dominate first European 
international relations and eventually the entirety of international society: “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”59. 
Yet, this minimal definition is merely the starting point for further faculties a state might and ought 
and can possess as evidenced by the very small sample of positive theories of the state outline 
above. Shifting from analysis to metaphor, the modern European state in its rawest form could be 
conceived as a skeleton (territory/borders, sovereignty, army, basic state institutions) that little by 
little adds meat to the bones (democratic values, impartial judiciary, incorruptible office-holders, 
universal health care) – though the meat’s shape, colour and consistency may vary depending on the 
function the state is meant to perform (security, liberty, social rights, etc.) – so as to morph into a 
genuinely and fully-clothed modern state of a higher order.  
It is this notion of the democratic, accountable, institutionalized, territorially extended and widely 
present state that protects its citizens from external and internal sources of violence and delivers 
services as varied as education and unemployment benefits to citizens that have a say in the state’s 
working – it is this state that is seen and taken as the implicit and sometimes also the explicit 
measuring stick and ultimate destiny of statebuilding in the developing world, in particular on the 
African continent. 
2.2. The nation 
A seemingly inconspicuous definition of ‘nation’ is that it is a “community of commonality” whose 
special feature, which sets it apart from other communities, “is in the emotional investment that it 
can extract from its members and in the solidarity it can inspire”60. For a community to have such an 
emotive effect on its members it requires both objective facets of commonality like a shared 
language, history, (high) culture or territory and a subjective consciousness of these objective factors 
by the collective that constitutes the nation61. What sets a thus-defined community apart from other 
emotionally charged communities (like families, corporations, football teams) is the specific way we 
talk and debate about the community, the ‘discursive formation’ essential to the recognition of the 
nation by both members and outsiders62 in a manner akin to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family 
resemblance’.  
A fundamental divide among theories of nationalism opens up about the question of whether 
nations have existed for time immemorial or whether they are more recent constructions by political 
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and intellectual elites – a dichotomy Anthony Smith characterized as perennialist versus modernist 
conceptions63. Thus, Ernest Renan, who according to the distinction would fall in the perennialist 
camp (which others like David Brown call ‘primordialist’64), described the nation as a soul and a 
spiritual principle which formed a link between a glorious past and future: “To have common glories 
in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do 
so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation”65. 
Hence, the argument goes that “*w+herever a process of civilisation has developed, complex 
communities have evolved which believe in a common culture, origin and territory and claim self-
determination”66. Arthur Hastings likewise contends that nations, which arise out of ethnic groups 
when these develop a literary language, have existed as a category for much longer than modernists 
allow; in the case of England since about the 12th and 13th century67. Others, while agreeing with the 
contention that the nation is a creature of modernity, argue that nations are nonetheless rooted in 
antiquity in so far as they emerge from older ethnic ties, so-called pre-modern ethnie68. According to 
the (dominant) modernist conception on the other hand, nations are a fairly recent phenomenon, 
originating in Western Europe sometime in the 17th and 18th century (France, Great Britain) but only 
blossoming into a vibrant concept in the course of the 19th century before becoming the dominant 
model of political organization of territories in the 20th century and the near-exclusive ideal in the 
post-imperial post-Cold War world of the 21st century.   
An essential component of the nation’s creation is what Eric Hobsbawm in his eponymous work calls 
The Invention of Tradition. Nations, although novel occurrences in the concert of political concepts, 
portend to continuity with a select and typically glorified past (à la Renan) and “invented traditions 
*…+ use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion”69. Nations, in Homi Bhabha’s 
elegant phrasing “like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their 
horizons in the mind’s eye”70. Implicit in the idea of invention is that the idea of the nation is at its 
inception an elite concept and therefore nationalism initially equally an elite project – as, for 
instance, the rediscovery of the Italian nation by humanist writers from Dante and Petrarca to 
Machiavelli71 or Johann Gottfried Herder’s writings that stirred nationalism in late 18th century 
Germany72.  
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It is anything but a coincidence that the aforementioned forefathers of European nationalism are 
poets as language and literature play prominent roles in European nation-building. Thus, Benedict 
Anderson traces the (positive) origins of the nation to the spread of a unitary language across 
originally multilingual territories73. The main driving forces behind this process are said to be 
compulsory education, conscription and, in particular, (mass) print media that transmit the 
nationalist idea developed and propagated by prophets, leaders, parties etc. to the masses74. These 
processes are essential for any one individual to project a sense of belonging to millions of people 
that he or she has never met and will most likely never meet in person – in other words, for him or 
her to imagine a national community75.  
On the other hand, there is a strong current of thought that sees the presence of a negative ‘other’ 
against which to define the group ‘self’ as a key component of nationalism and the nation – 
something Ernst Moritz Arndt during the Napoleonic wars termed Volkshaß or popular hatred76. This 
basic idea that an external enemy increases cohesion internally goes back at least to Thucydides who 
observed the phenomenon among the Hellenic cities during the war against the Persians77. However, 
although an external enemy or cultural disparagement from without “may be a necessary condition 
for the birth of nationalism, it is not a sufficient one”78.  
Hence, the nation as it came to be conceived in Europe is an imagined community whose imagined 
commonality is based on a common past and common future, regardless of whether or not this past 
actually existed. Strengthening this bond of the national community is the juxtaposition of enemy 
‘others’ that serve as unifying glue in a common struggle. What matters greatly with regard to 
postcolonial African nations and nationalisms is that it generally took centuries for European nations 
to achieve widespread popular cohesion and approval. And, as the subsequent section on the nation-
state will emphasize, a functioning modern state and means of mass communication were vital in the 
success of the national idea. 
2.3. The territorial nation-state 
The territorial nation-state is a specific form of the state that arose, in world historical terms, very 
recently but has since become a uniquely successful model of political organization across the globe. 
Thus, the last two centuries of European history are characterized by  
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the almost universal reordering of political space from a confusing welter of empires, kingdoms, 
city‐states, protectorates and colonies into a system of nation‐states, all of which have embarked on 
‘nation‐building’ policies aimed at the diffusion of a common national identity, culture, and language.
79
  
It is an uncontested historical fact that the nation-state as a concept arose in Europe; and it was here 
that the territorial nation-state developed into the most influential political concept with a highly 
emotive capacity to stir its members into action. Johann Gottfried Herder, writing in 1784, is arguably 
the first to explicitly call for the unity of the state and a people endowed with a single national 
character while decrying the “unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of species of man and 
of nations under one sceptre”80. The Italian lawyer and politician Mancini, on the other hand, is 
credited with being the first to argue (in 1851) that each nation should form only one state81. 
The intricate relationship between nation and state (at least in the European context) is readily 
apparent in Ernest Gellner’s concept of nationalism as “primarily a principle which holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent”82. In accordance with this principle, nationalist 
political actors and movements strive to create a common body politic, voice and location for the 
national group83. Territoriality is the decisive factor that serves to conjoin nation and state and is also 
the reason why a nationalist group is by necessity also a political group with a common goal84. A core 
element of the nation-state is therefore its territoriality and – directly conjoined to territoriality – the 
centrality of borders to the state’s ability to exert control over its citizens and to define their 
identity85. The contrast to empires is captured very well by the aphorism that while empires possess 
(open, ill-defined) frontiers, nation-states possess (closed, demarcated) borders.  
A useful distinction can, however, be made between nation and nation-state: while a nation in the 
true sense of the word is a homogenous entity, consisting of people that share language, culture, 
religion, the nation-state is hardly ever homogenous86. Another critical question in this regard is 
which of the two – state or nation – has chronological and ontological primacy. While some thinkers 
like Connor argue for the primacy of the nation and national attachment because loyalty to the 
national group is both stronger and preceded loyalty the state87, the majority subscribe, like 
Reinhard, to a top-down view of the relationship between state and nation88. In Hobsbawm’s words, 
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“*n+ations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round”89. Whereas nationalism 
requires some pre-existing sense of national belonging to build upon, the process of nation-building 
is inherently political and carried out by the state and its elites (or counter-elites)90. 
Irrespective of these debates, what makes the nation-state such an attractive and promising political 
ideal is the fact that there is no comparable motivator for members of a commonwealth to 
cooperate and to sacrifice for the common good than a common national identity91. In an ideal-type 
scenario, the relationship between citizens and the state is shaped and conditioned by national 
sentiment and a feeling of allegiance to the whole92. Herfried Münkler believes that where state and 
nation “became aligned, a political order was created that in terms of social cohesion (solidarity) and 
political self-assertion to the outside was far superior to all other models of political authority”93.  
Even though the nation-state as an idealized concept arose in 19th century Europe and owes its global 
spread to European world dominance, it ironically took until decolonization in the mid-20th century 
and the demise of European imperialism for the model of the territorial nation-state to achieve 
nearly unrivalled primacy in actual world politics. And while some theorists, possibly borrowing their 
pathos from Fukuyama, have proclaimed the end of the nation-state in the near future94, the 
continued salience of the territorial nation-state as a model of political organization across the world, 
including the African continent, appears just about as certain as the continuation of ideological 
disputes after The End of History95. Democratization has raised the stakes for aspiring rulers across 
the globe and defining the national community in the territorially circumscribed states is an excellent 
avenue to power – to give but one reason for the vitality of the nation-state as a political model in 
the 21st century.  
Moreover, the parameters of a state system are largely set by historical fait accompli and by the 
system’s strongest members. Crucially, it can be argued that the existence of nation-states cannot be 
fathomed or understood without the existence of a state system comprised of nation-states. 
“International relations are not connections set up between pre-established states, which could 
maintain their sovereign power without them: they are the basis upon which the nation state exists 
at all”96. The reason why the whole of Africa (and, indeed, the world) is organized according to this 
principle is the European dominance over international affairs since roughly the mid-19th century97. 
While stronger states like Meiji Japan were in a position to pick the model of a modern state it 
wanted to implement at home, “very few of the smaller countries in Asia and Africa possessed such a 
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freedom of choice”98. That is why for the analysis of postcolonial countries in Africa, I am going to 
apply and operationalise the concept of the nation-state.  
As Schmitt wrote in the waning years of the Second World War, “*d+ie Maßstäbe, nach denen 
beurteilt wird, ob ein politisches Gebilde wirklich ‘Staat’ oder ‘staatsreif’ ist, sind eben aus der 
Normalvorstellung eines europäischen Staates abgeleitet”99. Africa’s political history since the end of 
the Second World War shows that this claim is still largely accurate. Not only in the immediate 
aftermath of independence but throughout the 50-odd years of independence (for most countries), 
the European nation-state has been the guiding principle of African governing elites. And it continues 
to inform the ambitions of the continent’s state-builders and nation-builders both local and foreign 
to the present day. The following chapter is going to substantiate this argument along a focus on the 
main developments in African postcolonial history.  
  
                                                          
98
 Osterhammel (2009), p. 900 [my translation]. 
99
 Schmitt, Carl, “Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft”, in Schmitt, Carl. Verfassungsrechtliche 
Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924 - 1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958, 
pp. 386-429, p. 390.  
32 
 
3. Overview over trends in Africa’s political and social history  
Comparing and contrasting the prototypical postcolonial African nation-state to the paradigm set out 
by its Western European paragon, it first has to be shown conclusively that African countries are 
sufficiently distinct in their internal makeup and structure so as to allow for a generalizing typology. 
Therefore, this chapter introduces several of the grand lines of historical development that have 
shaped the African continent and, so my argument, led to the particular pattern of statehood and 
nationhood that I will discuss and describe in the subsequent chapters on the African state and the 
African nation. Thence, after giving a cursory overview of Africa’s modern history in 3.1, the 
subsequent sections in 3.2 are going to engage with the evolution and trajectory of the nation-state 
and how it took root in Africa as well as look at perspectives on the nation-state in Africa. 
Furthermore, some critical aspects of the territorial nation-state’s acceptance – arbitrary frontiers, 
ethnically mixed populations, continuities in the form of governance – will be pointed out. This is 
meant to furnish both an initial grasp of the nature of the African postcolonial nation-state which will 
be dealt with in a more detailed manner in chapter 4. More importantly, though, this chapter serves 
to underline and support the contention that there is a peculiar type of African nation-state that can 
serve as a more useful comparison to statebuilding and nationbuilding efforts on the continent than 
the presently used standard derived from the Western prototype.   
3.1. From colonialism to life in the postcolony 
For a satisfactory grasp of contemporary African politics and in particular for an accurate 
understanding of African states and nations, it is in my opinion inevitable to take into account the 
thorough and often traumatic restructuring of realities that the colonial occupation and division of 
Africa wrought upon the continent’s peoples, incumbent political structures and collective groupings. 
Similarly, the demise of colonialism and the transition to the countries that today occupy the world 
map has been of crucial importance to the shape and form of African nation-states. This section will 
accordingly begin in 3.1.1 with a part on the impact of colonization and decolonization and then in 
3.1.2 present political and social organization in the postcolony at a glance.  
3.1.1. Colonization and decolonization 
The one element that unites the African continent beyond its geographical boundaries is the shared 
experience of colonization by European powers. Coastal trading posts were established in West 
Africa as early as the mid-15th century but the colonial period, the systematic colonization of Africa 
by European powers, began in earnest only around 1880100, punctuated by the Berlin Conference of 
1884/5 that legalized and regularized the contemporary scramble for African soil101 and put an end to 
the previous system of hands-off rule content with “ensuring the continuation of the traditional free-
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trading system on its coasts and its great rivers”102. Explanations for the European conquest cover a 
wide range of points of views: a classic argument sees colonialism as the result of bourgeois capitalist 
competition in the search for new markets103 and – in the case of Britain – in geostrategic 
considerations bent on protecting valuable possessions in East and South Asia104; another line of 
thinking argues that the ultimate object was national aggrandizement in a less competitive setting 
than 19th century Europe105 in order to divert the working classes’ aspirations from revolution at 
home to colonial conquest abroad106. This is contrasted with a portrayal of European publics’ attitude 
toward the colonization of Africa as absentminded indifference107, which is why some actually take 
the colonial adventure to have been an outright irrational undertaking108.  
This discussion of the origins of and motivations behind European imperialism in Africa belongs, 
however, to an intellectual enterprise whose focus of analysis is on the European state rather than 
on its African equivalent and I shall not engage with it any further. What can be said is that the 
European colonial empires in Africa, though substantial in physical area, do not compare favourably 
with other historical empires such as Rome or Spain when it comes to duration. After the treaties of 
the 1880s that partitioned Africa on paper, the partition on the ground using negotiations with local 
rulers and – increasingly – the technological superiority of machine guns, took place during the 
following decade (1891-1901)109, which included the defeat of the Mahdist state and the re-conquest 
of the Sudan by the British led by General Kitchener in 1899. The subsequent period between 1900 
and roughly the end of World War I when most of the initial resistance movements had been 
subdued has been characterized as the key moment in African colonial state-formation110.  
Yet, just as soon as ‘effective occupation’ had begun to take hold, World War I intervened, seeing 
large numbers of colonial subjects take part in and experience the horrors of fighting and lastingly 
damaging the “familiar rationale of white rule in Africa *…+ that it conferred the benefits of 
civilization”111. These effects were multiplied during World War II, which “greatly increased the 
number of Africans who were politically conscious”112 and was also the period that saw the rise of 
anti-colonial parties with a mass following especially in West Africa113. All colonial powers with the 
exception of the United Kingdom suffered the embarrassment of occupation (Britain’s East Asian 
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possessions, though, succumbed quickly to the Japanese) and the post-war world order was 
governed by the United States and the Soviet Union, two at least nominally anti-colonial 
superpowers.  
For the majority of the continent, the colonial era lasted until about 1960 when most of the British, 
French and Belgian colonies were released into independence. Forerunners had been Egypt (de jure 
1922, de facto 1952) and Sudan (1956) in Northern Africa, although Ghana’s independence in 1957 
and the 1958 All-African Peoples’ Conference in Accra provided arguably the greatest impulse for 
further decolonization across the continent114. The Portuguese possessions (1975) and white settler 
colonies in Southern Africa all followed suit until 1990 when Namibia gained independence from 
South Africa, which held its first free elections in the same year (1994) that Eritrea seceded from 
Ethiopia. The relatively short duration of Africa’s colonial period, however, had a massive impact on 
the political, social and economic, not to mention the linguistic, religious and cultural character of 
most of the continent and its people. As Crawford Young states in a succinct and much-quoted trope: 
“The colonial state in Africa lasted in most instances less than a century – a mere moment in 
historical time. Yet it totally reordered political space, social hierarchies and cleavages, and modes of 
economic production”115. 
3.1.2. Life in the postcolony – a brief overview 
The end of colonialism was at least as decisive a turning point in African history as its onslaught a 
couple of decades earlier had been, grouping subsequent events under the common header of the 
postcolonial period. The overall narrative of life in what Mbembe calls the postcolony116, i.e. a distinct 
historical entity shaped as much by colonization as by decolonization, follows a pattern whose 
roughness when zooming in on the individual country case does not tarnish its overall relevance and 
accuracy when sticking to the continental scale. Thus, loosely based on Chabal’s categorization117, 
these subsequent if overlapping stages (plus the theoretical models en vogue to explain them) are: 1) 
Pan-Africanism; 2) Modernization; 3) Dependency; 4) Cold War; 5) Structural Adjustment; 6) 
Democratization; 7) War on Terror; 8) Asia’s entry.  
In the immediate post-independence period, African intellectuals as well as some of its most 
prominent political figures saw independence from European empires as only the first step of 
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political emancipation to be superseded by a pan-African political structure118. For, “unlike any other 
continent except Australia, ‘Africa’ is a political idea as well as a geographical fact with a distinctive 
ideology: African nationalism”119. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Peter 
Nyerere of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Sekou Touré of Guinea 
were only the most well-known proponents of the idea that the small colonial units of governance 
had to be overcome to construct a continent-wide form of rule while reconstituting communalism as 
the base of political life120. What united the ethnically, linguistically and in many other facets highly 
heterogeneous inhabitants of the geographical continent to proclaim themselves as Africans was, 
paradoxically, the common yearning for independence and hence, by extension, the common 
experience of subjugation under the yoke of colonialism121. In Nyerere’s words, “colonization had 
one significant result. A sentiment was created on the African continent – a sentiment of oneness”122. 
In spite of the firm belief among some leaders like Azikiwe that an ‘African Leviathan’ was going to 
emerge123, African unity as envisioned by the pan-African movement was to be short-lived as a 
realistic option124 as in 1964 the newly founded ‘real-life Leviathan’, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), enshrined the sanctity of colonial borders. As Warner argues, “Pan Africanism failed because 
the other units in the international system valued sovereign states”125 and it could be added that 
most of the African units in this system also valued their own sovereign statehood more than the 
utopian vision of African oneness126. Imperialism’s demise and the form of decolonization imperial 
powers reluctantly agreed to unwittingly served as midwife to the present-day international order of 
nation-states127. Retention of the nation-state and retention of colonial borders were thus the two 
most important decisions taken in the liberation period. One of the results was that, in direct 
contradiction to traditional models of international relations, politics between countries in Africa was 
well-ordered (the Horn of Africa being an exception), yet domestic politics was highly unstable128. 
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The early paradigm for African rulers in these new old state-units was to follow modernization 
theory’s precepts in catching up to the industrialized world through industrialization and nation-
building: the developmental state paradigm promoted in the 1960s and 1970s129. Yet, the transition 
from dependence on the export of raw materials to a flourishing industrialized economy was not 
successful. A popular explanation for Africa’s shortcomings, in particular in the economic field, was 
found in a transposition of dependency theory that had developed in Latin America. There, 
dependency had been defined as the historically grown imbalanced structure of the world economy 
that benefits only the advanced industrialized economies and is thus “a type of international and 
internal structure which leads [countries] to under-development or more precisely to a dependent 
structure that deepens and aggravates the fundamental problems of their peoples”130. For the 
African context, this meant – according to Walter Rodney’s influential work How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (1973)131 – that the colonial powers had only sought to exploit the colonies 
for the benefit of the metropolitan state, distorting economic development (monocultures, raw 
materials but no industry), infrastructure (communications oriented toward the sea-ports) and 
politics (authoritarian command structures)132.  
In line with modernization theory, during the post-independence decades the state as an economic 
and political actor expanded massively, irrespective of the regime’s ideological leanings, crowding 
out competition in the market-place as well as at the ballot box. Offered “a cruel choice between 
rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes”133, most African states opted for growth 
and against democracy. By the early 1980s, faced with a sharp drop in commodity prices, a 
concomitant drop in export revenues, a massive hike in U.S. interest rates (1979) and with ‘rapid self-
sustained expansion’ no longer within reach, the overextended one-party-state could no longer 
service its debts and had to seek help from the World Bank which, following the 1981 Berg Report, 
made loans conditional on the state undergoing a structural adjustment programme134. In turn, 
national institutions were obliged to follow policies designed by international creditors, most notably 
the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank. 
The resulting downsizing in state apparatuses and state services along with the overall economic 
crisis on the continent led to a substantial decrease in living standards and also undermined the neo-
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patrimonial system of governance that had relied on buying off rival groups in a form of monetary 
appeasement135. The plight of sub-Saharan Africa as well as its peripheral standing in world affairs 
further intensified with the end of the Cold War as both Soviet and U.S. aid to proxy regimes dried up 
while Western aid increasingly came attached with political conditions136. One of the paradoxes of 
African development in the 21st century have been the parallel yet diverging processes of very low 
levels of integration into global trade, finance, production and communication and high levels of 
political and economic reform, generally on par with developed economies137. Thus, in tune with 
global trends, a wave of democratization swept through Africa (though losing steam in the 2000s)138 
and (re-)introduced multi-party competition across much of the continent. One unintended result 
has been a resurgence of political ethnicity and often vitriolic struggles over the politics of belonging.  
In the 2000s, several developments have triggered a resurgence of Africa in the global arena. On the 
development front, the allegedly widespread failure of African states combined with a focus on 
indigenous state-building and capacity-building, which has been explicitly spelled out in among 
others the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (to name but three), has led to a stronger 
concentration on strengthening the governing apparatuses instead of providing mere relief aid139. 
Secondly, the U.S. government’s global war on terror has contributed to a rededication of military 
resources to and strategic focus on Africa140, in particular the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa and 
Nigeria. Finally, China and India’s emergence as resource-poor economic super-powers has opened 
up Africa as a source of raw materials to the Far East, in what amounts to a renewed scramble for 
Africa, which according to Duffield marks the declining relevance of the West or at least of Western 
aid to all but the most downtrodden and desolate of countries141. The continent’s overall 
extraversion, though, has remained the same, even if France, Belgium, Portugal and the UK have 
been gradually supplanted first by the USA and Soviet Union and now also by China, India and Brazil.  
3.2. The nation-state in Africa: Colonial heritage in the postcolony  
Contemporary Africa finds itself covered with what are at least nominally European-style territorial 
nation-states but the nation-state’s ubiquity has certainly not been to everyone’s delight. The 
relevance of discussing the nation-state in its specifically African context becomes apparent when 
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considering the large body of writing and thought that is dedicated to blaming the introduction of 
the nation-state for the failure of contemporary African countries to deliver many of the benefits 
that the ideal-typical European nation-state promises. This is of great importance for the typology of 
the African nation-state because it highlights and illustrates the expectations, hopes and fears that 
were associated with and projected onto the nation-state in postcolonial Africa.  
In recent years, there has been some debate about whether Africa’s adoption of the nation-state 
preceded the continent’s imperial conquest. The classical conception of pre-colonial African political 
organization is that of primitive states or stateless societies142, small in size and exhibiting little 
centralized authority143. A view predicated on the belief that “in Africa *…+ there was no pre-colonial 
tradition of statehood”144. The counterargument put forward is that at least some pre-colonial states 
were politically and economically strong enough to be deemed the equal of contemporary sovereign 
European states145. It is this line of thinking that informed the intellectual current of the Ibadan 
school of African historiography that treats the colonial period as a mere interlude while 
accentuating the long line of continuities between the present and pre-colonial times146. Thus, 
variations in the post-independence fate of intermediary institutions of governance, primarily chiefs 
and tribal leaders, “are attributable in very large part to preexisting forms of political authority and 
other factors external to the colonial state, such as lineage structure, land tenure relations, and 
religion”147. 
A more accurate account of the evolution of political authority and statehood in Africa appears to be 
the recognition that states clearly existed in pre-colonial Africa but that these were overwhelmingly 
weak states148. These pre-colonial states did not reflect the model of the Westphalian nation-state 
and their weakness and inability to protect their inhabitants against the European intruders 
continues to impact present-day state capacity149. Hence, it is beyond doubt that the origins of the 
modern African territorial nation-states lie in the colonial period: “Despite the great variety of 
societies, cultures, languages, religions, forms of commerce and production, and indigenous political 
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structures that existed in the precolonial and colonial eras, the process of de-colonization produced a 
single format – the Western territorial state”150. 
Continuing ties to the former colonial power played a significant role in perpetuating the incumbent 
state order. Oftentimes, senior colonial officers (including in the armed forces) continued on in their 
posts151 and in many parts of what came to be known, derisively, as Françafrique, the French 5th 
Republic’s institutional design was simply imposed on the newly independent states that 
surrendered control over monetary policy, external economic relations and defence to the Elysée152. 
In a kind of vicious circle, at independence there were few Africans skilled and trained in the running 
of a country since the colonists had deliberately kept them out of state administrations153, and the 
resulting lack of capacity and weakness of the state fed into the continuing reliance on the former 
masters154.  
Alas, the failure of the Pan-African dream to materialize and leave an imprint on political realities on 
the continent is not only grounded in the independence generation’s political leaders’ parochial 
interests and lack of a vision that went beyond the nation-state. To some extent, the nation-state 
was bequeathed upon Africa because it suited the established notions of political organization 
prevalent among the exiting colonial rulers155. In fact, most of the states that came into being as a 
result of decolonization did and do not meet the criteria for statehood that were part of international 
law in the 1930s during the era of the League of Nations, i.e. effective government with centralized 
institutions156. During the wave of decolonization, in contrast, the United Nations lent its support to 
an immediate end to colonialism which included a provision that “*i+nadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence”157. Thus, the quick success of anti-colonial movements and the rushed nature of 
decolonization also had an impact as none of the new leaders was forced to seek out alternatives to 
the metropolitan nation-state model158. Therefore, African states arguably “have been obliged to 
adopt the model of the sovereign, territorial state (with the corollary that every state must evolve 
into a nation-state) as the exclusive form of organization to order their political lives”159.  
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As the nation-state as the template for political organization in postcolonial Africa is thus a given, the 
following four sections will investigate more closely how and to what extent the existing nation-
states in Africa are shaped and beholden to the heritage of the colonial states they succeeded. In 
3.2.1 the focus will be on principled criticism of the imposition of nation-states on African societies, 
subsequently 3.2.2 discusses the value or plight of colonial territorial boundaries, 3.2.3 analyses the 
continuities of the political system from colonial to post-colonial regimes and 3.2.4 questions the 
idea of African states as remote and weak ‘Berlinist’ states.  
3.2.1. The nation-state in Africa: the Black Man’s Burden? 
There is a strand of thought epitomized by Basil Davidson’s aptly named book The Black Man’s 
Burden160 that argues that the nation-state has been a harbinger of doom and downfall for African 
societies that have suffered due to its alien and ill-fitting institutional and normative straitjacket161. 
Regardless of where one stands on the matter of choice or inevitability, the fact that African leaders 
upon independence retained and embraced the status quo of the territorial nation-state model has 
been a major bone of contention in academia and beyond. This strand of thought is represented by 
the claim that “the vast majority of national trajectories in Africa starkly reflect the limits on the 
nation-state’s ability to deliver the prosperity and freedom that it was thought to embody in the 
heyday of decolonisation”162.  
The territorial nation-state has been characterized as a “prison house” and “*t+he West’s cruelest 
joke at the expense of Africa”163. In a somewhat circular argumentation, some blame the exogenous 
origin, the lack of ‘Africanness’ of the African state for its lack of legitimacy164 and see the state as “a 
purely imported product, a pale imitation of the diametrically opposite European political and social 
systems, a foreign body”165 whose imported institutions will lead to a popular backlash by those 
opposed to alien institutions166. This argument does not seem very convincing in and by itself. After 
all, the nation-state was, initially at least, an alien introduction wherever it was introduced and it is 
far from certain that African societies in a counterfactual universe without any nation-states would 
be more peaceful, prosperous and stable than in the actual world.  
The postcolonial nation-state’s critics vary, however, in their analyses of why and how the nation-
state is detrimental to African countries and societies. The most famous articulation of the idea that 
the nation-state in Africa failed (and thereby failed Africans) is Basil Davidson’s argument that 
“acceptance of the post-colonial nation-state meant acceptance of the legacy of the colonial 
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partition, and of the moral and political practices of colonial rule in its institutional dimensions”167. 
This quote embodies two of the main facets of the African nation-state that have been instrumental 
in shaping the political and societal structures in the postcolony: a) the imposition of colonial borders 
on disparate peoples and ethnic groups, and b) continuities between the state structure and form of 
governance from colonial to postcolonial rulers. These two will be looked at in more detail because 
they provide deep insights into the makeup of African nation-states in the independence period.  
3.2.2. Colonial boundaries: obstacle or asset to state-building? 
The fixed territoriality of today’s states goes counter to the African pre-colonial experience where 
control over people was much more crucial than control over territory. As population density was 
low, wars were fought “to capture people and treasure, not land which was available to all”168. 
People were highly mobile and their mobility ensured accountability among political leaders as 
populations could simply move on to a different location if pressed too hard by the rulers169. Pre-
colonial Africa was thus, in the words of Igor Kopytoff, a “frontier continent”170. As a consequence, 
rule and authority lacked the stringent focus on territoriality so central to European history and 
state-making.  
Colonial border-making forever changed this state of affairs as it introduced to Africa an entirely new 
principle of political organization171, the principle of the territorial nation-state. Decolonization did 
not alter the territorial status quo of colonial subdivision172 as colonial borders that were often only 
ill-defined on the ground were appropriated, reassessed and refined by post-colonial 
governments173. Then in 1964, the OAU decreed that “all Member States pledge themselves to 
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”174. As a result, Africa’s 
map “was entirely constructed by colonial cartography, thus bearing the original sin of alien origin 
and artificiality”175. Up until South Sudan’s secession from the North in July 2011, Eritrea’s secession 
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from Ethiopia in 1994 had been the only example (apart from minor border corrections) of a 
successful and internationally recognized redrawing of Africa’s political map176.  
Hence, the classic critique of African borders is to bemoan the borders’ artificiality as a major reason 
for the African state’s present-day lack of cohesion and politico-economic success in state-building 
and nationbuilding177. The political boundaries adopted by postcolonial states were in reality the 
ossified expression of European and not African interests178, often reflected the short-term rationale 
of European politicians in the late 19th century and were characterized by “the high degree of 
geographical ignorance on the part of negotiators and their consequent desire to avoid ambiguity by 
defining lines capable of objective survey”179.  
Colonialism thus forcibly brought people of different ethnic, political and religious affiliations 
together to form a state and forge a common sense of citizenship in an arbitrarily circumscribed 
territory180. This fact that the inherited borders cut across traditional group entities such as the Hausa 
or across natural resources claimed by several states as in the case of Mali and Burkina Faso has been 
widely lamented181 because African borders “distort processes of political development and divide 
communities that otherwise would be organically constituted”182. While some have challenged the 
artificiality hypothesis on the grounds that the colonial intruders often did take into account the 
ethnic and demographic facts en place183, the main opposition to this line of thinking arises from the 
claim that, at the end of the day, all borders whether in Africa or Europe are artificial184.  
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Moreover, it can be considered rational for African post-colonial governments to defend the 
territorial status quo “*s+ince any boundary change could undermine their precarious internal 
structure, and perhaps even threaten their existence as states”185. In Africa, as a rule states were 
created inside boundaries that had existed prior to the states’ existence and in the absence of pre-
colonial antecedents these borders therefore constitute the state’s sole raison d’être186. Defending 
these boundaries has become a primary occupation for African governments not in spite but because 
of their arbitrariness. Hence, the fact that states do or did not possess full control over borders and 
the people that cross them does not automatically mean that these same borders are irrelevant to 
state formation. 
In fact, the often artificial boundaries have typically been an asset rather than an obstacle to 
effective statebuilding in post-colonial Africa187, with the result that while in “the precolonial era, 
population distributions yielded boundaries *…i+n the modern era, boundaries define a people”188. 
Whereas borders were usually determined by force and thus in the sense arbitrary that local 
populations’ wishes were not a priority, the difference with “African borders is that they did not 
enshrine the balance of power a posteriori but determined it a priori”189. Later changes to power 
relations after the cut-off date of independence would not be reflected in the size and shape of 
African states. Therefore, while there have been a small number of secessionist movements – 
Katanga in the Congo, Biafra in Nigeria190, Casamance in Senegal, Anjouan in the Comoros, 
Somaliland191 and Puntland in Somalia and, most recently, Azawad in Mali – these have been 
unsuccessful (so far) not least because of the unwillingness of fellow African governments to 
recognize them for fear of repercussions for their own countries.  
In spite of these debates, borders rarely take centre stage as the only or prime reason for African 
nation-states’ failings. Urban bourgeois elites who benefited from control over international borders 
were juxtaposed to a rural majority that typically regarded borders (and, in fact, the state itself) as 
irrelevant192. As a consequence borders have in practice been widely ignored in the post-
independence years193. Although it bears mentioning that Africa is not only the most mobile 
continent but also “has the ignominious distinction of being home to the largest number of 
involuntary migrants” as Africa leads the world in refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)194. 
The persistence of colonial boundaries is, of course, a very critical component of the evolution of 
contemporary forms of political authority and organization in Africa and – as will be shown in the 
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typology in the subsequent chapters – in itself triggered and shaped several characteristic features of 
African nation-states like their extraversion, the gatekeeper status, the tendency to use proxy forces 
in neighbouring states and the prevalence of armed non-state actors to name but a few. 
3.2.3. Continuity of the political system: new states or new regimes?  
At least as important as boundaries, however, were and are continuities in the political system of 
governance and rule between colonial and postcolonial countries. The decisive flaw of the 
postcolonial period, as Mkandawire rightly points out, “is not so much that the nationalists accepted 
existing colonial borders, but rather that this acceptance gave individual states carte blanche in terms 
of what they could do to their citizens within these borders”195. Therefore, we shall look at the type 
of political system postcolonial states inherited at independence and how it has evolved since then in 
order to gain first insights into the African nation-state’s characteristic patterns of rule. 
The end of colonialism was accompanied by grand hopes of a brighter tomorrow, including 
expectations of a break in how the state acted and interacted with its citizens. Alas, there is a long 
tradition of arguing that de-colonization in Africa has not led to the creation of new states but has 
merely meant a change of regime and the re-emergence of features of the colonial state under new 
guises196. According to this strand of thought, “*t+he basis of the post-colonial state in Africa is the 
colonial state”197. Continuity with the colonial state is particularly troubling considering that the 
colonial state set up by European powers did not resemble the democratic and progressive 
pretensions of the metropolitan states of, say, France, the United Kingdom or Belgium. Instead, the 
colonial state was based on “a characteristic neo-traditionalist ideology of patriarchal bureaucratic 
authoritarianism”198. Creating states was clearly not the object of colonial rule. The fact that colonial 
states were not constructed as alter egos of the metropolitan state was thus grounded in the very 
foundations of the domineering, racialist-supremacist paradigm of colonialism itself199, which laid the 
groundwork for the “gubernatorial, territorial, bureaucratic, paternalist-educational, caste-like” 
nature of the postcolonial state200.  
Thence, state bureaucracies expanded massively after independence and established a robust 
bureaucratic autocracy in the newly independent state201, which just “like the colonial state before it, 
turns on the calculus of strength”202. The colonial state had been based on the circular premise of 
exacting submission from its citizens solely for the sake of attaining submission; the postcolonial 
state employed essentially the same methods of submission that the colonial state had introduced 
and thus came to embody the colonial legacy of despotism203. Even though many recognized the 
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need for a substantive restructuring of the state204, the emerging political class dominated by 
nationalist leaders was keen to protect the colonial legacy by “using the enormous authoritarian 
structures of the state to appropriate economic gains for themselves”205  and generally acting like “a 
predatory other for the citizen”206. This endeavour was facilitated by the fact that national 
bureaucracies were taken over largely by officials with experience in the incumbent administration, 
“the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, those with the unique expertise of rule, learned at the colonialists’ 
office desks”207. 
For parts of African societies, however, the very fact that African states were built on the European 
colonial model made them illegitimate208. By agitating against the state as an external imposition, 
nationalist anti-colonial movements had thereby in the eyes of many citizens ostracized the state per 
se209; the African state not only inherited the colonial state’s flaws but also the resentment its 
subjects felt toward the state qua state210. This lack of legitimacy and accountability was 
compounded by the mostly peaceful colonial handover which meant that states did not emerge out 
of a contestation with society211 and by liberation leaders who failed to include the wider population 
and thus gain legitimacy in deciding the shape and form of the new states212. Citizens’ alienation was 
compounded as the new leadership concomitantly rejected African traditions because for them 
“*l+iberation from colonial rule *…+ had to go hand in hand with liberation from whatever was or 
seemed to be ‘traditional’”213.  
3.2.4. Strong or Berlinist states? 
In addition to the legacy of authoritarian rule, the dominant position of the state in relation to 
society equally dates from colonial times214 when the state “managed in a short time to assert a 
powerful hold on subject society and to smash its resistance”215. Regardless of their political leanings, 
independence leaders picked up the statism of colonial pedigree “for its obvious utility in 
consolidating power and accumulating personal wealth”216. On the other side, there is a school of 
thought which acknowledges that the African colonial state may have been ruthless, violent and 
authoritarian, yet was only able to demonstrate its ruthlessness, violence and authoritarianism to the 
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minority of Africans whose lives the state actually reached and touched217: “Africa was systematically 
conquered but not so systematically ruled”218.  
Going back to the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 that divided the continent among European powers, it 
was deemed sufficient for European states to stake a claim over a given territory, exert physical 
control over the capital – typically located at or near the coast for better communications with the 
metropolitan state – and otherwise merely promise to eventually extend rule to the hinterland. This 
minimalist governance strategy that Kieh called ‘Berlinist’219 in honour of the infamous gathering 
persisted after independence because “empires bequeathed underdeveloped state institutions and a 
faith in planning to the independent African rulers”220. Faced with the failure of these institutions, 
now manned by local elites, to improve their livelihoods, many Africans “have detached themselves 
from the Berlinist state and ostracized the state from their lives”221. Crucially, this disdain for the 
state could be found both in states that were notionally strong, e.g. imperial Ethiopia, or weak and 
‘Berlinist’ like, for instance, Chad.   
3.3. Colonial heritage and the African territorial nation-state – a short summary 
In spite of misgivings over its origins and the shape it has taken, today there is only a minority of 
political thinkers and academics that harbour serious designs of overcoming the territorial nation-
state as presently constituted. Wherever one stands on the question of continuities, it is worth 
remembering that de-colonization across most of the continent occurred half a century ago and 
hence some forms of continuities, for example in terms of personnel or in personal memories, are 
highly unlikely to still be a major factor today. “New historical experience reshapes social memory 
and begins to obscure the colonial past”222. Africans have appropriated and effectively hybridized the 
institutions inherited from the colonial state and this process of endogenisation has Africanized the 
state223. The reasons for the state’s shortcomings must therefore be sought elsewhere as the 
question of guilt and responsibility for present-day calamities slowly but surely becomes moot224.  
What is, however, apparent is that several of the key characteristics of the African nation-state 
originated in and hail from the colonial period and the peculiar African form of decolonization which 
maintained intact not only the territorial grid of colonial times but also many of its institutions and 
ways of interaction between state and citizens or, rather, rulers and ruled. The centralization of 
authority, the authoritarian neglect for popular accountability and the lack of reach beyond the 
capital are all part of the typified African postcolonial territorial nation-state. Hence, while I fully 
agree with the assessment that “*t+he ‘national order of things’ should neither be taken as natural 
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nor dismissed as an artificial imposition on Africa”225, what matters more is that this ‘national order 
of things’ has become the norm in Africa over the past half century. Regardless of whether they like it 
or not, Africans have had to come to terms with the fact that “we in Africa, too, have become 
offshoots of the Western political heritage, even though our roots lie in a different soil”226. Given the 
length of time that has elapsed since most colonies became independent the territorial nation-states 
on the African continent have since then developed their own idiosyncratic features that will be 
depicted in the coming chapters.  
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4. Typology of the African nation-state 
Building on the groundwork laid in the preceding chapter on some of the overarching themes of 
post-colonial African history, this chapter has the object of developing a typology of the African 
nation-state based on a varied and critical reading of previous analyses and characterizations of sub-
Saharan African countries and their development in the five-plus decades since independence from 
colonial rule. The nation-state may be a composite construct but it is analytically possible to 
disentangle the components focusing on the construction of the state and on the building of a nation 
– even if the two are meant to or actually do influence each other in real life. Since the conceptual 
idea of this investigative undertaking is to develop a comparative framework and measuring stick for 
the analysis of South Sudan’s statebuilding and nationbuilding record, such an approach has the 
advantage of circumventing the dominance of the prototypical nation-state of (Western) European 
pedigree – even if admittedly many of the academics that have come up with theories of the African 
nation-state are from the West or work at Western universities227. Furthermore, the types of the 
state and nation will emanate from South Sudan’s continental peers (so to speak) and thus allow for 
more intricate conceptual and diachronic comparisons.  
Those theories and concepts that I have taken to be most representative and accurate in their 
depiction, analysis and explanation of certain aspects of postcolonial African statehood and 
nationhood have been distilled from a larger offering. In what has been a crucial step in the evolution 
of this typology, several of the main themes have been combined into composite characterizations 
where this made sense due to the proximity and/or interrelatedness of the concepts. Thence, this 
typology is divided into two separate sections: 4.1 is going to depict the nature of the postcolonial 
African state whereas 4.2 will delve into the nature of the postcolonial African nation. 4.3 will then 
juxtapose the typology of the African nation-state to the model of the European nation-state before 
the categories are applied to the case of South Sudan in the subsequent chapters. Prior to all three, 
however, a brief excursus will be devoted to debating and questioning the utility of the failed or 
failing state concept for an analysis of the African nation-state. 
Excursus: The failure of the failed state  
Analyzing and discussing the African nation-state, it is impossible to avoid the strand of thinking 
about the African state that centres on the idea of state failure. As I am going to argue, the concept 
of the failed state is not a very useful tool to understanding and grasping political realities in 
contemporary Africa and with its binary logic fails to yield insights that a comparative typology of the 
African nation-state permits. State failure is understood as the state’s failure to deliver positive 
political goods to its citizens, especially security but also political participation, property rights, rule 
of law and social services228; failed states are therefore “those where the government cannot or will 
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not deliver core functions to the majority of its people”229. The concept of state failure is moreover 
predicated on the fact that as a result of external and internal pressures – structural adjustment, 
corruption, disaffection with lack of democracy and ethnic mobilization – the state has lost control 
over the economic and the political space230 and centrifugal forces have been strengthened to such 
an extent as to fundamentally devalue the state as a place of political decision-making231. The end of 
the Cold War in many cases hastened a decline of state institutions by removing political and 
especially financial backing supplied by the two superpowers232.  
Addressing the failed/failing state hypothesis is imperative because it has transcended academic 
discourse and strongly influences the rationale and actual policy-making of several Western countries 
(led by the United States) towards the developing world and, in particular, state failure’s mother-
ship: Africa. This focus is epitomized by a series of CIA-commissioned reports by the State Failure 
Task Force from 1995 onwards233. The 2000 report which contained a specific ‘Sub-Saharan Africa 
Model’ of failing states asserted that “*t]he proportion of African countries experiencing some form 
of state failure was higher in the mid-1990s than it was at any other time in the post-colonial era”234. 
Others have asserted that “[t]here is hardly a low-income country that does not face the possibility 
of failure”235, which, being low-income, would encompass the vast majority of African states236.  
The failed state hypothesis can also serve as empirical backing to an appeal for American 
imperialism237. According to this argument, when failed states pose a major threat to stability, in 
Africa’s case for instance as safe havens for terrorists, the West – the United States in particular – can 
no longer afford to “refuse to impose their own institutions on disorderly ones”238. Similarly, the 
ever-growing literature on nation-building, from the RAND corporation’s manual to Francis 
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Fukuyama’s edited volumes, apply their more or less technocratic proposals and remedies not only 
to the two American military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan but also to the many African states 
diagnosed with state failure239.  
There are, however, major difficulties with the failed state concept and its analytic utility. Milliken 
and Krause claim that expectations of African state performance were unrealistic and naïve and the 
present dismay with the state of the African state should be seen in the light of disappointed hopes: 
“what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive, developmental state that 
sustained generations of academics, activists and policy-makers, than any real existing state”240. 
Likewise, Bilgin and Morton argue that by “presenting the experience of developing countries as 
deviations from the norm does not only reinforce commonly held assumptions about ‘ideal’ 
statehood but also inhibits reflection on the binary opposition of ‘failed’ versus ‘successful’ states”241. 
This holds with added force because it is difficult to find fault with the assessment that “now in the 
fourth decade of African independence *…+ it is somewhat naïve to think that the modern, 
Westphalian and Weberian state is somehow going to emerge in many parts of Africa”242.  
In my mind, the most damning aspect of the failed state paradigm is the fact that measuring African 
states against a standard of state failure does not add to our understanding of the way political 
authority is exercised and organized in African states. This is certainly true of theoretical models that 
work with a binary prism that sees and treats states as either failed/collapsed or functioning/not-
failed but it also holds for more subtle versions. Rotberg, for instance, allows for the possibility that 
states may fail in some aspects of statehood but deliver in others; state failure therefore ought to be 
analysed on a continuum ranging from strong to weak to failing to collapsed states243. However, such 
an understanding of state failure is neither helpful nor necessary because instead of treating the 
continuum as a downward slope towards decay and ultimate demise, the African state can more 
gainfully be looked at along a continuum of different characteristics that it actually exhibits. Rather 
than focusing ex negativo on those characteristics that the state does not possess based on a 
comparison that “contrasts African states to a static, ahistorical definition of the state based on 
exclusively European values customs, practices, organisation and structures”244, a critical typology of 
the African nation-state promises to shed a much more nuanced light on the deficiencies but also the 
positive facets of present-day African countries. 
Hence, I am now going to turn to the typology of the African nation-state – an enterprise that is 
among other things designed as a refutation of the failed state paradigm.  
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4.1. Nature of the postcolonial African state: the deficient state 
In the name of constructing theories or models as well as in the name of making a name for herself 
many an academic has handpicked or invented an attribute that serves as a prefix to the African 
state. In fact, the list of attributes (‘swollen’, ‘juridical’, ‘neopatrimonial’, ‘criminal’ to name but a 
few) is so long that the act of complaining about the multitude of adjectives has itself become a 
cliché of academic introductions to the study of the African state245. The terminological confusion is 
further increased when one author characterizes African states as both strong (a functioning police 
state) and weak (an inefficient bureaucracy)246 while another describes the African state as “both 
rational and absurd, violent and powerless”247. And this is before we include anthropological 
conceptions of the ‘imagined state’ where – building on Bourdieu’s ideas in a Theory of Practice248 – 
the state is presented as a wholly constructed entity whose essence differs according to the 
perspective – local, national, transnational; peasant, middle class, elite – of those that speak of ‘the 
state’249.  
At second glance, however, the varied analytical terms no longer seem that different altogether. One 
thing these characterizations have in common is that they all position the African state somewhere 
on a downward slope from state weakness over state decay to state failure: “The record of the 
independent African state has been abominable. It has tolerated little freedom, grossly violated 
human rights, applied excessive force, encouraged ethnic and regional divisions, and redistributed 
wealth from the African masses to a limited domestic and international elite”250. As Robert Fatton Jr. 
observed in a strident critique, African studies in the post-war era, in spite of great ideological and 
intellectual rifts, did not “move beyond the talismatic concept of the ‘soft’ or non-institutionalized 
state”251. In other words, they are theories, models, ideas of décadence. African states have clearly 
not lived up to the standards of a successful state implicitly or explicitly posited by its judges.  
Reconstructing (or constructing) the African postcolonial state with theoretical tissue of different 
texture and colour will therefore be the task of the following sections that make up the typology. It 
starts in 4.1.1 with the hybrid quasi state that lacks different forms of sovereignty and has to 
compete with various non-state actors and then turns in 4.1.2 to the illegitimate, i.e. undemocratic 
and non-delivering state. Section 4.1.3 addresses the privatized neo-patrimonial state structure 
before 4.1.4 discusses the swollen centralized state.  
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4.1.1. The hybrid quasi state 
The hybrid quasi state is a composite construction of two perspectives on the same aspect of 
statehood: provision of security and maintenance of a monopoly of violence on a state’s territory by 
that state’s government and recognition of that monopoly of legitimate use of violence by other 
actors both international and domestic. Whereas the idea of the quasi state focuses more on the 
inability of African states to exert control over territories that are nominally theirs, the notion of the 
hybrid state seeks to address the presence of various alternative non-state actors of violence on said 
territory. Yet, both point to the African postcolonial state’s inability to establish effective control. The 
following sections 4.1.1.1 on the quasi state and 4.1.1.2 on the hybrid state are meant to highlight 
and substantiate the idea that the hybrid quasi state is a prevalent feature of African states after 
decolonization.  
4.1.1.1. The quasi state - a state in name only 
The basis of the modern state is that it is sovereign, i.e. that the state is the only legitimate authority 
on its own soil and recognized as such by actors within and without. However, over the last two 
decades the concept of state sovereignty has come under assault and much ink has been spilled on 
the issue as the end of the Cold War has dealt a major blow to the principle of non-interference in a 
state’s domestic affairs. The concept of the quasi state, a term coined by Robert Jackson252, 
postulates that most African states in fact rely mostly on the sovereignty granted to them by the 
international system. Quasi states are not apt to physically uphold the monopoly of violence against 
external aggression and largely lack domestic sovereignty altogether. Since African states do not fulfil 
the protective functions of a state, on the continent “sovereignty is an international right not of 
peoples but of rulers – their negative freedom from external intervention”253. African states stand at 
the centre of the debate over the changing nature of sovereignty as evidenced by the African Union 
which explicitly disavows the strict understanding of state sovereignty espoused by its predecessor, 
the Organization of African Unity, and endorses a “strong shift away from the principle of non-
interference to the principle of non indifference”254.  
The theoretical concept of the quasi state likewise hinges on a critique of state sovereignty as it is 
interpreted on the African continent. Disentangling the concept of state sovereignty, it can be said to 
consist of international sovereignty, Westphalian and domestic sovereignty, which, in an ideal-type 
state, should mutually reinforce each other255. Therefore, the question to be asked with regard to the 
African state is to what extent it possesses either of these forms of sovereignty: the ability to defend 
itself against external aggression and interference (international sovereignty), recognition by the 
international system as the sole legitimate source of violence on its territory (Westphalian 
sovereignty) and internal control over and the ability to reach and protect its citizens throughout its 
territory (domestic sovereignty).  
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Postcolonial African states inter alia lacked and still lack domestic sovereignty, i.e. they do not have 
control over their territories, fail to protect their citizens and are effectively unable to defend 
themselves against potential attacks from the outside. The sovereignty accorded by outside actors 
has been identified as the primary cause for this state of affairs and the ‘original sin’ of African 
statehood256. These quasi states are states in name only, kept afloat solely by the global powers’ 
unwillingness to consent to their demise257. “They are not allowed to disappear juridically – even if 
for all intents and purposes they have already fallen or been pulled down in fact”258. As the 
international environment has been, for the most part, highly inimical to changes to the territorial 
status quo, secessions or border changes have been extremely rare since de-colonization259. 
Precolonial Africa, in contrast, had been akin to medieval Europe in possessing a state system 
without fiction, meaning that if you couldn’t physically control an area you laid claim to, no other 
member of the system would uphold your claim against a challenger capable of sustaining his claim 
by force260. A good example of the safety-net that more powerful states provide to their weaker 
African brethren261 is the case of Sierra Leone where “[s]tronger state reluctance to permit disorder 
ensures nominal support for territorial integrity”262.  
In fact, a trade-off can be said to exist in postcolonial African states between the dual efforts at 
maintaining international and domestic sovereignty. Bangoura makes the case that the postcolonial 
state’s international sovereignty is compromised by the fact that the monopoly of violence does not 
rest with the state but with those in possession of political power and thus serves the purpose of 
maintaining domestic sovereignty to the detriment of the state’s capacity to defend itself against 
external threats263. Additionally, the inability to police their borders also poses a security threat to 
African states as not only nomadic tribes like the Tuareg or Massai but also refugees, migrant 
workers, smugglers and guerrilla fighters are able to ignore and cross borders largely unimpeded264. 
Given this mutual sense that one’s borders and territory cannot be properly protected from outside 
attack, it is not a coincidence that inter-state conflict in Africa has only very rarely resulted in direct 
military confrontation but has more typically taken the form of support for opposition or rebel 
movements in the respective country265. And in those few instances where inter-state wars have 
been fought, for instance between Tanzania and Uganda, territorial conquest has not been the aim.  
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Another component of the quasi-stateness and the lack of sovereignty of the postcolonial African 
state is that these states’ leaders recognize and are aware of their lack of domestic as well as genuine 
international sovereignty. The most common remedy sought to rectify the state’s sovereignty deficit 
is, however, not substantive reform but exercises in public relations and make-believe. What gives 
credence to and substantiates the claim to stateness in the absence of substantial facets of 
statehood are performative acts of statehood. Inventing and celebrating ceremonies, rituals and 
other public spectacles are all part of shaping the state’s image266. “Military parades, custom checks, 
tax collections, national press conferences are examples of actions – or performativity – that help 
reify ‘stateness’. States that are able to perform these everyday attributes of stateness are 
considered solid, strong, substantial states”267. However, such ceremonies and performative acts can 
also backfire. On the 50th anniversary of Benin’s independence from France, a power cut interrupted 
the official parade, which triggered widespread ridicule on the streets and in the press268.  
As states and regimes rely on a continued interpretation of sovereignty in their favour, i.e. a 
continued ascription of statehood, states have learned to simulate sovereignty for the sake of 
survival269. As shown above, the failed state discourse has become so influential as to directly impact 
actions by governments both in the West and in Africa. African leaders therefore ascribe great 
importance to fulfilling the functions deemed characteristic of a ‘proper’ state by the dominant 
discourse and, if they are unable to, take to a ‘politics of pretending’: “the model of the modern 
state, though being far from an actual description of how these states really are, still profoundly 
shapes them, both because their formal institutions are based on this model and because they must 
strive to emulate this model (or at least pretend to do so)”270.  
The overall lack of substantive physical control over state territory is compounded and made 
apparent by the presence of alternative actors and sources of violence and – in some rare cases – 
alternative actors and sources of security.  
4.1.1.2. The hybrid state: informal non-state actors, non-state spaces 
In the African setting, the hybridity of the state in many areas of life – both territorially and 
thematically – is a phenomenon of postcolonial statehood because “a greater proportion of Africans 
are now experiencing political life with no minimally viable state presence”271. Thus, it is crucial to 
look at the realities of power-relations and to discern the actual places where authority is being 
exercised as well as who is exercising it over whom. The characteristic hybridity of African states 
consists in the typically large and diverse group of informal actors of violence that exist alongside the 
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formal state272. On a territorial level, state power and state authority vary according to location. 
Relatively privileged areas where the state is present are connected by corridors of very limited state 
presence where a kaleidoscope of actors, institutions and jurisdictions vie for control: armed gangs, 
local communities, irregular soldiers, militias, paramilitary forces273.  
Due to the weakness of post-independence states, ‘deterritorialisation’ is taking place in 
contemporary Africa as “authority in Africa is increasingly exercised beyond the state”274. Thus, state 
organs compete with traditional institutions (sometimes strengthened by official recognition) and 
new institutions and actors for influence among citizens275. Moving beyond the purely domestic 
horizon, international actors also play a part in filling the void left by the state. In some countries like 
Côte d’Ivoire, the government relies on foreign mercenaries instead of the army to fight 
insurgents276. Donors increasingly tie aid to a commitment to good governance and the Millennium 
Development Goals, and foreign investors impact events on the ground as African economies, for 
good and bad, are no longer insulated from the global economy277. In addition to civil society groups 
and private security companies, the United Nations, the EU, international organizations and 
international NGOs interfere with and circumscribe government power to the point that the 
established view of the state’s spatiality as being both above society and encompassing all its 
localities is no longer tenable278.  
Another way to analyze the state’s retreat or invisibility is in its rapport with society. Thus, Migdal’s 
‘state-in-society’ approach recognizes that the state in Africa only represents one amongst many 
forces that struggle to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force279. Arguably, this 
conception of state and society does not accurately represent African countries because positing the 
two, state and society, as separate entities is empirically untenable280. “The state is in fact so poorly 
institutionalized, so weakly emancipated from society, that there is very little scope for 
conceptualizing politics in Africa as a contest between a functionally strong state and a 
homogenously coherent civil society”281. As a result, relations between state and society are 
characterized by a high degree of informality and a concomitant lack of institutionalized forms of 
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engaging with citizens or the state. Informality is the pervasive trait of African states not because of 
the institutional make-up but because social formations themselves are highly fluid and prone to 
change282. Hence, in order to understand and fully grasp the working of politics in African countries 
one has to look beyond the classical loci of state and civil society “towards socio-political groups 
based on ethnicity, religion, generation, and gender”283. 
One explanation for the state’s aloofness can be found in the disconnection between urban and 
rural. While there was urban bias right from the beginning as anti-colonial movements were largely 
urban, the budgetary crisis of the 1970s magnified the issue, with the state no longer able to project 
power over territory nominally under its control284. Thus, to borrow and transpose Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s concept of the frontier from the United States to Africa, contemporary African states 
contain inner frontiers where various actors and various norms and systems of authority compete 
and interact in an uneasy equilibrium. Much like in the 19th century United States, this African 
frontier is populated by gangs of young men that use violence or the threat of violence to get by 
while clouding their greed in the semi-respectable language of particularist claims285.  
What is important to note, however, is that the existence of competing authorities has not meant a 
full-fledged retreat of the state, let alone its descent into complete irrelevance. Non-state actors 
cooperate with the state and in some cases operate within and through its institutions286. Apart from 
being the main channel of international and transnational activities, the state’s competition with 
other actors, for example smugglers and drug cartels in the field of customs controls, can lead to the 
institutionalization and legitimization of new alternative forms of authority287. Hence, what can be 
observed are the evolution of new forms of governance that reconfigure the state’s territoriality in 
ways often unforeseen by both state and non-state actors involved288.  
It is this form of mutual interaction and dependence between the state and informal actors for which 
Hagmann and Péclard propose the idea of a “negotiated state” to capture the evolving and dynamic 
nature of political authority in a number of African states289 – although the extent of negotiability is 
constrained by international norms of statehood as relates to, for instance, international borders290. 
An example of such negotiated statehood can, for instance, be found in the Eastern DRC (Democratic 
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Republic of Congo) where the state depends on local forces to exert influence while these local 
forces in turn require the state’s blessing and stamp of approval to continue to wield power291.  
In post-colonial African states, a paradoxical symbiosis has thus come to characterize the relationship 
between leaders and local strongmen: “while the strongmen have become ever more dependent on 
state resources to shore up their social control, state leaders have become dependent on strongmen, 
who employ those resources in a manner inimical to state rules and laws”292. In some cases like 
Kenya, Rwanda or Zimbabwe, it is the state itself that creates non-state militias as cheap and 
potentially expendable forces as an “intentional government response to increased external 
conditionalities on foreign aid and to domestic threats accompanying democratization”293. 
Whereas some voices call on the international community to include these informal alternative 
actors in the calculations of their external statebuilding agendas294, it is important to caution against 
the idea that hybrid political regimes could be the panacea to the ills affecting the African state 
because constellations of hybridity might effectively turn out to be nothing other than neo-
patrimonial relations of power295. This warning applies with particular stringency to modern rebel 
movements, the most drastic kind of non-state actor. Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia, which operated as a military-economic force in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1990s and early 2000s, was typical in so far as in the process of trying to seize control of the judicial 
state, it actually created its own state within the state. Yet, because “Taylor as well as other African 
rebel leaders had no other scheme than to reproduce the idea of the state”, this new rebel state 
strongly resembled the existing state296.  
4.1.1.3. The hybrid quasi state – a summary 
The domestic monopoly of violence is clearly not the norm in Africa where civil wars far outnumber 
inter-state conflicts and where it is much more typical to find an ‘oligopoly of violence’ with power 
shared among different authorities297. States do not have control over all or most of their territories, 
including international borders that are often easily crossed by people, goods and weapons alike. 
What we are seeing today, much like in colonial times, are concentric circles of sovereignty, radiating 
out from the capital and decreasing in strength the further away one gets298. Alternative actors fill 
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the space left void and coexist with the formal state in an uneasy oscillation between confrontation 
and cooperation. This is especially true for rural areas where the state and other actors coexist along 
a kind of internal frontier of governmental reach. Yet, these non-state actors, be they domestic 
militias or international organizations and businesses, are rarely more benign than the absent state 
and certainly lack the legitimacy to act as they do – the focus of the subsequent aspect of African 
statehood.  
4.1.2. The illegitimate state  
The concept of the illegitimate state partly overlaps but expands upon the concept of the hybrid 
quasi-state and is equally a composite of two concepts: the non-performing state and the 
undemocratic state. State institutions not only fail to provide security, they fail to deliver much of 
anything to the state’s citizens – provided they even physically exist outside of the official 
government organogram. As a consequence, the state is not legitimized to rule if it does not deliver 
anything in return. At the same time, the state government is not accountable to its citizens and 
democracy, where it exists, is but a name. Accordingly, the first subsection will focus on the non-
performing state and the second on the undemocratic, unaccountable state, both of whom combine 
to mark the African state’s lack of legitimacy.  
4.1.2.1. The non-performing state: a state without institutions 
It is not only changing norms of international sovereignty that have altered states’ scope of action. 
Globalization has not only intensified relations between distant places and peoples, it is also widely 
held to have contributed to a retreat of the state from its position as the most important actor in 
society299. For African states in particular, however, the lack of institutionalization and service 
delivery by the state can be taken as a colonial heritage. European states generally established 
something approaching territorial hegemony, i.e. a monopoly of force, between 1900 and the end of 
World War I, yet left the provision of education, health care and other services largely to locals and 
missionaries300. Effectively, government penetration remained weak in the states of colonial Africa301.  
Furthermore, as post-colonial regimes received international sovereignty without much of a struggle, 
including a de facto guarantee that their states would persist for eternity, the new governing elites 
did not need to strive to gain acceptance among the wider populace302. Postcolonial governments 
continued in the colonial tradition of focusing their energies on controlling the capital and otherwise 
enacting minimum levels of governance to avoid costs, with government presence decreasing 
proportional to the distance from the capital303. This lack of a visible and tangible presence, the 
failure to develop and improve people’s material situation along with the state’s fondness for 
coercion and repression are part of a phenomenon affecting many African countries: “The state in 
Africa is plagued by a crisis of legitimacy”304. While enjoying official recognition on the level of 
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international society, the African state cannot fulfil the statehood criterion of possessing a monopoly 
of legitimate violence not only because of its lack of positive sovereignty (as highlighted above) but 
because the basis of its political power is illegitimate and – in some cases – even illegal305.  
The colonial experience and in particular the experience of late colonial policies of introducing a 
semblance of a modern welfare state have had a major impact on the state’s struggles for 
legitimacy306. Both the experience of the colonial state and nationalist agitation against it had left 
many Africans disenchanted not only with the colonial state but with the state as such and 
“*p+postcolonial politicians therefore had to reintegrate the state with the society and make the 
postcolonial state acceptable to the people”307. In order to win back citizens, the state was portrayed 
as an infinite treasure chest shelling out benefits to the people while pushing off repayment into the 
seemingly remote future and thereby paving the way for the debt crisis that would befall many 
countries by the 1980s308.  
However, only a specific subsection of society actually benefitted from the African ‘welfare state’. Far 
from establishing legitimacy among the population at large, the spend-thrift attitudes of postcolonial 
governments contributed to widening the ravine separating town and country. African politicians 
traditionally equated political survival with appeasing the urban population by means of subsidies 
while the much larger and poorer rural population had to shoulder the main burden of taxation309. As 
such, the frequent choice of taxing the countryside to appease the city is part of the increasing 
domination of government and the state by growing urban elites and urban concerns to the neglect 
and exclusion of the rural majority310. In many African languages, in fact, the terms for state and 
town are very closely intertwined (e.g. in the West African languages Yoruba and Ga) as statemaking 
was a function of and conditional upon urbanization311.   
Yet, many Africans perceive the state as an oppressive entity, which “is not in a position to generate 
an affinity with the people because it does not work for the interest of the people. In response the 
people of Africa have learnt to treat the state with disdain”312. Large parts of the citizenry withdraw 
into private life and retreat from the abusive state that does not furnish the individual citizen with 
rights but is primarily busying itself with enforcing submission to its rule313; hence, “for most Africans 
the state continues to have little meaning, as many people continue to operate outside of the ambit 
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of its clutches”314. The state on the one hand concentrates its energies on extracting resources and 
intimidating and silencing (potential) opposition while striking deals with self-serving interests; on 
the other hand, the state is neither able to supply the population with basic necessities like hospitals 
or schools, nor to provide safety of life or property315. The lack of economic development316 in most 
African states is moreover not only a source of popular dissatisfaction, it has been identified as the 
determinant factor most likely to lead to outbreaks of large-scale violence317.  
Ihonvbere argues that because many citizens – in particular those not benefitting from the state’s 
exploitative measures – feel little to no solidarity with the state, the African state becomes irrelevant 
to people’s lives whereas for those at the heart of the state, survival becomes the preeminent if not 
exclusive preoccupation318. Weak leaders threatened with domestic challenges do not hesitate to 
intentionally cripple the arms of the state so as to avoid challengers to their rule from employing 
state resources against them319. Such behaviour is especially to be found in states with little public 
revenue, low income-levels, and those where incumbent rulers are facing political challengers320. The 
pursuit of regime stability and regime security thus undermines the pursuit of legitimacy through the 
promotion of economic development.   
This so-called politics of survival has the perverse effect that “keeping state leaders afloat may 
paradoxically have involved the systemic weakening of the state’s agencies, a kind of 
deinstitutionalization”321. The lack of institutions, as Callaghy shows for Zaïre (the present-day 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), is in turn a driving force of crisis in the state and beyond322. While 
the degree of institutional decay in the DRC may be exceptional, Chazan is right in arguing that “it is 
not usually the lack of institutionalization, but poor institutionalization, which is significant”323. 
Institutions, even where they exist, suffer from flawed institutional design, lack of oversight, few 
capable and dedicated staff and the absence of binding and widely internalized institutional norms of 
conduct.  
A caveat is nonetheless in order. The wide-spread non-functioning of state organs is by no means 
tantamount to violent anarchy. And based on the case study of Mozambique’s capital Maputo, 
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Morten Nielsen shows that the idea of the state can survive and persist in people’s minds regardless 
of the actual presence of the state:  
We cannot a priori determine that incoherent and partial state practices necessarily lead individuals to 
perceive the state as devoid of legitimate moral value. *…+ Ideas of the state can thus be a basis for 
social action; even when the reality of state dysfunction is widely accepted, ‘ordinary people’ continue 
to invest themselves in these ideas.
324
  
While the presence and performance of state institutions is in many places decisive for its 
acceptance and recognition by the public, in others the African state has reached the higher plane as 
an immaterial existence in people’s imagination removed from empirical evidence of its functionality.  
4.1.2.2. The undemocratic state: a state without society 
Most of the African states gained independence at the height of the Cold War and various forms of 
autocratic and non-democratic forms of government have predominated on the continent 
throughout the postcolonial period (and been tolerated by their international sponsors of different 
ideological persuasions). In this context, some responsibility has to be put not only on superpower 
competition but on the original colonizers. Even though in the process of extracting themselves from 
the colonies they sought to install democratic constitutions based on European models (for example 
Britain’s bicameral parliamentary system or French presidentialism), the uninterrupted continuation 
of commercial relations was of paramount concern and led France and Britain in particular to 
acquiesce to many countries’ descent into authoritarianism, one-party-rule and dictatorship325. In 
fact, this colonial legacy of centralized and autocratic rule has been branded the impediment to 
democratization in Africa326. 
The debate about the illegitimate nature of the African state gained steam and lustre with what 
Huntington termed the ‘Third Wave of Democratization’, renewed experiments with pluralist 
elections that started in Latin America in the 1980s and snowballed on the heels of the global demise 
of Soviet-style Socialist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s327. This wave has had a very mixed 
record in most African states. First of all, democratization did not touch each and every African 
country and even in those where multi-party elections were introduced and progress on the political 
front was observable, democratization beyond the ballot box, i.e. in the field of administration, 
economic governance, civil society participation and social equality often proceeded on rather 
uneven paths328.  
In a paradoxical way, the political opening in the 1990s while by no means erasing widespread public 
cynicism about state predation created new demands that states were ill equipped to meet. Feeble 
governments were challenged by the emergence of discourses of human rights linked to a 
reawakened imagining of the state as a “representation of the volonté générale producing citizens as 
well as subjects, as a source of social order and stability, and as an agency capable of creating a 
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definite and authorized nation-space materialized in boundaries, infrastructure, monuments and 
authoritative institutions”329.  
At the same time, democratization combined with the state’s forced retreat from the economy as a 
result of debt-crisis and IMF-imposed budgetary austerity, has meant that African states today 
actually have less power to act for the betterment of the state’s and its citizens’ socio-economic 
situation330. Thus, newly elected African governments of the democratic era are facing the dilemma 
of having to placate two irreconcilable constituencies: (1) external donors and creditors, and (2) their 
poverty-stricken domestic majorities331. The inability to please both constituencies is vital to an 
assessment of democratization efforts on the continent because the intention to build or rebuild the 
state structure and state institutions was very much at the heart of the drive to install democracies in 
Africa and seen as a condition for the lasting success and longevity of democratic systems332.  
In some corners, however, democratization was perceived and criticized as the export of capitalist, 
(neo)liberal, democratic state institutions from the West to the continent333. Especially in weaker aid-
dependent countries like Malawi, foreign donors did indeed have sway in tipping the balance 
towards an opening of the political system334 but there are limits on foreign powers’ ability to steer 
states towards more thorough democratization efforts. External pressure was able to force elections 
in Zambia in 1991 but subsequent violations of democratic norms in Zambian politics did not trigger a 
punitive response from abroad335.  
Therefore, another line of critique of the democratization experience is that for the vast majority of 
the African population nothing much has changed at all. After the supposedly sweeping changes of 
the 1990s, states are, according to Houngnikpo’s perspective, still headed and run by the same 
incompetent, self-serving, greedy and predatory politico-bureaucratic elites at the helm, ruling and 
mismanaging the country in a form of pseudo-democracy that he calls démocrature336. “African rulers 
today avoid denying democracy outright, and instead seek to outflank it by expanding their personal 
powers at the expense of institutions that might constrain them”337. Francis Deng therefore held that 
“indigenous societies were more democratic than most modern states in Africa”338. Most of Central 
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Africa, on the other hand, has not even experienced genuine democratization on the electoral front 
where incumbents continue to exploit their in-built advantages by sidelining the opposition and 
resorting to any means necessary, including electoral fraud, to ensure ‘re-election’339.  
A special case in terms of democratization are those countries mostly in Southern Africa that did not 
attain independence in a peaceful transition but had to fight drawn-out wars of liberation. As post-
liberation regimes in Eritrea, Zimbabwe or Namibia have given their blood for the state’s liberation, 
they tend to feel a sense of entitlement to rule and hence show extreme reluctance to share or 
relinquish power340. The experiences of armed struggle carry over into peacetime and help shape the 
outlook of officers-turned-politicians on how to govern the country they set out to liberate: “the 
forms of resistance against totalitarian regimes were themselves organized on strictly hierarchical 
and authoritarian lines *… and+ the new societies carried within them the essential elements of the 
old system against which they had fought”341. But even in those countries where it was deemed to 
have been successful, the outcome of democratization could be considered, in Claude Ake’s words, 
‘democratization of disempowerment’, meaning that in African democracies, elites merely alternate 
in taking advantage of the majority that remains just as disaffected as under one-party rule342.  
Furthermore, establishing nominal democratic rules of the game is not necessarily tantamount to 
getting the political class to abide by these rules. Although some see evidence of stronger rule-based 
and formal-legal constraints on African leaders’ freedom to act as they please343, oftentimes, 
incumbents that have lost or are in danger of losing at the ballot box will refuse to concede defeat 
and linger on in their positions344. “The notion that constitutional norms and principles are binding on 
political leaders is still very much in doubt”345. That is very visible in democratically elected 
governments’ relations with the press, which is often either cowed or voluntarily submits to a regime 
of limited self-censorship346. Judicial systems are also often subservient to the political leadership of 
the day347, although there are exceptions of more assertive judiciaries for example in Zambia and 
Malawi348 but also in Benin where the constitutional court has repeatedly asserted itself vis-à-vis 
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parliament and president349. Another potential game-changer is the spread of mobile phones which 
can be used, as in Nigeria’s elections, to collect and collate observations from polling stations to local 
and international observers350.  
As to the likelihood of violence erupting as a direct consequence of democratic competition, the 
evidence for Africa is scattered and uneven. While on the one hand, there is a global link between 
increased electoral competition and rising levels of violence351 that also holds in Africa – examples 
would be Congo-Brazzaville’s democratization process under Sassou-Nguesso and post-election 
violence in Burundi and Lesotho352 – the opening of non-military venues to power combined with 
scarcer resources after the end of the Cold War have meant that opposition movements are less 
likely to take to the bush and pursue large-scale rebel wars353. 
4.1.2.3. The illegitimate state – a summary  
In postcolonial Africa, the lack of legitimacy is a widespread and persistent feature of African states. 
The lack of legitimacy is embodied by the lack of benefits and services the state delivers to its citizens 
in exchange for the right to exact obedience and taxes from them. Those public institutions that do 
exist in, for example, health care and education are either prohibitely expensive or of low quality. 
Characteristic is the lack of state presence in the countryside where citizens have very little contact 
with any arms of the state. Moreover, many governments, even when democratically elected, are 
not accountable to the electorate and along with the rest of the state structure and bureaucracy do 
not abide by a liberal democratic ethos. The rhetoric of freedom, human rights and democracy is 
nonetheless widely present, both to placate domestic audiences and international partners or 
donors. Instead of concentrating on development, all energies are devoted to staying in power, to 
the politics of survival. All the while, the state is treated as a treasure chest for those at the helms of 
power and their kin, something that will be the subject of the next section.  
4.1.3. The privatized neopatrimonial state  
The privatized neopatrimonial state is, in my definition of the typified African state, also a composite 
of several facets:  officeholders and members of the state’s ruling elite take advantage of their 
positions for personal gain (rather than common good) and as means to bolster and maintain their 
hold onto power. The first part on the privatized, corrupted and criminalized state will point to the 
frequent instances of outright theft and enrichment, often in connection to resource wealth, for the 
sole purpose of personal enrichment. The second part on the neopatrimonial state is going to 
describe more closely those cases when state goods are privatized for the sake of placating a client 
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group – ethnic, regional or other – that in turn constitutes the backbone of the rulers’ continued hold 
onto power.  
4.1.3.1. The privatized criminal state – kleptocracy and corruption  
The state in Africa is typically not a public force but tends to be privatized354. African states are 
victims of ‘privatization’355 with leaders frequently using the state exclusively to further their 
personal interests as well as the interests of a small elite: “The state is used by the governing elite for 
accumulation as against legitimation purposes”356. This notion of privatization picks up on François 
Bayart’s ideas on ‘the politics of the belly’, according to which various social actors strive to gain 
hegemonic control over the state, which boils down to control over the spoils of state production357. 
In essence, African politics is then that everyone, high and low, is trying to seize and eat as large a 
chunk of the national cake as they can stomach. Extravagant expenditures like the private football 
stadium Burundi’s president built in his home village358 or the replica of St Peter’s basilica in 
Yamoussoukro are only the tip of the iceberg of a form of behaviour that treats the state as one’s 
personal casket. Crucially, the privatization of the state is not tantamount to the private sphere 
devouring or dominating the public but should be understood as a renegotiation and reconfiguration 
of power relations between dominant actors, both private and public359. State and societal elites 
both seek to maximize their political autonomy, yet also interfere in each other’s spheres; the state 
to better exert control over the people, the private elites to gain access to state resources for their 
own ends360. An example of such collusion is South Africa’s extensive private military sector as former 
branches of the army now work in the semi-private sector which the state promotes and uses as 
sources of income and influence361. 
Skill in dealing with these various players that transcend and frequently cross the imaginary 
boundary between politics and private life is essential to, on the one hand, maintain a grip on power, 
and on the other hand, partake of the state’s riches: “Political life in Africa consists first and foremost 
of the management of factional intrigues for personal interest”362. And in contrast to European and 
some Asian states, most African countries have not seen the growth of a distinct ethos among state 
employees that work for the amelioration of society rather than for personal gain363. Equatorial 
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Guinea, the only former Spanish colony in Africa is a good case study. The state structure has since 
independence been controlled by different branches of the same family clan, people from president 
Obiang’s hometown Mongomo fill all important positions and together with foreign companies 
(including arms and drug traders and toxic waste dumpers) try to seize as large a portion of state 
revenues as possible. While the majority of the population lives as subsistence farmers, “the 
voraciousness of a small government elite and its core constituents” is satisfied “with a range of 
legal, quasi-legal and criminal supporting enterprises”364.  
Democratization since around 1990 has not seriously dented the practice of privatization as elected 
‘big men’ shift resources from the state to the private domain. Shadow structures and personnel 
without official title effectively run large parts of the state, including sovereign functions such as 
negotiations with foreign governments and multinationals365. Hence, depicting how African 
governments and state elites expropriate and steal from the state’s coffers has the added benefit of 
shifting the focus away from an analysis of state structures and a view that “assumed that the actions 
of states should be explained in terms of the interest of the state itself, rather than those of the 
individuals who controlled it”366.  
Privatization of the state is also aided by the African state’s extreme extraversion; by which is meant 
that although the state formally possesses independent national institutions, it continues to be 
shaped by external forces367. A particularly influential facet of the state’s extraversion lies in what 
Cooper calls the ‘gatekeeper function’ of the state368, which goes back to the early independence 
period when controlling the borders was tantamount to “control*ing+ resources brought in from the 
outside, whether those resources be economic or technical assistance, or political support”369. Those 
in control of the state profit from regulating access to the international sphere, for example by 
channelling foreign aid, creaming off custom revenue, doling out business licenses and receiving a 
cut from importers and exporters alike370. The presence of exportable natural resources as, for 
example, in Botswana means that control of the state and thus the gate are a source of wealth and 
power371. Politics therefore invariably becomes a zero-sum game over the position of gatekeeper372. 
The zero-sum nature of politics on the continent is moreover captured in the very high incidence of 
imprisonment, exile or death experienced by prominent African politicians373; a cynic might argue 
that that is a deserved price to pay but the high level of risk is also a reason for these politicians to 
accumulate as much wealth as possible while they still can.  
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In addition, control over the gate enables the governing elite to shunt accountability to its citizens 
(see above Ch. 4.1.2. ‘The illegitimate state’) because the source of the elite’s power lies not in 
representing and pleasing the state’s population but in control over the nexus between domestic and 
international markets and thus in accumulation and financial support from abroad374. The fact that 
many African leaders take recourse to foreign companies thus stems from an effort to balance and 
compensate for the rulers’ lack of legitimacy among the domestic electorate375. But extraversion and 
“displacement of accountability” can also be found in countries that have undergone reforms 
liberalizing the political system when these reforms occurred under pressure from international 
donors376. In Mauritania, domestic and international pressures forced Colonel Ould Taya to initiate 
democratizing reforms in 1991 but he subsequently ruled without concern for better governance 
“based on an exclusive reliance on external support”, mostly from the United States that trained and 
funded the security apparatus necessary for his staying in power377. Extraversion not only 
redistributes wealth from the masses to the elite but is part of the story of how “the independent 
African state has facilitated the export of wealth from the continent”378. Zambia’s copper industry, 
which generates roughly 80% of Zambia’s GDP, has been owned by a Chinese state-owned company 
since the 1970s when pressure from the International Monetary Fund forced the Zambian state to 
sell it off. Alas, returns from the copper industry have yet to improve the livelihood of most 
Zambians379.  
State privatization, rent-seeking and corruption are especially pronounced in resource-rich countries 
like Nigeria’s oil economy. Due to vast petrol revenue, the state is by far the largest entity of 
accumulation but rather than using its wealth to become involved in the production process shells 
out its capital to private companies by way of contracts380. The result is that competition among 
Nigerian companies does not take place in the market place but finds expression in a struggle over 
access to political decision-making power381. Ghana is a similar case in that profits in the cocoa-
export industry are more tied to political connections – needed, for example, to get a seat on the 
Cocoa Marketing Board – than to business acumen382. Both countries are illustrations of the (by no 
means exclusively African) resource curse, the nefarious link between natural resource wealth and 
politicians’ retreat to enrichment and public neglect.  Apart from economic distortions to the rest of 
the economy caused by an overreliance on one sector and currency appreciation that renders 
national products less competitive on the world market (the Dutch disease), it is weak state 
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institutions that turn resource abundance into a curse383. In a downward spiral, a resource economy 
is in turn said to weaken state institutions384. What is more, evidence has been presented that 
resource abundance in Africa coincides with more authoritarian regimes385, with rulers of resource-
rich rentier-states like Gabon using welfare, low taxes and the targeted buying off of disgruntled 
groups to ensure regime stability386. Clearly, though, in addition to these internal factors, the 
complicity and rapacity of international companies exacerbates the scourge of resource-related 
corruption as evidenced by mining companies involved in bauxite extraction in Guinea387.  
Privatization of the state as it has been depicted in the paragraphs above has different effects on the 
African state and its citizens. One the one hand, state privatization has been taken as merely a 
specific form of state formation388; for instance, the privatization of border zones and transnational 
trade and commercial interactions may weaken the reach of the state, yet serve to consolidate the 
nation’s territory389. Overall, however, the pervasive practices of appropriating and reallocating 
public funds for private benefit have deleterious results on state-society relations390. Many citizens 
perceive the self-serving, parasitical state as the predatory ‘other’391, feel less and less like proper 
citizens and in response withdraw from the state’s reach into civil disobedience392. Bates, in contrast, 
conceives of the citizenry less as a victim of the privatization of the means of coercion but rather as a 
participant in the never-ending game of access to the honey-pots of wealth, power and leisure 
played between citizens, patrons and rulers393. Disaffection arises because some people do not win 
the game, not because they disapprove of the game as such.  
Finally, in contrast to expectations that weak states in the globalizing, economically liberal post-Cold 
War world should respond to their weakness – cut off from easy access to aid and loans as they are – 
by strengthening and streamlining state institutions, some “rulers of weak states seek stability and 
security by destroying state institutions and contracting indispensable functions out to foreign 
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partners”394. When Siaka Stevens became prime minister of Sierra Leone in 1967, he decided to cut 
off the railway line to the hinterland from where most of the country’s export produce was 
transported to the coast. While this crippled Sierra Leone’s economy, it ensured that the hinterland 
which had overwhelmingly supported the opposition candidate would have less of an impact on 
politics and thus help Stevens’ survival in power395. Hence, it can be rational for rulers to forgo 
development and statebuilding and instead ensure political survival by continuing to feed their 
clients396. In a similar vein and leading over to the neopatrimonial form of governance that privatizes 
the state with an ulterior motive other than simple greed, “*n+eo-patrimonial rulers are likely to be 
uninterested or even strongly opposed to bureaucratic reforms that threaten their control of 
patronage and self-advancement”397.  
4.1.3.2. The neopatrimonial state: o brother, I feed thee  
The concept of neopatrimonialism goes back to Max Weber’s typology of forms of governance in 
which patrimonial rule is based on a personalized hierarchy headed by an individual leader who 
exercises power over his or her subjects by delegating domestic authority and property (mostly land) 
to dependent clients who, in exchange, support and sustain the patron’s rule; a system fortified by 
tradition, custom and, in some cases, religion398. In its reincarnation as neopatrimonialism399, where 
personalized patron-client relations coexist with the state’s formal legal structures400, the 
neopatrimonial paradigm has become a very popular looking glass through which to assess politics in 
African states, if not necessarily “the standard tool of analysis”401 some take it to be.  
A key aspect of the neopatrimonial state is the (mis)appropriation of state property and funds for 
non-state purposes402. But there is more to neopatrimonialism than simple theft and greed. As 
shown in the part on the illegitimate state, African state institutions and bureaucracy are neither 
functional nor do citizens or rulers alike have faith in and trust them. Behind the papier-mâché 
camouflage of a modern state, informal practices and personal relationships are what really matter 
in exercising power and getting things done. Bratton and Walle draw a brief yet accurate sketch of 
how such a personalized neopatrimonial form of rule looks like in a typified African state:  
One individual (the strongman, ‘big man’, or ‘supremo’), often a president for life, dominates the state 
apparatus and stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal 
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political and administrative system, and officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public 
service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status.
403
 
Two spheres exist next to, yet not in isolation from one another other, with the patrimonial 
permeating and altering the functioning of the rational-bureaucratic system. “Neopatrimonial rule 
takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ 
stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice, the separation of the private 
and public sphere is not always observed”404 . Exhibiting thus a characteristic mixture of formality 
and informality (with informal exchanges more common than formal ones), a critical component of 
neopatrimonialism is that “*t+his form of governance rests on well-understood if unequal forms of 
political reciprocity that link patrons with their clients across vertical social lines”405. Rather than 
constituting a mere top-down relationship of command-and-obey, both those at the top and at the 
bottom of the system of rule more or less directly depend on each other. Political strategies in 
African domestic politics have accordingly for a long time principally relied upon clients as the 
backbone of rule, “they are, at the same time, the means to attain power and the tools for its 
retention”406. During the Cold War, for instance, a patron-client chain existed as resources obtained 
from superpower patrons went into domestic patronage networks to prevent unruly strongmen from 
challenging authority.  
A problematic feature of neopatrimonialism as an analytical tool is its all-encompassing grasp that 
unites a number of phenomena and practices of African politics under a common tree, for instance 
“nepotism, clanism, ‘tribalism’, regionalism, clientelism, cronyism, patronage, ‘prebendalism’, 
corruption, predation, factionalism, etc., based on either parochial corruption or market 
corruption”407. As such, it has been claimed that neopatrimonialism has “become something of a 
catch-all concept, in danger of losing its analytical utility”408, does not account for important 
differences in detail between countries, and posits the flawed assumption of an African 
exceptionality409. In spite of these criticisms, I continue to take neopatrimonialism to be a very useful 
part of the typology of the African state. For one, the fact that neopatrimonialism is a composite 
concept of several seemingly inchoate developments and thus “seeks to make sense of the (real or 
imaginary) contradictions to be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa”410 should be considered a 
strength as it enables a broader comparative framework than each individual facet, say nepotism, 
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would yield if looked at in isolation. Moreover, it is not necessary to argue that neopatrimonialism is 
a uniquely African trait to make the case that it is characteristic of African states411. 
Just as it is itself a composite of different ideas, neopatrimonialism has been blamed for a whole 
range of ills afflicting the African state. To begin with, the failure of law and order is said to be the 
result of personal interventions trumping due legal process. Sluggish economic development and 
especially differences in economic performance between different African countries have equally 
been attributed to the prevalence of neopatrimonial conduct412. Furthermore, politicians that devote 
most of their time and energy to their clientele will have little left to fulfil their actual duties like, for 
example, holding other office-holders accountable413. Another problem is that by shuffling clients in 
and out of official posts in an effort to please and appease as large a group of clients as possible, such 
a system creates an entire class of disaffected, disappointed and potentially rebellious elites414.  
An analysis of West African politics also observes the duality of confrontation and cooptation in the 
practice of neopatrimonialism as “daily government in a neopatrimonial regime *…+ resembles a 
balancing act to maintain a degree of political stability by satisfying the regime’s supporters and 
weakening its opponents”415. In Francophone West Africa, clientelism and dissolving boundaries 
between the formal and informal are pervasive features of states416. Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouet-
Boigny is a particularly good example for a neopatrimonial attempt to appease regional discontent by 
pumping in state resources and thereby co-opting local leaders into the overall national leadership 
arrangement by way of limited power sharing417. The extent to which personalized relationship of 
dependence became convoluted with the official state structure is epitomized by the designation of 
the remote village of Yamoussoukro as Côte d’Ivoire’s capital on the grounds that it was president 
Boigny’s place of birth.  
Social diversity, lack of communication and transport infrastructure compounded, for some African 
states like Congo, Mali or Chad, by vast and sparsely inhabited territories have meant that in order to 
be able to govern at all, the neopatrimonial tent had to be so large as to include a varied number of 
groups from most parts of the state’s territory418. The size of the neopatrimonial edifice can 
therefore be correlated to the state’s overall weakness. Democratization has in many a case left the 
neo-patrimonial order intact while applying some democratic window-dressing to make the situation 
more palatable to national and international publics alike. Richard Sandbrook describes how in 
Ghana “under the democratic façade the old neo-patrimonial rules of the game came to the fore. 
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Centralization of power in the hands of the president, personal loyalties, pervasive clientelism, 
growing corruption, and unofficial presidential control of his own, personally loyal armed force”419.  
The same neopatrimonial personalization of power has even been observed in South Africa, often 
termed the success story of sub-Saharan political development. At his private estate president Jacob 
Zuma is said to regularly receive long lines of visitors eager for his personal intervention. The 
governing African National Congress (ANC) has a similar penchant for giving out contracts and jobs to 
family members and as political favours420. While there is a dearth of empirical testing, a study on 
elections in Benin confirmed neopatrimonial relations as key determinants for the electorate as the 
“credibility of clientelist appeals and accessibility of clientelist goods greatly influence voting 
behavior”421. Madagascar’s political parties likewise serve as instruments of neopatrimonial rule422 
whereas in Ghana a large majority of voters did not pick a party based on expectations of handouts in 
return423. 
While political power in a neopatrimonial state is synonymous with personal power, it does not 
mean that the state is tantamount to one of Potemkin’s villages for “although the state is a façade, 
compared to what it pretends to be, it is not only a façade, for it is able to extract and distribute 
resources”424. Crucially, for those involved, patrimonial relations take on a sense of inevitability; 
politicians feel bound (rather than free) to please their clients while ordinary citizens, even if they 
disapprove of patrimonialism, in practice cannot conceive of an alternative way to do politics425: “The 
contradiction of the politics of the belly is that both rich and poor, elites and masses, share the same 
opportunistic and materialistic view of politics and the state”426. Omar Bongo, former president of 
Gabon and a notorious practitioner of neopatrimonialism, commented on the politics of patronage: 
“I do not know if this system is good *…+ But it is the only possible way”427. Hence, in analogy to what 
Akhil Gupta argued for corruption’s role in India428, the African state can be said to be ‘discursively 
constituted’ in its neopatrimonial guise, i.e. it is only the neopatrimonial system that makes the state 
visible to citizens both on the local and on the national level.  
From the outside, taking care of the vertical network of relations and amenities by all means 
necessary may be perceived as endemic corruption, for many Africans, however, it is a moral 
obligation to support your own group in the struggle with competing networks429. And there is also 
the issue of historical precedent: patrimonial relations were typical of pre-colonial African chiefdoms 
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as “personal interaction between the ‘big man’ and his extended retinue defined African politics, 
from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly”430. In regions 
affected by the slave trade, the strength of personalized kinship organizations was in part a reaction 
to the failure of incumbent African states or other non-state forms of political authority to protect 
them against slave raiders431.   
Whereas neopatrimonial power relations can in certain cases contribute to statebuilding by 
accumulating political capital at the centre and establishing vertical bonds that accommodate but 
transcend ethnicity432, they can just as easily lead to highly divisive political and social relations 
between those benefiting and those excluded from the troths of state handouts. Even if it is a 
misconception that personalized rule is inherently inimical to accountability433, the solidarity and 
conformity engendered by a system of patronage and personalized relations actually do undermine 
the modern state by replacing democratic interest representation with paternalistic support for one’s 
clients434. Thus, for example those few Liberians that benefit from the salaries of the legion of ‘ghost 
employees’ certainly approve of the scheme but for the state and society as a whole such wasteful 
corruption is clearly detrimental435. Especially so because once debts mount and resources run out, 
regimes can no longer provide benefits to their supporters and have to resort to coercive means to 
prevent a challenge to their rule, thereby erasing the last traces of public legitimacy436. 
4.1.3.3. The privatized neopatrimonial state – a summary   
The privatized state in its criminal, corrupt and neopatrimonial manifestation is common and 
widespread in Africa and is largely detrimental to both citizens and the state structure and its 
institutions. Winning and retaining control of the state is the ultimate prize of politics for which 
oftentimes the position as gatekeeper to the international arena is used, in particular in resource-rich 
countries. The state’s riches are employed for personal gain and to support a patron-client 
relationship with key groups in society that ensure the regime’s continued hold on power. Rulers 
therefore do not need to rely on general popular support and are prepared to cripple the state if it 
serves the purpose of staying in power. As a result, cynicism and detachment towards the state 
characterize those parts of society that do not partake of its privatization. All the while corruption, 
nepotism and patronage are widely seen as normal and in fact inevitable. The ease with which the 
state is privatized is aided by the state’s centralization and bloated size, which will be addressed in 
the coming section.  
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4.1.4. The swollen centralized state  
The high degree of extraction necessary for the maintenance of a neopatrimonial system of rule is 
only made possible by the centralization of power and control in the African state. As the state is the 
primary source of wealth and influence, it is much larger than the country could sustain and 
effectively a burden on society that seeks to carve out its own local or regional realms. Hence, 
African states are in a perpetual state of oscillation between tendencies to centralize and 
decentralize authority and resources. Tendencies that will be looked at in subsections on the bloated 
centralized state and on efforts to install a federal state with powers devolved to lower strata. This 
part of the typology provides a critical link to the depiction of the African nation because 
centralization is frequently justified with the need for nationbuilding whereas local actors, often 
ethnic groups, to differing degrees resist inclusion into the centralized nation-state. 
4.1.4.1. The bloated centralized state  
A side effect of the neopatrimonial nature of most African countries is the bloated size of the state 
and its branches that both provide benefits to those that are part of the patrimonial network and 
crowd out competition in the market and in the political sphere. The African state consolidates 
power at the centre – most of the time the capital and surrounding areas – and extracts large 
amounts of resources from society, which it then proceeds to spend on itself437. Having largely 
remained the essential focus for the accumulation of wealth in an environment in which “any official 
decision affords an opportunity for gain, from a fiscal control to a technical verification, from the 
signature of a nomination form or a concessionary market to an industrial agreement or an import 
license”438, the postcolonial state, much like the colonial state it succeeded, takes up an exorbitant 
space in society439.  
The small class of post-liberation regimes that had to wage a war of independence are especially 
fond of and characterized by strong centralized bureaucracies440: “The institutionalization that occurs 
within armed groups then becomes a contribution to state-building”441. So dominant is the state in 
public life that it becomes difficult to distinguish it from other actors as “the state, the regime, the 
party, and even individual personalities have been closely intertwined in the vast majority of African 
countries, and are not easily disentangled”442.  
Due to its overbearing size, the African state is embroiled in a cycle of self-reproducing expansion in 
which the oversized state apparatus breeds widespread political corruption, leading the beneficiaries 
inside the state structure to strive for a “further expansion of the state — which tends to generate 
even greater political corruption to reinforce the dominance of the political class”443. As a result, the 
state is both too large and too weak. A good example of this duality is the large number of states that 
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have mingled in land tenure arrangements. Even in those states that have enacted substantial land 
reforms (e.g. Zimbabwe and Kenya), the state remains on the local level only a marginal actor in 
allocating and adjudicating land rights as traditional institutions of social authority persist444.  
One of the historical sources of the bloated size of the state is the late colonial period and the period 
of decolonization. In francophone Africa, in particular, a strong Jacobin current of thought survives 
among the political class intent on mimicking the centralized and unitary French state and the 
hegemony it enjoys in the political arena445. Niger is a good case of such a state that is Jacobin in 
aspiration, but in practice far too weak to live up to the professed ideals of the strong centralized 
state: the state elite did its best to sideline and weaken regional, ethnic or social power centres 
outside of the centre by any means necessary, yet this struggle has on the contrary resulted in the 
strengthening of centrifugal forces rooted in religion and ethno-regional associations446.  
French and British attempts in the 1940s and 1950s to export the newly developed West European 
welfare state to Africa (albeit on a much smaller scale) had a major impact on the postcolony by 
inspiring nationalist leaders to install interventionist welfare states on the carcasses of the weak and 
authoritarian state structures they inherited447. From early on in the post-independence era, though, 
the bloated, unproductive and unsustainably costly government and state apparatuses, which 
constitute the leading ‘industry’ of most African countries, have been deemed one of the main 
obstacles to development. As Dumont wrote in 1962, “The administration, in the way it is set up, will 
lead these countries into ruin”448. Arguably, though, for the average African state there was not much 
of an alternative to the welfarism and state-led economic developmentalism of the early 
independence period because “the state was the only entity that could perform this function; Africa 
had no domestic bourgeoisie!”449.  
According to this reasoning, a unitary state was in fact essential to preserve cohesion among diverse 
‘tribes’, ethnicities and other social cleavages in the immediate aftermath of independence450. In the 
more recent past, however, the overcentralized African state has been held responsible for the lack 
of development as well as for disease, conflict, hunger and other ills. Rather than creating strong 
functional states, centralizing political and economic decision-making has led to weak states that 
need to rely on coercion instead of other forms of legitimacy in order to stay in power451. 
Concurrently, devolving power to the local level has rarely been on the agenda of African states. 
Political parties (except for solely regional ones) “are generally organized at the center and largely 
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ignore the countryside and smaller urban areas”452. As a result, capital cities, though typically large 
anywhere on the globe, are in many places much larger than any other city; Luanda, the capital of 
Angola, is for instance approximately ten times the size of Benguela, the second-largest 
settlement453.  
Ruling groups regardless of regime type have sought to control local-level public affairs in 
postcolonial Africa from the centre while local social groups have typically paid little attention to sub-
national political structures and players454. Since the 1980s and 1990s, however, the ‘integral state’ 
of the first postcolonial decades with its claim to complete control over most aspects of its citizens 
has been on the retreat although the true extent of this retreat remains open to debate. 
4.1.4.2. The decentralized federal state 
The ebb and flow of African statism is most directly visible in the fate of institutions of local or 
regional governance or, in more general terms, in the relative strength of centralizing tendencies vis-
à-vis drives for decentralization and devolution of powers to lower levels of the administration and 
the state. Often as part of the process of democratisation, a growing number of African states have 
begun to undertake decentralising reforms. These reforms were accompanied by a popular critique 
of the state as “[h]alfway through the 1990s a further move away from a state-centrist position could 
be observed when the idea of the state itself was contested”455. There are, following Blundo and 
Jacob, four main reasons for decentralizing reforms: a) to reduce the size (and cost) of central 
government; b) a genuine willingness to devolve power to citizens; c) power-sharing in the face of 
ethnic conflict; and d) complying with donor requirements to receive aid456.  
Regarding the first point – smaller government – structural adjustment programmes prescribed by 
the Washington Consensus457 have often reduced the scope of public expenditure to such an extent 
that especially smaller and/or weaker states like Gambia are no longer capable to provide a majority 
of social services and therefore do not actively choose reforms but experience decentralization by 
default458. A genuine willingness to devolve – the second point – has, however, been the great 
exception as in those instances when local government reforms were undertaken, “the reforms lead 
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to growing central government control”459. This form of covert centralization has a long tradition 
going back to the 1960s when decentralization undertaken in countries like Kenya, Senegal or 
Tanzania was in actual fact not meant to devolve powers to the local level but had the ultimate 
objective of giving the centre better control over the periphery460. More recent examples are Uganda 
and Ghana that both undertook decentralizing reforms that eventually led to recentralization of 
power and a strengthening of central government vis-à-vis local government461.  
In terms of the third point – power-sharing to stave off ethnic conflict – federalism is particularly 
critical in multicultural and ethnically heterogeneous countries which, in Africa, are the norm rather 
than the exception. A case can be made that the exponential increase in the number of Nigeria’s 
federal units from three in 1960 to thirty-six in 1996 has helped stymie the minorities’ sense of 
exclusion and thus kept the state from imploding462. The decentralized state structure can on the 
other hand also be used as a new and alternative channel to shift the initiative to the local and 
regional level and contest power at the level of the nation-state. Nigeria is again a good example of 
this as the planned introduction of sharia in one particular federal state triggered and drove political 
debate and conflict in the whole of the state463. As will be dealt with in detail in the section on ethnic 
groups and traditional authorities, decentralisation also directly impacts the role and standing of 
chiefs in the political structure464 – either by recognizing and integrating them into the official state 
structure or by setting up alternative and rival officials in their stead. 
Yet, even those countries where administrative reform has created greater political space and scope 
of action for local governance often suffer from the discrepancy between legal provisions and the 
reality on the ground. Denis Tull lists state weakness, lack of political will among the leadership, rent-
seeking political entrepreneurs, popular political apathy and local government funding as the primary 
obstacles to successful decentralization in Africa465. A typical feature is “‘elite capture’ of local power 
structures *…+ facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the 
countryside”466. The lack of democracy and accountability on the local level effectively nullify the 
expected poverty reduction effects of decentralization467 and there is “little evidence that 
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decentralization is instituting procedures and institutions for representative, accountable and 
empowered forms of local governance”468.  
States with weak institutions cannot properly oversee and supervise the activities of local officials 
who in turn exploit rather than serve local populations469. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for 
instance, where regionalization has been pursued as a solution to the problem of national identity470, 
the weakness of the state combined with contradictory legislation grants de facto autonomy to local 
actors who, spurred by their own precarious standing, prey on the local population and thereby allow 
the federal government to run the country on the cheap471. One reason for this outcome is the 
central government’s often cynical approach to devolving powers. A local administrative unit’s status 
is elevated without a proportional increase in material endowment or political clout; the lack of 
visible results quickly leads to exasperation among the local population, which in turn justifies the 
national government’s interference in local matters on the grounds of the local unit’s inaction472.  
4.1.4.3. The swollen centralized state – a summary 
Its centralization and bloated size are features of the African state even after international pressure, 
in the form of mandatory structural adjustment reforms, and internal calls for devolution of powers 
in the course of democratization. Decentralization where it has been undertaken has not altered the 
actual centre of political gravity and oftentimes authority has effectively been recentralized as a 
result. Control and capture of the state remains the ultimate prize of African politics as lower levels 
of the executive and administration are ill-trained, ill-equipped and lack real powers and resources to 
act independently of the centre. At the same time, local government also has to compete and coexist 
with traditional authorities that are either partly co-opted or at least tolerated by the state. This 
general failure to devolve authority and institute genuine federal systems directly impacts the 
standing and satisfaction of sub-national groups and, on a continent where multi-ethnic countries are 
the norm, has a strong bearing on the success of nationbuilding projects – the focus of the coming 
chapter.  
4.2. Nature of the postcolonial African nation 
The evolution of nations and nationalism on the African continent has in many ways proceeded along 
a path akin to that of the African state, which is hardly surprising considering that state and nation 
are intimately linked in the theory and practice of the nation-state, which was and continues to be 
the model for African countries and their leaderships. In order to gain a better understanding of the 
development, the peculiarities and the obstacles to the creation of national identities and, in fact, 
national peoples, this chapter will begin by concentrating in 4.2.1 on the evolution of inclusive state-
driven nationalism from the late anti-colonial struggle through decolonization until the present. The 
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subsequent sections are, in contrast, going to look at alternative loyalties and impediments to 
successful propagation of nationalism: 4.2.2 looking in particular at politicized ethnic loyalties and 
4.2.3 dissecting the new exclusive nationalism with its focus on autochthony, religion and other non-
inclusive forms of belonging.   
4.2.1. Inclusive state-driven nationbuilding  
Nationbuilding was a formative ideology of the early postcolonial moment and its success or rather 
the lack thereof proved critical in shaping later forms of African nationalism, both officially 
sanctioned and alternative national visions. This section on nationbuilding in the postcolony is 
therefore going to start in 4.2.1.1 with an overview of the standard narrative of inclusive African 
state nationalism that emerged after decolonization, subsequently in 4.2.1.2 look at elements of 
negative ‘othering’ in trying to create unity among the people confined within the nation’s territory 
and then in 4.2.1.3 deal with national identification that exists in spite of the state.  
4.2.1.1. African inclusive nationalism in colonial and early postcolonial times 
During the late colonial period and in the immediate aftermath of independence, African nationalism 
was seen as coterminous with opposition and resistance to colonial rule473; i.e. as anti-colonial 
nationalism, which “was a progressive movement in the colonial and semi-colonial world, when it 
embodied the struggle of a national bourgeoisie against imperialism”474. Genuine nations, on the 
other hand, were on principle presumed not to exist in Africa475. Based on this reasoning, the 
postcolonial African country was said to be at a similar developmental stage as Europe’s new 
monarchies of the 15th century and described as “an aspirant nation-state” in which “*t+he state is to 
create the nation, not the reverse”476. This point is echoed by Tangri’s categorical statement that “at 
independence, African countries largely lacked a national identity, partly because colonial policy did 
much to strengthen ethnic, as opposed to national consciousness, and partly because the countries 
were too recent in existence to elicit a sense of common nationhood”477. In Nigeria, for instance, at 
the time of independence in 1960, the people of Nigeria did not conceive of themselves as Nigerians 
because people’s “identity as Nigerians lay in the shadow of their tribal and parochial allegiances”478. 
Most nationalist leaders that came to power with independence shared this assessment and in their 
aspiration of duplicating the nation-states of European pedigree, set about the project of building 
nations where none had been before – an aspiration possibly influenced by the fact that 
“*n+ationalist movements rely very heavily on men and women to whom a Western style of 
education and new types of employment and occupation have opened new horizons”479. In particular 
in countries that had emerged from war, governments composed of former ‘freedom fighters’ have a 
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strong sense of ownership of the nation480; the armed struggle, for example in Guinea-Bissau, 
becomes coterminous with national identity, “engendering a veritable cult of the ‘nation-party-state’ 
as the sole pillar and symbol of authority”481.  
But there is also a more pragmatic explanation that highlights the utility of the nationalist idea to 
states faced with high expectations and little to offer to citizens in terms of tangible benefits: “As 
such, nationalism is a particularly interesting issue for Africa because it may represent a way of 
broadcasting state authority that does not require the financial resources that poor countries 
lack”482. In post-genocide Rwanda, for example, the official state-sanctioned account of an idyllic pre-
colonial unity that was shattered by divisions introduced by the colonialists has become a pole-
bearer of the government’s attempts at forced social engineering483. The degree of top-down 
propagation of nationalism has been so consistently high that John Markakis went so far as claiming 
that “*w+hatever it may be elsewhere, nationalism in Africa is the ideology of the state. More 
precisely, it is the ideology of those who wield state power”484. In that sense, African state-
nationalism is categorically different from the notion that nationalism emanates from an already pre-
existing primordial nation485.  
In another contrast to European nationalism, what stands out about African state nationalism is the 
subordinate role assigned to language as the common signifier of national belonging – at least 
outside the Arabic-speaking countries of Northern Africa486. In spite of occasional appeals to return 
to indigenous languages as a means of “decolonizing the mind”487, most sub-Saharan African states 
have chosen to retain the former colonial language as language of official discourse as even those 
African languages that were symbolically and constitutionally enshrined as national languages did not 
manage to take the place of English, French or Portuguese in the school, market or courthouse488. 
The main reason for this continuity lies in linguistic plurality, i.e. the lack of a common mother 
tongue, and in resistance toward the imposition of an African language among speakers of minority 
languages. Thus, Léopold Senghor, first president of Senegal and one of the fathers of Négritude – a 
philosophy based on the idea of a distinctly African way of being and thinking and “the awareness, 
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defence and development of African cultural values”489 – was nonetheless a virulent proponent of 
French as Senegal’s official language. Although the indigenous Wolof is the de facto lingua franca, 
when people breach the matter of “official recognition of Wolof as a national language above and 
beyond all other languages, there is much resistance and speakers of other languages are quick to 
remind the government that Senegal is a democratic multilingual society”490. Tanzania, where Julius 
Nyerere’s government successfully installed Swahili as the national language is clearly the exception 
to the rule491.  
Writers and artists were in some countries integrated into efforts at popularizing national identity, 
for example by commissioning songs. In West Africa, in particular, the composition and performance 
of hagiographic songs has a long tradition predating the colonial period and is preserved among a 
specialized class or caste of performers, today commonly known as griots492. As a rule, however, the 
role of cultural actors was rather limited in the formulation of national identities in sub-Saharan 
Africa, lest they had to function as in Congo where “the nation has been engineered top-down by 
ideologues and state-sponsored official literature, which has in turn been challenged by orality and 
non-official and diasporic literature”493. On the other hand, authors have often sat uneasily with 
attempts to instrumentalise their work for nationbuilding purposes and, as Simatei shows for East 
Africa, have in their literary production reacted against the nation-state’s homogenizing 
tendencies494. 
Initially, most African governments opted for an inclusive version of nationalism rather than an 
exclusive one.  By promoting an assimilationist idea of the nation, they thereby strove to place their 
legitimacy on a broader footing495. Hence, during the first decade after independence, “it seemed 
natural that the priority should lie in the projection – the making concrete – of the myth of national 
unity”496. Nation-building as the counter-project to imperial strategies of divide-and-rule morphed 
into the guiding principle that inspired the first generation of independence leaders497. As the 
postcolonial historian Gyan Prakash pointed out, third World Nationalism was thus built on a 
paradoxical stance. It attributed agency to the nation long subjected to subservience under a colonial 
yoke and yet staked its own claim to national leadership on the order of reason and progress of 
European colonial pedigree498.  
                                                          
489
 Senghor (1996), p. 49.  
490
 McLaughlin, Fiona, “Senegal: The Emergence of a National Lingua Franca”, in Simpson, Andrew (ed.) 
Language and national identity in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 79-97, p. 87.  
491
 Topan, Farouk, “Tanzania: The Development of Swahili as a National and Official Language”, in Simpson, 
Andrew (ed.) Language and national identity in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 252-266.  
492
 Panzacchi, Cornelia, “The livelihoods of traditional griots in modern Senegal”, Africa, Vol. 64, No. 2, April 
1994, pp. 190-210.  
493
 Thomas, Dominic Richard David. Nation-building, Propaganda, and Literature in Francophone Africa. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 2.  
494
 Simatei, Tirop Peter. The Novel and the Politics of Nation Building in East Africa. Bayreuth: Bayreuth 
University, 2001.  
495
 Bratton and van de Walle (1997), p. 75.  
496
 Chabal, Patrick, “Imagined Modernities: community, nation and state in postcolonial Africa”, in Torgal, Luis 
Reis; Pimenta, Fernado Tavares and Sousa, Julião Soares (eds.) Comunidades Imaginadas: Nação e Naciolismo 
em África. Coimbra: University of Coimbra, 2008, pp. 41-48, p. 44.  
497
 Tetzlaff and Jakobeit (2005), p. 125.  
498
 Prakash, Gyan, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 5, 
1994, pp. 1475-1490, p. 1475.  
82 
 
Yet, governments generally failed to put the lofty ideals of state-nationalism into practice as popular 
identification with the state was widely lacking, and few signs of genuine expressions of nationalism 
could be found apart from “the now pro forma exhortations from propaganda organs to engage in 
state-building”499. At least as important as loyalty of the mass or at least a significant share of the 
population is the evolution of a national elite that actually and genuinely conceives of the nation as 
their prime focus of loyalty and whose attachment to the idea of the nation exceeds mere cost-
benefit calculations. The failure of nationalism is therefore related to the failure of political elites to 
act as genuine representatives of the nation (as opposed to ethnic group, e.g. Kenya, or family, e.g. 
Mobutu). 
4.2.1.2. Othering to create national unity 
The flipside to the inclusive narrative of the newly independent African state was the designation and 
creation of groups of people that were to serve as the ‘other’ to the respective national group. There 
were, as Dorman et al. point out, very sound reasons and motives for African governments and state 
elites to act in this way.  
Working with a problematic colonial legacy, political elites have manipulated history, land, and social 
and economic factors to exert a collective sense of identity over their citizens. The claiming of control 
over the defining of citizenship and nationhood provides unrivalled political power. [...] To maintain 
this position it is necessary for them to cast a negative other against which to rally their nation.
500
  
The attempt to define citizenship and thus identity (and vice versa), often by way of designating a 
negative other, functioned as a tool to ensure a continued position of influence in the country. 
Creating strangers that did not belong to what had been circumscribed as the national community 
thus arose both from a need to supply a glue to a disparate population and the void left behind by 
the desertion of the previous enemy ‘other’. Edward Said famously posited the Orient as Europe’s 
‘other’, functioning as a typically negative mirror-image of European self-conceptions501. Anti-colonial 
movements used Europe and specifically the colonial oppressors in much the same manner to 
strengthen self and group identification among African populations because 
societies undergoing rapid social change, or nation building, or territorial or political expansion, can 
escape or postpone internal political difficulties – the fear of established groups for the loss of 




A case in point, many nationalist movements-turned-governments derived their legitimacy to rule 
from the fact that they had resisted the colonial powers and portrayed their own struggle as a 
continuation of earlier resistance movements, e.g. Tanzania’s TANU party presenting itself as the 
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successor to the Maji-Maji that led a violent uprising against the German colonizers503. Another 
example is the Zimbabwean ZANU-PF government’s decision to circumscribe academic freedom in 
historiography and decree the propagation of ‘patriotic history’ in order to disseminate their 
preferred reading of recent history, including the party’s own role in it504: “The ruling party has 
deliberately venerated the victimhood of the war veterans for political expediency and for purposes 
of playing down the significance of opposition”505. Mugabe herein followed in the footsteps of 
president Banda in Malawi where in the 1960s “to ensure that his version of Malawian culture and 
history prevailed, the machinery of the ruling Malawi Congress Party set out to control what could or 
could not be published or taught in schools and colleges”506.  
Patriotic history is also reflected in the different memorial cultures and lieux de mémoire of countries 
which had to wage a war of liberation: whereas Zimbabwe has a strictly hierarchical layered system 
of commemorating its heroes (which, for instance, leads to frequent quarrels over which tier a 
deceased fighter is supposed to be interred in), Eritrea pursues a highly egalitarian culture of 
memorialisation embodied by the statue of a sandal that was worn by virtually all combatants during 
the liberation struggle507. Yet, memorials can also continue to divide nation-states as in Mozambique 
where the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo is being replayed on the country’s public squares in 
a struggle over monuments that is equally a struggle over recent national history and national 
identity508.  
However, in contrast to the late colonial period when nationalism blossomed due to the visible 
presence of an easily identifiable enemy – the colonialists – post-independence regimes struggled to 
define a relevant other and concomitantly struggled to create virulent symbols of national identity509. 
In a rather cynical assessment, Jeffrey Herbst blames the absence of inter-state wars because no 
peaceful scenario can come close to equalling the unifying effect that warfare has on a disparate and 
heterogeneous society510. Alas, the new wars of the post-Cold War era are more likely to exacerbate 
existing fissures and cleavages in society rather than rally the people to unite511. Civil wars, which 
have been the predominant form of large-scale violence in Africa in the last decades, often revolve 
around issues of identity and apportioning of resources and thus are the antithesis of state-making 
wars in early modern Europe.  
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Although there were genuine attempts at uncovering local history, for example in newly independent 
Mozambique where ‘Interest Circles in People's History’ were formed in factories, secondary schools 
and communal villages that helped to find precolonial archaeological sites512, another major obstacle 
aspiring African nations have to overcome “is the lack of any shared historical mythology and 
memory on which state elites can set about ‘building’ the nation”513. Following independence, “the 
aspiration to create a state-nation from virtually nothing was stronger than the desire to base new 
states on old nations”514 that had existed prior to the colonial onslaught. In some cases, relying on 
national symbols that hail from the colonial period can actually be advantageous because – much in 
the same way as European languages – these symbols do not belong to any of the distinct groups 
that live in the contemporary state515.  
A slightly incoherent feature of African nationalism is that although there was a strong sense of 
creating a new community that looked towards the future instead of the past, some attempts at 
rekindling a glorious precolonial Africa were nonetheless undertaken. Several countries bear the 
name of historical empires – Zimbabwe, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Malawi, Angola – though for some of 
these the modern state’s territory is anything but congruent with the territory where the presumed 
state-ancestor had its seat and centre of power. Historical Benin, for instance, lay in modern-day 
Nigeria and the Ghana Empire in contemporary Mali and Mauritania. Overall, only very few countries 
retained their colonial names (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Cabo Verde), many other countries chose new 
names from rivers (e.g. Zambezi, Gambia, Niger, Senegal), mountains (Kenya, Sierra Leone), a desert 
(Namib) or a lake (Chad)516.  
In the present, though, given that most of Africa’s postcolonial countries are set to remain 
linguistically heterogeneous, there is reason to be sceptical about “whether they (like their 
predecessors) will create unique national cultures within their boundaries”517. In fact, variations on 
the theme ‘unity-in-diversity’ are part of several African states’ official proclamations of national 
identity. This is especially true for multiethnic countries like Nigeria where in the waning years of 
British suzerainty the future prime minister already designated unity in diversity as the guiding 
principle for a future independent Nigeria518; in Zambia, equally home to a large number of ethnic 
groups, the role of national radio was said to be “to mediate both national unity and national 
diversity”519. A telling example of the lengths to which African states have to go in order to come up 
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with a positive symbol of national identity that does not hold the risk of favouring and/or alienating 
groups in society, is the motto of the new South African Coat of Arms, which proclaims “Diverse 
people unite” in an extinct bushman language rather than any of South Africa’s living tongues520. And 
yet, the title of a controversial and influential book about South African national identity can without 
too much conceit ask the reasonable question: Do South Africans Exist?521. For many African states, 
the analogous question of whether a nation exists in their territory also still remains to be answered. 
4.2.1.3. Nationalism in spite of the state 
Reviewing the relative success of state-led nation-building projects across Africa at the beginning of 
the 1990s, Elaigwu and Mazrui come to the conclusion that single-party states generally fared better 
in creating a unified citizenry than multi-party states522. With the benefit of a further twenty years of 
hindsight, this contention appears much more dubious as some of the countries cited in defence of 
this hypothesis (notably Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon) have experienced internal dissent leading all 
the way to civil war based on issues of national identity. It is however indisputable that in spite of the 
African states’ many failings and the resulting disconnect between citizens and the state, attachment 
to the idea of the nation seems to persist regardless of state performance. “A remarkable 
contemporary paradox is the persistence of an affective attachment to a territorial nationality even 
when the state institutions are derelict. The trauma of the 1990s shows that states may entirely 
collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imaginary”523. 
A striking example is the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo where the state’s presence has 
almost entirely vanished and been replaced by alternative centres of power, yet the feeling of 
belonging to the Congolese nation (and the feeling that others do not belong to it) continues to 
shape local self-identification and has arguably grown stronger over time524. In spite of African states’ 
relatively short life-span, the experience of living in territorially bounded territories along with 
‘softer’ symbols of identification such as the national football team525 or a particular style of popular 
music526 have contributed to the coming-into-their-own of genuine national identities527. Even in 
those instances where the state has by all appearances disappeared from people’s everyday lives, it 
does not mean that the nation-state has lost meaning for its citizens. “Indeed, a positive attachment 
to the ‘nation’ seems often to coexist with a very negative view of the state”528. Hence, we can say, in 
analogy to Eugen Weber’s study of the 19th century transformation of French peasants from ‘savages’ 
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to citizens529, that to some extent the idealistic-cum-self-serving African nation-building projects of 
the 1960s onwards were at least partly successful in turning, for example, the people of Kivu into 
Congolese.  
4.2.1.4. State-driven nationbuilding in Africa – a summary  
The initially inclusive nature of state nationalism in Africa largely failed to take roots in the 
population as easily relatable symbols of national unity, a common language and a common history 
were missing. A homogenous national community agreeing on shared values and goals does not exist 
in Africa530. Moreover, the state did not deliver upon its promises of a better life and thus did not 
deserve adherence to its vision of the nation – though in some cases attachment to the nation 
existed and persisted in spite of the state’s absence. A special class are post-liberation countries in 
which the memory of the liberation struggle and its heroes is glorified and used to strengthen 
cohesion and mobilization. As a rule, othering and the creation of strangers did also not succeed in 
unifying Africans once independence had been attained as the citizens of African states increasingly 
distanced themselves from state-driven national narratives. Instead, alternative loyalties came to the 
fore or were reactivated, which will be the focus of the coming section on the resurgence of 
ethnicity.  
4.2.2. Politicized ethnicity 
In the continuing attempts by African politicians, writers, historians, thinkers etc. to construct and 
develop a national consciousness, a national narrative, tout court a nation in the territories of the 
independent states of post-colonial Africa, the fall and rise of political ethnicity is probably the most 
important factor in the relative failure of state nationalism (depicted above) to lay the foundation for 
a tight link between citizen and state; a failure that is partly a result of African states’ deliberate 
policies towards ethnic groups and traditional authorities in the early post-independence period. 
Politicized ethnicity – in contrast to the state-driven nationbuilding depicted above – is much more of 
a bottom-up process although there are certain overlaps when political entrepreneurs utilize 
ethnicity to garner support.   
4.2.2.1. Invention of Ethnicity 
A highly contentious issue that has indirect bearing on the role of ethnic groups and traditional 
authorities in African nationbuilding and in particular for nationalist history and national myth-
making is the question to what extent chiefs and tribes are actually genuinely local institutions or 
mere colonial puppets, invented to suit the conveniences of indirect rule. Whereas the classical view 
treats ethnicity as a primordial given531, Terence Ranger proposed a counter-narrative:  
Far from there being a single ‘tribal’ identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities, 
defining themselves at one moment as subject of this chief, at another moment as a member of that 
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It was European colonialists that designated a single ‘tribal’ identity on each individual while 
superimposing their own concepts of ‘tribe’. In Tanganyika, for instance, the colonial authorities 
directly encouraged the African population to conceive of themselves and others along ethnic 
lines533. According to Mahmood Mamdani’s hypothesis, tribal leaders were collaborators of the 
(British) colonial state, which was founded on a ‘regime of differentiation’ with a white urban class 
ruling over the peasant masses by help of tribal leaders that functioned as extensions of the colonial 
state534. Crucially, colonialists were able to expand their rule by enforcing customs and restructuring 
tribes according to their own concepts and understandings – which were not those of the indigenous 
Africans – and in numerous cases actually recreated, altered or simply invented supposedly native 
institutions and even tribes: “In Africa, European colonialists reified a certain image of the tribe in 
order to co-opt chieftains whose power they had recently enlarged”535.  
Opponents of this view that treats African ‘tribes’ and chiefs as colonial inventions and therefore 
illegitimate and alien in the eyes of the population argue that it strongly exaggerates the extent of 
invention. Locals and colonialists oftentimes interacted in shaping institutions of customary authority 
which required historical precedents to attain legitimacy. “Far from being created by alien rulers, 
then, tradition was reinterpreted, reformed and reconstructed by subjects and rulers alike”536. Ethnic 
groups were not and are not tantamount to mere interest groups that emerge without a prior basis 
because an ethnic group not only has to 
embrace ideas of intra-intelligibility, of shared language, cultural norms and social institutions, it also 
requires an idea of blood ties and a shared past, of common descent and a history of union. Such 




Related ideas reverberate in a study on Malawi which claims that an ethnic identity designed by the 
colonial administration only developed into an actual ethnic identity “when and where a group of 
African intellectuals were available to give specific cultural definition to the supposed ‘tribe’ and to 
communicate this vision through education”538. Finally, Catherine Boone presents an argument 
diametrically opposite to Mamdani’s, arguing that variations in the post-independence fate of 
intermediary institutions of governance, chiefly chiefs and tribal leaders, “are attributable in very 
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large part to preexisting forms of political authority and other factors external to the colonial state, 
such as lineage structure, land tenure relations, and religion”539. A claim substantiated by a study of 
the Acholi people of Northern Uganda whose ethnic roots are traced to precolonial and pre-19th 
century times540.  
More convincing than either extreme of the debate is the nuanced view that Bruce Berman 
proposes. While the invention of ethnic identities long predates the European arrival, “[t]he modern 
ethnicities of Africa originate in the colonial period, however, and they are both clearly derived from 
the character of pre-colonial societies and profoundly influenced in form, scope and content by the 
social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism”541. The impetus for the fixation of ethnic 
and tribal identities usually came from the colonialists but the way these identities took shape and 
developed was out of their hands. At the end of the day, the origin of present-day ethnic groups is 
not of paramount importance because their most important facet with respect to present-day 
African nation-states is not how they came into existence but the fact that these new identities were 
widely accepted and utilized and thus acquired meaning for groups and individuals542. And it is a 
much less contested historical fact that it was under colonial rule that “*t+he state became the focal 
point for ethnic claims, a role inherited by the post-colonial state”543. 
4.2.2.2. Agitation against ethnic groups: “For the nation to live, the tribe must die”544 
In the aftermath of decolonization and the establishing of independent African states, the promotion 
of an inclusive idea of the nation that all of a state’s inhabitants could adhere to and that was to 
transcend traditional bonds545 was complemented by a negative campaign against tribalism, as the 
new elites “demanded a more or less complete flattening of the ethnic landscape”546. As the main 
threat to cohesion was seen to emanate from ethnic and other communal divisions, governments 
made a deliberate attempt to overcome and deny ethnic and tribal loyalties547. This policy choice was 
not a foregone conclusion because “a strong feeling of ethnicity can obviously coexist with a strong 
sense of national identity”548. Togo’s anti-colonial nationalist movement, for example, was both 
imbued with expressions of Togolese nationalism and Ewe nationalism549 while in Mauritius, an 
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island state where everyone is the descendant of immigrants and ethnic endogamy remains strong, 
“*e+thnic, class-based, and nationalist ideologies are not mutually exclusive” and competition 
between these ideologies as a result mostly peaceful550. Although there is thus no prima facie reason 
to suppose that equally strong identification with ethnic group and nation is ontologically impossible, 
most state organs saw the two as mutually incompatible. In that sense, African nation-states 
mimicked the way in which “*t+he Westphalian territorial state strives for more homogeneity, and *…+ 
is less tolerant of both alternative ethnic or religious communities or unconventional lifestyles”551.  
The overarching appeal and pull of the ideology of modernization in the extended post-war period 
was a major impetus for the drive to render ethnic identities extinct. Modernization’s underlying 
tenet was not only an adoption and recreation of Western societies but by extension also “the ‘total’ 
transformation of premodern societies: their institutions, their cultures and the behaviours they 
promoted”552. Therefore, both progressive and reactionary regimes perceived chiefs as ideological 
opponents who due to their status “as representatives of the old order, and as specialists 
conservatively versed in customary law and chiefly administration, *…+ constituted an obstacle to 
progress and modernization”553. The iconoclastic mood during this period of African Sturm und Drang 
is captured exceedingly well by a description of former British colonies where “many observers 
believed that for all the British support for the chiefs the organizational bourgeoisie would triumph 
after independence while outmoded chiefdoms would simply fade away”554.  
Even ardent anti-colonial activists like Ndabaningi Sithole, who were otherwise highly critical of 
European colonialists, actually praised them for having used their technological superiority to 
forcefully end the incessant tribal wars of precolonial times555. As a result, African constitutions 
wilfully ignored ethnic identities while leaders enforced the nationbuilding project as a tool to retain 
power556. In Guinea, for example, independence was actually preceded by the abolition of customary 
chiefs whom nationalist politicians like Sékou Touré derided as representatives of anti-democratic 
feudalism and keen collaborators of the French colonial bureaucracy557. At the same time, the 
‘ethnically colour-blind’ values proclaimed by official state discourse could be and were in fact 
employed to discredit political challengers as based on ethnic affiliation and therefore subversive and 
illegitimate558.  
In some respect, the state policy of denying political space to ethnic groups and identities was 
successful in pre-empting the type of irredentist strife by ethnic groups separated by state borders 
that has devastated, among other regions, the Balkans and the Caucasus in the 1990s; a notable 
exception being Ethiopia’s majority-Somali region of Ogaden that was the object of an attack by 
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Somalia in the late 1970s559. One of the reasons for the lack of irredentist agitation was that the 
colonial period had set up members of previously united groups on different trajectories by 
integrating them into educational, administrative and linguistic structures – a process further 
catalyzed by anti-colonial national movements that generally relied on trans-ethnic cooperation560.  
In an illustrative example of how borders shape people, Paul Nugent shows how the borders 
between Togo and Cameroon have led to divergent habits among members of the same ethnic group 
in such every-day attributes as dress and food, which has in turn strengthened identification with the 
national as opposed to ethnic identity561. Especially in West Africa, colonial powers have further 
contributed to top-down alienation by designating different official names for members of the same 
ethnic group living on different sides of the border – e.g. Peuls/Fulani, Yoruba/Nago, Tubu/Goranes, 
Kpelle/Guerzé and so on562. Crucially, even if people disagree with existing borders, “there is no way 
of redrawing the map of Africa to create ethnically homogenous nations”563.  
The period of nationalist leaders’ agitation against ethnic ties had its high-point in the aftermath of 
independence in the 1960s but already in the late 1960s there were signs of a ‘retribalization’ of 
society in response to the failure and corruption of African nationalism564. By the 1980s, the anti-
ethnic nationalism had clearly faltered and “*t+he democratic moment which opened about 1990 
largely ended national integration projects which presumed that ethnicity could be, if not eliminated, 
at least confined to an underground private sphere”565. Hence, there is a counter-narrative that 
emphasizes a more nuanced and uneven relationship between the state and traditional authorities 
as representative of ethnic groups.  
On the one hand, post-colonial governments continue to diminish the chiefs’ formal and legal powers 
while, on the other hand, they have created spaces for chiefs in the political system and thus 
elevated their status566. While Ethiopia’s at least nominally ethno-federalist system enshrined in the 
1995 constitution, which dispenses self-governing rights to ethnically defined regions, may still be an 
anomaly in Africa567, there are several countries that feature formal representations of chiefs in the 
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state structure, e.g. in the form of Botswana’s House of Chiefs568. This increased propensity to grant 
official recognition to chiefs has been linked to democratization and the introduction of neo-liberal 
reforms569 but recognition is generally not tantamount to granting chiefs a say in political affairs. 
Most governments that convey recognition on traditional authorities do so on the understanding 
that the chief or king will restrict his or her activities to the realm of culture and custom rather than 
politics. This was, for instance, spelled out unmistakably when Ugandan president Museveni 
reinstated the Kingdom of Buganda570.  
4.2.2.3. Resurgence of political ethnicity  
The predicament faced by the African state of the present, then, is that the reality of ethnic pluralism 
in society frequently translates into a similar plurality of loyalty and thereby undermines the state’s 
pretension to monopolize allegiance571. Nationalist leaders, though fearful of tribal cleavages, clearly 
underestimated the salience of politicized ethnicity572. While there were some countries that sported 
a relatively ethnically homogenous population – “Swaziland had the Swazi people, Lesotho BaSotho, 
Botswana BaTswana, and Somalia the Somalis”573 – ethnic pluralism is the norm on the continent574 
where “*t+he phrase ‘one state – many nationalisms’ *…+ is particularly appropriate in describing the 
new states of Africa”575. Moreover, in addition to ethnic diversity, most African states also do not 
have a dominant ethnic group that constitutes a clear majority of the population and is thus able to 
impose a majoritarian ethnic nationalism on the state akin to European nation-building for instance 
by the French in France576. And in contrast to the states of Europe, “*p+olitically and economically 
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weak African countries have not been well placed to provide incentives to their citizens to identify 
strongly with the new nation, to the exclusion of ethnic allegiances”577. 
The very fact that only less than half of African countries include a question about ethnic identity in 
their national census578 has been taken as an indication that states deliberately ignore ethnic 
identities in order to promote national integration579. Contrary to the popular narrative of a 
widespread reliance on pre-political loyalties580, however, African political parties do not fit neatly 
into the overall picture of an ongoing ethnicisation of state and society. Whereas in some countries 
like Kenya the party system is a close approximation of the country’s ethnic composition, others like 
Ghana and Namibia are dominated by non-ethnic parties581. A study of four Francophone countries 
found only Benin’s party system to be dominated by ethnicized parties whereas for party systems in 
Mali and Burkina Faso ethnicity was not a major factor and Niger was somewhere in between582. And 
South Africa’s Inkatha Freedom Party, once the embodiment of being Zulu, has been on a prolonged 
decline even though Zulu identity is very much thriving583. Ethnicity, though very important, is far 
from being the only common denominator in African politics.  
There is a panoply of theoretical explanations for the ethnic revival in African politics and group 
identification. According to one line of argumentation, the instrumental inclusion of ‘tribes’ in the 
colonial administrative edifice which turned chiefs into salaried, appointed officials of colonial grace 
severely undermined the legitimacy and authority even of those chiefs that had been in power prior 
to colonial intervention584. As chiefs received material benefits from the state in exchange for 
compliance with its wishes, the bond between chiefs and their people came under strain – a good 
example is Côte d’Ivoire where chiefs gained access to diamond markets for personal benefit and in 
consequence lost legitimacy among their folk585.  
As such, the strengthening of ethnic ties often went hand in hand with neopatrimonial attempts to 
seize the state to enrich oneself and one’s ethnic group; an example of such a country is Burundi 
where elites have persistently acted as politico-ethnic entrepreneurs and sought to mobilize ethnic 
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groups to seize the upper hand in exploiting the state586. Moreover, the ossification of hitherto 
flexible ethnic categories by the colonial state and “the massive expansion of a modern form of 
patrimonialism along these newly congealed ethnic lines led to a system in which both political and 
economic factors favoured the ever greater ‘ethnicisation’ of African life”587. In Uganda, for instance, 
the roots of postcolonial ethnic conflicts have been linked to the colonial-era introduction of new 
internal borders and the systematic positive ethnic discrimination in favour of one ethnic group, the 
Buganda588.  
An alternative view apportions part of the blame to nationalist liberation movements that removed 
the white leadership but left the ‘tribal’ leadership intact or even ‘retribalized’ society as a means of 
controlling the countryside by proxy. As a consequence, resistance to the state and the government 
du jour also came to be expressed along ethnic lines589. Independence paradoxically helped to 
restore chiefly authority and legitimacy as the power to dispense resources shifted to the state, and 
as a consequence “chiefs could, and did, recover a measure of moral authority, which in due course 
placed them on a collision course with the post-colonial state”590. More importantly, though, the 
African state’s failure to deliver on its promise of development has led to a dramatic loss of 
legitimacy for the modern state in its citizens’ eyes (see Ch. 4.1.2 ‘The Illegitimate State’). As a result, 
people have turned (or returned) to chiefs as figures of authority since “the more the state in Africa 
fails to fulfil the expectations of its citizens, the more people seem to turn to solutions to former 
institutions among which are chiefdoms and chiefs”591. Africans – especially but not only those living 
outside the cities – turn to communitarian structures like clan or ethnic group because they have 
very little interaction with the state592 and the idea of a national community therefore does not 
concur with most people’s actual experiences which are  overwhelmingly local593.  
The chiefs’ resurgence can be placed in a wider narrative where the concept of the state is rapidly 
going out of favour in a process of “the ‘political tribalization’ and ‘cultural ethnicization’ of social 
order”594. And even where the state directly impacts people’s lives, the presence of ethnic counter 
institutions can have an empowering effect on citizens. One example is Niger where the 
reintroduction of chiefs into the administrative hierarchy by the democratically elected government 
in the 1990s has created persistent competition between chiefs and the lower levels of the 
administration in the field of land rights. This has allowed claimants to play off chiefs and 
administrators and pick and choose the authority most congenial to their own interests595. Fay, on 
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the other hand, describes the Malian chiefs’ return to political prominence not as re-
traditionalisation but as an autonomous and essentially modern way of organising authority in which 
Western and African ideas are amalgamated596. An example of such hybridity is Ghana, where a 
growing number of chiefs are actually return migrants that have lived in Europe or America and thus 
bridge the realms of tradition and Western modernity597.  
Moreover, state-led assaults on utterances of ethnic identity failed spectacularly in attaining their 
objective since “*s]tate intolerance towards ethnic rituals does not usually lead to popular support 
for state rituals, but rather to the creation of ethnic countercultures”598. Among the Dogon in Mali, 
for instance, public spectacles with masked men and women multiplied after the introduction of an 
official state-appointed mayor in an apparent show of force of traditional affiliations599. Furthermore, 
disaffection for economic reasons leads ethnic groups to turn “to ethnonationalism due to alienation 
from the central government, especially minority groups who are peripheralized in the economic and 
political dispensations in their polities”600. Treading the same line in their focus on the economic 
motives behind the activation of ethnic identities, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars have portrayed 
tribalism as an ideology and “a mark of false consciousness on the part of the supposed tribesmen” 
that are unwittingly being exploited601. Tribalism is seen as a mask that obscures the actual  
underlying motives of economic exploitation: “there is often a non-traditional wolf under the tribal 
sheepskin”602. Alas, it is not necessary to imply malicious intent or blindness on the part of traditional 
authorities and those that respect them. Thomas Eriksen rightly stresses the contingency of identity 
politics and the fact that “people are loyal to ethnic, national, or other imagined communities not 
because they were born into them, but because such foci of loyalty promise to offer something 
deemed meaningful, valuable, or useful”603.  
We need to be careful, though, not to overstate the strength of political ethnicity, which oftentimes 
constitutes a formidable power bloc inside a state’s domestic political arena. Although it is true that 
ethnicity is always present in some form in violent uprisings against the state as “*v+irtually all African 
insurgencies *…+ draw to some degree on ethnic differentiation within the state concerned”604, 
ethnicity is hardly ever the sole factor to drive rebellion and rarely in and by itself poses a challenge 
to state integrity. “In fact, instances where a separate state has been sought concern not ethnic 
groups, but regions representing coalitions of groups – Eritrea, Southern Sudan, Biafra, Katanga – and 
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in one instance clans – Somaliland”605. Somaliland is a particularly interesting case in this regard 
because its inhabitants are almost all ethnic Somalis. The driving impetus for the declaration of 
independence was the disappearance of the Somali state much more than the strength of a separate 
Somaliland identity606.  
Descriptions of conflicts as ethnic also need to be treated with caution because this can be, in cases 
like the war in Angola607, a deliberate ploy to deflect attention away from the primarily political or 
economic causes of conflict. Additionally, the rapid urbanization of African societies and in particular 
the rise of mega-cities like Kinshasa, Nairobi, Dakar, Luanda, Johannesburg, Lagos and others affects 
the individual’s identification with ethnic as opposed to other ties (class, profession, neighbourhood, 
generation, nation, etc.). But as Bjornson observed in the mid-1980s, while moving to or growing up 
in the cities may weaken ethnic allegiance, the vast majority of Africans retain at least some sense of 
ethnic belonging608. The continued stream of migrants from the countryside to the cities helps to 
maintain a sense of belonging among earlier migrant communities. In South Africa, for example, 
“new cohorts of urbanizers help to keep urban ethnicity alive”609.  
4.2.2.4. Political ethnicity and the nation – a summary 
There are hardly any states in Africa today that do not have to contend with local strongmen that 
constitute rival power centres in society and which continue to play a large role in people’s lives, 
providing them with identities such as clan and ethnicity that clash with the state’s efforts to shape 
popular definitions of identity and to ensure loyalty and attachment to the national body610. The 
state’s attempt to deny any space for ethnic identities in the framework of the nation contributed 
decisively to drive people back into the arms of their ethnic identity – irrespective of whether these 
identities are colonial inventions or authentically African. This holds in particular for the rural 
majority outside the cities and for pastoralist communities that both remain largely outside the 
purview of the state. In a number of cases, ethnic communities have added ideas of blood ties to 
previously more fluid notions of group identity. In spite of this surge of ethnic mobilization, both 
ethnic separatism and cross-border irredentism are the exception in Africa as the focus of political 
ethnicity has been the nation-state and – as will be addressed in the subsequent section on ‘new 
nationalism’ – the local level.  
4.2.3. The ‘new’ exclusive nationalism 
Whereas the mobilization of ethnicity in African politics has been the most substantial challenge to 
the nation-state and in particular to the African nation from within, there are other features of 
identity – some related to ethnicity, some not – that impact citizens’ association with the nation, 
with the state and with each other. What unites these aspects of the ‘new nationalism’ is that they 
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all deal with questions of personal and group identity that are of high emotional but also practical 
pertinence for those affected. Starting in 4.2.3.1 with an outlook on the exclusionary politics of 
nationbuilding and citizenship characteristic of the new nationalism then in 4.2.3.2 turning to the 
politics of autochthony and belonging, I will in 4.2.3.3 focus on religion and nationbuilding and in 
4.2.3.4 concentrate on processes of justice and reconciliation before giving a brief summary in 
4.2.3.5. 
4.2.3.1. Exclusionary nationalism and citizenship: the politics of ‘who is who’ 
By the 1990s, the nature of nationalism and identity politics had radically changed across much of 
Africa as what Claude Ake coined the ‘new nationalism’611 proved to be remarkably different from 
that of the early 1960s612. Flying in the face of pleas that acceptance of cultural diversity is essential 
to the survival of reconstituted African nation-states613, contemporary ‘uncivil nationalism’614  shows 
a tendency to exclude rather than to include populations, resulting in alienation and xenophobia615. 
In the modern setting the concepts of citizenship and population have been disentangled and split, 
juxtaposing what Chatterjee calls the homogeneous and indivisible construct of the nation with the 
heterogeneous construct of the social616. At the same time, society is not any more beholden to the 
territoriality of the nation-state: globalization has also touched the African continent and has meant 
that individuals’ identification is less connected to a specific location617. 
Yet, even in the earlier period of inclusive nationalism, there had been some instances of deliberate 
‘othering’ and exclusion. The Asian minority in East Africa of mostly Indian descent had to serve as 
the negative other for post-colonial nationalism. Idi Amin’s expulsion of all ethnic Indians from 
Uganda was only the most notorious act that designated Indians as not belonging to the national 
community. Similar rhetoric along with discriminatory action was also employed in both Kenya and 
Tanzania618. The Lebanese in West Africa have to some extent faced the similar issue of not belonging 
to the ‘black’ African nation619. There is therefore only so much novelty in new nationalism since the 
distrust shown towards ethnic groups can be seen as a precursor to the more extreme exclusion of 
individuals and groups from citizenship and the national community. Zambians belonging to other 
ethnic groups are, for example, irritated by the degree of reverence the Lozi show to their king, 
which is taken as proof of “why a Lozi must never be allowed or trusted to become President of 
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Zambia”620. Thus, the strengthening of ethnic loyalties mentioned above may contribute indirectly to 
more exclusionary practices by other societal groups (including other ethnic groups) that are 
suspicious of people’s true loyalties: to the nation or to their particular group?621   
One of the driving forces behind the activation of ethnicity and the exclusionary new nationalism lies 
in the demise of post-colonial nation-building projects and the high-stakes struggles over state power 
and resources in the wake of political openings622. The ‘wave of democratization’ that swept across 
Africa since around 1990 played a significant part in the (re-)activation of ethnicity as ruling elites 
manipulated ethnicity as a means to cling to power: “‘Government by the people’ requires a 
definition of the people and thus raises issues of identity”623. Defining citizenship all of a sudden 
becomes much more crucial when each citizen is also one vote. Hence, based on an analysis of post-
election violence in Kenya, Branch and Cheeseman argue that “[w]ithout certain prerequisites such 
as basic state capacity, the effective rule of law, and an agreed national identity the reintroduction of 
multi-partyism may exacerbate underlying tensions which the state is powerless to manage”624.  
In other cases, though, the state is not powerless but itself the instigator and perpetrator of 
exclusion. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda can therefore be read as the desperate attempt 
by Hutu extremists to cling to power in the face of economic crisis and international pressure to 
democratize the political system625. Côte d’Ivoire’s vicious struggle over ivoirité is the most 
prominent recent case of deliberate denial of citizenship for political purposes. The government of 
Laurent Gbagbo reneged on the old vision of the country as a melting pot and waged a vicious 
propaganda campaign against immigrants, many of whom had lived most of their lives in the country, 
in order to keep them from electoral registers and thereby ensure victory at the polls626. Apart from 
being about sheer power, the rebellion that sprung up against Côte d’Ivoire’s president Gbagbo was 
a war of ‘who is who’ about “the redefinition of the content of citizenship”627.  
These events are echoed by the bouts of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa 
where anti-immigrant riots have targeted and lynched migrant workers from neighbouring countries. 
Xenophobia is driven by the South African state’s own rhetoric against migrant workers as “the 
hegemonic discourse of nationalism was one which equated democracy with the exclusion of 
foreigners from citizenship rights”628. In addition to migrant workers, refugees from war-torn 
neighbouring countries can also serve as a convenient outlet for collective acts of brutality as for 
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example in Guinea in the year 2000 when the country’s president incited Guineans to act against 
refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia629.  
But the ‘other’ can also take the form of discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation. 
Tanzania provides a fitting example of the first. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the government 
party TANU’s youth wing orchestrated several public campaigns against what it considered ‘indecent 
dress’, which mostly meant women that wore mini-skirts. These campaigns ought to be seen in the 
context of the government’s attempt to establish and impose its concept of national culture 
conceived of as a mélange of tribal traditions and modernity, to which mini-skirts, among others, 
served as the negative other630. Similarly, the official discourse of what the exemplary woman ought 
to be like is critical for national identity in Mali631. A more universal ‘other’ in this regard are 
homosexuals that are not only shunned in society but victims of discriminatory legislation (Uganda, 
Nigeria, Mauritania and many more632). The attacks against homosexuals are interesting because 
they are often accompanied by anti-Western rhetoric: homosexuality (like the territorial nation-
state) is vilified as a cultural import from the morally corrupt West633. Thus, what makes the new 
nationalism so perfidious is that anything and everything can be chosen as a signifier of unacceptable 
difference.  
4.2.3.2. Autochthony: the politics of ‘who was here first’ 
A truly novel development that has gripped an increasing number of African states in the last twenty-
odd years is the rise of debates over autochthony and the politics of belonging, i.e. the question of 
who rightly belongs to the national community and who does not. Autochthony hereby means the 
indigenous, original, native (and therefore rightful) inhabitants, a loaded concept that becomes more 
complicated still by the processes of urbanization and migration that characterize many African 
countries in the present. The reason why the autochthony discourse matters so much to our analysis 
of the African statebuilding and nationbuilding experience is “what seems to be a crucial dimension 
in all autochthony’s variations: its crucial but volatile relation with the nation-state and the idea of 
national citizenship”634. Not only does the national community exclude rather than include potential 
members, sub-national and local communities do much the same in deciding who is ‘one of us’ and 
who is not.  
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Generally speaking, the resort to autochthony represents a break with the African past and a reversal 
of the traditional norm of inclusiveness. Going back to pre-colonial times, a society’s strength was 
measured by wealth in people as opposed to the wealth in things typical for Eurasian societies635. 
Therefore, rulers tended to facilitate the accession and integration of strangers into the community, 
e.g. by way of ritualized and institutionalized forms of adoption, because it was a means to increase 
their power636. On the other hand, Carola Lentz shows that for parts of Ghana and Burkina Faso the 
issue of land ownership has been tied to first-comer status since as far back as the 18th century637. 
And struggles over land between white settler communities and autochthonous inhabitants in what 
is today South Africa were already in the 18th and 19th century about more than just access to a vital 
economic commodity. For both newcomers and incumbents, these struggles were just as much 
about who rightfully belonged and about an assertion or loss of identity638.  
For most parts of the continent, however, the introduction of property rights and other privileges 
that are tied to ‘being autochthonous’ have created a rupture as “land and land rights play an 
important role in the politics of belonging in Africa due to the fact that rights to land are intimately 
tied to membership in specific communities”639. Peter Geschiere relates the fate of the Maka, a 
forest community in Cameroon, which had been very open and inventive in creating kinship links. As 
soon as ownership of the (very valuable) forest became tied to the status as indigenous inhabitants, 
villagers began to question each other’s claims to belonging, shattering the previous openness640. 
Autochthony as the main criterion for rights is also problematic for certain groups that are clearly 
indigenous yet do not qualify for the status of an autochthonous group because the state as the 
ultimate judge of belonging decides otherwise. This affects in particular pastoralist and other non-
sedentary groups with little clout like the Baka ‘Pygmies’ of Cameroon that cannot be tracked as 
easily by the state and appear to lack the close tie to a specific plot of land that is so crucial to the 
discourse of autochthony641. The same applies to the indigenous Twa in Congo which are 
discriminated against by a land regime that does not recognize the rights of nomadic groups and 
collectives as well as by the fees and literacy required to obtain title deeds642.  
On the local level, then, interest in autochthony and ‘being indigenous’ stems from a search for 
prosperity and security of tenure amidst underdevelopment and a non-delivering state. After all, 
most of the rural masses did not develop an attachment to the nation which went beyond expected 
benefits. “The jubilant crowds celebrating independence were not inspired by a ‘national 
consciousness’ *…+ They were inspired by the hope of more and better food and shelter”643. 
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Competing claims to land encourage the politicization of identity as a means to protect and promote 
claims to ethnic terroir644. Functional concerns, most importantly access to land and forest, also 
inspire the redefinition of ethnicity: “While some communities may be willing to accept new 
members as a bolster to their numbers and political weighting, others may reject hangers-on if they 
view them to be a drain on community resources”645. But the language of autochthony has also 
become popular in places where no obvious motive for gain is involved. In this way, the dichotomy 
between ‘sons of the soil’ and ‘strangers’ has become a standard trope of conversations and media 
discourse in the Democratic Republic of Congo, partly as a defensive mechanism directed against all 
Rwandan speakers because Rwanda is one of the sponsors of war in the country646.  
In the course of the growing importance of and reference to the status of being native and 
indigenous to a locality, a new distinction between national citizenship and local citizenship has been 
observed, with the latter the primary locus of autochthony discourse: “While national citizenship 
rarely – if at all – discriminates between groups, or between men and women, local citizenships are 
segmented to the detriment of certain categories of people”647. Abah and Okwori tell the story of 
Agaba who has lived in Kano in Northern Nigeria for over 30 years where he has fathered twelve 
children. Yet these children are denied scholarships at university on the grounds that ‘they are not 
from Kano’648. The confusing and potentially bloody kaleidoscope of citizenship is well-characterized 
by Nyamnjoh’s depiction of migrants in Southern Africa that are “trapped in cosmopolitan spaces in a 
context where states and their hierarchy of ‘privileged’ citizens, ethnic minorities and others who 
straddle borders are bound to feel like travellers in permanent transit”649. This construction of local 
(or localized) communities and local citizenship is not only a bottom-up grassroots project by the 
local populations themselves. The state, international development agencies, conservationist groups 
or industrial companies may all participate in the creation of community and local citizenship650.  
Moreover, there appears to be an intimate link between the politics of autochthony and overbearing 
and authoritarian structures of governance since “the appeal to the indigenous often becomes an 
appeal to diachronic oppressive social structures”651. Irrespective of whether it is spurred by 
grassroots movements or orchestrated from the top, accentuating autochthony in the political 
sphere and emphasizing the disparity in rights, citizenship status and social standing between 
indigènes and allogènes has a high incidence of leading to outbreaks of violence652. Bronwen Manby 
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argues how violence has been sparked by the denial of citizenship rights to large numbers of people. 
This argument is backed by a telling quote from an Ivoirian fighter which leads off her book: “We 
needed a war because we needed our identity cards”653. The greater incidence of autochthony-
inspired violence is thus not a coincidence. Autochthony and statehood are closely intertwined in 
that the state seeks to justify its existence by creating crises that it then proceeds to provide 
solutions for. Discourses of autochthony provide an excellent pretext for the state to act as arbiter 
between different local groups – if need be by force654.   
4.2.3.3. Religion and the nation: fighting for adherents  
Religion has not played a formative role in the construction of African nations in the period since 
decolonization. Yet, while religion did not constitute the kernel of the aspiring African territorial 
nation-states, it has in several countries played a key part in undermining and subverting national 
unity. In a sense, priests, mullahs, sheikhs and shamans are just as much a challenge to national unity 
and the state’s paramount role as the embodiment of the nation as tribal chiefs (although in some 
cases they may be identical). The two major world religions, Christianity and Islam, are also the two 
biggest creeds on the African continent.  
A number of countries more or less equally split between Muslims and Christians (the Sahel zone is a 
rough dividing line) have experienced contestation in which conflict over ownership of the state 
becomes conflated with struggles over ownership of the nation and what it represents. Two 
prominent examples are Nigeria and Tanzania, both of which have roughly the same number of 
Christians as Muslims. Nigeria is sharply divided geographically between a predominantly Muslim 
North and a predominantly Christian South that compete for ownership of the state655. For many 
Nigerians their sense of belonging to a religious group triumphs over their attachment to citizenship 
and the national identity656. Religion works similar to ethnicity in defining an individual’s and a 
group’s place in the state’s neo-patrimonial pecking order and this instrumental view of religious 
belonging as a ticket to resources also “explains why ethnicity sometimes takes precedence over 
religion, and vice versa”657. In Tanzania, on the other hand, political liberalization, growing social 
inequality along with the state’s contraction opened up conflict over the content of national identity 
which crystallized along the Muslim-Christian divide658. Both Christian and Muslim organizations 
launched direct challenges to the secular nation-state659.  
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But there is also a more principled opposition between organized religion and the territorial African 
nation. One of the motivating stimuli for the political mobilization of African Muslims as Muslims is 
the perceived failure of the secular nation-state associated with the West660. Movements like 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram, commonly translated as ‘Western education is sacrilegious’661, explicitly target 
institutions associated with the Western state like state schools but also fellow Muslims that they 
deem to be insufficiently devout662. A major tenet of fundamentalist Islam that has been on the rise 
in Africa and beyond from roughly the 1960s663 is the supremacy of the Umma, the community of 
believers, over worldly states. This doctrine thus directly contradicts the territoriality of the national 
community claimed by the nation-state. Not coincidentally, the closest the African continent has 
come to a theocracy – the Union of Islamic Courts that ruled the rump state of Somalia until ousted 
by Ethiopia’s army in 2006664 – was in an area where state control has virtually collapsed. The 
northern half of Mali where in 2012 a mélange of Tuareg separatists and jihadis unilaterally declared 
the Islamic Republic of Azawad was well on the way to recreating a similar theocratic dictatorship 
before the French army intervened665.  
Regarding Christianity, as a heritage of the subdivision of African colonies into separate spheres of 
activity for different missionary organisations (Uganda being the prime example) in addition to more 
recent proselytization efforts by mostly American Evangelicals, many majority Christian countries 
exhibit a variety of Christian denominations not unlike Switzerland or the Netherlands. Churches 
therefore do not speak with one voice and actually compete with each other which somewhat 
weakens their ability to act as a unifying symbol of the nation. An exception is the Ethiopian church 
which under Emperor Haile Selassie became autocephalic and was transformed into a symbol of the 
nation666. Alas, Christianity can also turn genocidal as, infamously, the Catholic Church was complicit 
in targeting ethnic Tutsi during the Rwandan genocide667 while the Central African Republic has been 
witnessing since late 2013 the targeted lynching of Muslim citizens by Christians as a form of 
collective punishment for the crimes committed by the Muslim Séléka rebel movement668.  
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4.2.3.4. Justice and Reconciliation  
For the special category of countries that have experienced civil war or other forms of substantial 
violence of citizens against each other, the question of how to atone for the crimes committed while 
at the same time enabling a collective future is inevitably part of efforts to create or recreate a 
national community and national identity. The key problem that each country has to face is on the 
one hand how to balance between the countervailing poles of justice and reconciliation and on the 
other whether to rely on an international or at least external institution or broker or whether to seek 
indigenous and crypto-traditional solutions.  
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has become emblematic across the continent 
and indeed the globe as a model of success: in exchange for a wide-ranging amnesty, former 
perpetrators of crimes during the apartheid regime had to come clear and confess their involvement 
to a public body. This approach was explicitly meant as a contribution to nationbuilding as “*t+ruth 
commissions, like all nation-building processes, construct a revised national history and *…+ write into 
being a new ‘collective memory’”669. Yet, while being able to voice their grievances was important to 
many victims, a major problem of the South African process has been that truthtelling has not been 
accompanied by compensation for past victims, leaving many feeling slighted and disaffected670. In 
the wake of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda for its part pursued a unique path in reinventing a traditional 
form of conflict resolution called gacaca courts which were set up all over the country and run by the 
community – not professional judges or lawyers. This system was successful in alleviating the backlog 
of cases, in creating popular ownership of the process and in some areas enabled restorative justice 
and a first step on the long road to healing671, but it also opened the doors to arbitrary arrests, lack of 
fairness and accusations of victors’ justice carried out by the Tutsi-led government against the 
Hutu672.  
Other countries like Sierra Leone tried a combined approach by employing traditional methods of 
reconciliation as part of their post-war healing process. However, although the country’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission involved traditional authorities, “it largely eschewed local rituals of 
cursing, cleansing and purification, which may have limited its ability to induce confessions and effect 
reconciliation”673. In Mozambique, on the other hand, the two parties to the civil war opted for “a 
culture of denial”, which in turn led to the emergence of grassroot practices to fill the void. Practices 
that are rooted in the evocation of spirits to cope with the memories of violence and injustice674.  
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Yet another route taken is to refer cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague – as 
happened, among other cases, in Liberia and the DRC – which has the advantage of preventing 
revenge justice and minimizing the threat of a renewed escalation of violence surrounding the trial. 
But it also effectively means that locally there is less of a sense of closure, especially if as for example 
in Côte d’Ivoire only a few high-profile figures are prosecuted while the vast majority of perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity continue to live in splendid impunity675. Finally, the International Criminal 
Court can involuntary help to galvanize the national community as has been happening in Kenya 
whose president Uhuru Kenyatta is sought for instigating ethnic violence following the national 
elections in 2007 but has successfully used the indictment to boost his standing at home and on the 
continent as the African Union resolved that African heads of state ought to be exempt from the 
ICC676.  
4.2.3.5. The New Nationalism – a summary 
In contrast to early post-independence nationalism, the ‘new nationalism’ in Africa is characterized 
by the designation and exclusion of ‘strangers’ that do not belong to the national community. 
Maintaining control over the levers of power in systems with free elections is a key driver for these 
top-down manipulations of citizenship. A similar logic informs the tendency to have more closed 
definitions of ethnic and local belonging in an environment where being indigenous can be a source 
of privilege and property; but autochthony is just as much a source of disunity and conflict. Religion, 
meanwhile, though only rarely an ally of state nationalism, has been a major factor in undermining 
nationbuilding by stirring sectarian violence and providing an alternative supra-national identity to 
compete with the territorialized nation-state. Processes of justice and reconciliation in countries that 
had witnessed large-scale internal violence are crucial for national cohesion yet have a decidedly 
mixed record regardless of which indigenous or international model has been pursued.  
4.3. The African nation-state vis-à-vis the European nation-state 
As the description of developmental trends in African political and social organization from colonial 
times to the present (Chapter 3) and the typology of postcolonial African states and nations (Ch. 4.1 
& 4.2) have amply demonstrated, the typical and typified African nation-state differs substantially 
both from the ideal-type and the reality of the Western European nation-state. This section is meant 
to point out the similarities and especially the differences in a comprehensive manner so as to justify 
once more the choice of contrasting South Sudan’s evolution as a state and nation to its African 
peers rather than to the standard model of statehood and nationhood derived from the peculiar 
historical circumstances of (Western) Europe.  
The typified postcolonial African state and its governing elites clearly strive for a replication of the 
idealized European-style state in trying to establish hegemony in society, a modern welfare state, 
centralized authority and a monopoly of violence. In actual fact, however, the postcolonial African 
state diverges substantially from its declared aim and self-image and from the European example. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences. Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008, 
pp. 61-83, pp. 80-81.  
675
 Singh, Param-Preet. Turning Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious International Crimes in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Human Rights Watch, April 2013. 
676
 Mueller, Susanne D., “Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law”, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, pp. 25-42.  
105 
 
For one, control over the state’s territory was not acquired or won on its own accord – either 
militarily or otherwise – but handed over and gifted by the exiting metropolitan colonial powers. In 
contrast to international sovereignty which was granted without conditions or the need to prove 
genuine statehood (by whatever criteria), domestically the typified African state is far from 
possessing a monopoly of violence as alternative actors persist on the state’s soil. Moreover, the 
state generally lacks legitimacy among the populace due to its failure or inability to deliver the 
services and benefits of a modern welfare state and the lack of democratic accountability. 
Frequently, the state institutions bequeathed by the colonialists have not changed their authoritarian 
and oppressive modus operandi. In fact, in contrast to the European model, state and society are not 
separate but closely intertwined. Corruption and state capture for private or group interests and 
enrichment are rife as a distinct public ethos among state employees is clearly lacking while power 
and resources are concentrated in the hands of a few powerbrokers in the capital. 
Much the same can be said for the contrast between nationalism and nationhood in Europe and 
Africa whose leaders imported the concept of territorialized national unity. Parallels exist in the 
initially elite-driven nature of nationalism designed to trickle down to wider strata of society through 
education and public spectacles as well as in the designation of external and internal enemies as a 
negative other to strengthen group cohesion. Attempts to suppress alternative loyalties to entities 
other than the territorial nation-state are likewise a common feature of both continents. In contrast 
to Europe, however, the dissemination of state nationalism generally remained an elite project that 
met with little appreciation and take-up by the population at large that instead – disappointed and 
disillusioned with the postcolonial state and its leaders – sought refuge in non-state identities, 
frequently ethnic groups. Othering also proved divisive rather than unifying. Once the immediate 
memory of colonial oppression had worn off, states in their search for a new ‘other’ turned less to 
neighbouring states – irredentism being a very rare occurrence on the continent – but to groups on 
the inside. Yet, differentiating between those that are ‘true’ nationals and those that for various 
reasons, e.g. membership in a different ethnic or religious group or alleged lack of ties to the land, 
are deemed to belong to a lesser degree to the nation did not succeed in creating a homogenous 
national community. A crucial factor herein is the ethnic diversity found in most African countries 
which makes majoritarian nationbuilding on the European model prohibitively challenging. Finally, 
wars may have been instrumental in forging states and nations in Europe but in Africa most wars 
divide rather than unite since they are fought within and not between countries and involve a variety 
of non-state parties that also target the civilian population.  
Hence, in the coming chapters it will emerge how and to what extent South Sudan abides by the 
typology of the African nation-state of the postcolonial era, which should furnish more valuable 




5. A very brief history of South Sudan 
Akin to the historical overview of trends and lines of development in African history (Chapter 3), this 
chapter is meant to introduce some broad lines of historical developments that have shaped the area 
of Africa that is today the territory of the Republic of South Sudan as well as the peoples that inhabit 
South Sudan. All in all, this introduction to South Sudan’s history is to facilitate the understanding of 
the concepts and conundrums that will show up in the coming chapters that analyse the South 
Sudanese state and nation through the lens of the typology developed in the preceding chapters on 
postcolonial African statehood and nationhood. What is more, while each of the analytical chapters 
on the South Sudanese nation-state will make mention of particular episodes or historical turning 
points that are relevant for the respective argument, in order to assess and locate specific events in 
the grander scheme of South Sudanese history the reader can return to this brief outline. As a matter 
of course, this section relies on secondary literature and rather than striving for novelty of argument, 
I will concentrate on those things that I take to be pertinent to contemporary developments in the 
country. History in this reading mostly refers to political history understood, however, so as to 
encompass anything with a lasting effect on the local, regional or national organization of political 
authority, i.e. slave raiding may be deemed social or economic history but is clearly of political 
relevance then and now. 
When discussing and analyzing the history of South Sudan, it is inevitable to look at and consider 
Sudanese history writ-large. For by far the largest part of its modern history, South Sudan has been 
shaped by the political union with what is today the Republic of Sudan. South Sudan’s status as a 
disadvantaged, minoritarian and exploited constituent part of a greater political unit – be it Ottoman 
Egypt, the British Empire or independent Sudan – clearly conditioned events to such an extent that 
leaving out a depiction of South Sudan’s geopolitical environment would be a sign of ignorance. 
Including the historical circumstances that shaped the South from outside and triggered Southern 
reaction is, however, not tantamount to denying agency to the inhabitants of Equatoria, Bahr al-
Ghazal, Upper Nile etc. altogether. As a matter of fact, establishing a history of South Sudan 
independent of perspectives shaped either by Western anthropologists or Northern historians is a 
vital task for intellectuals and politicians alike in contemporary South Sudan and constitutes a major 
step toward the construction of a genuine nation-state (see Chapter 7.1 on Nationbuilding).  
While the focus will lie on the more recent historical past, several historical events from the more 
distant past are referred to because they are held to be of continuing import to present-day South 
Sudan and South Sudanese. Divided into four sections, I will start in 5.1 with a look at pertinent 
events from South Sudan’s precolonial history to the end of British colonialism in 1956, then in 5.2 
look at the Anya-nya rebellion and the Southern Regional Government until the resumption of war in 
1983, move on to 5.3 and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)’s war against Khartoum and the 
intra-Southern fighting in the 1990s all the way until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 before in 5.4 dealing swiftly with the main events of the period of investigation in 
this research project, i.e. the CPA period from John Garang’s death until independence and the 
rebellion in 2013/14.  
Beforehand, the next page shows the two Sudans on a contemporary map courtesy of Media and 






5.1. Precolonial times to Sudanese independence in 1956 
The history of South Sudan as it has been narrated by mostly non-South Sudanese historians, 
archaeologists and anthropologists, habitually starts in 1821 when Muhammad Ali’s troops 
conquered the Funj Sultanate of Sinnar in Northern Sudan and began to establish Ottoman rule over 
the territories of the pre-2011 Sudan677. For the pre-colonial period, it used to be said that “*i+t is 
impossible to reconstruct any history of the past of the southern Sudan”678. In recent decades, some 
attempts have been made in combining archaeological evidence with oral histories to look behind 
the precolonial curtain. Of these, Sarah Beswick’s work is arguably the most impressive (and 
audacious) in that it traces Dinka history to 14th and 15th century migrations from the Gezira in 
Northern Sudan to their present-day abodes679. These histories, however, even at their best shed a 
light only on the collective memory of one particular ethnic group and are not conducive to a 
national history of South Sudan as opposed to a history of, say, the Zande680 or the Shilluk681.  
Even though 1821 is the customary starting point of (South) Sudanese historiography, it was only in 
1839-40 that a Turkish sailor managed to navigate the previously impenetrable Sudd swamps on the 
White Nile and thereby opened up the Southern Sudan to traders682 who, failing to find much ivory, 
resorted to raiding slaves for markets in Egypt and the Middle East683. Hence, the North-South divide 
in Sudan in its earliest forms dates to the aftermath of the Turco-Egyptian conquest (the so-called 
Turkiyya) as harsher demands in taxation led to hardship in the North, which was one of the main 
factors for the expansion of slave raiding and trading684. The presence of the Egyptian state was 
manifested in fortified garrisons (zariba), which are in many cases, including the capital Juba, the 
precursors to the modern-day towns in South Sudan.  
Egyptian rule came to an end in Sudan when an army raised by Muhammad Ahmad, who had 
revealed himself to be the Mahdi, i.e. the returning prophet, swept away the Egyptian armies and 
their British aides in the early 1880s. While parts of Southern Sudan were affected by the Mahdiyya, 
a time that according to Francis Deng is remembered among Dinka as ‘the spoiling of the world’, 
large parts of the South were unaffected and “[t]he worst most Southern Sudanese were subjected 
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to were the occasional foraging parties of Mahdist armies based in the north or in Equatoria”685. A 
Nuer army in fact conclusively defeated a Mahdist force near Tonj in 1895686. 
Following the downfall of the Mahdist state in 1898 and the reconquista of Sudan by the British (who 
established a nominal condominium with Egypt), the pervasive and persistent southern resistance 
and the British government’s view of the people of the South as savages led the British to appoint 
military men (so-called ‘bog barons’) as administrators in the South for the first two decades of 
condominium rule687. This ‘pacification’ campaign led to expeditions against Dinka, Nuer, Anuak and 
Beir that were first carried out from 1910-13688. British colonial rule in Southern Sudan in the initial 
period consisted in little other than punitive excursions (mostly staffed by Northern Sudanese or 
Ugandan soldiers) with ample use of brute and homicidal force to subjugate the population. Apart 
from that, “throughout the Southern Sudan during the 1920s colonial presence was confined to 
riverbanks and on the northern and southern fringes of pastoral country”689 as the number of 
Europeans per province could be counted on one hand. Outside of the central region, political 
control of the British was typically much less tight than imperial self-conceptions would have it.  
Formalised in 1930 with the introduction of Closed Districts Ordinances, the British pursued what 
became known as the ‘Southern Policy’, which effectively separated the Southern provinces from the 
North in administrative matters but also opened up the South to Christian missionaries while 
expelling Northern traders (jalaba) whose permits were not renewed. Kenneth Henderson, who 
worked for the Sudan Political Service, describes the thinking of British authorities that inspired the 
exclusion of Northerners from the Sudan: Northerners were seen as either raiders or poachers, while 
Northern traders were taking advantage of Nilotes by selling overpriced and useless goods, spreading 
venereal diseases and generally standing in the way of progress690.  
British support for Sudanese self-government after the Second World War was a tactical move to 
dispel Egyptian claims to the Sudan in the immediate post-war period. When Egypt renounced its 
claims after the 1952 revolution, Britain could not halt the momentum for Sudanese independence 
while paying no attention to the situation in the South. “In the end, what was negotiated for the 
South was the transfer of the colonial structure intact from Britain to the northern Sudanese 
nationalists”691. A cornerstone in this transition from Southern Policy to reintegration of the two 
unequal halves was the Juba Conference in 1947 between Southern chiefs and representatives of the 
North. While the details of the two-day event are hotly contested up to the present day692, it is 
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certain that after rejecting integration into an independent Sudan on the first day, Southern chiefs 
agreed to it on the second and final day of the meeting.  
5.2. Anyanya rebellion to the end of the Southern regional government in 1983 
After the first Sudanese elections in 1953 in which the hastily founded Southern Party competed as 
sole representative of the Southern provinces, the Sudanization of the civil service introduced the 
theme of Southern marginalization in independent Sudan as Southerners – for lack of qualification as 
much as for Northern discriminatory selection procedures – only received a few subaltern posts in 
the state’s administrative structure693. Parliament in Khartoum was dominated by two political 
parties, both affiliated to Muslim sects, that have persisted as stalwarts of Sudanese politics ever 
since: the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) relying on support from the Khatmiyya order and the 
Umma Party headed by the successors to the Mahdi, the Ansar. Parliamentarianism, however, ended 
quickly as a military junta headed by General Abboud seized power from 1958 until it was toppled by 
popular protests in 1964. It was during this period that the first civil war in Southern Sudan got 
underway, driven by exclusion, racist attitudes and infringement on the lives of Southern Sudanese. 
“While the *Abboud+ military regime did examine possibilities of forwarding economic development 
in the Southern Sudan, the main concern of government policy lay in Arabization and 
Islamization”694. Mission schools were closed down, all missionaries expelled in 1964 and Arabic 
enforced over English as language of instruction695. As such, the South between independence and 
1972 has been likened to an internal colony696. 
The canonical starting point of the Anya-nya697 war is the rebellion in 1955 by the army garrison in 
Torit (present-day Eastern Equatoria), which refused to relocate to Northern Sudan. Convincing 
arguments have been presented that the smouldering conflict only erupted into full-scale guerrilla 
warfare sometime during the early-to-mid 1960s698. Throughout much of this period, the Southern 
rebels were marred by internal quarrels, lack of coordination between political and military actors 
and their inability to muster significant international support for their cause which had shifted from 
autonomy to self-determination. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Southern movement was 
increasingly streamlined under the leadership of General Joseph Lagu (partly thanks to his access to 
Israeli military aid) while in the North in 1969 a coup by Jamal Nimeiry ended the democratic 
interlude. The situation in Southern Sudan between the Anya-nya rebels and the Sudanese army had 
reached a state of military parity which along with the urgent need for a major political success 
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persuaded Nimeiry to negotiate the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement that established regional 
autonomy in the South under a Southern Regional Government (SRG)699.  
The solidity and functioning of the peace deal, however, rested less on institutional safeguards but 
on the personal relationship and trust between Nimeiry and the head of the SRG, Abel Alier700. At the 
same time, this personalization weakened the institutions designed to manage North-South 
relations, e.g. the allocation of budgetary funds to the South701, which became evident when Alier 
was replaced by Joseph Lagu in 1978. During this period, tension between different Southern regions 
and ethnic groups intensified – especially between Dinka and Equatorians – which triggered a debate 
over division (kokora) of the South into three sub-regions. Alier himself blames Nimeiry’s 
reconciliation with the Islamist forces in 1977 and the Chevron oil finds in Southern Sudan in 1978 for 
the unravelling of the Addis Ababa Accords702. Nimeiry’s unilateral decision to abrogate Southern 
regional autonomy, the failure to stand by promises of development and financial transfers to the 
South as well as the introduction of sharia and hudud punishments703 in what became known as the 
September Laws all combined to lead to a resumption of civil war in 1983.  
5.3. New Sudan to the Naivasha Peace Agreement in 2005 
Actual fighting broke out over Khartoum’s decision to relocate Southern battalions consisting of 
many former Anyanya fighters to the North for training purposes. This order met with resistance and 
led to an attack by the Sudanese Armed Forces on Bor, Pibor and Pachala in May 1983704. It took 
about a year of serious infighting until John Garang had achieved supremacy inside the newly 
founded Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and until the SPLM/A had taken on 
the leadership of Southern Sudanese resistance against the Khartoum government. Crucially, the 
SPLM/A which in the period until 1991 relied heavily on support from the Communist Derg regime in 
Ethiopia, did not call for Southern secession but for a reformed decentralized ‘New Sudan’705. The 
SPLM/A’s insistence on fighting for the liberation of the whole of Sudan deprived the Khartoum 
government of the propaganda tool of ‘anti-secessionism’, forcing it to rely instead on calls for jihad 
and defence of Arab civilization706.  
Fighting in the South continued after Nimeiry had been ousted from power in 1985. A critical role in 
the continuation of fighting in the South was the failure by the different governments in the 
democratic interlude (1985-89) to abrogate the September Laws, with the final straw being Prime 
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s refusal to accede to the Sudan Peace Initiative that DUP and SPLM had 
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negotiated in November 1988707. The overall situation changed once again with the coup d’état in 
1989 which brought Omer al Bashir to power, backed by Hassan al Turabi’s National Islamic Front 
(NIF), the political wing of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood708. The second major sea-change in 
Southern Sudanese affairs was the fall of the Derg regime in the wake of the end of the Cold War, 
which meant that the SPLM/A lost its foremost backer as well as its rear bases in Ethiopia. Also in 
1991, the movement suffered a split whose ripple effects are still felt today: two senior figures of the 
movement, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, tried to depose John Garang and, failing to succeed 
immediately, set up a separate wing of the SPLM/A in Nasir (hence commonly referred to as ‘Nasir-
split’).  
Much of the 1990s was characterized by fighting between the SPLM and a varying number of 
Southern militias, many of whom (including Machar and Akol709) somewhat paradoxically both stood 
for secession and received arms and support from the government in Khartoum that used them as 
proxy battalions710. The SPLM/A, at the same time, cooperated with the Northern Sudanese 
opposition organized in the National Democratic Alliance. Only after hundreds of thousands of 
people, most of them civilians, had died – an estimate of all people that died as a result of the war in 
Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains for only the period 1983-1998 arrives at a figure of more 
than 1.9 million deaths711 – and many more had fled did Machar and Garang finally reconcile in 
2002712. 
The idea of allowing Southern self-determination was first broached in 1994 by the regional 
organization Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and the Sudanese 
government concluded an agreement with non-SPLA southern factions, the 1997 Khartoum 
Agreement, which accorded the right of self-determination and possible secession to the South713. 
Right around 1998/99, the U.S., UK and Norway all became more involved in cooperating with the 
IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)-led process of negotiating between SPLM and 
the Khartoum government714. It took, however, for the completion of the oil pipeline to Port Sudan in 
1999, the falling out of al Turabi and Bashir in 2000 and the terror attacks in the U.S. in 2001 for 
peace negotiations with the SPLM/A to progress. Negotiations that came to a breakthrough with the 
2002 Machakos Protocol that divvied up oil revenue between North and South and included the 
provision of an independence referendum that paved the way to peace.  
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Both Bashir’s National Congress Party and the SPLM/A agreed to peace negotiations because it 
presented the best way for each to stay in power. Domestically, the NCP (National Congress Party) 
was struggling with declining popularity and legitimacy in the North715. On the external front, Sudan’s 
image had been tarnished since the US imposed sanctions in 1997, the leadership had been accused 
of supporting the US embassy bombings in 1998 and was facing a post-9/11 Bush administration 
bent on the war on terror716. The SPLM/A for its part was also losing support from regional allies 
(Ethiopia and Eritrea), faced increasing criticism from NGOs for human rights violations and internally 
over John Garang’s style of leadership and ‘New Sudan’ vision717. For Hilde Johnson, the current head 
of the UN mission in South Sudan, further driving factors behind the eventual signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 were the two dominant personalities of John Garang, 
firmly in charge of the SPLM/A edifice and decision-making, and Sudanese Vice-president Ali Osman 
Taha718.  
5.4. Comprehensive Peace Agreement to Independence and beyond 
Since the period from the signing of the peace agreement in 2005 all the way to 2014 is the main 
subject of the application of the typology of the postcolonial African nation-state to the realities in 
South Sudan, this final section will only touch upon a few outstanding events as more detailed 
descriptions and analyses will ensue in the following chapters. 
The CPA on the one hand installed a Government of National Unity which shared power in Khartoum 
between NCP and SPLM but on the other hand established an autonomous Southern region 
governed by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) under SPLM leadership and also provided for 
a referendum on the future status of the South (independence or union with the North) to be held 
after a six-year interim period. The period’s formative event occurred right at the start as John 
Garang died in a helicopter crash in Uganda in July 2005 and was succeeded at the helm of SPLM and 
GoSS by his deputy Salva Kiir who was much less committed than Garang to the idea of a united New 
Sudan. War between Southern factions finally ended in 2006 with the Juba Declaration that 
integrated the last major remaining militia, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), into the national 
army719.  
Relations between the CPA’s signatories remained tense as implementation of agreements was slow, 
there were mutual accusations of foul play and disagreement over the three disputed territories 
(Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)720. The SPLM briefly left the Government of National Unity in 
2007 but a return to full-scale war was avoided (the Sudanese army, however, twice raided the 
contested area of Abyei) while Khartoum was dealing with war in Eastern Sudan (until 2006) and 
Darfur (since 2003). The first national census since 1955 was completed in 2008 and national 
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elections were held in 2010 that the NCP easily won in the North due to a boycott by opposition 
parties while the SPLM nearly swept the South and Kiir won the presidency with 93% of the vote. In 
the independence referendum in January 2011, 98.83% voted for secession and South Sudan became 
the continent’s newest state on 9 July 2011. Sudan had acquiesced to Southern independence but in 
February 2012 Juba accused Khartoum of stealing oil and decided to halt oil export through the 
pipeline to Port Sudan. Subsequently, SPLA soldiers attacked and briefly held contested oilfields 
under Sudanese control in Heglig. As the shortfall in revenue nearly crippled the budget of both 
Sudans, in September 2012 the two sides agreed to African Union-brokered Peace Accords in Addis 
Ababa and oil started flowing again in the spring of 2013.  
Security in South Sudan initially marked a clear improvement over the pre-CPA period but over the 
years the situation deteriorated again in certain areas. Cattle raiding increased both in volume and in 
brutality and successive disarmament campaigns led to widespread human rights abuses. Disbanded 
militias remained a threat to reassemble and several rebellions sprung up after the 2010 elections as 
defeated candidates took up arms. Violence affected mostly states in the North of South Sudan with 
Jonglei state the hardest hit by fighting that increasingly took on ethnic overtones. The most serious 
threat to South Sudan’s internal cohesion, however, originated from frictions inside the hegemonic 
governing party. As several prominent politicians (Machar, Amum, Wani Igga) announced that they 
were going to stand against Salva Kiir for head of the SPLM, the president reshuffled the cabinet and 
disbanded most party organs in 2013. Things came to a head on December 15th 2013 when fighting 
broke out in SPLA barracks in Juba that soon spread to other parts of the country (Jonglei, Unity, 
Upper Nile) and pitted the government against a rebel faction SPLM-in-Opposition led by Riek 
Machar. At the time of writing, the fighting was still going on and expanding to wider areas mostly in 
the North of South Sudan, about a million South Sudanese are internally displaced and a severe 




6. The state and statebuilding in South Sudan 
As the object of our analysis is a sophisticated juxtaposition of typological characterisations of the 
postcolonial African nation-state with realities on the ground in South Sudan, the presentation of 
said reality as it transpires from scholarly books and articles, consultancy and advocacy reports, 
official government sources and statements as well as the South Sudanese press does not and cannot 
fit neatly into the categories established above (Ch. 4 ‘The Nation-state in Africa’). Hence, what these 
sub-chapters aspire to do is to depict the South Sudanese state along the lines of the established 
types of the African state (see Ch. 4.1) while grouping the findings under sub-headings for greater 
clarity of presentation and to establish the different aspects of statebuilding that fall under 
categories as wide as, say, the hybridity of state control.  
Analogous to the typology of the postcolonial African state, there will be four sub-chapters on the 
South Sudanese state. The first section in 6.1 will be on the hybrid quasi state and how it relates to 
the realities of South Sudan. This will be followed in 6.2 by an analysis of South Sudan as an 
illegitimate, non-performing and undemocratic state. 6.3 approaches the privatized, corrupted and 
neopatrimonial aspects of statehood in South Sudan while 6.4 delves into the degree of 
centralization and devolution of authority and resources in the country. Bookending the chapter in 
6.5 is a comparison of the South Sudanese state as depicted in these four categories to the typified 
African state.   
6.1. The hybrid quasi state in South Sudan 
For the first category, the hybrid quasi state, there are – in accordance with the typified African state 
– two topical subsections that deal with varying aspects of what is or is not a hybrid quasi state in 
South Sudan. Section 6.1.1 is going to assess the degree to which South Sudan is a quasi-state by 
looking at the country’s external sovereignty, i.e. the state’s acceptance in the international state 
system and state control over territory and borders vis-à-vis other states and other foreign actors. 
Afterwards, 6.1.2 focuses on the South Sudanese state’s hybridity by analyzing the state’s domestic 
sovereignty, i.e. its ability to provide internal security and maintain a monopoly of violence. These 
sections will be followed in 6.1.3 by a brief summary.  
6.1.1. The quasi state in South Sudan  
Quasi-statehood is intimately linked to external sovereignty as shown in Ch. 4.1.1.1. External 
sovereignty is a broad frame of reference and is here understood to mean a number of interrelated 
things that illustrate South Sudan’s degree of quasi-statehood. On a most basic reading, external 
sovereignty is concerned with 6.1.1.1 international recognition for the state pretender, i.e. whether 
or not the international community recognizes a country’s claim to membership in the global state 
system. Moving from the legalistic to realities of realpolitik, in 6.1.1.2 the involvement and activities 
of foreign states in the internal affairs of South Sudan are critical indicators of external sovereignty 
and quasi-statehood. Finally, 6.1.1.3 on control over its international borders reflects directly on 
South Sudan’s ability to uphold its claim to external sovereignty and full-fledged statehood.  
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6.1.1.1. International recognition of statehood 
For every secessionist movement, international recognition for its claim to statehood comes a close 
second to military victory on its list of top goals. With a decisive and outright military victory a very 
rare event, international sovereignty may in fact be at the top of the priority list of realistically 
attainable goals. In the case of South Sudan, the Government of South Sudan’s stringent focus on the 
independence referendum during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement period to the detriment of 
almost all other concerns, e.g. development, bears out this contention. Especially after John Garang’s 
death in 2005, which brought to an end almost from the start any serious attempts at “making unity 
attractive”, international recognition became of paramount importance to the South Sudanese 
leadership. This state of affairs lasted all the way until South Sudan had successfully executed the 
referendum, declared independence and joined several international organisations. Henceforth, 
however, it is unlikely to play much of a role because the regime, although it is being challenged 
domestically, does not face the imminent threat of a total lack of domestic sovereignty for which it 
would need to compensate for with international backing.  
The fact that South Sudan was able to win backing of the United Nations and the African Union – the 
country acceded to both organizations immediately following independence in July 2011 – is no small 
feat and warrants closer examination. Arguably the most important reason why the African Union for 
once relaxed its stance on the inalienability of colonial borders is that there is very little danger of 
South Sudan providing a blueprint and a substantial boost to other independence movements on the 
continent. Even though other secessionist parts of Africa like Somaliland argue with great dismay 
that they possess a stronger case for statehood than South Sudan did, they fail to win sufficient 
support in the international community to sustain their claim721. That is primarily because outside of 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, occupied by Morocco but a member of the AU, there are in 
fact no movements which possess a similarly strong case and a similarly strong group of international 
supporters as South Sudan722: “South Sudan’s long struggle will surely embolden existing secessionist 
groups and may inspire new movements – but the obstacles to independent statehood appear as 
formidable as ever”723.The other equally important factor is that the AU was directly and intimately 
involved in the negotiations that led to the CPA and thus had ownership of the entire process 
including the possibility of the South opting for independence at the end of the interim period724. As 
a matter of fact, Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s former prime minister and current chair of the African 
Union High-Level Implementation Panel played a key role in convincing African heads of state to 
consider South Sudan an exceptional case725.  
Internationally accorded sovereignty does not, however, automatically entail that the international 
community is able and willing to uphold and enforce a state’s external sovereignty. The United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS, since July 2011: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)) 
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has generally interpreted the scope of its mission very conservatively and has refrained from 
interfering in domestic or inter-Sudanese conflicts726. When the Sudanese army overran Abyei in 
2011, for instance, the UNMIS troops stationed in the vicinity stood by and remained idle727. On the 
other hand, UNMISS troops have on occasion helped to abet violence in Jonglei and were 
instrumental in giving shelter to fleeing civilians during the violence that ensued after the thwarted 
‘coup’ on December 15th 2013728. Not to everyone’s satisfaction, however, as president Kiir accused 
the UN of acting like a “parallel government”729 and exerted pressure to have UN personnel allegedly 
friendly with former vice-president Machar removed from the country730. Hostility towards and 
public protests against the UN peaked after weapons found in a UN convoy in March 2014 were 
alleged to have been destined for anti-government rebels731. But criticism of UNMISS also comes 
from a different angle. A South Sudanese journalist-cum-activist wanted UNMISS to pack up and 
leave the country because its presence undermined South Sudan’s sovereignty732.  
More generally, however, and in spite of proclamations to the contrary, the international community 
is not in a position to define the shape and design of the evolving state. As Bennett et al put it: 
“Neither donors nor GoSS have produced an overriding and clear model of statehood for Southern 
Sudan”733. It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether Alex de Waal’s claim that for Southern 
Sudan “*s+eparation is more likely to resemble incomplete decolonisation than partition”
734
 has 
turned out be accurate.  
6.1.1.2. External actors and states involved in South Sudanese affairs 
A second aspect of quasi-statehood is the fact that foreign powers have the ability to interfere 
directly into a state’s domestic affairs – including the threat of military invasion – and in some fields 
hold more significant power than the state’s nominal government itself. Therefore, the impact of 
foreign countries’ governments on the politics of South Sudan has to be part of our analysis of the 
alleged quasi-stateness of South Sudan. Due to the specific circumstances in South Sudan and its 
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regional environment, this overview will be split between an analysis of foreign states and external 
non-state actors.  
Foreign states 
Direct and indirect interference into the affairs of South Sudan has been a constant for most of its 
modern history because it was neither independent nor autonomous. Since the British left the 
Sudan, provincial opposition to the centre of power in Khartoum has regularly turned for support to 
the governments of neighbouring countries and formed a sort of patron-client relationship. This state 
of affairs continues in the present as the majority of the region’s countries (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda, Eritrea, Egypt) are in one way or another involved in South Sudan’s internal affairs. The 
patronage systems that underwrite the governing regimes throughout the Horn of Africa region that 
South Sudan belongs to therefore also determine relations between states. It is habitual for 
governments to fund and support insurgent groups in neighbouring countries as a means to 
strengthen their own hold on power by having proxy forces on the ground735. In a game of 
geopolitical tit-for-tat, this has reciprocally involved Sudan’s military and secret service in these 
countries’ domestic affairs736.  
For the first phase of the renewed war in the South in the 1980s, Ethiopia, more specifically the 
Communist Derg regime was the principal backing and source of material support for the SPLM737. 
After the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front defeated the Derg, took over power and expelled the 
SPLA fighters from their base on Ethiopian soil in 1991, Kenya and Uganda became the movement’s 
strongest regional backers. Since about 2002, the Ethiopian government has morphed into the main 
interlocutor between the two Sudans738. For some time around the turn of the century, Asmara 
evolved into the hub for all Sudanese opposition movements and Eritrea trained and even 
accompanied SPLA forces inside Sudan739.  
Uganda has been supporting the SPLM/A to differing degrees ever since Museveni’s coup d’état 
brought him to power in 1986 and Nairobi has provided a base for the SPLM’s activities since at least 
the 1990s. Museveni went to school with John Garang and Khartoum’s patronage of Ugandan rebels 
further strengthened ties with the South Sudanese rebel movement740. What is more, the Ugandan 
army (UPDF) maintains a substantial if unofficial presence inside South Sudan. Having supported and 
conducted joint operations with the SPLA during the civil war with Khartoum741, the UPDF remained 
in South Sudan ostensibly to eradicate Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. But far from engaging 
the LRA, UPDF soldiers have been accused of running private businesses in South Sudan and abusing 
the local population while the South Sudanese government turns a blind eye742. The Ugandan army’s 
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ambivalent role in South Sudan became very apparent during the fighting that erupted in December 
2013 when its troops entered Juba and tacitly helped the government against the armed rebellion by 
bombing Bor and trying to take Malakal743 – paid for by the South Sudanese government744.  
Kenya for its part is by all accounts secretly supplying arms to the government in Juba, a fact that 
became apparent when Somali pirates captured a delivery of tanks from Ukraine to Kenya in 
September 2008745. Kenyans have large investments in South Sudan, among others much of the 
banking sector is Kenyan-dominated, and the two countries have agreed to build an oil pipeline from 
South Sudan to the Lamu port north of Mombasa746, though lack of funding has derailed such plans 
until now. Tanzania is supplying troops for an international intervention force to stop the de facto 
civil war but does not appear to have substantial interests in the country747. Finally, as the White Nile 
passes through its territory, South Sudan’s independence also directly affects Egypt’s interest in 
maintaining the status quo in management of the Nile waters, an arrangement dating to 1959 that 
greatly benefits Egypt’s interests and that is contested by all other riparian states748. As a 
consequence, Cairo has given substantial development aid to South Sudan749, signed a military 
cooperation agreement750 and has been trying to get South Sudan to join the Arab League751.  
Outside of the region, there are a number of countries that have had and continue to have a major 
impact on events in South Sudan. First of all, the very fact that a lasting peace agreement was 
reached has been attributed both to the overall international climate – post-9/11 Khartoum rightly 
feared to be targeted in the ‘war on terror’ – and to the engagement of international actors from the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the AU, the UN and individual countries like 
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Norway, the U.S. and Britain (the three form what is commonly called the Troika)752. Especially for 
the U.S. and Norway, the perception of the civil war as a religious753 and ethnic conflict and the much 
publicized revival of slavery helped put Sudan on the foreign policy agenda as Sudan took over 
apartheid South Africa’s and Libya’s mantle as the continent’s most notorious rogue state754.  
China has for a long time been Sudan’s closest ally outside of the Gulf and is Khartoum’s largest 
economic partner, having built the oil pipeline to Port Sudan and purchasing most of Sudan’s oil. 
Since the CPA, Beijing is slowly engaging with the GoSS to make up for the People’s Republic’s bad 
image as a staunch supporter of the regime in the North755 while trying to salvage its investments in 
the oil industry756. SPLM cadres are mostly pragmatic in their interaction with the Chinese 
government because they desperately need Chinese investment757 – something that meshes well 
with China’s focus on economic rather than political engagement758. India started to engage with 
Sudan in 2003 when it replaced Western companies that pulled out from the Sudanese oil sector and 
initially upheld Sudan’s territorial integrity but begun to establish closer links with the GoSS during 
the CPA period759. In contrast to China’s increasingly active role in political disputes in South Sudan, 
India’s diplomatic involvement is still very limited760. Russia has been a regular supplier of weapons 
to South Sudan, state-owned Safinat is building the South’s first oil refinery761 and there has been an 
unexpected rapprochement between presidents Putin and Kiir after the cooling off of relations with 
the United States in spring 2014762. In terms of military supplies, Ukraine has been the GoSS’s main 
supplier of weapons since 2005 with shipments transiting through Kenya and Uganda763.  
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External non-state actors 
In spite of the monumental achievement that is the CPA, relations between Juba and the NCP regime 
remain acrimonious. Khartoum is known to have used proxy forces against the SPLA in addition to 
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and by most accounts continues to do so in the present764. The 
South Sudan Liberation Army for example, an outlet that fought the GoSS after independence, had its 
headquarters in a Khartoum compound and was reportedly forcibly recruiting South Sudanese 
residents into its ranks765. Kurt Beck argues that there is a long tradition of complicated relations of 
mutual dependence between states and (warrior) nomads in Sudan. Governments employ nomads 
as irregular forces charged with policing the border zones while nomads benefit from the state’s 
resources, notably weapons and legitimacy, to further their own ‘small’ aims like access to grazing 
land. Thus, Baggara Arabs have fought against Dinka and Fur in the name of Khartoum while various 
ethnic groups in the South – Nuer, Murle, Mandari, Toposa – were armed by the Sudanese 
government to fight the primarily Dinka SPLA766. After South Sudan’s independence, Sudan’s 
intelligence service continued to use airdrops to supply arms and ammunitions to anti-SPLM 
militias767. The outsourcing of the fight against rebels in the South and other peripheral regions to 
irregular militias – Popular Defence Forces, Murahaleen, and Janjaweed – can be interpreted as 
Khartoum’s conscious disregard for the state structure and its efficacy768.  
What becomes clear is that contrary to some journalistic accounts of the North-South conflict769, 
religion plays a subordinate role to strategic and military considerations: both Muslim tribes 
bordering the South like Misseriya, Rizeigat and the Ma’aliya as well as the Southern Christian and 
Animist Mandari, Didinga, Murle and Bari received arms during the 1983-2005 war to block the 
SPLA’s advance770. In the years following South Sudan’s independence, several anti-SPLM militias 
were rumoured to receive weapons from Khartoum and there is evidence that Khartoum supported 
the most dangerous and active militia in the years 2012-13, the South Sudan Democratic 
Movement/Army Cobra Faction run by David Yau Yau771. There were also allegations that rebels from 
the Congolese M23 movement that had been defeated in their erstwhile area of activity against the 
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Kinshasa government in Eastern Congo were part of the Ugandan troops brought into South Sudan to 
assist the government of Salva Kiir against the armed opposition in early 2014772.  
As becomes evident from this overview of international engagement in South Sudan, external actors 
play a very significant role in curtailing the actual ability of the South Sudanese state to act as the 
sovereign in its territory. Interdependence between Sudan and South Sudan remains high as 
Sudanese export bans have significantly increased prices of food and other essential commodities in 
South Sudan773. Foreign-sponsored rebel militias in particular constitute a clear limitation to the 
GoSS’s ability to effectively govern all of its nominal territory. The weak economic position and 
continued rivalry and brinkmanship with Sudan entail further dependence on external partners that 
have to lend diplomatic as well as material support by way of weapons shipments.  
6.1.1.3. Control over international borders  
An integral aspect of international sovereignty is control over a given territory and possession of a 
monopoly of violence in said space. The one area that best epitomizes state control over territory are 
international borders. For most its post-colonial history, states in the Horn of Africa, one of the 
regions South Sudan belongs to, have been characterized by borders that are ill-defined, contested 
and easily crossed774. Yet, according to Alex Klein, these very same facets are also the reason why 
borders in this region have been essential for states’ persistence and survival775. This section, 
therefore, will look at the major points of friction along the border, starting with a general look at the 
Sudan-South Sudan border and then focus specifically on the local contested areas of Abyei, Mile 14 
and Heglig and the cross-border relationship between SPLM/A and rebels in Darfur, Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile. Subsequently, other critical areas along the border with Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia as well as in the Ilemi Triangle will be discussed.  
Sudan-South Sudan border 
The majority of border conflicts arise along the newly formed border with Sudan; a border that to the 
present day remains to be fully delineated as well as demarcated. In an interesting recurrence to the 
colonial period, a major source for those charged with border demarcation are maps and other 
cartographic material from the British colonial archives776. Unsurprisingly, the delineations depicted 
on these maps are not always accurate or specific and in addition remain open to conflicting 
interpretations. Thus Nicki Kindersley, who used to work at the South Sudan National Archives, 
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writes about British colonial cartography that “there’s no one map that shows, in sufficient 
detail, where the border exactly is in 1956”777. 
Crisis Group warned already in 2010, a year prior to independence, that the fact that the border 
between North and South remained undefined constituted a major source of insecurity for relations 
between North and South as well as for local populations which feared a post-secession hardening of 
the border778. Oil fields straddling the border (most notoriously the Heglig/Panthou fields), military 
posturing and long-standing mistrust between Juba and Khartoum and between SPLA and SAF make 
the Sudan-South Sudan border a likely spot for renewed fighting. Human Rights Watch listed five 
areas along the North-South border that have the potential to become sites of future conflict, in 
particular due to the presence of natural resources: “These include Kafia Kingi/ Hofrat al Nahas in 
Western Bahr el Ghazal; border between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and South Darfur; Heglig at the 
border between Unity and Southern Kordofan; a small area on the border between Upper Nile and 
White Nile; and Shar el Fie, near southern Blue Nile”779. 
Apart from the lack of trust and cooperation on the national macro-level, local communities are 
severely affected by the new border. As CPA and subsequent negotiations have been conducted only 
among high-level politicians and generals, border communities do not feel consulted in the 
demarcation process. In the case of the nomadic Rizeigat and Misseriya – long allied to the NCP 
government – they fear marginalization as a consequence of Southern independence780. At the heart 
of conflict lies competition over scarce resources, which has been exacerbated by the ecological 
disaster that struck the Sahel zone in the 1970s781. In addition to oil, for pastoralists and sedentary 
farmers alike these resources are primarily access to land and water. A 2010 Michelsen Institute 
report found a particular density of such conflict hotspots along the South Kordofan-South Sudan 
borderline782, whereas a Crisis Group study from 2011 found violent contestation of the border in 
Unity State where Dinka tribes have been forced from their traditional homelands since oil 
discoveries in the 1960s and have been replaced by Misseriya tribes783.  
As a matter of fact, both governments, Juba and Khartoum, have been accused of largely neglecting 
the fate of pastoralist groups straddling the border784. The latter point also came to the fore after the 
2012 Addis Ababa agreement had been negotiated between Juba and Khartoum to resolve the oil 
dispute. To the dismay of local residents fearful of their safety, the agreement stipulated the creation 
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of a demilitarized border zone785. However, by September 2013 both Sudan and South Sudan had yet 
to comply with the demilitarization clause786 and in some areas SPLA soldiers have been seen 
donning police uniforms to circumvent the prohibition to carry out patrols787. Further complicating 
the matter of the demilitarized zone, Sudan and South Sudan have not agreed on the zone’s centre-
line. An African Union Border Technical Team has been charged with determining the centre-line’s 
exact locations but local residents prevented it from carrying out its job for fear that it might have 
negative repercussions for their communities788. 
Abyei 
The area where matters come to a head is the contested district of Abyei789. Abyei’s plight as a 
contested piece of land goes back to the early 20th century when the British transferred 
administrative control over the Ngok Dinka from Bahr al Ghazal to Kordofan. During the first civil war, 
the Ngok Dinka fought alongside the Southern Anya-nya rebels and as a result of the Addis Ababa 
Accords in 1972 were offered the prospect of a referendum on whether to belong to the South or 
North – a referendum that never materialized as warfare resumed in the 1980s790. Most of Sudan’s 
oil fields are scattered along the North-South border and Abyei is located at the heart of contention 
over rightful ownership791. Ever since oil discoveries during the later stages of Nimeiry’s rule, the 
resident Dinka therefore became the target of government policy designed to remove them from the 
precious soil they occupied792. This is repeating itself in the present as both governments appear to 
pursue a deliberate policy of establishing a demographic fait accompli. On the heels of small 
skirmishes on the presumptive border, SAF forces razed and burned Abyei town to the ground in May 
2008793. Events from 2008 repeated themselves in May 2011 as SPLA and police forces clashed with 
the Sudanese army and Misseriya fighters, which razed Abyei and expelled nearly all its 
inhabitants794. While the NCP uses the Misseriya as proxies to clear the area of Dinka, the SPLM 
encourages Dinka returnees from Kenya and the North to settle in Abyei town795. In spite of living 
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conditions that are poor even by South Sudan’s low standards, by August 2013 60.000 of an 
estimated 100.000 inhabitants that had fled in 2011 were said to have returned to Abyei796.  
Abyei’s future status came on the table during peace negotiations in the 2000s but a final settlement 
was pushed off to a referendum to be held alongside the nationwide independence referendum. 
However, two successive attempts to establish the exact size and shape of the Abyei region – by the 
internationally staffed Abyei Boundaries Commission in 2005797 and by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in 2009 – were both rejected by Khartoum; even though the PCA in 
particular made strong concessions to Khartoum’s point of view798 by almost halving the size of the 
region (the rest automatically going to the North) and awarding grazing rights to both Ngok Dinka 
and Misseriya799. A key obstacle to agreement is Sudan’s insistence that Misseriya nomads that graze 
in Abyei on a seasonal basis be allowed to vote in the referendum – a proposition South Sudan is 
vehemently opposed to800. Abyei also played a key role in the African Union-sponsored peace 
negotiations between Juba and Khartoum in 2012 but in spite of periodic newsflashes of a 
breakthrough801 a definite agreement is still outstanding802. In the end, a unilateral referendum was 
organized and held by the Ngok Dinka community on 31st October 2013 – the GoSS distanced itself 
from the proceedings at the last minute after previously canvassing for the referendum – with 
99.89% wanting to join South Sudan803.  
Douglas Johnson argues that there are a couple of underlying factors for the continuing conflict 
surrounding Abyei. Locally, many Ngok Dinka fought with the SPLA during the war, distrust the North 
and are very determined to join the South rather than lead a minority existence as part of Southern 
Kordofan. At the same time, as a result of changing rainfall patterns in the Sahel zone and an 
expansion of government-run mechanized farming schemes, Misseriya nomads have increasingly 
come to rely on grazing lands in Southern Abyei for pasture where many have settled on land forcibly 
deserted by Dinka since the 1970s804. The Misseriya, though traditionally allied to Khartoum 
(President Bashir used to be stationed in the area before seizing power in 1989), have grown 
increasingly restless with the National Congress Party regime and fear that their interests in Abyei 
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will be swept under the carpet unless they take action themselves805. Proving how well-founded such 
worries are, the SPLA made a point of charging Misseriya heavy taxes for allowing their cattle to 
graze in areas south of the Bahr al-Arab river806. What makes Abyei additionally combustible is the 
nearly universal support among South Sudanese for Juba to take any steps necessary to ensure 
Abyei’s inclusion into the South807.  
Pastoralist migrations: Mile 14, Malual Dinka and Rizeigat, Panthou/Heglig 
There are a number of other areas along the South Sudan-Sudan borderline that are both contested 
and sites of more or less open confrontation808, two of which I will look at in some detail since they 
exemplify characteristic features of the border regime in South Sudan and how it compares to the 
status of borders in the typified African state depicted in chapter 4.1.1. The first of these hot-spots is 
the so-called 14 Mile Area along the Darfur-Northern Bahr al-Ghazal border, which extends 14 miles 
south of the river Kiir/Bahr-al Arab, hence the name. The area was formed as part of an 
administrative agreement between British colonial governors in the 1920s to ease conflict between 
resident Malual Dinka and pastoralist Rizeigat that used the area for grazing809. The Malual Dinka, 
however, refuse to acknowledge the colonial boundary and insist on rights to all the territory up to 
the river810.  
Thus, when the Addis Ababa Agreement of September 2012 between Juba and Khartoum provided 
for a demilitarized zone along the border, the Malual Dinka community openly protested and sent 
protest notes to President Kiir811. By lobbying its own government in Juba to uphold their ‘historic 
rights’ and subsequently voicing their frustration at the GoSS’s inaction, the contemporary Malual 
Dinka highlight both Juba’s inability to delineate let alone control its state territory (or what it claims 
as rightfully belonging to the state of South Sudan) and the key role played by local communities and 
local stakeholders in the prima facie international and intergovernmental arena of border 
negotiations812. The degree of local initiative independent of national oversight is also evident from a 
recent inter-communal peace conference in Aweil at which representatives of Misseriya and Malual 
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Dinka agreed upon peaceful interaction813. On the flipside, pastoralist communities that migrate in 
and out of South Sudan do not have a choice but are effectively forced to develop adaptive strategies 
in an environment where the strained relations between Juba and Khartoum lead to intermittent 
border closures. The adaptive strategies range from taking a different route to forming or renewing 
local alliances and from shorter stays on the pastures to altogether refraining from entering South 
Sudan814. 
The second contested area and point of contention between the Sudans is control over the Heglig 
oilfields, which given both regimes’ massive dependence on oil income have become the biggest 
prize in the delineation process815. Heglig or Panthou, the name used by most South Sudanese, 
gained international notoriety when in April 2012 it became the site of the culmination of hostilities 
between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-CPA period. In a joint operation with fighters from 
Sudan, SPLA troops attacked and briefly held the Heglig oilfields before withdrawing amid air assaults 
a couple of days later. A Crisis Group report saw support for the SPLA coming primarily from Darfur’s 
Justice and Equality Movement while the SPLM-North’s leadership denied any involvement and 
resisted Khartoum’s claim that they were but proxy forces for South Sudan816. Apart from 
demonstrating yet again the paramount importance of controlling the sources of oil and thus wealth, 
the Heglig incident proved the impossibility of trying to rely on British colonial maps to determine a 
volatile 21st century border. Even two of the most renowned international Sudan experts, Alex de 
Waal and Douglas Johnson, publicly disagreed over the area’s legal status, with de Waal arguing that 
the “1956 border clearly shows Heglig to be within North Sudan”817 – an assertion disputed by 
Johnson818. 
SPLM-North and Darfur’s rebel movements 
The outbreak of a violent rebellion against Khartoum in Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states 
in the aftermath of contentious gubernatorial elections in May 2011 and thus almost parallel to 
Southern independence has seriously dented prospects of a less confrontational border environment 
between North and South. On the one hand, the indiscriminate shelling of South Kordofan and Blue 
Nile including occasional border transgressions by the Sudanese Armed Forces have driven hundreds 
of thousands of refugees across the border to camps in South Sudan. Many of the affected 
populations in Sudan’s new Southern provinces used to sympathize with or even fought alongside 
the South during the civil war and people in South Sudan continue to feel allegiance to them819. A 
material sign of this allegiance are numerous reports that point to continuing logistical and military 
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support for the SPLM-North after the SPLA had officially cut cords with their Northern affiliate in 
February 2011820. Even if Khartoum’s allegations that the South continues to pay SPLM-North 
soldiers’ salaries is difficult to verify (and appears doubtful given that Juba had to suspend paying its 
own soldiers after the oil cut-off in early 2012), moral and political support is certainly 
forthcoming821. These events confirm Emeric Rogier’s dictum from 2005 that it “is a fundamental 
principle of Sudanese politics that northerners (and southerners as well) seek allies from ‘the other 
side’ to fight their own-brother enemies”822.  
The SPLM-N moreover claims to control significant parts of the North-South border in Blue Nile823, 
which along with “the SPLM-N’s privileged relationship with South Sudan *…+ have linked the conflict 
in Blue Nile (and South Kordofan) to the broader North–South dispute”824. In response, Khartoum 
has repeatedly sought to include a provision that Juba has to convince the SPLM-N to lay down their 
arms as a condition for the implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace Accords from September 
2012825. It appears, however, that the SPLM-N is moving freely in South Sudan and is visibly present 
in the Yida refugee camp just inside South Sudan that houses an estimated 65,000 refugees from 
Sudan826. In the meantime, Sudanese planes occasionally bomb South Sudanese areas near the 
border827.  
In addition, as evidenced by Justice and Equality Movement’s (JEM) participation in the Heglig attack, 
Juba is also involved in the simmering conflict in Darfur. The SPLA had had relations with Darfur’s 
rebel groups since the early 1990s, culminating in the early years of the Darfur insurgency (2003-
04)828 but involvement had seen a lull since the CPA’s signing. Darfur only came back into the fold in 
2010 as tensions between Juba and Khartoum heightened so that “[d]uring the six months preceding 
the referendum, Juba became the main rear base for Darfur rebel politicians”829. In an apparent act 
of repaying the debt, JEM allegedly helped the South Sudanese government in recapturing Bentiu, 
the capital of Unity State, in January 2014830.  
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What these events go to show is that the sanctity of international borders is far from reality on the 
ground on the Sudan-South Sudan border. The GoSS and the SPLA as its military arm are neither able 
to prevent transgression and incursions from armed state or non-state actors nor are they on the 
other hand constrained by international borders in their scope of activity. The latter point can be 
observed at the borders with some of South Sudan’s other neighbours: Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo and 
Kenya.  
Uganda border 
As Merkx observed at the start of the peace process in 2002, the Uganda-South Sudan border – 
arbitrarily demarcated by the British in the early 20th century – is highly permeable and rather than 
being an obstacle to their freedom of movement presents an opportunity for gain for local SPLA 
soldiers that control trade in both directions831. Anne Walraet found that there was an additional 
ethnic element involved as cross-border trade with Uganda constituted an economic opportunity 
that was primarily seized by Dinka cattle traders that had resettled here due to the war and also 
controlled the border with Dinka SPLA fighters832. Forms of conduct inherited from the long years of 
war persist as the official South Sudanese presence, “a military authority with an individual/local hold 
on power that still relies on coercive structures” poses a threat to and constraint on Ugandan small-
scale traders833. Nonetheless, opportunities for gain are so high compared to other parts of Uganda 
that a wide array of actors – merchants, soldiers, security personnel, spies – can be found in large 
quantities on either side of the border posts in Nimule and Bibia834. The border also has an impact on 
local conflict, with ownership of land in the proximity to a new custom point on the South Sudan-
Uganda border in Elegu becoming the focal point of violent contestation between different ethnic 
groups – Oyapele and Ofodro – that live on either side of the border835. Moreover, many of the 
people in Uganda’s West Nile province both profit from legal and illegal trade with South Sudan while 
also seeing the border as an unnatural division, separating people that they feel much closer to than 
to southern Ugandans836.  
Democratic Republic of Congo & Ethiopia borders 
South Sudan’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo is also effectively little-controlled and 
does not constitute an obstacle to traders or soldiers. In fact, the SPLA has led incursions into the 
DRC since 1998 – when they conquered and looted the border town Dungu in cohort with the 
Ugandan army837 – and for several years after 2000 maintained a military presence on Congolese 
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soil838. Apparently, this state of affairs continues as SPLM troops refuse to move out from positions 
on DRC territory near the border839. De Vries who reported on a separate incident on the border with 
the DRC observed that the SPLA eventually gave in to Congolese demands to respect the colonial 
borders. What stands out about the episode is that the DRC government only started to call for its 
borders to be respected when the SPLM/A’s rule became officially sanctioned with the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, thus binding the SPLM/A to rules of conduct of a state and 
no longer those of a guerrilla movement840. Today, South Sudanese poachers are apparently 
responsible for much of the killing of elephants for ivory in DRC’s Garamba national park841. Although 
the Nuer and Anuak live on both sides of a border that used to be the site of fighting between British 
and Italians in WW II and marked a dividing line between Cold War blocs during Mengistu’s reign 
until 1991842, South Sudan is seemingly abiding by international diplomatic standards on its Western 
border with Ethiopia as a South Sudanese-Ethiopian border commission is set to begin work on 
delineating and demarcating the border843.  
Ilemi Triangle 
Arguably the biggest border issue facing South Sudan outside of Abyei actually involves four 
countries, with South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda all laying claim to all or parts of the Ilemi 
Triangle. Several ethnic groups (Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom) in what Khadiagala calls “one of 
the core frontiers of insecurity” engage in cross-border fighting as the absence of the state has not 
only allowed for lawlessness but also the de facto takeover of service provision by NGOs844. Okumu 
likewise sees potential for dispute between the above countries in case rumoured oil finds or other 
natural resources actually materialize845. Increasing insecurity and raising the costs of governing, the 
triangle is awash with weapons as each of the adjacent states has been arming an ethnic group it 
considers its proxy force: Ethiopia arms the Dassanechs, Kenya the Turkana and in the decade to 
2002 Khartoum allegedly supplied 50,000 weapons to the Toposa to fight the SPLA846. It is 
questionable, however, to what extent South Sudan and its government is truly keen on securing the 
area and risk cordial relations with their former allies in Nairobi. In fact, Douglas Johnson picks up on 
a widely circulating if unconfirmed story that John Garang, in secret negotiations with Kenya’s 
president Arap Moi, ceded nominal control over Ilemi in exchange for Kenyan support to the SPLA 
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war effort847. However, what makes this area a very interesting illustration of South Sudan’s border 
regime is that local pastoralist “communities have often been, and partly continue to be, partners 
rather than subjects of the state”, which means that “strong man figures, ephemeral or more 
permanent, in the multilayered power structures can exercise surprising (extralegal) influence”848.  
Thus, even though South Sudan only officially attained statehood in 2011, it is already faced with a 
multitude of problems along its approximately 4800 km of borders with the six states of Sudan, CAR, 
DRC, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia.  
6.1.2. The hybrid state in South Sudan 
A key component of domestic sovereignty is the state’s ability to deliver stability and guarantee its 
citizens’ physical security. Conversely, the inability to guarantee security is one of the prime reasons 
for the designation of many African post-colonial nation-states as hybrid states (see Chapter 4.1.1.2). 
The one overarching picture that emerges from a multitude of reports on the security situation in 
South Sudan is that the state is still far from possessing the monopoly of violence849. A number of 
issues combine to make the GoSS’s overall performance in the provision of security inside its territory 
a major disappointment – regardless of the standard one applies. In order to attain a clearer picture 
of the state of the domestic security situation, this section will begin in 6.1.2.1 by depicting the state 
agents meant to provide security and then in 6.1.2.2 lays out the non-state actors that challenge the 
state’s monopoly of violence and in some cases provide alternatives to the state’s security sector. 
Finally, in 6.1.2.3 the issue of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants 
will be addressed as it has great import for overall security in a post-conflict setting like South 
Sudan’s.  
6.1.2.1. State agents of security provision 
To begin with, among South Sudanese there is generally a very low threshold to use violence in order 
to further personal interests or to settle an argument. A study on the psychological effects of war 
revealed relatively few cases of post-traumatic stress syndrome but found high levels of aggression 
to be very common among former SPLA soldiers850. In a national survey, the most common sources 
of violence affecting South Sudanese directly were cattle raiding (25%), local crime (23%), inter-
ethnic conflict (19%) and armed militias (12%) – while a meagre 5% of respondents said that they 
were not affected by any kind of violence851. Rolandsen blames the militarization of society, the ease 
of access to weapons and the lack of institutional capacity to provide security as the main factors852. 
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However, the initial point of departure for the GoSS is not only disadvantageous. After decades of 
warfare, citizens are wary of insecurity and show broad support for a strong army that receives a 
large share of the national budget and in turn ought to act as a deterrent to external as well as 
internal security threats853.  
This popular demand is not fulfilled as the GoSS and its security organs are unable to maintain 
security and are hardly present outside the main towns854. Hence, civilians find themselves ill-
protected from violence because both army and police appear to refrain from intervening and 
putting a halt to inter-communal fighting855. Lack of security also undermines the GoSS’s standing in 
the public eye: “The legitimacy of the State is particularly challenged in the remote rural areas where 
the notion of a ‘peace dividend’ is in stark contrast to reality”856. Even when there had been clear 
warning signs of impending clashes, the GoSS did not interfere to stop the violence857. In addition, 
the terrible state of road and communication infrastructure mean that large tracts of the country 
(e.g. Jonglei) are inaccessible for security forces, in particular during the rainy season when most 
roads turn into mud858. The governor of Jonglei actually admitted to the security forces’ inability to 
protect citizens from raiding due to lack of access, saying that “*e+ven if you have police 20km (12 
miles) away, they can’t get there”859. The continuously high levels of insecurity – due to cattle 
rustling, militias and criminality – are thus a major reason for public disaffection with the state860.  
Thus, while there is support for a strong army per se, when it comes to evaluating the actual 
performance, state security organs are widely mistrusted and even perceived as a menace rather 
than a helping hand in need861. A Crisis Group report found that “ill-treatment by under-resourced 
and sometimes predatory security forces” was a common complaint among South Sudanese862 and a 
separate study ranked rogue conduct by soldiers and police as the main source of insecurity next to 
tribal conflicts and crime863. The UN Human Rights Council found that in South Sudan “*s+ystematic 
human rights abuses continue in an environment of impunity, with the most frequent and worst 
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abuses perpetrated by the security forces of Southern Sudan”864. Crucially, there is a significant gap 
in the capacities and in popular attitudes towards the SPLA army on the one and the police force on 
the other hand. It is the SPLA, and not the police, which is trusted as well as feared and that is seen 
as the main provider of security865. Even though the SPLA in its dealings with civilians is often itself a 
source of insecurity, it is far more competent to solve conflicts than the South Sudan Police Service.  
South Sudan Police Service 
The police force in South Sudan consists mostly of former SPLA soldiers who were transferred to 
their new positions without proper training in police work866. Many are illiterate and lack even basic 
equipment which makes the police particularly ill-equipped to deal with increasingly well-organized 
criminal networks from neighbouring states that operate on South Sudanese soil867. In addition, 
many police officers are in fact retired SPLA soldiers that are too old to be effective policemen868. The 
GoSS’s preference for the army, which the vast majority of high-ranking SPLM officials belonged to 
and fought for, is also reflected in the security sector budget, with spending for the SPLA far 
outpacing and coming at the expense of spending on the police869. As a result, the police are not 
capable of solving community-based issues like cattle-rustling as they are under-staffed and 
outgunned by civilians870. Police and SPLA are often no match for local raiding forces, many of whom 
have received some form of military training during the war. Another reason is that SPLA elite troops 
are concentrated near the volatile border with Sudan and cannot easily be deployed elsewhere in the 
country871.  
Furthermore, when actually present on the ground, police often lack discipline (e.g. they are drunk 
while on duty) and are widely seen as corrupt and even predatory872. In a study of Ikotos County in 
Eastern Equatoria, respondents described how the police accepted bribes to let suspects go, used 
torture and collective punishments on the communities of suspected criminals and was prone to 
drunkenness873. And prior to the cabinet reshuffle and the appointment of Aleu Ayieny Aleu as the 
new minister of the interior in August 2013, many of the rising number of violent crimes in Juba, 
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mainly robberies, were said to be have been committed by off-duty police officers that used their 
guns to acquire some additional income874.  
Many of these issues originate at the leadership level as appointments are based less on meritocratic 
considerations than on military rank and achievements during the civil war. Even the former minister 
of the interior admitted that the police was still struggling to break the tribal blocs inside the 
police875. While the overall number of police have increased from approximately 30.000 to 52.000876 
following a reform in the run-up to the referendum, there is little improvement in output as the 
culture and training of police remain violent, abusive, militarized and thus ill-suited for interaction 
with civilian matters877. This culture of violence and brutalization arguably goes back to SPLA training 
camps that, in the words of a high-ranking SPLA member, taught gun-worship and were run much 
like concentration camps878. A key factor in the lack of discipline may also be the immense wage 
discrepancy between army and police, “with SPLA personnel receiving three or four times more than 
SSPS members”879. As such, relations between SPLA and the police are tense and violent clashes 
between members of police and army not uncommon880. The police are generally not in a position to 
arrest offenders that belong to the SPLA881. Quite on the contrary, the SPLA frequently transgresses 
its legal authority by arresting and detaining suspected wrongdoers instead of leaving that task to the 
police882.  
6.1.2.2. Internal non-state agents of violence  
While few South Sudanese would deny that security has improved in comparison to the civil war 
period, there are still multiple sources of insecurity and violence throughout the country. A good 
indicator for the degree of domestic insecurity is the high number of IDPs, with the UN counting 
350,000 newly displaced in South Sudan in 2011 alone883. In the five months since the alleged coup 
attempt in December 2013, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that the 
number of internally displaced in South Sudan has risen to over 950,000884. Of the five prime causes 
for displacement that IDMC listed in 2012 – a) fighting between SAF and SPLA in Abyei in May 2011; 
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b) fighting between SPLA and new dissident militias in South Sudan (Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei); c) 
tribal conflicts over cattle and resources (Jonglei); d) the Lord’s Resistance Army (25 attacks in 2011: 
Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal); e) floods and the 2011 drought (Warrap, Lakes, 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei)885 – three were directly related to agents of violence that the 
state’s security organs were unable to stymie. In the following, we shall discuss each factor of 
insecurity separately – rebel militias, the Lord’s Resistance Army, inter-ethnic raiding and, not 
mentioned by IDMC, armed youth gangs – though the interrelatedness of these actors and factors of 
insecurity is bound to show up.  
Rebel militias  
One of the greatest current threats to internal security and stability in the independent Republic of 
South Sudan are rebellious SPLA generals886. In the immediate aftermath of the Naivasha Peace 
Agreement, the GoSS had been very successful in neutralizing the largest domestic source of 
insecurity at the time: the South Sudan Defence Forces. Having negotiated their integration into the 
ranks of the SPLA in the 2006 Juba Declaration, the SSDF was effectively broken as a military force887 
while some remnants sought to develop a political branch in its stead888. Alden, however, claims that 
the SSDF nonetheless retains the ability to act as a spoiler “not because of its present number of 
‘active duty’ members but rather because of its ability to rapidly recruit afresh, as well as call up 
‘reservists’ should conflict resume in the south”889. The swiftness with which formally disbanded 
militias can reassemble was evident in late December 2013 when after less than two weeks of 
conflict, the White Army composed of Nuer soldiers was said to march on the town of Bor in Jonglei 
with up to 20.000 men890.  
A fresh round of rebellions against the SPLM-led government in Juba broke out following the national 
and state-level elections of 2010. In the wake of defeat at the ballot box, a number of disappointed 
candidates took up arms to wage war against Juba while employing the language of tribalism and 
‘tribal’ marginalization to rally their troops and attract disaffected youth891. Muntu Mutallah 
Abdallah, for example, used to be the NCP’s county commissioner in Maban County. After losing in 
the 2010 elections, he raised a militia that of 2013 was affiliated to Gordon Kong’s South Sudan 
Defence Forces892. The most prominent of these generals-turned-rebel-leaders was George Athor 
who, having failed to win the governorship of Jonglei via elections, operated with an estimated 3,000 
fighters in the state until he was ambushed and killed in December 2011893. Other militias included 
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the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, active in Upper Nile since 1999, and the National 
Democratic Front, established in September 2011894. Presently, the largest rebel militia is the South 
Sudan Democratic Army Cobra faction run by David Yau Yau, a Murle, who defected from the SPLA in 
April 2012, and is active in Pibor County of Jonglei state895. Yau Yau, who claimed to be “fighting for 
the people of South Sudan, the minority communities like the Murle and the others” to be better 
represented896 and has been blamed for several atrocities, was said to have agreed to a ceasefire 
agreement in January 2014897.  
These rebellions and militia activities are not grounded in political-ideological grievances with the 
GoSS but appear to be motivated by the desire to achieve favourable terms for the eventual 
reintegration into the SPLA898. General Peter Gadet’s conduct is merely a particularly flamboyant case 
of someone who has repeatedly switched sides both during and after the CPA899. The latest instance 
in his personal cycle of rebellion and reintegration was the seizure of Bor as part of Riek Machar’s 
anti-Kiir alliance in December 2013900 and Gadet was also the first South Sudanese to be targeted by 
U.S. sanctions901. A military-cum-rebel career like Gadet’s is made possible by the state’s military 
weakness – in May 2013 the SPLA temporarily lost the symbolically important town of Boma, which 
was the first to be captured by the SPLA during the war in the 1980s902 – and the concomitant 
willingness on the part of the government to extend an open hand towards the rebels which includes 
impunity and the promise of reintegration into the army. Salva Kiir granted the latest amnesty to six 
militia leaders in April 2013 and – until the ‘coup’ on December 15th 2013 – there was indeed a 
marked reduction in militia activity in the country903.  
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Lord’s Resistance Army 
An excellent illustration of GoSS inactivity in security provision is its policy (or lack thereof) towards 
the Lord’s Resistance Army. Originating in Northern Uganda in the late 1980s, the LRA, a messianic 
and extremely brutal militia group, has been terrorizing local populations in the hard to access jungle 
areas straddling Uganda, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and (Southern) 
Sudan since the early 1990s. After the Nasir split in 1991, the Sudanese army gained control of parts 
of the Uganda-Sudan border and from 1993 onwards Khartoum started to provide military aid to 
Joseph Kony as a proxy force against the SPLA and as retribution for Museveni’s support to the 
Southern rebels904. Although Northern support to the LRA officially ceased after the CPA’s signing905 
and the organization was the target of multi-national military campaigns starting in 2008, Human 
Rights Watch in 2009 found that civilians in Western and Central Equatoria were ill-protected against 
continuing LRA attacks906. Cakaj similarly concluded that the SPLA was either unable or unwilling to 
protect people in Western Equatoria, who showed significantly more trust in the so-called Arrow 
Boys – local, mostly sparsely armed self-defence groups907. The government in Juba has even pledged 
financial support to the Arrow Boys to conduct the fight in its stead908.  
Clear evidence for the perceived lack of government protection is a public appeal by 20 civil society 
groups from northern Congo, CAR and South Sudan to president Kiir, calling on him to fight the Lord’s 
Resistance Army more decisively909. It is in this context that the fact that the Ugandan army remains 
on South Sudanese soil with the objective of fighting the LRA is locally taken as a sign of GoSS 
weakness910. Even if the LRA is clearly not a priority for the government in Juba given the multiple 
sources of insecurity across its territory, local feelings of abandonment may very well become 
entrenched and eventually lead to a retreat from the state altogether. Since about 2012, however, 
organizations that monitor the LRA have registered a marked reduction in LRA attacks in South Sudan 
compared to Uganda, DRC and CAR, which they attribute to the UPDF presence, improved road and 
mobile phone networks and self-defence groups911.  
Inter-ethnic raiding & conflict  
While South Sudanese officials can with some justification point to the international dimension of 
armed rebellions due to the apparent support extended in terms of logistics and weapons supplies by 
Khartoum, this line of argumentation is more difficult to uphold with regard to inter-communal 
violence that is ravishing large swathes of the country. As the UN High Commissioner for 
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Humanitarian Affairs reported for 2012, “[i]nter-communal violence persisted in the first half of the 
year, spiking in Jonglei State, affecting up to 170,000 people, with many of them being displaced and 
many more losing their livelihoods”912. And as a separate UNMISS report on the violence between 
Lou Nuer and Murle in December 2011-January 2012 concluded, perpetrators no longer act solely to 
steal cattle but use hate speech to incite violence against the other group, including women and 
children, because of their ethnic identity913. A common explanation blames the prevalence of inter- 
and intra-tribal fighting and raiding on the brutalization of society through the long wars during 
which the use of force has lost the stigma previously attached to it914. And the presence and 
availability of small weapons means that violence – when it occurs – is more likely to be deadly. Yet, 
at their core, most of these conflicts between Southern ethnic groups and clans derive from 
competition over scarce resources915. In some areas, the climate also contributes to insecurity as 
pastoralists and sedentary farmers struggle over access to water during the dry season916. In this 
context, a major security threat emanates from incursions of cattle into agricultural land, especially 
in southern Equatoria, and the resulting clashes – with possible involvement of the SPLA on the side 
of cattle herders917.  
Regarding the inter-ethnic violence in Jonglei between Murle and Lou Nuer since 2009, a Small Arms 
Survey Brief argues that the “*u+nderlying causes include persistent lack of services, increased 
competition over natural resources, and the erosion of traditional leadership structures and the 
unspoken rules of cattle raiding”918. Attacks are driven by political and material exclusion (especially 
true for the Murle) but in recent years extend beyond the economically motivated cattle-raiding to 
ethnically-driven violence that also targets women and children919. Neither GoSS, nor SPLA, nor 
UNMIS/UNMISS for that matter have so far been successful in calming the situation and bridging the 
gulf between communities. As mentioned above, the police are generally ill-equipped to protect 
herders from raids but even the presence of SPLA soldiers is not a guaranteed safeguard against 
attackers. Lou Nuer migrating with their cattle in Jonglei’s Akobo West sub-county in February 2013 
were assaulted and overwhelmed even though they were accompanied by SPLA escorts920. Finally, 
the opportunity cost of raiding is not enough of a deterrent as “*t+he main challenge in Jonglei is not 
that people want to use violence to solve problems and disputes, but that the opportunity to use 
mass-violence with impunity exists”921. Hence, in Jonglei as in many other parts of South Sudan 
where pastoralists live, high levels of need, resource scarcity and tradition combine with easy access 
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to weapons and a minimal risk of judicial prosecution to make cattle-raiding a route worth taking. 
This is especially true for one of the largest demographic groups in South Sudan: young men.  
Armed Youth 
Age-sets delineating social belonging and rank according to an individual’s age group have been a key 
component of South Sudanese societies as a wealth of anthropological studies has established922. In 
contemporary South Sudan where decades of war and forced migration have significantly altered 
social and cultural norms and expectations, youths, a category that can extend to people up to the 
age of 45, are a key demographic that could either be an asset or an obstacle to statebuilding and to 
security. There is a sense that the large number of unemployed, increasingly disillusioned and 
frequently armed youth of South Sudan923, many of whom have experience in violent forms of 
resolving conflict, constitute not only an economic and social but also a potential security risk if 
peace dividends continue to be scarce924. Thus, the National Minister of Agriculture called on idle 
youths to move back to the countryside to work in agriculture and help feed the nation925. These 
sentiments were echoed by the head of a government commission who said he was drawing up plans 
to have “those youth drinking tea and sitting under the trees” conscripted to work on government 
farms926. This is critical because for most young South Sudanese with at least some completed 
education, going back to ‘digging’, i.e. agricultural labour, only constitutes a last resort, a fallback 
option if everything else has failed927.  
In the last couple of years, youth gangs have begun to constitute a substantial problem in urban 
areas of South Sudan. There are two main gangs, the Niggaz and the Outlaws (both started in 2009), 
which are active across the country and range from extremely dangerous to just exhibiting an 
alternative ‘hip-hop’ lifestyle928. In Eastern Equatoria, there is also the issue of increasingly militant 
youth groups, the Monyomiji, that fail to honour customs and elders929. Gangs are aided in their 
recruitment by very high levels of youth unemployment as even the few jobs available often go to 
foreign workers that possess more skills and training930. Many in South Sudan believe that gangs 
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receive backing from or are even orchestrated by members of the government and the armed forces, 
which is why they can largely act with impunity931.  
Another factor that drives youth violence is the inflation in dowry prices in the CPA period. For a 
South Sudanese man to reach adulthood he has to get married, which is only possible if he pays the 
required heads of cattle to the bride’s family. As obtaining cattle is hard, especially for orphans and 
those lacking a wealthy family932, youths resort to raiding while some are said to have joined militias 
with the express purpose of raiding cattle for dowry933. Finally, however, youth can also form armed 
groups to provide security that the state is unable to provide itself. This is in fact the explanation a 
Shilluk youth organization offered for establishing a defence group near Kodok in Upper Nile state934.  
6.1.2.3. Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration 
The hybridity of the state can also arise from within the state’s own security sector. A key component 
of every post-conflict statebuilding manual is to account for the fate of fighters, their transition into a 
civilian life and the collection and destruction of weapons held by civilians. On the one hand, 
demobilization is essential for the state’s budget as an oversized army cannot be maintained if other 
priorities, especially development, are to be met. On the other hand, releasing former soldiers into 
the void without any guidance and assistance bears the risk that they will fail to adjust to civilian life 
and turn to a life of crime or reactivate dormant militias. The latter aspect also applies to arms in the 
hands of civilians. After decades of an often viciously fought war, society has been brutalized and 
people have in many places become accustomed to using violence to get their way. Demilitarizing 
civilian life is therefore equally important for the creation and maintenance of physical security in the 
new state. Hence, the first part of this section will deal with DDR (demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration) of former ‘liberation’ fighters while the second part addresses the issue of civilian 
disarmament.  
Demobilization, disarmament & reintegration of fighters 
The process of downsizing a (rebel) army after the end of conflict to the requirements of a peacetime 
state is typically known as the triplet demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. A DDR 
framework was established as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations and set to 
last in its initial phase from 2005-2012. All observers agree with the Sudan Human Security Baseline 
Assessment that DDR in South Sudan in this period has been an all around failure as only 13% of 
those designated to participate actually took part in (let alone finished) the programme935. The 
failure of DDR in South Sudan can be traced to a couple of factors. For one, while the CPA stipulated 
an overall number of soldiers that were to undergo disarmament (90,000), there were no specific 
targets and no details about the overall force strength that the SPLA was to have eventually936. In the 
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CPA period, with the integration of the former militias of the South Sudan Defence Forces in 2006937, 
the number of soldiers enrolled in the SPLA actually rose rather than fell. Estimates of total troop 
strength are forcibly vague as they are based on haphazard evidence and documentation. Richard 
Rands in 2010 put the number at 140,000938 whereas the International Institute of Strategic Studies 
in 2014 pegged the total at 210,000 soldiers939.  
Secondly, national ownership of the process was and continues to be highly questionable. The 
Southern Sudan DDR Commission (now the National DDR Commission) is under-resourced, most of 
the budget goes to salaries, and it is dependent on the UN and other international organizations for 
most of its work940. SPLA and SPLM did and do not take ownership of the DDR process and only 
formally complied to abide by the letter of the CPA941. The lack of governmental buy-in into the DDR 
framework is epitomized by the fact that, contrary to CPA provisions, South Sudan (just as Sudan) 
used the CPA period to refurbish and upgrade its weaponry, with Ukraine and Russia the largest 
suppliers942. And as verification of candidates for demobilization is practically impossible in the 
absence of a national master list of candidates, the SPLA actually uses DDR as a form of social service 
provision for individuals that are already back in civilian life rather than to demobilize actual 
soldiers943. All of this is aided by the fact that contrary to the CPA that outlined a community-based 
reintegration strategy, practitioners on the ground have opted for an individualized DDR approach944, 
i.e. training and cash allowance are given to individual soldiers rather than to groups or communities. 
Yet, it is local communities that have to shoulder the burden of reintegrating ex-combatants that 
may struggle with a return to civilian life945.  
In addition, some demobilized soldiers have apparently been remobilized and reintegrated into the 
SPLA946. A much bigger problem, however, is that ever since the SPLA started paying regular salaries 
from around 2006/7, the attractiveness of taking part in DDR measures has decreased substantially 
and soldiers had to be pushed to participate947. What is more, the allowance for demobilized soldiers 
is probably too small to entice well-paid soldiers with little marketable skills in the world outside the 
army to give up the gun948 and the government made matters worse by doubling SPLA salaries 
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shortly before the referendum in January 2011949. William Deng Deng, chairman of the South Sudan 
DDR Commission, indeed recognizes that “the current approach is not sufficiently based in the 
realities on the ground” and advocates for a stronger focus on training and educational activities for 
ex-combatants950. In early 2013, the GoSS promised new efforts to make DDR more attractive951 but 
the effects remain to be seen. A substantial mapping exercise of potential livelihood opportunities 
for demobilized fighters assumed a total figure of 150,000 participants – 80,000 active soldiers and 
70,000 from other security forces952. The announcement in early 2013 that more than 100 army 
generals had been retired by the president953 should, however, be taken as a sign of an internal 
power struggle rather than as a first step to a force reduction in line with the DDR spirit.  
Civilian disarmament: “an hour with a gun is better than a month in the market”954 
While disarmament of former rebel soldiers did not succeed, civilian disarmament – the second pillar 
of post-conflict DDR efforts – has been downright disastrous. Periods of inaction have alternated 
with ill-planned and ill-executed disarmament drives that have left scores dead and contributed to 
instability and disenchantment with the government rather than strengthening security and public 
trust. Civilians are estimated to hold about two-thirds of all small weapons circulating in South 
Sudan955. For a start, local communities as a rule do not fully understand the concept and purpose of 
disarmament; a shortcoming that can be attributed to the government’s failure to communicate 
these objectives to the public956. In fact, South Sudan still has not passed legislation regulating 
ownership and use of firearms957. Furthermore, since the 1980s guns have become an important 
symbol of wealth, power, physical strength and marriage worthiness for young South Sudanese men 
as individual ownership of weapons has replaced the pre-war norm of collective ownership958.  
Hence, it should not come as too much of a surprise that efforts at disarming civilians have been 
ineffective, marred by resistance and violent clashes and failed to unearth many weapons959. An 
assessment of the 2008 nationwide disarmament campaign concluded that the operation was poorly 
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planned, highly decentralized, lacked support from the South Sudanese government and was only 
erratically implemented, with five of ten states ignoring the directive altogether960. In several 
localized areas, the experience of forced disarmament (voluntary disarmament was neither popular 
nor given much time to succeed) has been particularly violent, harrowing and disempowering. The 
fact that disarmament has proceeded very unevenly has additionally heightened feelings of 
insecurity as communities that had to hand over their weapons were subsequently targeted by other 
communities that had been able to retain their weapons961.  
Jonglei state is a particularly good case to illustrate the unevenness of disarmament, with critics 
charging that the GoSS specifically targeted those areas and population groups – e.g. Lou Nuer and 
Murle – that were deemed the least loyal to the government and thus a potential source of 
instability962. A first disarmament campaign from January to August 2006 (including Upper Nile) was 
driven by the attempt to control the threat of White Army youth militias that continued to be active 
after the CPA963. A follow-up campaign in Jonglei in 2007 was said to have contributed to insecurity 
with groups that had been disarmed becoming the target of attacks by neighbouring groups that had 
avoided disarmament964. At the same time, rather than taking confiscated weapons out of the 
system altogether, these weapons were partially redistributed to policemen965. Another 
disarmament campaign in 2012 designed to eradicate the underlying causes of persistent rebellions 
and inter-ethnic raiding in the state, resulted in massive human rights abuses committed by 
government forces as it was found  
that men, women and children were subjected to extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killing, 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and unnecessary or excessive 




Even where no attacks occurred, the sense of relative weakness compared to groups that live in 
surrounding or adjacent areas has been deeply unsettling967. Thence, as Willems and Rouw argue, 
the process of disarmament is often perceived as distinctly disempowering and even akin to 
castration968: “The proliferation and the retaining of SALW *=small arms and light weapons+ is 
rationally logical when looking into the prevalent circumstances in South Sudan”969. In a survey 
conducted in Eastern Equatoria and Northern Kenya, 90% of respondents said that a gun “makes a 
person safer”, while 75% believed that a reduction of weapon ownership at the village and 
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community level would result in less rather than more overall security970. While the experience of 
escalating violence has tainted the allure of weapons somewhat971, guns’ central place in South 
Sudanese life is reflected in the title of a study on disarmament: ‘This Gun is Our Food’972.  
Matters are further complicated by reports that the GoSS has in some instances actually armed 
civilians as proxy forces. According to Mike Lewis, “supplying small arms and ammunition to 
Southern Sudanese communities remains both a means of political patronage for the SPLA and a tool 
for outsourcing the provision of security in the absence of the GoSS’s ability to provide for 
community security”973. Even the Deputy Minister of General Education and Instruction Rebecca 
Joshua claimed that weapons were given out to civilians instead of being destroyed974. Finally, even 
those weapons and ammunitions that are actually confiscated are stored in ramshackle conditions 
which makes them prone to theft975.   
6.1.3. The hybrid quasi state in South Sudan – at a glance  
South Sudan very much fits the characterization as a hybrid quasi-state as depicted in the typology 
(Ch. 4.1.1). The country has received international recognition as a matter of course 
contemporaneously with independence but foreign governments from Uganda, Sudan as well as the 
United Nations continue to circumscribe South Sudan’s international (as opposed to Westphalian) 
sovereignty. The multifarious complications that affect South Sudan’s borders from Abyei to Toposa, 
from the DRC to Uganda, in spite of the idiosyncrasies and the high degree of variation they exhibit 
combine to draw a very illustrative picture of borderlands and statehood in South Sudan. For South 
Sudan, the perplexing reality is that demarcation, delineation and nominal-legal control over a 
definite territory and thus over its international borders has been extremely important in the 
government’s public communications both with its own people and with the international 
community. Domestically, demonstrating control over borders has been a means to gain legitimacy 
and prove the regime’s credentials as a guardian of the nation while internationally it served the 
wider purpose of showing the government’s capacity to act as a bona fide government in the run-up 
to secession976.  
In reality, however, borders do not delimit the geographical scope of government action as South 
Sudan is both unable to prevent alternative non-state agents of violence from roaming its soils while 
its own troops do not stop short at international borders in pursuing their interests977. At the same 
time, local communities are not mere extensions of the GoSS but articulate and pursue their own 
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groups’ interests when they feel – as is often the case – that Juba does not stand up for their 
territorial rights. Rebel militias with foreign sponsors (read: Khartoum) also impinge on South Sudan’s 
monopoly of violence. A return to a full-fledged international war with the Republic of Sudan, not to 
mention South Sudan’s other neighbours, does, however, appear not very likely. The relative balance 
of strength between SAF and SPLA and the high diplomatic costs of a potential full-blown war make 
such a course of action seem increasingly improbable978.  
Domestically, however, is where South Sudan’s hybridity and quasi-stateness really becomes 
apparent. Large parts of the country see neither police nor army in their counties but even when 
security agents are present, they routinely fail to provide security to citizens: either out of 
unwillingness or lack of capacity and equipment or because they themselves prey on the population. 
Violence by state agents has accompanied each disarmament drive but to no avail; small weapon 
ownership and availability remain high. In addition to anti-government militias that have regularly 
sprung up since 2005 and can not be defeated militarily by the SPLA, inter-tribal violence and raiding 
has been on the rise not only in Jonglei.  Across the country, armed and underemployed youth 
constitute a threat to citizens’ security that the state is unable to curb. Violence in South Sudan has 
elements of a vicious circle: citizens react to insecurity and the state’s inability to protect them by 
arming themselves and using violence to fend off, for instance, cattle raiders. On the other hand, the 
widespread armament of civilians and their willingness to use force is in itself a massive factor of 
insecurity and constitutes an additional obstacle for the state to attain and maintain a monopoly of 
violence. 
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6.2. The illegitimate state in South Sudan 
Following on from the assessment of the degree to which South Sudan is a hybrid quasi-state that 
neither provides security to its citizens nor possesses a monopoly of violence on its territory, this 
chapter is going to look in more detail at the non-security aspects of statehood. As established in the 
typology of the African state (Ch. 4.1.2), African states are frequently characterized by institutions 
that function only nominally, regimes that only on paper respond to their citizens, judges that only in 
theory adhere to the letter of the law. For South Sudan, there were already concerns at the time 
when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had just been signed “that the national pattern of 
governance was likely to be repeated within the South”979 because SPLM institutions lacked 
transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy. 
Thus, this chapter on the illegitimate state in South Sudan will first of all in 6.2.1 take a look at the 
performance and reach of modern state institutions like the judiciary and of social services like the 
health and education sectors. The second part in 6.2.2 will deal with the various components of what 
is commonly called democratization, which apart from elections refers to constitution-making, 
freedom of the press and democratic political conduct. In both cases, the progress or lack thereof will 
be measured against the Government of South Sudan’s own declarations of intent – insofar as that is 
possible. At the same time, a general assessment of the state of each institution, each substrata of 
modern statehood will be forwarded based on the available evidence. 
6.2.1. The non-performing state: modern state institutions & services in South Sudan 
The overview over the state of modern state institutions and services in South Sudan will proceed 
from the general to the specific: starting out in 6.2.1.1 with an overall look at the presence of the 
state in South Sudan past and present and the state’s capacity to reach its citizens before analyzing 
three key sectors of modern statehood: 6.2.1.2 inspects the judiciary including customary law, 
6.2.1.3 the field of primary to higher education and 6.2.1.4 the health sector. These four sub-sections 
should furnish an understanding to what extent South Sudan is a performing or a non-performing 
state.  
6.2.1.1. Presence of the state and its institutions 
A modern state is largely defined and judged by its citizens on its ability to deliver services to citizens; 
services that citizens indirectly pay for through their taxes. South Sudan and, more to the point, 
South Sudanese have arguably never experienced such a state. 
Prior to 2005 
Even after the nominal conquest of Sudan in 1821, the Southern areas of contemporary South Sudan 
were not penetrated for most of the 19th century except by slave raiders, ivory merchants and 
occasional traders and explorers980. The Mahdiyya affected South Sudan but most of the South was 
never controlled by the Mahdi or his successor. While there are different perspectives on the 
violence and cruelty of British colonial rule – the Royal Air Force pioneered indiscriminate aerial 
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bombardment of Nuer areas in the 1920s and 1930s981 – few would argue with Collins’ assessment of 
British rule in the South as minimal. Very few administrators with even fewer resources meant that 
“south of Malakal the Africans were left to their traditional cultures and got on with their lives with 
minimal interference from the imperial authorities unless they disrupted the peace”982. Outside of 
the central Gezira region around Khartoum, political control was generally not very tight, which was 
not simply the result of the later and thinner extension of British control to the South but was also 
due to the conscious adoption of the policy of indirect rule during the 1920s983. In short, Britain had 
no interest in setting up a centralized bureaucracy984. The price of relying on a light state structure 
that granted relative autonomy to local communities was social, political and economic stasis985.  
Independent Sudan neglected the South for most of its existence and fought a bloody insurgency 
throughout the 1960s. Two decades of civil war following the resumption of fighting in 1983 and 
widespread devastation rendered South Sudan at the turn of the century into a “stateless situation 
[where] one can observe the revitalisation of traditional-political grass-root movements, the 
development and networking of new forms of political representation, and local and regional 
institution building”986 and the dominance of international NGOs (so-called INGOs) in the delivery of 
services to the people. Existing government institutions in South Sudan like the Southern 
Coordination Council, the Khartoum government’s official arm in Juba, were very weak as their 
effective authority only extended over a very limited territorial area987. Hence, writing at the time of 
the Machakos negotiations in 2002, John Young considered the South arguably less prepared to 
administer the state than after the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement thirty years prior988.  
During the war, social services and education in rebel-held areas were largely left to international 
NGOs989 while civil administration – officially instituted separate from the military structure at the 
SPLM’s 1994 Chukudum Convention990 – suffered from the SPLM’s military culture and John Garang’s 
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personalized style of leadership and aversion to delegate authority991. Whereas some credit the 
SPLM’s ability to control a large rural population to its introduction of civil administration and 
concomitant course reversal from a reliance on external support and expropriation of civilians992, 
LeRiche and Arnold rightly state that “*d+espite its revolutionary zeal and ostensibly progressive 
form, the SPLA/M has never emphasised civil administration or even basic development, preferring 
to view itself as a national movement for reform rather than a nascent Southern government”993. 
And as Blunt observed in 2003, appointments to positions in the civilian administration were not 
based on merit but on military rank and reputation994.  
The SPLM’s lack of institutionalization during the war against Khartoum and other militias can be 
considered understandable because administrative concerns had to play second fiddle to the overall 
objective of fighting and winning militarily995. This prioritization of military concerns over the 
interests of the population the SPLM/A claimed to be fighting for is illustrated by the organization’s 
conduct during the 1998 famine when the SPLM/A was accused of diverting food aid from civilians to 
soldiers996. Such criticism notwithstanding, the SPLM/A was generally successful in getting 
transnational NGOs to support its attempts at establishing administrative capacity while restricting 
the SPLM/A’s own (low-cost) role to managing the service provision by other actors997. Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, for example, that provided relief during much of the war was in part a response to 
appeals made by the SPLM/A since 1985998. The situation in the garrison towns and surrounding 
areas that were held by the Khartoum government largely mirrored the SPLM’s reliance on 
international NGOs, save for a few years in the mid-1990s when Islamic organizations sponsored by 
the NIF-government sought to combine care with proselytization999.  
Since 2005 
Thence, the question is to what extent matters have changed and evolved since autonomous rule in 
the South begun in 2005. Since 2005, the International Organization for Migration has tracked more 
than 2.5 million returnees to South Sudan1000, and 50.6% of the population was found to live beneath 
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the national poverty line – a step up from the 90% of the population thought to have lived on less 
than a dollar a day in 20041001. After decades of war, the South’s infrastructure is decrepit and a 
massive obstacle for the government to reach its citizens1002. The average speed at which cargo 
traverses South Sudan was calculated at 6.4 km per hour or roughly equivalent to a horse-drawn 
cart1003. Unknown numbers of landmines continue to maim citizens and disrupt access to many areas, 
in particular in the North of the country near the border with Sudan1004. In October 2013, UNMAS 
(United Nations Mine Action Service) reported that there remained 642 hazardous areas of varying 
sizes1005.  
One of the South Sudanese state’s problems is that it is hardly present outside of the capital Juba and 
the ten state capitals, with a significant disconnect developing between farmers in rural areas and 
the government1006. According to the 2008 census, 83% of South Sudanese still live in rural areas1007. 
Getting from place to place is a major issue, in particular during the rainy season, as there are very 
few all-weather roads (and only 50km of tarmac roads1008) apart from the lone American-built 
highway connecting Juba to Nimule on the Ugandan border. Some progress has been made in 
building roads into rural areas but grave local discrepancies remain: decent all-weather roads can be 
found in Northern Bahr al Ghazal compared to hardly any in Jonglei1009. “At the local level, the 
government often consists of little more than a handful of overstretched employees, working out of 
thatched-roofed buildings with no power, vehicles, communication, or regular salaries”1010. That 
physical presence matters a lot is shown by a study that describes how the visible presence of the 
state via administrative buildings was received very positively by residents whereas South Sudanese 
from areas where such buildings were nonexistent strongly criticized their absence1011. In other 
words, successful statebuilding also means the building of state buildings. 
Skilled, experienced and motivated staff to man the administration also appears to be missing in 
large enough numbers. The 2005 Joint Assessment Mission that accompanied the CPA negotiations 
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and set out targets for the development of state capacity and service delivery has been criticized as 
an unprioritised wish-list that overestimated implementation capacity on the ground1012. In its 
present state, the GoSS is effectively unable to carry out many of what are nominally its government 
functions without assistance from external sources1013. And that is in spite of the fact that service 
delivery often remains the domain of NGOs while several key state functions such as accounting, 
procurement and auditing have been delegated to non-state agencies1014.  
To the great dismay of the GoSS, NGOs generally operate parallel implementation channels 
independent of South Sudan’s state structures due to the latter’s lack of capacity to perform1015. 
Although most of the government’s wrath is in truth directed at the United Nations “because the 
agencies that are contesting governance in South Sudan at a meaningful level are UN organizations 
and the World Bank, not INGOs”1016. But the lack of oversight also works in the opposite direction as 
far from all development projects run and funded by foreign NGOs are actually useful to the 
supposed beneficiary, the South Sudanese1017. On a more fundamental level, foreign NGOs tend to 
operate with normative assumptions about the role of the state that are strongly based on the state 
as it exists in the West1018.  
Quality and training of government staff is also a major concern.  An internal GoSS evaluation of state 
capacity found that the civil service was not able to do the job it is supposed and expected to1019 and 
a UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) report found that half of all positions in 
government ministries remain to be filled, 50% of public servants only have elementary education 
compared to only 5% with a graduate degree and many lack work experience and adequate 
knowledge of English, the official working language1020. This appears to be a repeat of the situation 
after the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement when there was not enough qualified staff to fill 
administrative positions in the Southern Regional Government1021. A USAID study corroborates these 
findings: the high degree of illiteracy among members of the civil service in combination with the lack 
of a common language of administration severely constrains the administration’s capacity to act and 
deliver1022. Even the new head of the armed forces, Paul Malong (appointed in 2014), is believed to 
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be unable to read and write1023. Moreover, ministries and other government bodies are typically 
characterized by a division between former SPLA fighters (often in positions of leadership), former 
members of the administration in Khartoum and younger foreign-educated returnees1024. Tension 
arises from the fact that the latter appear to be doing most of the work and with their expertise are 
seen as a challenge to less educated and less hardworking higher-ups1025.  
One of the underlying factors for the lack of visible progress in governmental services is that given 
the limited budgetary resources, South Sudan faces a trade-off between development and 
security1026. Spending sufficiently on both posts is currently not in the books and the fragile security 
situation, the SPLM’s military culture and the risk of alienating the army all tilt the scales in the 
army’s favour1027. A game-theoretical study actually went to great lengths to show that in the run-up 
to the referendum, excessive militarization and brinkmanship were perfectly rational choices for the 
governments in Juba and Khartoum1028. Recent events confirm that brewing discontent in the army is 
not an empty fear but a very dangerous proposition indeed. In 2014, wounded soldiers hurled stones 
at cars and blocked traffic in Juba to underline their demand that unpaid wages be paid 
immediately1029. In this context, a quantitative study of 75 South Sudanese counties for the period 
from 2006-2010 found a fascinating correlation between the level of state personnel and levels of 
violence. The lowest levels of violence were found both in those counties with the most and in those 
without any state manpower, indicating that in those places where the state was only present in 
small, insufficient numbers, state presence actually led to more violence than where the state had 
stayed out altogether1030.  
6.2.1.2. Judicial system 
As already pointed out above, insecurity in South Sudan is partly driven by a vicious circle of citizens 
creating insecurity by arming themselves against prevailing insecurity. A similar and closely related 
dynamic severely impairs the effective working of the judiciary and of the rule of law in the country. 
When the GoSS officially took over the administration of the South in 2005, rule of law institutions 
were almost entirely inexistent while the few prisons were in a dilapidated state of disrepair, lacking 
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trained staff and equipment1031. As Robert Collins quipped in a book published in 2005, no one has 
governed in South Sudan since the departure of the British because no one has been able to maintain 
law and order1032. Khartoum contributed to this sorry state by sacking judges and attempting to 
Islamize the security services in the South1033. Problems of South Sudan’s embryonic police and rule 
of law structures include “lack of capacity, unreliable payrolls, inappropriate or non-existent 
equipment and infrastructure” as some converted soldiers only receive two weeks of training1034. 
While the Interim Constitution is, on paper, a modern progressive document, most laws to specify 
institutions’ rights and obligations have so far not been passed and/or signed1035. And there are limits 
to the degree of progressiveness: capital punishment is part of the legal code and people are actually 
being sentenced to death and executed1036. Oftentimes, sparse if any evidence suffices for a 
defendant to be sent to death row1037 and the executions are carried out in secret as no information 
about the executed and their crimes is made available to the public1038.  
Impunity is the key judicial problem in contemporary South Sudan where widespread poverty, almost 
equally widespread gun ownership and the “absence of effective justice systems means that there is 
little or no deterrent effect”1039. This can be seen as a legacy of war as Kircher quotes a government 
official as saying that in the course of the war “the rule of law has been thrown away”1040. Security 
forces are generally able to act with impunity and are themselves involved in illegal activities1041. 
There is, for instance, no clear legal protection for land titles as SPLA soldiers frequently occupy land 
that was deserted by its legal tenants during the war1042. The arrest and trial of several SPLA generals 
for human rights abuses committed in Jonglei in mid-2013 is an extremely rare exception to the 
rule1043. Even then, judicial action appeared to be hastened by an international outcry over SPLA 
violence rather than by the government’s concern for its citizens’ rights. Much more common is the 
example of the town of Pibor related by David Deng. In the absence of a statutory court, customary 
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courts are unable to try SPLA members accused of crimes that as a result go unpunished1044. 
Furthermore, during the civil war and especially in the aftermath of the Nasir split, all sides made 
sure to include broad amnesty provisions in subsequent peace deals thus preventing any 
accountability for past crimes1045. As of 2014, while some first steps were underway, no form of 
justice and reconciliation, e.g. by truth-telling commissions on the Northern Irish or South African 
model, has been meted out for crimes committed during the war1046.  
Those who are nonetheless sentenced to prison are very unfortunate. Prisons are in a dilapidated 
state of disrepair, prisoners have to purchase food and health care and beatings and permanent 
shackling are the norm1047. At the same time, prison breaks are a regular occurrence, often in 
collusion with guards1048. Trials are very slow, 95% of defendants go through court proceedings 
without any legal counsel while a third of inmates are held in remand, i.e. awaiting trial or the 
conclusion of police investigations1049. In what can be considered an exemplary case, the police 
officers that arrest and detain a suspect also act as de-facto judges, with the punishment often 
depending more on the whim of the officer in charge than on the severity of the crime1050. Torture 
also appears to be a commonplace component of the police’s toolbox.  
The few state judges that exist are overstretched as each judge covers two to three counties1051. To 
give an example, the formal justice system in Jonglei, a state almost the size of England, is manned by 
“four judges (two High Court and two Magistrates) and eight prosecutors in Bor; two Magistrates and 
a prosecutor in Akobo; and one Magistrate and a prosecutor in Twic East”1052. Moreover, many of the 
older judges continue to adjudicate according to the laws of Sudan that they are familiar with instead 
of the new laws of South Sudan. A conundrum complicated by the fact that many of these judges lack 
proficiency in English and therefore cannot properly read said laws1053. The perception that judges 
lack legal skills and are prone to accept bribes and allow for ethnic favouritism leads many South 
Sudanese to discard the official judicial process altogether1054 while the pervasive culture of impunity 
reigning in South Sudan has driven disenfranchised groups to take matters into their own hands1055.  
Customary law  
In response to this state of affairs, customary law – which is officially recognized by the GoSS as a 
legitimate source of justice – continues to dominate over statutory law, which is only present in the 
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form of formal judges in the major settlements1056. “Throughout the South, but especially in rural 
areas, jurisdiction on all subjects remains squarely in the hands of local chiefs even where the 
Ministry has established jurisdictional guidelines”1057. Customary law continued to be applied to 
Southern Sudan (and much of Northern Sudan) during the British colonial period and throughout 
much of the independence period until Nimeiry’s and later the NIF regime’s attempts to impose 
sharia law on the South1058. While the SPLA had its own legal code, Monyluak Alor Kuol, who worked 
as a judge in SPLA-held areas of Bahr-al Ghazal during the 1980s, only applied customary law, which 
retained its prominent place after the 1994 Chukudum Convention1059. This is in line with Johnson’s 
observation that SPLM/A administration prior to 1994 was based on traditional authorities (chiefs) 
and chiefs’ courts1060.  
Since the beginning of the peace process, customary law has been officially recognized in the law of 
the New Sudan (2003), the Interim Constitution of South Sudan (2005), the Judiciary Act (2008), Local 
Government Act (2009)1061 and the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011). In a national 
survey, 42% of respondents saw the primary responsibility for solving local disputes with traditional 
leaders (10% national government, 10% state government, 26% local government)1062. In another 
survey from Eastern Equatoria, 90% of respondents cited traditional leaders as primary security 
providers compared to 27% for the police and 6% for the SPLA1063. Research from Aweil also found 
that chiefs continued to act as judges in courts of customary law1064 while the traditional leaders’ 
meeting in Bentiu in May 2009 called on kings and chiefs to revive traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms, e.g. in allocation of land to pastoralists and sedentary farmers1065. Apart from being 
more accessible – travelling to the closest statutory court can be costly and time-consuming – 
customary courts generally take less time to conclude a case than statutory courts1066. But in 
practice, the coexistence of several legal codes and legal systems also contributes to confusion and 
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conflict1067. For, in addition to the differences between customary and statutory law, there is a wide 
range of different systems of customary law; centralized legal systems as can be found among the 
Shilluk, Zande1068 and Anuak are juxtaposed to highly decentralized systems among Dinka, Nuer1069, 
Bari and Fertit1070.  
Moreover, customary law rather than being the embodiment of century-old traditions to some 
extent constitutes an invented tradition in Hobsbawm’s sense (see Ch. 2.2). The interplay between 
British colonial administrators and village elders and chiefs produced a legal framework that 
strengthened the standing of traditional authorities of patriarchy and seniority1071. Thus, much of 
customary law goes counter to international human rights standards, especially as regards the rights 
of women1072. Customary law, for instance, allows for forced and arranged marriages and bride 
inheritance and “therefore perpetuates unjust gender relations that serve the social, psychological 
and economic interests of men, by bringing women into a position of subordination and inequality in 
the family and the community”1073. 
This especially affects the many women-headed households (especially among refugees), which have 
an inferior status in customary law, for example when it comes to inheriting property1074. Public 
attitudes toward the punishment of gender-based violence are also an impediment to human rights 
standards. In a survey of more than 600 men and women “82% of women and 81% of men agreed 
with the statement ‘a woman should tolerate violence in order to keep her family together’”1075. In 
turn, some level of physical violence by men against their wives was generally accepted and went 
unpunished in customary courts, just as corporal punishment for both sexes is a common feature of 
customary trials1076.  
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Customary law also does not know the neat separation between civil and criminal law and for most 
transgressions operates on the basis of material compensation as penalty1077. Empirical research in 
South Sudan, however, observed a much higher prevalence of punitive measures than normative 
theoretical accounts of customary law would lead to believe1078. Additionally, the separation of 
customary law and statutory law is rarely upheld in legal practice where the lack of educated judges 
means that most of the time an amalgamation of both legal traditions, customary and statutory, is 
applied to any given case1079. But this state of legal pluralism also provides openings and 
opportunities for litigants that can decide to take their case to the institution most likely to 
adjudicate in their favour1080: if somebody disagrees with a customary court’s verdict he or she can, 
in theory, turn to a statutory court and vice versa.  
Clear evidence of the intermixed nature of South Sudan’s legal system is the (allegedly not 
infrequent) case of General Malual Kuat who systematically arrested and tortured innocent people, 
typically relatives or chiefs, in a form of collective punishment designed to convince wanted suspects 
to turn themselves in to the authorities1081. There is a faint echo of British ‘pacification’ strategies in 
the early part of their reign when they regularly resorted to punitive missions that had the express 
purpose of killing locals to deter any further unrest1082. Finally, chiefs’ authority varies substantially 
from one community to the next and whereas some chiefs are actually themselves involved in 
criminal activity, others are reluctant to pursue and hand over criminals to the authorities for fear of 
reprisals1083. And for all the praise that traditional negotiating mechanisms receive, they are 
admittedly strained by the sheer number and intensity of contemporary conflicts1084. 
6.2.1.3. Education 
As mentioned above, South Sudan’s government prioritizes spending on security and invests very 
little, even by regional standards, into health, education and agriculture; sectors that are, in 
development-speak, pro-poor1085. This also has tradition in Southern Sudan. During British colonial 
rule, education and educational policy differed substantially between the North and South of the 
country. Since the 1920s, the overriding objective of British ‘Southern Policy’ was to deny Islamizing 
and Arabizing influences in the South. Hence, the only affordable providers of education were 
missionary schools, which mostly only provided elementary education and whose quality of 
education was low even compared to missionary establishments elsewhere in Africa1086. Mission 
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schools were met with indifference by the large majority of Southern Sudanese1087, only in Equatoria 
there was a somewhat higher uptake of the sparse educational opportunities available1088. As a result 
at independence the South only had very few educated leaders to negotiate with and challenge their 
Northern counterparts1089. In independent Sudan, schools were nationalized in 1957 and education in 
Arabic made obligatory1090. As a result, educational levels dropped off dramatically while knowledge 
of Arabic in the South remained poor and minoritarian1091. In response, the Anyanya during the first 
civil war continued to run schools according to the old system (starting with vernacular languages, 
and then switching to English). While the SPLA was fighting against successive Khartoum 
governments, education was largely neglected and outsourced to NGOs1092. Effectively, however, 
communities were highly vulnerable, teachers were not paid and sometimes abducted (along with 
their students) into the army or SPLA while ill-coordinated donors focused mostly on supplying 
food1093. As a result, only 30% of children in SPLM-controlled areas attended school1094. Thus, at the 
time of the CPA, Marc Sommers concluded that “*i+t is hardly an overstatement to say that Southern 
Sudanese are one of the most grossly undereducated populations in the world”1095.  
Today, education remains one of the most pressing concerns for South Sudanese when going by 
survey responses. In Eastern Equatoria, education and health care were listed as the biggest needs 
along with sufficient food and water1096 and throughout the country affordable education was an 
issue very much on people’s minds1097. This assessment is shared by South Sudanese elites from 
government, private sector and media that clearly chose education as the country’s most urgent 
development priority1098. Public schools suffer from lack of facilities, under-paid teachers and low 
quality1099. In contrast to the war, education is today predominantly provided by the GoSS and states 
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that pay teachers’ salaries1100. On the local level, however, the lack of funds has meant that 
education, health services and access to clean water continue to be provided by international NGOs 
and churches instead of county, payam or boma1101. Churches also play a key part in teacher training, 
in particular the Episcopal Church of South Sudan1102. Thus, a concise summary of education in South 
Sudan is that “*p+rimary education is basically ensured by trained and untrained teachers paid by the 
government; all the other operational expenditures such as schoolbooks and capital investments are 
funded by development partners and implemented by non-state actors”1103.  
The official education statistics for 2010, the most recent available, tell a mixed story. School 
attendance has increased nationwide (with strong regional variations) and several times as many 
schools and teachers operate in the country compared to the pre-CPA era. On the other hand, still 
only one out of ten from each age group completes primary school1104. There are manifold barriers to 
schooling: sending children to school is expensive and incurs additional opportunity costs as children 
are expected to contribute to household chores and cattle herding1105. Cultural barriers 
disproportionately affect girls who are deemed a family resource that can be ‘cashed in’ in exchange 
for bride wealth1106. Girls’ are indeed severely underrepresented in schools; while 37% of primary 
school students are girls, that number falls to 29% in secondary schools and only 18% at 
university1107. Literacy also shows a clear gender discrepancy: while overall only 27% of South 
Sudanese are literate, the figure for women is only 16% (men: 40%)1108. Overall literacy levels drop 
significantly among rural populations where only 22% can read and write whereas 53% of urban 
dwellers possess these skills1109. An extreme example is Yirol West County in Lakes State where 97% 
of respondents in a local survey turned out to be illiterate1110.  
While substantial strides have been made in terms of supplying broader sections of society with 
elementary education1111, South Sudan’s schools still lag far behind regional standards, which can be 
observed in the significant number of well-off South Sudanese that send their children to schools 
abroad, e.g. to Uganda or Kenya1112. The World Bank found that in South Sudan already today, 
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poverty strongly correlates with level of education1113. As education is thus at risk of becoming an 
entrenched factor of class division, other cleavages like culture also play a role. Respondents in 
Jonglei said that “that many pastoralists have little interest in schooling or alternative livelihood as 
this hardly provides in a culture where everything revolves around cattle”1114. Education and 
educational standards are also a divisive issue because most returnees both from the North and from 
abroad have higher levels of formal education than those South Sudanese that stayed behind during 
the war1115. Nonetheless, government jobs tend to go to applicants with a military background as 
those that ‘did not hold a gun’ or did not spend time in the bush are often deemed unworthy1116. 
Thus, unemployment also affects most elite youths with secondary and university education that 
flock to Juba in search of an elusive government post1117.  
The decision to switch to English as language of instruction – the government announced the phasing 
out of Arabic in secondary education by 20141118 – is also problematic for many students and older 
graduates that have begun or completed their studies in Arabic and are now faced with the added 
obstacle of learning an entirely new language. As a consequence, protests erupted at the University 
of Juba and the University of Bahr el Ghazal where students resisted being lectured in English1119, 
with Juba University eventually relenting and allowing some leeway in the use of Arabic1120. 
Conversely, the arrival of English-language textbooks in Western Equatoria’s primary schools was 
hailed as a breakthrough since many students had not been able to read the old Arabic textbooks1121. 
6.2.1.4. Health care 
Many of the things said about education equally apply to the provision of health care only that this 
field, from funding to structures to delivery, is still more firmly in the hands of international 
donors1122. The overall picture of the health sector in South Sudan looks dire. Since 2005 there have 
been some improvements in access to drinking water, child mortality has been reduced and polio 
eradicated. These moderate successes notwithstanding, South Sudan remains among other things 
the most hazardous country in the world for a woman to give birth in: 30% of women give birth 
unattended, only 10% deliver with skilled assistance, in some states only one in two pregnancies 
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leads to a live birth and maternal mortality is the highest in the world1123. Malaria is more deadly 
than any war, responsible for 40% of all deaths in the country1124. Health infrastructure is very poor, 
with access a major obstacle1125; qualified staff is sorely lacking while half of all health workers are on 
the payroll of NGOs that offer higher salaries1126. The few existing state-run hospitals which are 
typically located in the state capitals are unable to cope with demand and there are recurring reports 
that patients are forced to pay for services that ought to be free of charge1127. Members of the health 
administration are said to lack the skills to do their job, for instance struggling to draw up reasonably 
plausible budget proposals and funding requests1128. Access to health care is particularly difficult in 
those areas close to the border with Sudan while the country as a whole is home to only 120 doctors 
and 100 medical nurses1129. Those health facilities that do exist are reported to lack sufficient 
amounts of even the most essential medicines1130.  
On the part of the state, the extremely low level of capacity in the Ministry of Health resulted in the 
World Health Organisation and the World Bank taking the lead in the initial post-2005 period of 
setting up a health care infrastructure and institutions1131. At the time of independence, more than 
130 humanitarian organizations were active in the health sector1132 and in 2010 it was still the case 
that “NGOs deliver up to 85 per cent of primary health-care services in Southern Sudan and pay the 
salaries of three quarters of the health staff”1133. The South Sudanese government, for its part, 
spends very little on health1134, yet is eager to take over responsibilities from donors, which 
occasionally leads to clashes between the two sides1135. What Simon Allison says of the relationship 
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between Kiir and UNMISS does in fact hold for the wider relationship between international donors 
and aid agencies and the Government of South Sudan:  
Should South Sudan’s government be providing these services instead? Absolutely. Can it? No. That’s 
where Kiir gets it wrong. Instead of criticising, he should be praising an institution which has relieved 




For the most part, NGOs do not trust the government’s capacity to oversee delivery and hence – in 
contravention to the tenets of their coordinating mechanism, the Multi-donor Trust Fund for South 
Sudan which prizes government and stakeholder ownership1137 – operate independently from the 
state structure1138. As it is therefore up to the suppliers of health care, the NGOs, to decide where to 
set up health centres, there are grave local discrepancies in the availability of health care1139. 
Operating costs in South Sudan are phenomenally high, so a large portion of donor funds get eaten 
up at that level1140 and in the unstable environment of South Sudan “*r+ather than being mandate-
driven, many organisations are becoming more insurance-driven and donor-driven”1141. Although 
health NGOs in South Sudan in the initial period after the peace treaty in 2005 faced “key tradeoffs: 
saving lives versus building capacity”1142, NGOs are overall focused more on relief than on 
development, which makes their efforts both expensive and unsustainable1143. To some extent, 
privately operated foreign clinics – in particular Chinese – have begun to fill the gaps in the health 
sector though problems remain in terms of quality and mutual comprehension1144. 
Appeals to their sense of patriotism may certainly convince some skilled South Sudanese doctors and 
teachers to work and live in Spartan conditions with meagre pay (less than 100 USD a month). 
Countering the brain drain and filling the capacity gap in services is, however, likely to require some 
financial incentives. Hence, in order to accomplish the herculean task of building a modern state 
virtually from scratch, the South Sudanese state will for the foreseeable future need to lean on 
international assistance – both in terms of finance and know-how. On the part of NGOs and donors, 
the idea of the dependency syndrome appears to be present in the minds of administrators and 
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sometimes functions as an excuse for their policy-choices1145. Presently, however, this issue is far 
removed from everyone’s mind as displacement from the fighting between the SPLA and Riek 
Machar’s forces and a resulting lack of agricultural cultivation have a third of the population facing 
starvation1146. 
6.2.2. The unaccountable state: democratization in South Sudan 
While it was in Africa that the greatest number of countries experienced a transition from autocratic 
regimes towards democracy during the ‘Third Wave of Democratization’, transition to democracy 
oftentimes has not meant a change of living conditions or acceptable standards of interaction 
between state and citizen. In many a case, whether or not democratization has actually instituted a 
democratic state remains very much an open question (see Ch. 4.1.2.2). The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in Sudan called for free and fair elections and according to its transitional constitution 
South Sudan is a democratic republic. In this chapter, the South Sudanese state’s democratic 
credentials and accountability and legitimacy vis-à-vis its citizenry will be placed under the 
microscope from various angles. Beginning with 6.2.2.1 free elections, an important yet insufficient 
criterion of democracy, then shifting to 6.2.2.2 the ongoing process of constitution-making, before 
turning to the less tangible aspects of 6.2.2.3 the norms and reality that govern political conduct and 
ending with 6.2.2.4 an outlook on civil society, freedom of speech and the press.   
6.2.2.1. Elections: “converting the bullets into ballots”1147 
Holding elections is not only a matter of ensuring domestic legitimacy but can also be a performance 
directed at the observant international environment. As Willis and El Battahani show in an overview 
of Sudanese elections from 1953 to the present, elections have been customarily rigged and have 
particularly failed to represent the views of the people in the South. Thus, in the 1986 elections that 
followed the ouster of the dictator Nimeiry, turnout in the three southern regions was only 1% in 
Bahr el Ghazal, 2% in Upper Nile and 6% in Equatoria as the SPLM/A boycotted the elections1148. 
Organisation of political parties started late in Southern Sudan as the first specifically southern party, 
the Southern Party, was founded only during the election campaign for the first Sudanese elections 
in 19531149. Southern parties were only briefly part of Sudanese governments and even then only as 
token representatives of the South without much real influence. The only elections that Southern 
parties viably contested were those for the Southern Regional Government during the period 1972-
83 and these elections were marred by ‘tribalist’ discourse and ethnic mobilization1150. Although the 
SPLM/A was initially not too enthusiastic about the inclusion of democratic elections in the CPA, the 
lack of a demonstrable peace dividend and internal power struggles in addition to increasing inter-
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ethnic disputes meant that the national elections came to represent a very welcome opportunity to 
reassert the party’s legitimacy1151.  
National elections in 2010 
Initially scheduled for 2009, national elections were held in April 2010 after having been postponed 
several times. A key factor in the postponement had been the national census necessary for the 
allotment of seats and constituencies as well as for lists of eligible voters. The SPLM did not accept 
the results of the 2008 census which had allegedly severely undercounted the population of South 
Sudan1152 and only gave its consent for elections to be held when the South was granted additional 
seats1153. In the event, elections cemented the dominant status of the NCP in the North and the SPLM 
in the South. Whereas most opposition parties in the North had boycotted the elections, in the South 
other factors aided the incumbent. For one, the electoral system for the 2010 parliamentary, 
presidential and gubernatorial elections contained provisions that the CPA’s signatories, NCP and 
SPLM, would be certain to retain a large bloc of representatives and thus dominance over the 
respective political arenas in Northern and Southern Sudan1154. The drawing of constituency 
boundaries in many cases amounted to open gerrymandering1155. This all occurred with the 
connivance of the U.S. and other Western countries involved in the Sudan peace process that were 
wary of upsetting the two signatories to the CPA such a short time before the independence 
referendum1156. Some commentators therefore consider it shameful how the elections “were 
internationally delivered to the NCP in northern Sudan and the SPLM in southern Sudan without even 
the grace of acknowledging their farcical nature aloud”1157. 
Even though many in the SPLM seemed to take electoral success for granted, they nonetheless chose 
to manhandle the opposition in the South in a manner very much akin to NCP strategies in the 
North1158. The SPLM mobilized security organs to intimidate candidates and supporters of opposition 
parties1159 and election observers observed many instances of harassment “particularly by party and 
candidate agents and supporters, and unknown and unauthorized security personnel”1160. While 
there are voices that consider cases of intimidation in the course of the 2010 election campaign as 
the acts of individuals rather than the outgrowth of a top-down directive1161, members of opposition 
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parties felt that harassment was so widespread as to be systematic1162. The Carter Center actually 
concluded that interference in some states had been so extreme as to call into question the 
election’s overall credibility1163.  
Independence referendum & upcoming elections 
The second major occasion when South Sudanese could exert their democratic rights and arguably 
the more important and seminal instance for most of them was the independence referendum on 
January 9th 2011. While the European Union Election Observation Mission found evidence of ballot 
stuffing (about 10% of precincts had more than 100% turnout1164) as well as voter intimidation by the 
SPLM and instances of pandering with votes while educating voters about the election process, the 
EU report stated that the referendum “was a credible process that accurately reflects the 
overwhelming desire of Southern Sudanese voters for secession”1165.  
The true test of the worth and standing of elections in the political and social life of South Sudan are 
going to be the first elections to be held in fully independent South Sudan1166. Scheduled for 2015 at 
the latest, two main worries surround the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. The 
first worry is whether the elections are actually going to take place as Salva Kiir’s leadership style has 
veered towards authoritarianism – in particular since reshuffling the cabinet in 2013 and in the 
process sacking the two most likely challengers to his continued pre-eminence in party and state. The 
second worry is directly related to the first. Several people in Juba voiced the opinion that Kiir would 
only hold elections if and as soon as he was ensured of winning a comfortable majority. According to 
a certain reading of the events since December 15th 2013, these fears have been confirmed as all 
potential challengers to president Kiir have been arrested or face trial for treason.  
The war between the government and troops led by Riek Machar also reveals how the language and 
rhetoric of democratic rights, democratic behaviour and procedures has become an integral part of 
the war of words fought in communiqués and press briefings by either side. Machar insists that he 
would have preferred a battle at the ballot box but was driven to use force in order to liberate South 
Sudan “from the current dictatorship being established by Salva Kiir” and to strive for “a democratic, 
peaceful, prosperous nation where elections would not be rigged, where people would not be 
intimidated”1167. On his part, Machar’s successor as vice-president, James Wani Igga, advised the 
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rebel faction to cease fighting and instead contest the upcoming elections1168. While fighting was still 
raging in parts of the country, Kiir stated in a similar vein that a national census1169 would be carried 
out in 2014 so that elections could be held in time in 20151170 – an extremely ambitious target 
considering the large-scale displacement of people and the fact that it took all of three years to 
conduct the previous census in 20081171. Soon after the signing of peace accords between the 
government and the SPLA-in-Opposition in May 2014, it was announced that elections would be 
postponed until 2017 or 20181172.  
Popular attitudes towards democracy and elections 
Comparing the electorate’s perspectives on the electoral process, a highly varied picture emerges. 
Willis and El Battahani argue that “in the south, the secret ballot has been tarnished by its 
association with an authoritarian and violent state”1173. Thus, prior to the elections in 2010 negative 
views of multi-party competition prevailed in Southern Sudan as elections were feared to divide 
Southerners1174. Furthermore, the highly complex voting system – a combination of constituency-
based elections and voting for a party list – confused much of the electorate, which was not 
accustomed to democratic elections1175. Many citizens were also unaware of specificities in the 
election process while a third could not name any parties other than NCP or SPLM1176. Asked 
specifically about their knowledge of democracy, only half of the sample (48%) claimed to be at least 
partly familiar with the idea of democracy. In a 2013 survey, 40% of respondents felt that South 
Sudan was a democracy with major problems, 21% said it was a democracy with minor problems 
while 19% considered South Sudan not a democracy compared to only 10% who thought it was a full 
democracy1177.  
Closely related to this scepticism of pluralist competition is the fact that in the eyes of many South 
Sudanese, SPLM and the state are virtually identical1178. Yet, there is also a very vocal group of South 
Sudanese mostly in the towns that has readily adopted the language of democratic accountability1179. 
Thus, a summary of an NDI survey from 2011 reads: “More than anything, participants want a 
government that listens and is responsive to its people. They believe that achieving that first requires 
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the adoption of democracy, with its provision of equal rights for all and its empowerment of the 
citizenry to choose leaders and hold them accountable”1180.  
However, it is worth noting that such an outcome is very much what NDI would like to obtain since it 
coincides almost entirely with its vision for post-war South Sudan and would therefore constitute a 
boost to the credibility and legitimacy of its own mission. On the other end of the spectrum, there is 
scepticism about having too many parties and even a call for a constitutional limit on the number of 
political parties1181. The ambiguity many feel towards democracy is captured in a former minister’s 
quip during a conversation in parliament: “If the sun is shining outside and we say it’s night, then it is 
night. That is democracy”1182. 
6.2.2.2. Party politics in South Sudan 
South Sudan is a parliamentary democracy with more than 20 registered political parties, yet the 
SPLM’s dominance in parliament and public life is so vast that South Sudan in its present form has 
been called a de facto one-party state1183. Given the SPLM’s dominant standing and the fact that it 
encompasses a broad coalition of actors, Crisis Group’s assessment that “intra-party politics are likely 
to overshadow inter-party politics for the foreseeable future”1184 is an accurate description of 
political realities in South Sudan. Oftentimes it is difficult to distinguish party and government in a 
manner which is reminiscent of Eastern Europe’s Socialist states of the Cold War period. As Gérard 
Prunier points out, “*m+ost political debate does not take place in parliament but within the SPLM, 
which has preserved the vertically integrated organisation of its Leninist past”1185. Therefore, the 
SPLM warrants a special analysis all to itself.  
SPLM internal politics 
On the one hand, the first guiding principle in the SPLM Constitution is democracy and political 
pluralism1186. Yet, there is a long tradition of hierarchical leadership in the SPLM which is a direct 
inheritance of the movement’s primarily military orientation throughout much of the second war 
period. In the early 1990s shortly after the Nasir split, Gill Lusk presented a whole list of in part 
mutually contradictory attributes that characterized the SPLM: “un mouvement militaire, une 
organisation politique, le ‘royaume’ de Garang, l’actualisation d’un continuum historique, 
l’affirmation d’une identité sudiste”1187.  
Up until his death in 2005, John Garang had been the head of both SPLM and SPLA. Garang’s 
personalized style of leadership meant that much of the decision-making and internal negotiations 
were conducted in highly informal, generally closed and often very exclusive circles of trusted 
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confidants and high-ranking generals. In turn, formal mechanisms of inner-party democracy and 
delegation of tasks and authority never amounted to much. Right from its inception, the SPLA 
developed the habit of resolving internal conflict by force as the movement put a premium “on 
military discipline, security, centralization of decision-making, control of information, and intelligence 
surveillance”1188, which led to an authoritarian structure at odds with the purported aim of liberating 
the country from oppression. The Chukudum Convention in 1994, the party’s first ever gathering 
which had been organized in response to the defection of the Nasir faction in 1991, introduced the 
nominal division between military and civilian authority. However, internal elections in Chukudum 
were far from free and fair because “*t+he SPLM/A leadership was eager to vindicate its claim of 
fighting the war on behalf of the population, while, at the same time, it had no intention of loosening 
control of the Movement”1189. On the ground where several interrelated wars were being fought at 
the time, the pace of practical changes in the following years was in fact very slow and decision-
making remained personalized and concentrated at the top1190.  
In the present, “a military culture still pervades the SPLM and the GoSS”1191 where firm party 
discipline and highly centralized and opaque decision-making are the norm. An open question herein 
is to what extent party and army are really distinct entities. Modest hopes for a more democratic 
SPLM under the leadership of Salva Kiir, who had previously criticized Garang’s decision-making, 
soon dissipated during the CPA period1192. The party leadership, even if this is not reflected in 
everyday politics, is structured in a well-defined hierarchy reminiscent of the line of succession tables 
of European monarchies. Starting from Salva Kiir at the top, everyone in the leadership circle is part 
of a descending line that designates their rank and place in the order of succession1193. Status and 
rank are not conveyed based on achievement but remain very much tied to military rank and 
longevity in the movement with those that joined later in the struggle generally placed lower than 
those that had joined before. As a result, a generational gap can be observed inside the SPLM as a 
core group of mostly sexagenarian leaders that joined the SPLA rebellion soon after the resumption 
of armed struggle in 1983 continues to hold most positions of power and influence. On top of this 
gerontocratic mode of selection, “*e+thnic, regional and interest lobbies influence the appointments 
to SPLM positions in government as well as to legislative assemblies”1194.  
Throughout its existence, the SPLM as a political movement has not presented many openings for 
internal debate and competition and “the SPLA/M’s legacy of autocratic rule over ‘liberated areas’ 
still looms large in the South’s collective political psyche”1195. There is, for instance, a sense that the 
SPLM party has lost influence since 2005 and especially after independence in 2011 as most of its 
most powerful members moved (along with their power) from the party to ministries and other 
                                                          
1188
 Kok (1996), p. 559.  
1189
 Rolandsen (2005), p. 109.  
1190
 Young, John (2002), p. 110.  
1191
 International Crisis Group. Politics and Transition (2011), p. 12.  
1192
 International Crisis Group. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead. Africa Report 
No. 106, 31 March 2006, p. 22.  
1193
 When Riek Machar rejoined the SPLM in 2002, he took over the No. 3 position from James Wani Igga and 
behind No. 2. Salva Kiir and No. 1 John Garang. Upon Garang’s death in 2005, everyone simply moved up one 
spot, with 1. Kiir as president, 2. Machar as vice-president, 3. Wani Igga as speaker of parliament in Southern 
Sudan and 4. Pagan Amum as Secretary General of the SPLM. Nyaba, Peter Adwok. South Sudan. The State We 
Aspire To. Cape Town: CASAS, 2011, p. 168.  
1194
 Ibid, p. 165.  
1195
 LeRiche and Arnold (2012), p. 219.  
168 
 
government posts1196. At the same time, while the SPLM may have many members and 
organizational structures, it is in reality far from a genuine grassroots party in touch with the 
proverbial common man and woman1197. In many respects, the SPLM still retains the strictly 
hierarchical command structures borrowed from the Communist regime in Ethiopia in the 1980s, 
making the party “the orphaned child of the Derg”1198.  
An example of the lack of democratic practices inside the party is the selection of candidates for 
election. In preparation for the 2010 elections, the candidates elected by the electoral colleges of 
each state had to be endorsed by the SPLM politburo, which rejected candidates seemingly 
arbitrarily, leading to disgruntlement and rebellion1199. The SPLM’s decision to nominate members of 
the old guard over those candidates submitted by the state offices created a split between party elite 
and party base, and several among the rejected candidates (around 300) decided to run as 
independents against the SPLM nominee1200. Seeing their political ambitions frustrated in such a 
manner actively drove some manqué politicians (George Athor, Peter Gadet, David Yau Yau) to 
rediscover their past as militia leaders and take up arms against the state (see Ch. 6.1.2 on the Hybrid 
State).  
The most worrisome trend since the SPLM became the governing party of Southern Sudan has been 
the viciousness of infighting that can carry all the way to armed rebellion with thousands of lives lost 
(see the section on South Sudanese militias). Already during the last years of the civil war, a rift had 
emerged between a group of younger men close to John Garang (the so-called ‘Garang boys’) and 
more senior military figures that felt left out. Soon after Garang’s death in 2005, a power struggle 
between ‘Garangites’ and ‘Kiirites’ gripped hold of the party leadership and ended with the (in many 
cases temporary) political or physical exile of most of the Garangites1201. Thus, the events of 
December 2013 only follow in a long line of internal competition and do not mark an outlying event.  
In a cabinet reshuffle in July 2013, Salva Kiir sacked Secretary General Pagan Amum and Vice-
president Riek Machar, who had both announced their candidacy for the leadership of the party1202. 
This cabinet reshuffle was widely seen as part of a power struggle within the SPLM over the party’s 
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and hence the country’s future leadership1203. The background is that prior to the next national 
elections, a national convention will have to convene and choose a candidate. Originally scheduled 
for early 2013, the national convention is yet to come together1204. Instead, in November 2013 
president Kiir dissolved all party structures, allegedly because of their poor performance1205. Then, 
immediately after a meeting of the National Liberation Council, the SPLM’s highest executive organ, 
which Riek Machar and other senior members prematurely left in protest at the “undemocratic 
processes” in the party1206, violence erupted in army barracks in Juba on December 15th 2013 and 
soon engulfed several parts of the country. In the light of these events, the cabinet reshuffle was 
arguably the most momentous political event since South Sudan’s independence. A crisis in the 
governing party is an equally serious crisis for the state1207, which underlines the contention that in 
South Sudan the two cannot as of now be separated.  
Opposition parties and the SPLM  
Opposition parties in South Sudan are not only weak, the SPLM also has a history of absorbing other 
movements. The SPLM whose manifesto mentions “a vibrant multi-party democracy” as one of the 
party’s pillars1208 has pursued different strategies of dealing with opposition parties and opposition 
parties have likewise oscillated between cooptation/cooperation and harsh criticism of the SPLM. 
Public attitudes seem to favour a less adversarial and more cooperative approach to interaction 
between different South Sudanese parties. A survey from 2012 found that a majority thought that 
opposition parties ought to be included in the government both for idealistic and practical reasons, 
i.e. so as to prevent defeated candidates from acting as spoilers like George Athor and other 
candidates-turned-militia-leaders1209.  
In official interaction between SPLM and other Southern parties, a conciliatory tone has been the 
norm, especially prior to the independence referendum. Thus, in a meeting between opposition 
parties and the SPLM in 2008, the SPLM committed itself to uphold multi-party democracy, political 
pluralism, freedom of association, internal party democracy and the creation of a leadership forum 
for direct contacts between the SPLM and the opposition1210. Even shortly after independence, then-
vice president Riek Machar claimed to “have recognised the importance of collaboration and 
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mobilisation of all political parties and CSOs *civil society organisations+ in working together”1211. 
Consultation with other parties is also sought in times of crisis. Hence, in the aftermath of the 
outbreak of violence in December 2013, the president convened representatives of all political 
parties in South Sudan to convey his version of events and issue a joint statement condemning the 
coup d’état1212. The call for an inclusive interim government to resolve the crisis was on the other 
hand promptly rebuffed by the SPLM1213. 
Relations with the primarily Shilluk SPLM-Democratic Change are indicative of the SPLM’s more 
confrontational approach. The background to conflict is that Lam Akol, former leader of the Nasir 
split, left the SPLM to found the oppositional SPLM-DC (South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – 
Democratic Change) in 2009 and ran against Salva Kiir for president of Southern Sudan under the 
banner of national unity. As the sole challenger Akol won 7% of the vote based on the promise to 
rectify the SPLM’s alleged corruption and lack of democratic credentials1214. In response to this 
challenge to SPLM dominance, four elected SPLM-DC representatives were temporarily arrested in 
May 2010 while violent clashes between locals and SPLA occurred1215. Members of the SPLM 
establishment have accused the SPLM-DC as a party and Lam Akol personally with running an armed 
militia and being Khartoum’s stooges1216. Periodically, members of the SPLM-DC have been 
arrested1217 and Akol, himself threatened with arrest, eventually fled the country for Khartoum in 
late 2011 and only returned upon receiving a presidential pardon two years later1218.  
The United Democratic Front (UDF) and its leader Peter Abdelrahman Sule’s story is eerily similar. 
Accused of harbouring a military wing with the aim of bringing down the government, Sule was 
arrested in 2011 and pardoned in 2013 along with Lam Akol without having been charged during his 
incarceration1219. Following his release, there were rumours that the UDF was in fact in the middle of 
negotiations to merge with or rather to be submerged in the SPLM. Another more subtle manner by 
which the SPLM government challenges opposition parties is by adding more and more conditions 
for party registration – a party has to have democratically elected office-holders; proper 
representation of women, ethnic groups, regions, minorities and youth; branches in all ten states and 
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“as members, not less than five hundred registered voters from each of more than at least eight 
states”1220 – conditions that might be too onerous for many smaller outlets.  
One thing, however, holds for all opposition parties. Much like the different factions inside the SPLM, 
South Sudan’s political parties and their members are not distinguishable by ideological orientation 
but rather represent personal and sometimes ethno-regional group interests. At the risk of 
misrepresenting more high-minded individuals, the overall motivation for political activism seems to 
be the desire to partake of the state’s riches. Moreover, the opposition’s chances of truly challenging 
the SPLM appear naught as long as they remain as fragmented as currently constituted1221. Another 
crucial aspect of political parties in South Sudan is the centrality of possessing (or being accused of 
possessing) a paramilitary wing, which can be traced to the very nature of the political system that 
emerged from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The only parties to the peace deal were 
military organizations and the CPA excluded anyone from access to power who lacked the ability to 
raise a militia. Johan Brosché is absolutely correct in stating that “*t+his implies not just a severe 
democracy problem but also a significant risk for new violence by other groups, as it signals that the 
only way to power is through military means”1222. 
Constitution: Drafting a new one 
Bullying of the opposition through strength in numbers is an apt description of the SPLM’s approach 
to constitution-making. After the Transitional Constitution came into effect with independence on 9 
July 2011, a process of drafting a permanent constitution for the country was officially initiated1223. In 
this process, the president assumes an outstanding role: the members of the Constitutional 
Conference that the president appoints have to present their draft first to the president who will 
then present it to the legislature. He also possesses the final right of signing the Constitution into 
effect and therefore multiple points at which he can influence the content and shape of the 
document1224. “Among the organs of the National Government the President has been given a 
dominant position that has no institutional counterweight. *…+ Among the losers are the MPs, the 
states, the chiefs and the people”1225. Informing and involving the public about the process also 
seems to have a low priority for the government as a majority of those queried (56%) professed that 
they had never heard of the national constitutional process currently underway1226 while in a 
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separate study only about half of respondents (mostly from urban or peri-urban areas) could even 
define what a constitution was1227.  
SPLM officials seem to see any inclusion of opposition figures in the transition period as a gesture of 
goodwill rather than as an obligation. Thus, the ‘National Constitutional Review Commission’, 
charged with drafting the Transitional Constitution included only one non-SPLM member in direct 
contravention of agreements made at the October 2010 All Political Parties Conference1228. A civil 
society representative in the commission emphasized how little time and space was given to non-
SPLM members to voice their positions and that the SPLM majority often acted like bullies1229, which 
is very much a repeat of how president Kiir used carrots and sticks or coercion and goodies to get 
parliament to approve the current Transitional Constitution1230. Reluctance to allow outsiders to 
share in the exercise of actual policy-making is since its infancy characteristic of the SPLM and can be 
called a party tradition. Further proof of the government party’s majoritarian outlook on dealing with 
the opposition and on the future of democracy in South Sudan more globally can be gleaned from a 
revealing speech president Kiir gave in September 2013. Addressing an audience of SPLM members, 
Kiir said that in-fighting for government posts was unnecessary because the party would rule South 
Sudan for another 100 years1231. Hence, there would be ample time for everybody in the party to 
enjoy their moment in the sun.  
6.2.2.3. Governmental conduct & the ethos of democracy 
Elections alone do not make a full-fledged democracy. In one of the more hard-fought debates in 
political science and sociology, a strong strand of thought holds that there are pre-political 
preconditions for a democracy to take root and to succeed. In other words, political and societal 
elites have to buy into the idea of democratic procedures of decision-making and interest 
representation and themselves abide by democratic norms for the democratic state to function. In 
Southern Sudan, exposure to and experience of democratic processes has been minimal to date. As 
Joseph Lagu, the Anya-nya’s former commander-in-chief writes in his memoirs, the military and its 
organization took precedence not only because it was a higher priority but because unity among 
political actors was much harder to achieve1232. And in his memoirs current vice-president Wani Igga 
is sceptical that democracy can work in a country like South Sudan that lacks political consciousness 
and is prone to ethnic mobilization1233. 
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GoSS conduct in the political arena 
The period since independence has revealed most clearly the relative strength of constitutional 
organs and how far they respect or exceed their legally assigned limits of authority. Naturally, it is 
typically cases of transgression that make the news and stir debate rather than the more mundane 
regular functioning of government. These instances of unconstitutional behaviour and especially the 
reaction by published opinion towards these actions, however, reveal a lot not only about what is 
happening in South Sudan’s institutions but also what is deemed acceptable or scandalous, i.e. where 
the lines of passable political performance are drawn. To some extent, political conduct by those in 
charge of the levers of power has been shaped by the changed incentive structure to show 
democratic credentials after independence had been attained. Thus, having secured international 
recognition for South Sudan’s independence and with substantial oil revenues in hand, the 
government of South Sudan’s reliance on U.S. goodwill has markedly declined1234.  
In the light of mounting criticism from its Western backers1235 and the reluctance of Western 
investors to build up a presence in South Sudan, the Chinese politico-economic model may seem 
increasingly attractive to the leadership in Juba. Crisis Group quotes a state governor who opines 
that “the Chinese are here and ready to build now … the Americans … they just want to talk about 
politics and democracy”1236. Apart from economic cooperation that has extended beyond oil to 
infrastructure projects as well as to private enterprises (hotels, hospitals, petty merchants), China 
may prove to be a valuable partner to the GoSS not least because the near-indivisibility of party and 
state that prevails in contemporary South Sudan is akin to the Communist Party’s position in the 
Chinese state1237. A fascinating version of this argument is presented by Addis Ababa Othow Akongdit 
who claims to show, first, that political stability is the key determinant of economic stability and 
second that political stability is not tied to democracy but can be attained by one-party states1238. 
Since fear of losing power is the main trigger of instability in African countries, the SPLM’s 
preponderance over its competitors should be seen as a good thing for South Sudan’s economic 
prospects.  
On the other hand and in spite of Kiir’s belief that the SPLM will rule for another century, doubts 
about the party’s long-term dominance of the political scene in South Sudan have apparently 
penetrated the heart of the SPLM leadership. A tour of the ten states of South Sudan by members of 
the SPLM political bureau in 2012 is supposed to have led to the sobering realization that people in 
the country were increasingly unhappy with the SPLM’s and the government’s performance, which in 
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turn led to finger-pointing and dissension among the party elite1239. What is very interesting in this 
regard is the close relationship between the SPLM and South Africa’s African National Congress 
party1240. After fighting the apartheid regime in Pretoria for several decades, the ANC successfully 
transformed into a political party that – in spite of mounting scandals – continues to have a 
stranglehold on power in South Africa. As such, the ANC is clearly a model for the SPLM as evidenced 
not only by statements from SPLM officials but also by official consultations between party 
delegations1241.  
Illegitimate rule: autocratic conduct by the executive 
Going beyond the questionable treatment of the opposition both inside and outside the SPLM, there 
is plentiful evidence that the Government of South Sudan is failing to uphold the laws it has passed, 
the (transitional) constitution it has written and to protect the human rights it claims to have waged 
a long war for. This is particularly true for the constitutional rules of democratic politics that have 
been flaunted time and again by various layers of government. Gordon Buay, a former secretary 
general of one of the factions that comprised the South Sudan Defence Forces that merged with the 
SPLM in 2008, cautioned after the 2010 elections that “*t+he military supremacy that reigned 
supreme during the liberation struggle before the conclusion of the CPA is the first enemy of liberal 
democracy in South Sudan”1242. Additionally, Salva Kiir is allegedly building up South Sudan’s 
domestic intelligence services as a means to hold onto power1243.  
For one, president Kiir has sacked several elected state governors and replaced them with 
appointees while relying on a highly circumspect reading of his constitutional rights. In January 2013, 
Chol Tong Mayay was removed from his post as governor of Lakes State and replaced with a 
caretaker governor1244. The move confirmed worries that the transitional constitution assigned way 
too much power to the president1245. While officially the justification was a threat to national security 
(as required by §101 (r) of the Transitional Constitution), the real motive was suspected to lie in the 
former governor’s good connection with then-vice president Riek Machar1246. In fact, Mayay was 
arrested after the alleged coup attempt in December 2013 as a co-conspirator and Taban Deng Gai, 
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who had been dismissed as governor of Unity State in July 20131247, joined the rebel fighters against 
the government and was charged with treason1248. Contrary to the constitution, no elections for 
governor have been held or scheduled in either of the two states. The same fate of being replaced 
without much ado and proper justification also affects county commissioners, which are the next 
level beneath state governors1249. This is a clear sign of a top-down structure of authority as each 
officeholder de facto responds not to the people he or she is said to represent but to the higher-ups 
in Juba that have ultimate say over whether or not he or she gets to keep the job.  
Another sign of executive dominance in dealing with the other branches of government is the 
effective powerlessness of parliament. The most telling example occurred during the vetting process 
of prospective ministers for the new cabinet in the summer of 2013. Telar Ring Deng, a well-known 
judge, lawyer and Salva Kiir’s choice for Minister of Justice, was turned down by the South Sudan 
Legislative Assembly (SSLA) on the grounds that he could not produce his law degree. While some 
took this as a sign of parliamentary sovereignty and the nascent functioning of the principle of checks 
and balances1250, subsequent events tell a different story. The president threatened to dissolve 
parliament if it dared to vote against his nominee for vice-president1251. A member of parliament 
recalled the instance as follows: “The president came in with bad mood and introduced to us Cde 
James Wani Igga for his nomination as the new Vice President. Then he started to threaten us with 
dissolutions and dismissals. After he finished with his threats nobody spoke and the meeting ended 
like that”1252. Peter Nyaba’s assessment of parliament from 2011 is therefore still accurate: “Instead 
of fulfilling its supervisory and watchdog functions over the government, this SSLA has become the 
GOSS executive’s rubber stamp”1253. 
There are also regional and local examples of arbitrary conduct by officeholders. Under the 
leadership of state governor Rizik Zakaria Hassan, the authorities of Western Bahr el Ghazal have 
since October 2012 increasingly resorted to arbitrary arrests of parliamentarians, journalists, youth 
activists and others that are opposed to moving Wau County to a different town1254. In Warrap state, 
when trade unions protested in April 2013 against the unilateral decision to cut civil servants’ wages 
to pay for a sports tournament, the governor Nyandeng Malek reacted by simply suspending the 
union1255. A few months later, she violated the state constitution by instating a new cabinet without 
seeking approval from the state assembly1256. All in all, Freedom House gave South Sudan the grade 
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‘Not Free’ and ranked the country’s level of political rights as a 6 on a scale of 1 (best) to 7 
(worst)1257. Contributing to this disappointing ranking was the state of freedom of speech in the 
country which will be the next feature of democracy in South Sudan to be put under the microscope.  
6.2.2.4. Civil society, freedom of speech & the press  
The aspect of statebuilding that concentrates on building a relationship between state and society 
and thus popular legitimacy, has been largely neglected by donors and SPLM alike. Civil society 
engagement is very limited and restricted to service delivery and generally does not fulfil the 
watchdog function of controlling government and ensuring good governance1258. “There seems to be 
disagreement within SPLM over the extent to which an autonomous civil society should be 
promoted”1259. Still there are signs of an emerging and politically active civil society. Prior to the CPA 
already, Marina Peter highlighted how the SPLM’s attempts to establish a civil administration in 
liberated territories were less the result of decisions taken by the party leadership but came about in 
response to bottom-up pressures by some individual members, churches and local NGOs1260.  
The head of a civil society organization which derives most of its funding from foreign donors said in 
an interview that the government increasingly responded to its reports and briefings and even 
contracted them for studies which civil servants were unable to produce1261. At the same time, 
criticism of decisions and acts by the government, for instance the arrest of journalists, is very 
outspoken1262. An indirect testament to the increasing relevance of civil society organisations in the 
eyes of the executive is also the fact that civil society activists are being targeted. Deng Athuai 
Mawiir, chairperson of the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, was abducted and abused by members 
of the security services1263 and the official advisor on gender and human rights matters in Lakes State 
was beaten up by members of the security services1264. Largely overlooked during the fighting that 
ensued after the alleged coup attempt in December 2013, in January 2014 the South Sudan Human 
Rights Society for Advocacy (SSHURSA) received severe threats, shut down its operations and most of 
its staff fled the country out of fear for their lives1265. 
                                                          
1257
 Freedom House. South Sudan. Freedom in the World 2013, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/south-sudan#.UvfYR_6PLcs (accessed: 9 February 
2014).  
1258
 Haslie and Borchgrevink (2007), p. 35.  
1259
 Ibid, p. 26.  
1260
 Peter, Marina. Sudan. Berlin and Bonn: Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Conflict 
Analysis, June 2004, p. 12.  
1261
 Interview in Juba, 22 October 2013.  
1262
 South Sudan News Agency, “SSHURSA condemns detention of journalists, urges the deputy minister of 
Interior to stop intimidating the media and resign”, 12 May 2013, 
http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/sshursa-condemns-detention-of-journalists 
(accessed: 13 May 2013).  
1263
 Frontline Defenders, “South Sudan: Kidnapping and violent assault of human rights defender and anti-
corruption activist, Mr Deng Athuai Mawiir”, 13 July 2012, http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/18958 
(accessed: 6 February 2014).  
1264
 Sudan Tribune, “Lakes: government adviser on human rights beaten by security in house raid”, 2 April 2014, 
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50518 (accessed: 3 April 2014).  
1265
 Gurtong, “South Sudan Human Rights Closes Office in the Country”, 22 January 2014, 
http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/14706/Default.aspx (accessed: 17 February 2014).  
177 
 
Media in South Sudan  
Media in South Sudan are in a very interesting position. Due to the lack of communication 
infrastructure and the staggering rate of illiteracy, the reach of different forms of media varies 
enormously. The primary source of information for most South Sudanese is radio (51%), followed by 
word of mouth (29%) and community meetings (9%), whereas internet and newspapers are each 
only the primary source of 1% of those interviewed1266. This state of affairs, however, appears to be 
slowly changing as “access to information via the Internet is believed to be increasing, especially 
among younger people”1267. Among South Sudan’s elite, the picture is already different: a majority 
gave local newspapers as their main source of information, the second most frequented medium was 
the internet and only then came local radio1268.  
On the one hand, there are online news-sites and fora that go relatively unchecked in their criticism 
of the government, yet only reach a tiny fraction of South Sudanese living in the country. Members 
of the press working inside South Sudan face other challenges. Firstly, capacity is low and equipment 
scarce, in particular outside of Juba. A 2009 assessment of media presence and quality across 
Southern Sudan found that “the overriding theme in the states was one of overwhelmed, 
underfunded, understaffed and underdeveloped/under-served media/information infrastructure in 
the midst of great needs”1269. Reporting is also biased toward the governing party as one study for 
the post-referendum period found the SPLM receiving more than 90% of political coverage on 
Southern radio and TV channels1270.  
The SPLM’s 2nd National Convention in 2008 had itself complained of and called for an end to the 
clamp-down on press freedom1271. Nonetheless, harassment is rife in South Sudan and repressive 
habits from the war in the 1990s – characterized as “*f+or the press *…+ the bleakest period in the 
history of the country”1272 – have yet to give way to a more liberal attitude towards the media. After 
initially ranking in the middle of the pack, in its second year South Sudan dropped to 124th in a global 
ranking of media freedom in 20131273. But already during the CPA period, the GoSS, lacking its own 
media legislation, had continued to apply restrictive Northern rules to intimidate, harass and 
imprison critical journalists1274. In addition to targeting individual members of the press, entire 
broadcasting houses feel the brunt of state repression. In July 2013, the Good News Radio Station 
run by the Catholic Church was closed down by Lakes State’s Minister of Information and 
                                                          
1266 International Republican Institute (2013), p. 70.  
1267
 Noble, Kate and Morgan, Carol. Country Case Study: South Sudan. Support to media where media freedoms 
and rights are constrained. London: BBC Media Action, August 2012, p. 8.  
1268
 World Bank (2013), p. 40.  
1269
 Gachie, John with assistance from Mogga, Richard and Maika, Mac. Mapping the Void: A state-by-state 
media assessment report on South Sudan and selected Northern states. Nairobi: The Consortium on Promoting 
Freedom of Expression and Civil Society Involvement in Developing of Democratic Media Legislation in Sudan, 
August 2009, p. 66.  
1270
 Sudan Media and Elections Consortium. Southern Sudan referendum 2011: Monitoring of media coverage. 
Copenhagen: International Media Support Group, June 2011, p. 40.  
1271
 SPLM. SPLM 2nd National Convention. Juba, May 2008, p. 4.  
1272
 Deckert, Roman, “The history of the Sudanese press: Background to conflict”, in Media in Cooperation and 
Transition (ed.) The Sudanese press after separation – Contested identities of journalism. Berlin: MICT, 2012, 
pp. 6-15, p. 13. 
1273
 Reporters Without Borders. World Press Freedom Index 2013. Paris, 2013. 
1274
 Human Rights Watch. ‘It’s an everyday battle’: Censorship and Harassment of Journalists and Human Rights 
Defenders in Sudan. February 2009, p. 16.  
178 
 
Communications on the grounds that it had become politicized1275. Further evidence of this uneven 
attitude to openness and public scrutiny is the decision in 2013 to reverse the practice of allowing 
journalists to attend cabinet meetings, standard practice since 2006, in the name of secrecy1276.  
One of the most influential members of the South Sudanese media told me that he had been 
summoned by the head of national security and told to be more careful in what he published, 
especially as relates to corruption and anything regarding the president and his family. Another 
journalist, working for a South Sudanese media house which is funded by foreign donors, admitted 
that tacit self-censorship is the norm as journalists understand which topics to stay away from with 
official corruption at the top of the list1277. An editor-in-chief also expected a more heavy-handed 
approach by the state in the run-up to the next general election in 2015, in particular more severe 
restrictions on press freedom and direct interference with editorial decisions1278. A first indication of 
this heavy-handedness came shortly after the alleged coup attempt in December 2013 when the 
Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei Lueth, criticized reporters for not sticking 
to the government’s version of events and added: “I don't want you to give this misleading 
information this is unprofessional. From now onwards we will be very strict, this is for your 
information”1279. In April 2014, Citizen TV, the country’s sole private television channel, ceased 
operations because of insecurity1280. As the founder of Gurtong, Jacob Akol, told the Committee to 
Protect Journalists in 2011 on the matter of government officials: “They all come from a military 
background. They have no experience in democracy. It's not that you can just say, ‘Ah, now we are 
democratic.’”1281  
6.2.3. The illegitimate State in South Sudan – at a glance 
A South Sudanese diplomat told me that the world should appreciate how far South Sudan had come 
in the last nine years but an honest assessment cannot fail to uncover both successes and 
disappointments. South Sudan complies very closely with the standard type of the non-performing 
state in that coverage of the state’s territory is far from complete, with access to state-run justice 
and social services decreasing and soon thereafter ceasing to exist the further away you move from 
the capital and from the state capitals (where there is less to begin with).  
In many of these white spots where the state’s arm does not reach and the citizens themselves 
cannot reach the state, anarchy and lack of social bonds is not the lived experience of most South 
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Sudanese. Akin to what transpired in the assessment of security provision, the state’s place is taken 
by an array of alternative providers of justice and services, chief among them traditional authorities. 
As such, an individual’s level of access to services and type of response depends largely on the whim 
of his or her whereabouts rather than a universal state-wide standard. Among other things, this 
means that the South Sudanese state does not abide by its expressed wish to ensure equal human 
rights and equal services to its citizenry, which holds especially true for South Sudanese women.  
But even where the state is present, the quality of services – be they educational, health-related, 
juridical – is generally low with some highly qualified and motivated individuals overwhelmed by 
cohorts of scarcely trained, ill-equipped and varyingly motivated staff that lack a firm civic ethos. Low 
and irregular salaries are a major impediment to high-quality service delivery across the country. 
When it comes to the budget and the pay scale, the South Sudanese state sets the wrong incentives 
if its goal is to improve services: men and women with arms receive most of the budget whereas 
those without often do not even receive their small allowance in timely fashion or, sometimes, at all.  
The status quo in service delivery in South Sudan would not be possible without the at least implicit 
complicity of the international community, whose handling of development and peacebuilding 
efforts help sustain the South Sudanese government’s present course. Stepping in to fund the state, 
however, is to tacitly accede and effectively embolden governments in the region and beyond to 
pursue a strategy of “successful state failure”1282, i.e. ridding themselves of the costs and 
administrative burden of providing social services by permanently outsourcing them to NGOs and 
international donors. As concerns the state edifice in South Sudan, it is still unclear whether the GoSS 
will eventually pursue the model of a service-delivery state (including shouldering the huge costs that 
would entail) or continue to outsource and regulate service-delivery by contractors and NGOs1283.  
Democratization has occurred at the ballot box but not in deeds. Elections alone are unlikely to 
further unity or cooperation in South Sudan as the electoral system is predicated on majoritarian 
decision-making on the British model which severely limits opportunities for minorities to partake in 
decision-making. Similar to Sudan and not unlike many other African post-colonial states, elections in 
South Sudan are also motivated by a perceived need on the part of the ruling clique to please and 
appease its foreign backers from the West. The appeal to rebel factions to seek redress through 
elections while fighting was still ongoing should also be understood as an attempt to win over 
international opinion to the government’s side. Striking in this regard is that the SPLM’s breakaway 
faction consistently justifies its take-up of arms with president Kiir’s undemocratic conduct inside the 
party and with the  defence of “personal liberty, freedom and the rights of individuals to express 
themselves”1284. At the same time, democratic elections have not brought stability to the country and 
democratic norms clearly do not govern political behaviour. The SPLM has harassed the opposition in 
spite of its own dominance of the political space and the spectre of national elections in 2015 
triggered the strife inside the SPLM in 2013 that eventually led to the civil war after December 
20131285.  
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While the failure to develop peaceful, accountable and equitable state-society relations is widely 
recognized and decried (not least by the army of international experts), no solution has so far been 
proffered that goes beyond the mantra of ‘it takes time to build trust’ and exhortations to the 
government to stop misbehaving1286. Critically, the SPLM/GoSS does not practice the ruthless form of 
politics of survival that can be encountered in some African states where the government 
deliberately cripples the state structure so as to deny potential challengers any leverage. Since the 
SPLM counts on ruling for another 100 years, there is no urgency to fear outside challengers as all 
energies are devoted to the fight for control of the party and thus the fight against inner-party 
opponents. At the same time, however, given all these trials and tribulations, the party’s long-term 
coherence even beyond the signing of the peace treaty is truly remarkable.  
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6.3. The privatized neopatrimonial state in South Sudan 
The African state does not only suffer from a lack of legitimacy and a lack of services it provides. It is 
also (as shown in Ch. 4.1.3) said to be the object of capture by state and government elites that 
privatize and misuse state revenue and state resources for private gain and to sustain neo-
patrimonial networks of dependents that help in sustaining the ruling elite. The problem of state 
privatization often stems from an abundance of raw materials that are squandered for the benefit of 
a small coterie while leaving the rest of the economy neglected, hamstrung and underdeveloped. 
South Sudan, in spite of its youth, has not been spared either phenomenon. This chapter, therefore, 
will address the question to what extent the South Sudanese state has been privatized and its state 
coffers used for the enrichment of its leadership as well the creation and maintenance of clientelist 
support structures in the country.  
Hence, the first section in 6.3.1 is devoted to an assessment of the state’s privatization and the 
prevalence of corruption, focusing in particular on the relevance of resource-based problems like the 
oil curse and land grabs on the state’s standing as a gatekeeper between the national and the 
international spheres. Section 6.3.2 will then try to discern to what extent patronage and neo-
patrimonialism are apt descriptions of the workings of the South Sudanese state.  
6.3.1. The privatized state in South Sudan: resource economy & the gatekeeper state 
The presence of and extreme budgetary reliance on 6.3.1.1 exports from oil fields in South Sudan 
additionally complicate the issue as incentives for state capture and misuse of oil income are even 
greater than in resource-poor countries. As pointed out in 6.3.1.2, land grabbing by the state elite to 
the detriment of local communities is another means by which national resources are privatized, as is 
6.3.1.3 outright theft and organized crime. What all these cases have in common is that the state 
structure or select individuals near the levers of power abuse their status as the link to the world of 
international capital and commerce for private gain.  
6.3.1.1. Oil & the resource curse 
Since definite discoveries by Chevron in 1977, oil has been a driver of conflict and a source of 
violence and displacement in Sudan. Hassan al-Turabi’s ouster and the NCP’s shift to a more 
pragmatic (compared to the early-and-mid-1990s) governance system based on a mixture of 
patronage and autocracy not by accident coincides with the start of oil exports through the Port 
Sudan pipeline in 1999, made possible by joint ventures between the national petroleum company 
Sudapet and Chinese, Indian and Malaysian companies1287. A certain vicious circle of violence 
emerged from oil exploration: the revenue generated from the oil fields enabled Khartoum to 
purchase weapons – frequently from China, the main importer of Sudanese oil – which the 
government would then use to protect the oilfields and attack Southern rebels1288. During the war, 
various Southern factions (Paulino Matiep, Riek Machar, mainstream SPLA, etc.) and their respective 
backers (Khartoum, foreign oil companies1289) fought for control over the oil fields1290 and in 
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Northern Upper Nile and other places large amounts of people were forced off the land and 
permanently displaced to clear the land for drilling1291.  
The post-war CPA and independence periods are characterized by a different set of oil-related 
misgivings inside South Sudan1292 – at least until the 2014 civil war engulfed the oil-producing areas, 
especially Bentiu in Unity State1293. Today, “governments in Khartoum and Juba alike rely heavily on 
oil revenues that derive primarily from the border lands”1294 and many donors are aware of the 
danger that oil revenues may preclude an integrative approach to politics in South Sudan and instead 
lead to a winner-takes-all mentality akin to other resource-based economies like Nigeria1295. Mining 
of other mineral resources may become more relevant in the future but apart from a minor gold rush 
in Toposa territory1296 oil reigns supreme even after investor-friendly mining legislation was passed in 
20121297. However, given that that most oil fields are mature, i.e. appear to have passed peak 
production, output and hence revenue will decline steeply in only a few years’ time unless new finds 
come on stream soon1298.  
Official government policy is to use oil revenue (habitually estimated to contribute 98% to the 
national budget) to diversify the economy and allow for the modernization of agriculture and rural 
development in an effort to ‘bring the towns to the people in the countryside’1299. The problem, 
however, is that the reality on the ground is marked by “glaring examples of fiscal mismanagement 
and corruption [that] have fed resentment among local populations as unprecedented amounts of oil 
revenue flow into GOSS coffers”1300. A 2007 assessment of what the political economy of oil has 
brought to Sudan is still largely accurate for the contemporary South: “additional pressures for 
expenditure (some of which may be conditioned by capacity and other constraints), rent-seeking 
behavior, and reduced pressure to undertake key fiscal reforms that will ensure medium- and long-
term stability irrespective of the course of oil production and prices”1301. There is also a legacy of 
murky and shadowy oil deals negotiated and signed by different members of the SPLM at different 
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times of the war and post-war period1302. The one undeniable good oil revenue has done in South 
Sudan is to allow for the relatively smooth integration of various militias into the SPLA1303 – even if it 
leaves a legacy of a fiscally unsustainably large army.  
Control over the oil pipeline is therefore the principal source of pressure Khartoum can exert over 
South Sudan because a reduction of the amount of oil transmitted through the North is 
unsustainable. A sustained cut-off would lead to the breakdown of networks of patronage and 
corruption at the heart of the GoSS and SPLM1304; a situation that was nearing breaking point when 
Sudan and South Sudan signed the September 2012 Addis Ababa Accords to resolve the oil issue. The 
stand-off between the two Sudans had been long in the making as already in 2009 there were 
warnings that the suspected underreporting of oil revenues by the Khartoum government was 
undermining the little trust there was to begin with1305. Critically, far from being a show of strength 
on the part of the Juba government, the fall-out from the January 2012 cut-off may in the mid-term 
increase South Sudan’s dependence on foreign powers. For one, South Sudan depends on the re-
import of refined oil from the North as there are presently no refineries in the South (two refineries 
are currently being built1306) but three in the North1307  
From Karl Wohlmuth’s perspective, “the stop of oil production in January 2012 leads also to a new 
round of external indebtedness of South Sudan in relation to new actors (like China and Qatar) by 
mortgaging untapped oil resources for aid”1308. This alleged mortgaging of the future is only made 
possible by a not very subtle change to the country’s legislation governing the oil sector. Global 
Witness, a monitoring organization, had drawn up eight recommendations to the GoSS to ensure 
transparent use of the country’s oil wealth, including full public disclosure and wide dissemination of 
oil sector data, independent monitoring with participation of civil society, a transparent petroleum 
fund, transparent allocation of oil contracts and implementation of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative1309.  
With hindsight, none of these goals have been met. South Sudan’s original petroleum bill contained a 
provision that prohibited any borrowing against future oil revenues in order to ensure a continuous 
revenue stream. Said clause was scrapped in early 2012 in the very different environment following 
the oil shutdown and oil is now increasingly being used as collateral for loans1310. In connection with 
these loans, Global Witness warns of the dangers of using future oil revenues to secure loans to fund 
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the everyday workings of the government as the high volatility on global resource markets risks 
plunging the budget and thus the government into crisis at any point in time while also raising the 
likelihood of “a disastrous cycle of debt”1311. Lending against future oil revenue is also in direct 
contravention to the Future Generation Fund established by South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution 
whose objective is to retain funds for the mid- to long-term1312 and which only allows withdrawals for 
major long-term projects, e.g. investments in infrastructure. 
6.3.1.2. Taxation & non-oil state revenue 
The budgetary uncertainty induced by near-absolute dependence on the oil price and donor money 
is abetted by the fact that the division of Sudan’s substantial external debts (over 40 billion USD) 
between the two successor states has not been addressed and constitutes a stumbling block both to 
relations between the two Sudans and to South Sudan’s ability to access international credit 
markets1313. Additionally, revenues from oil and donors create a strong disincentive to resort to the 
never-popular step of taxing the population1314. Extreme reliance on oil revenue to fund the budget 
has numerous knock-on effects. In the classical ‘Dutch disease’ scenario, oil exports lead to currency 
appreciation which in turn makes the rest of the economy less competitive on the regional and global 
marketplace (see Ch. 4.1.3.1). While in South Sudan there is certainly some potential for similar 
trends to develop in the future, given the country’s current lack of any export industries and, in fact, 
any manufacturing sector to speak of, the issue here is more on the fiscal side. Tax collection has 
been highly irregular for decades as SPLA troops relied on an incoherent and contingency-driven 
approach to collect duties, often in goods and livestock rather than money, whereas unpaid officials 
used a vague right of taxation for the purpose of personal enrichment1315.  
For a whole range of reasons tax collection has remained very irregular and patchy in the CPA and 
independence eras and only contributes a fraction to the budget compared to oil and donor inflow. 
Tax revenue is thus still far from sufficient to sustain the national budget let alone finance the 
country’s vast development needs. To begin with, personal taxation is a 10% flat rate tax that only 
starts from a monthly income above 300 SDG1316. More importantly, the lack of training for tax 
revenue staff, the lack of a computerized system and a general lack of oversight enable an 
environment of collusion between taxpayer and tax collector – typically in a one-on-one connection – 
to bargain for a reduction in rates in exchange for some form of benefit to the official1317. South 
Sudan also lacks badly in trained tax and customs officials, which is critical since the majority of state 
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revenue will be generated from import duties (including a general sales tax)1318. A World Bank survey 
also found massive under-reporting and under-counting of businesses:  
In Yei River County against an official record of 1921 shops the survey revealed around 3500 shops and 
2000 stalls. In Rumbek East against the official estimate of 40 shops the survey revealed around 200 
shops and 500 stalls. In Juba trading licenses have been issued to less than 200 shops. The market 




Political will to change the status quo also appeared to be missing for much of the period under 
investigation as political decision-makers are very reluctant to pursue a stringent tax regime and 
thereby risk a drop in popularity1320, although a marked shift in attitudes has been felt after the oil 
cut-off in 2012 and the subsequent austerity budget. The UNDP in 2012 wrote that over the course 
of two years, tax collection had more than doubled across all ten states of South Sudan1321 and the 
GoSS in 2013 claimed that tax collection had again more than doubled in 2012/13 compared to the 
previous financial year1322. Likewise, the new finance minister after the cabinet reshuffle in August 
2013 promised to increase non-oil revenue by almost 30% in the span of 100 days1323 but any gains 
have in all likeliness been undone by the civil war in 2014.   
6.3.1.3. Land grabs & land sales 
The only resource other than oil that South Sudan has in abundance is arable land. In Sudan, the 
1970 Unregistered Land Act enabled the state to massively expand mechanized farming as part of 
the infamously unsuccessful ‘bread-basket strategy’ which enriched private investors while 
expropriating pastoralists1324. The 1990 Investment Act had the similar consequence of dislodging 
communities from their settlements and forcing migration to the urban centres1325. In the South, 
contrary to the Northern Islamist government’s concept of land belonging to God (and by extension 
the state), land is traditionally a community resource and land rights are communitarian in so far as 
local communities de jure own much of the available land1326. The GoSS acknowledges traditional 
communal land rights both in the Interim Constitution of 2005 and in the Land Act of 2009, which, in 
Alden Wily’s estimation, borrowed substantially from revised land legislation in Uganda (1998) and 
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Tanzania (1999)1327. In spite of legal recognition, however, there is intrinsic conflict between 
communal land ownership favoured by rural populations and traditional authorities and private 
ownership of land advocated by the GoSS, local government and some development 
practitioners1328.  
The GoSS itself is not overly content with the present Land Act, which it treats as a provisional 
document, because the government is extremely keen to invite foreign investors into the country, 
above all into the agricultural sector which has been identified as the best hope to diversify the 
economy and by extension the state’s revenue stream. But a major obstacle to convince investors – 
apart from the volatile security situation – has been insecurity of land rights1329. A high-ranking 
official involved in drafting what is supposed to become the new Land Act pointed out that the fact 
that land belongs to communities does not mean that they are free to do what they want with it: “If 
you don't use it [the land], then the government can appropriate the land and lease it to foreign 
investors”1330. His proposal is to give the national government authority over public land and to carry 
out zoning in order to define how the various parts of the land ought to be used. 
At the same time, the almost complete lack of institutional capacity at community, county and even 
state level as well as the fact that many South Sudanese are not fully aware of their rights could lead 
to abuses of the system. First of all, as ownership is based on customary law and tradition, most land 
has not yet been officially registered. There is also the problem of enforcement of ownership rights. 
In a case that is more the rule than the exception, armed herders refused to return land they had 
seized from farmers by threatening the county commissioner with the cattle-owner’s name, a high-
ranking SPLA commander1331. Furthermore, while the law states that local communities have to be 
consulted and compensated when land is sold to external investors, in practice, government officials 
in collusion with investors and, possibly, traditional authorities, should not find it difficult “to ride 
roughshod over local rights”1332. An investment scheme by a Norwegian company that plans to plant 
trees in Tindilo payam in Central Equatoria as part of a carbon credit scheme was, for instance, 
hampered by the lack of communication between the local community and those handling the 
development from the South Sudanese side who all resided in Juba1333.  
That is exactly what the Oakland Institute purported to have uncovered when David Deng in 2011 
analysed all the publicly available contracts that involved the sale or long-term lease of land to 
foreign investors1334. According to the report’s findings, in the country’s short lifespan South Sudan 
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had already managed to sell or lease around 8% of its territory, an area equivalent to the size of the 
entire country of Rwanda1335. And there is anecdotal evidence of large-scale land sales by individuals 
like the son of the late militia leader Paulino Matiep1336 who, as mentioned above, played a key part 
in displacing residents from oil fields. While it is unclear whether the large-scale agricultural 
investments are undertaken with the genuine eye on development or as speculative holdings that 
count on rising property values, what is clear is the South Sudanese government’s lack of capacity to 
oversee these investments, which may trigger domestic conflict in the mid- to long-term1337. Land is 
generally very cheap and has frequently changed hands based on cash payments, meanwhile “*t+he 
key people in large-scale land sales or leases are state governors, to whom the GOSS has delegated 
land issues at this stage of political development”1338 and there is plentiful evidence that “military 
units occupy land illegally, and uniformed personnel engage in illegal extraction activities”1339. 
But scepticism abounds with regard to these claims1340. Hardly any of the deals mentioned in the 
study have had any repercussions on the territories allegedly leased or sold and several contracts are 
said to have been declared null and void1341. To some extent, the publicity brought by David Deng’s 
report has alerted affected communities which have staged protests that included the threat to use 
violence against any would-be investor if he or she were to try to take possession of their purchase. 
Pearce mentions the case of two investors, British and American, that in 2008 signed a 49-year lease 
for 600,000 hectares of land in Central Equatoria only to find out that the chiefs with whom they had 
negotiated did not have authority to lease the land and later denied involvement altogether as public 
anger mounted against the contract1342. Finally, a much clearer shift away from communal land 
ownership is the new law that regulates oil exploration. The Petroleum Act 2012 grants the 
government the right to expropriate land and sell it to investors if doing so serves an unspecified 
public interest1343. The same holds true for the contemporaneously signed Mining Act that 
retroactively restricts the legal ownership rights set out in the Land Act1344.  
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6.3.1.4. Theft, illicit trade, organized crime – the criminalized state 
There is also another perspective on the privatization of state goods and resources. In the words of a 
South Sudanese civil society activist: “This is not corruption what is happening. It is simply theft. They 
are stealing and should go to court for that”1345. The absence of the state (see 6.2.1 The non-
performing state) and the way society has gotten used to the presence of arms and the use of 
violence have bred an environment in which stealing and expropriation by force are if not 
encouraged then at least not actively impeded. For instance, instead of international conglomerates 
arguably the greater threat to unlawfully seize land from communities are powerful individuals and 
indeed the state itself that are able to impose their will with the help of brute force regardless of 
legal status. As Alex de Waal wrote of the still-united Sudan in 2007: “The privatisation of security in 
rural Sudan means that local administrators, chiefs and army officers serve both as servants of the 
state, and individuals who can pursue private material interests through the use of violence”1346. And 
even the national Minister of Finance, Aggrey Tisa Sabuni, admitted that a key reason why in 2014 
numerous illegal roadblocks remained in place and money was being divested from the state into 
other people’s pockets was that “certain individuals are more powerful then *sic+ the state”1347.  
In the absence of effective oversight, the criminalization of the security forces is unlikely to be halted, 
let alone reversed. Security forces have, for instance, been found complicit with the illicit transport 
and distribution of arms1348. Anne Walraet describes how in Budi County – an area that has been 
continuously administered by the SPLM/A since 1985 – soldiers were not being paid and therefore 
resorted to looting, buying at gunpoint for unfairly low prices and also took over the lucrative local 
tobacco trade1349. Another area where theft is widespread is the timber trade. During the war, the 
SPLA sold teak from plantations in Equatoria to finance the war effort1350. The lack of care and 
widespread illegal logging has, however, severely degraded the plantations which require substantial 
investments before timber can become a ‘cash crop’ for South Sudan. In 2013, the Equatoria Teak 
Company started exporting timber to the U.S.1351 but there are serious concerns that the price paid 
for the concession is far below market value1352.  
As money was flowing in from oil revenues and foreign donors after the founding of the Government 
of South Sudan, the period 2006-08 was arguably a high-point of visible corruption during which 
officials flaunted their wealth before becoming slightly more subdued but no less effective in the 
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years thereafter1353. Contrary to repeated pledges to donors and the public, the GoSS continues to 
maintain off-budget accounts whose contents and the purposes for which they are used cannot be 
checked or controlled1354. Government contracts that are awarded without a competitive bidding 
procedure are apparently responsible for the largest corruption-related hole in the state’s coffers1355. 
The National Advocacy Group, a Juba-based think-tank, deemed the Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Investment the country’s most corrupt institution; involved among other things in a foreign 
currency exchange scam1356.  
Nyaba for his part believes the SPLA to “be the worst in terms of opaque deals and outright 
squandering of public resources”1357 as several army generals are known to own companies 
abroad1358. The demobilization process, to give a fitting example, is marred by a lack of effective 
oversight as it is often the official on the spot that decides who will undergo DDR measures, which 
opens the door to corruption1359. Oyai Deng, at the time the SPLA’s chief of staff, actually 
corroborated these allegations in private conversations with U.S. officials as he accused two of his 
deputies of corruption1360. In another case, the former governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and 
current army chief Paul Malong allegedly privately cashed in the revenues of a market called 
Warawar going back to 19931361. Not coincidentally, the budget for the Ministry of SPLA and Veteran 
Affairs is the only one that states only total expenditure but does not show in itemized form what the 
budget is spent on1362.  
Three high-profile examples of official corruption from the CPA period are the near-bankruptcy of the 
Nile Commercial Bank, South Sudan’s most well-known and at one point largest bank, the Dura Scam 
and the over-priced purchase of vehicles which involved the Minister of Finance. Founded during the 
war in 2002, the Nile Commercial Bank defaulted in 2009 (only to reopen two years later). Although 
nobody was arrested or found guilty, the bankruptcy has been widely blamed on the failure of 
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government officials to repay large loans that they had taken out from the bank1363. The Dura Saga, 
on the other hand, was a scam surrounding the state’s attempt in 2008 to buy grain for 
approximately 1 million USD to be sold domestically at lower prices but the grain was in fact never 
delivered1364. By 2013, nobody had been charged or persecuted1365, proving that political forces in 
the SPLM have no qualms and face little obstacles to override financial controls to make extra-
budgetary expenditures. The third well-publicized case has the most prominent culprit, the GoSS 
Minister of Finance Arthur Akuien Chol, who along with members of his ministry defrauded the 
public purse by buying several hundred vehicles at prices far above the market rate and cashed in the 
difference1366. Presently, the former foreign minister and current chief negotiator with the rebels, 
Nhial Deng Nhial, stands accused of an almost identical scheme while at the Ministry of Defence 
between 2008-2011, which involved the purchase of overpriced trucks, many of which never arrived, 
in addition to an “old and useless Air Defense System rusting in Uganda”1367.   
In addition to hearsay, word on the street and rumours about the origins of luxury goods and 
ostentatious wealth, President Salva Kiir himself provided more concrete evidence of official 
corruption. In May 2012, Kiir went on the offensive by publicly calling on more than 75 unnamed 
public officials to return the 4 billion USD he alleged they had looted from the state’s coffers in the 
period since 20051368 – an incredible sum in a country whose annual budget does not surpass 10 
billion USD. Little wonder then that in 2013, the first year South Sudan was included, the country 
ranked 173rd in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, ahead only of Sudan, 
Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia1369. 
6.3.2. The neopatrimonial state in South Sudan 
Neopatrimonialism has a long tradition in Sudan. The Islamist regime in the North has been 
repeatedly accused to have shed all ideological pretensions and to only seek to remain in power by 
way of blatant clientelism and corruption1370. Other than the costs of fighting rebellions in Darfur, 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, the rump-state of Sudan spends most of its resources on sustaining 
a comprehensive patronage network1371. As shown above, autonomous and independent South 
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Sudan is equally afflicted by various forms of privatization of national wealth. This section, then, is 
going to assess whether or not neopatrimonialism as a concept accurately describes the forms of 
governance that can be witnessed in the country. Starting in 6.3.2.1 with an investigation of the form 
and function of patronage networks in South Sudan, we will then in 6.3.2.2 turn to examples of 
political corruption before ending in 6.3.2.3 with popular perceptions of patronage and corruption 
and the government’s attempts to address the issue. 
6.3.2.1. Patronage networks: the political economy of paternalism in South Sudan 
Clientelism, patronage and corruption already plagued the political system of Southern Sudan during 
the abortive period of limited self-rule in the aftermath of the Addis Ababa Accords. Terje Tvedt gives 
a classic account of the state of governance during these times: 
The political and administrative elite possessed an unusual degree of autonomy in relation to the 
processes in the Southern agricultural and pastoral society. Financially and politically the elite 
depended, however, upon support from Khartoum, and the state therefore also became an object to 
be controlled for the purpose of supporting clients.
1372  
In Peter Nyaba’s perspective, the corruption of the SPLM as a party and institution goes back to 
behaviour that became ingrained during the liberation struggle and effectively started in the Itang 
refugee camp in Ethiopia1373. As the Naivasha peace negotiations were drawing to a close, Claire 
Metelits claimed that “[p]atrimonialism, a form of the traditional mode, has been an integral part of 
the postcolonial political order in the south, where a small group of closely knit ethnic Dinka 
commanders surround Garang and dominate the upper echelons of the movement”1374.  
In contemporary South Sudan, networks of patronage and vertical relationships of dependence 
continue to play an important part in structuring the system of governance, albeit in an informal 
manner that is prone to instability and sudden changes. The country’s public sector is characterized 
by “high levels of patronage, corruption and fund misallocation”1375 and opportunities in life for 
individual South Sudanese continue to be tied to identity and membership in patronage networks1376. 
Resource allocation is frequently based on patronage. A particularly striking issue is the large number 
of ghost workers that receive salaries as not only the police service mentioned above is affected. 
“While GOSS budget figures for 2008 suggest there is a notional civil service level of 23,938 people, 
payroll figures indicate that GOSS pays salaries to 66,525 workers”1377. In Jort Hemmer’s words: “The 
embryonic institutions of South Sudan’s state have developed into fully fledged instruments of 
patronage. Scores of political positions were given in reward or created for those in need of 
accommodation and co-optation”1378. 
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The result has been a bloated and ineffective administration and a tendency to centralize decision-
making in the hands of the GoSS. A senior government official admitted that as the excuse of blaming 
the North has disappeared with independence, “nepotism *has become+ a common senior official 
response to the government’s expanded authority and responsibility”1379. While that is obviously a 
corrupt and inefficient system of allocating resources in a modern state, in a situation where state 
institutions are largely absent or non-functioning, patronage may provide a level of trust and security 
that would otherwise be unavailable1380. Reliance on ethnic networks in South Sudan is a function of 
the lack of inter-personal trust on a wider societal scale (as shown in the preceding chapter 6.2 on 
the illegitimate state). Thus, Leach actually blames the lack of a firm southern national identity for 
the decay of the South into ethnic patronage networks in the post-1972 period1381. Even so, the trust 
and security created by such a system of patronage is only available to the select few while excluding 
all those citizens that are not part of the patron-client relationship.  
Typically, a key factor in the evolution of a patronage system is the predominance of a single actor. 
And as of today, the state of South Sudan is dominated by the military elites (SPLA and others) that 
fought in the civil war. The military is also a good indication of the neopatrimonial nature of the 
governance system as it combines official with unofficial channels for influence and enrichment. 
Schomerus and Titeca characterize the emerging South Sudanese state in accordance as follows: 
The central state draws on existing military structures in which military men search out new ways to 
retain their now-official powerful positions. Individual actors in the military state structure, however, 




Coming from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds, most of the SPLA leaders which make up the 
de facto Southern elite only reached their current standing and influence because of the war against 
the North1383. Yet, when comparing them to the elites of Northern Sudan, Southern elites lag behind 
in both political and economic weight1384. Their relative lack of wealth compared to the heavyweights 
in Sudan can mean one of two things: either, these elites are even more eager to enrich themselves 
as quickly as possible to make up for their deficit and (in their own eyes) to be justly reimbursed for 
the war effort; or, the awareness that the unified struggle of all South Sudanese was born from the 
common lot of deprivation and poverty, could lead them to forgo excessive enrichment.  
Yet, any generalizing statements about tendencies of the elite have to be tampered and uttered with 
great caution for the SPLM’s leading cadres are anything but a homogenous and monolithic group. 
Construing South Sudan as a one-party state is a misconception because the ex-soldiers now at the 
helm of the government primarily seek enrichment for themselves and their associates. Instead of 
shelling out large sums to sustain a pyramid of dependents, much of the money squandered by 
government officials goes directly into family members’ consumption and (foreign) accounts: “South 
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Sudan’s state has become the private property of its dominant political class, putting the business of 
governance and the benefits it generates well beyond the reach of the vast majority of citizens”1385. 
Moreover, the SPLM “elite is strongly fragmented and marked by competing clientelist networks 
structured largely along ethnic and tribal lines”1386. And Edward Thomas believes that the SPLM 
government in Juba – in contrast to the diatribes against ‘tribalism’ directed at its own populace – 
actually approves of migrants that organize along ethnic lines because these clubs or groups 
constitute “malleable partners who can strike political deals on behalf of ethnic constituencies”1387 
and are therefore also more easily co-opted and governed. Hence, the SPLM should be seen as “a 
forum for competing individuals and groups interested primarily in control of the resources and 
clientelist structures that come with posts in the state apparatus”1388. Although the opposition and 
other critics frequently claim that the SPLM and the government only cater to the needs of one 
ethnic group, the Dinka, the reality of clientelist politics is different in South Sudan than for instance 
in neighbouring Kenya where ethnic identities and party affiliation are much more aligned.  
In the post-war and post-liberation setting of South Sudan both politicians and the people they 
govern and represent do not exercise their respective roles mediated through state institutions. 
Influential politicians on the national scene generally derive their authority from direct contacts to a 
specific group of people that, as a rule, live close to each other in what is often the politician’s home 
town or county. In exchange for their support there is the implicit and often also explicit expectation 
that he or she will provide privileged access to jobs, privileges and other benefits to his or her people 
– the strongly denounced yet widely practiced spectre of ‘tribalism’. Accordingly, expectations of 
politicians tend to be skewed in a way that is more akin to representing particular parochial interests 
rather than speaking for and representing the entire South Sudanese people or nation.  
Demands for equal representation of ethnic groups in positions of power, which mark the popular 
counterpoint to the louder public appeals against tribalism, are thus motivated by the wish to have 
‘one of our own’ near the levers of power. Interest representation in this system follows the imperial 
model of sending a delegation to the capital in order to be heard. When people flock to Juba or – less 
often – the state capitals with a particular objective or grievance, they generally seek to address a 
member originating from their home region or at least from the same ethnic group, irrespective of 
whether he or she is in charge of the subject matter.  Hence, if the issue at hand is, say, the 
construction of a hospital in the county, then the delegation will generally first address their 
politician rather than the Ministry of Health.  
6.3.2.2.  “If you swallow something that belongs to the people, we will force you to 
vomit it out”1389 - Popular perceptions of corruption and the state’s response  
Large parts of the population (including soldiers) see corruption as a major problem because 
resources fail to reach the ones they were meant for1390. Nepotism is also a major source of 
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frustration among the mass of young unemployed: almost everybody seeks a white-collar 
government job but access to these jobs depends on membership in the correct tribe1391. The South 
Sudanese government as a whole is widely perceived as corrupt, exploitative and non-performing1392. 
Crisis Group in a review of the six-year CPA era cited corruption and nepotism on all levels of 
government as common complaints1393 and according to an IRI poll from 2013, for nearly half of 
respondents (48%) corruption was the main reason for dissatisfaction with the SPLM’s 
performance1394. In a survey from 2007 by the official Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, 
89% of respondents saw corruption as an important issue of concern (with 67% saying it has 
increased since the CPA) with the splendour and opulence of officials’ lifestyles and the concomitant 
lack of even basic services for the majority of the population serving as glaring evidence1395. Martin 
and Sluga’s in-depth study of Yei River County buttresses these claims as citizens roundly criticized 
Council members and the County Commissioner of working primarily for their own personal 
economic interests1396.  
There is a general sense that corruption and nepotism are negatively affecting the country, and lead 
to a lack of development (the view of 64% of respondents in an official survey) and a decrease in 
Southern Sudanese patriotism, brotherhood and a recourse to ‘tribe’, community and family for 
access to services and public jobs1397. More than half of those interviewed (54%) had already 
personally encountered instances of corruption but only a fourth of them (26%) reported such cases 
to the authorities1398. In the border area with Uganda, for example, locals increasingly perceive the 
SPLM/A as creaming off profits from border trade and acting solely in its own interest in an attempt 
“to claim ownership of South Sudan’s peace, including its benefits”1399. These impressions are backed 
up by a 2011 survey in which participants saw “both abuse of government funds and tribalism in 
government employment as corruption. The belief that it is impossible to win government 
appointment unless you know someone in an office leaves many feeling disenfranchised”1400.  
As the SPLM has fought for decades against the South’s (and other regions’) marginalization, it 
cannot from its ideological standpoint accede to corruption and ethnic patronage. This along with 
the need to appeal to foreign donors that contribute a third of the budget explains the outspoken 
rhetorical stance the party takes against corruption1401. Corruption is also one of the main points of 
attack for opposition politicians like Lam Akol, leader of the SPLM-DC, and thus a threat to the 
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SPLM’s continued dominance1402. Foreign donors are also increasingly losing patience. The EU, for 
instance, condemned corruption as one of the major obstacles for the new state and deemed 
fighting corruption a number one priority for the GoSS1403. Hence, it is not without reason that the 
2008 SPLM Manifesto declared that “*t+he fight against corruption constitutes one of the key pillars 
of good governance; hence it shall be waged with ever increasing rigor”1404. Correspondingly, the 
GoSS growth strategy for 2010-12 mentioned corruption in the public and the private sector as one 
of the prime impediments to a better economic performance1405 and tax collection was taken out of 
the hand of the states and centralized with the express purpose of curbing corruption1406.  
The issue of corruption and patronage is additionally charged with political importance because 
President Kiir has spent considerable political capital in repeatedly presenting himself as the nation’s 
foremost fighter against the curse of corruption; first and foremost by publicly denouncing the theft 
of 4 billion USD. Contrary to the intended outcome, however, Salva Kiir increasingly risks ridicule for 
the lack of progress and the fact that only a fraction of the funds were recovered1407. To make 
matters worse, a large sum of cash was stolen from his personal treasury in his office in March 
20131408. A number of fairly high profile officeholders have in fact been arrested based on allegations 
of corruption and graft (as well as some businessmen from the private sector1409) but political power 
games appear the more probable explanation for these arrests1410.  
The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, whose task it is to research, prevent and educate 
people about corruption, build capacity to fight corruption and prosecute those found to be guilty of 
corruption1411 has not tried a single official since it was founded in 20061412 and nobody has been 
held accountable for any of the numerous scandals from the CPA period and beyond1413. Members of 
the Central Equatoria Anti-Corruption Commission told me that they were on the verge of bringing a 
first group of officials to trial but that they lacked even basic equipment and could only act as long as 
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the state governor backed them1414. Apparently, the Central Equatoria branch was the only state-
level anti-corruption commission which was operational whereas the staff of the nine other 
nominally existing state commissions resided in Juba as they lacked the funds and protection 
necessary to do their jobs in the states1415.  
Lack of capacity, incompetence and the absence of political will are certainly the overriding reasons 
for the negligible progress made in terms of fighting corruption in South Sudan. The government also 
does not appear too keen on protecting members of civil society that actively rail against corruption: 
in 2012, Deng Athaui Mawiir, head of South Sudan’s Civil Society Alliance was kidnapped, tortured 
and questioned over his public activism against corruption before being able to escape1416. Reporting 
on official corruption is therefore a dangerous proposition and can have near-ruinous consequences 
for journalists and newspapers that go through with it. A radio journalist explained that when they 
had been researching for a show on police corruption, it was impossible to get any member of the 
police or the public to talk on record, even when granted anonymity1417. Tom Rhodes from the CPJ 
presents a case in which two South Sudanese newspapers (Al Masir and The Citizen) were ordered to 
pay the equivalent of 30,000€ to the SPLM’s then-Secretary General Pagan Amum for publishing 
allegations that he had embezzled 30 million USD1418. Considering the low turnover and revenue-
stream, such fines are close to a death knell for newspapers in the country and send an unmistakable 
message to local media about the dangers of meddling in politicians’ affairs.  
One of the understandable reasons Juba is reluctant to clamp down on the rampant corruption is 
that the government is very wary of further destabilizing the already fragile security situation1419. A 
sudden implosion of the pyramids of economic dependence might have a devastating impact on the 
internal security situation and is thus, much like a reduction of the number and pay of soldiers, 
something the GoSS duly seeks to avoid. An incident in March 2014 highlights the dangers of messing 
with soldiers’ pay. During the introduction of a new payment scheme which requires soldiers to pick 
up their salaries in person (a means to combat virtual ‘ghost soldiers’), a minor miscommunication 
led to a shooting with many fatalities1420. But ghost employees can also be employed in the service of 
good governance. In a very illuminating example, inside the government structure corruption is in 
some cases actually used to combat and circumvent the system’s own corruption and inefficiency 
that is driven by some “‘*p+olitically strong’ agencies demanding and receiving more than their 
budget ceiling”1421. In Juba I was told that one of the ministries charged with social service delivery 
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had a large number of fake employees on the books1422. Apparently, this was done by design so that 
the ghost employees’ salaries would make up for the fact that the Ministry of Finance regularly paid 
out less than the sum allotted by the budget.  
6.3.3. The privatized neopatrimonial state in South Sudan – at a glance 
The main source of enrichment throughout the post-2005 period has been the revenue the state 
receives from oil exports. In the light of the direct dependence on oil for the sustenance of its rule, 
South Sudan is on the way to becoming a gate-keeper state in which the ruling clique uses its key 
position as interlocutor between the international arena and global markets on the one hand and the 
domestic economy on the other as a means to get rich quickly. On the heels of the temporary stop to 
this source of income due to conflict with Sudan, some focus has shifted to the potential rents of 
land ownership. Conflict over land grabs by politicians, members of the army and international 
investors has arguably become one of the most contentious issues inside South Sudan today.  
Corruption is also an issue very much on people’s mind in South Sudan and a sore spot that cuts to 
the heart of many South Sudanese’s disenchantment with the liberation army. Lack of state services 
is that much harder to bear when the representatives of the same state parade their ‘privatized’ 
wealth through the country’s towns and villages. Corruption on all levels of interaction with the 
state, from having to bribe the traffic police to getting an import license from the Ministry of 
Commerce, has become institutionalized to the point that it is widely perceived as an inevitable part 
of life. The already weak official state institutions and the rational-legal bureaucratic system are 
thereby further undermined in the eyes of citizens that observe the political leadership routinely 
neglecting, sidelining and discarding these very institutions and structures in favour of informal 
dealings routed in patronage, nepotism and personal favours. In addition to dismantling the 
connection between citizen and the state, private entrepreneurial initiative is discouraged as 
business acumen is a far less certain avenue to profits than close personal ties to the political class. 
Given the country’s ethnic diversity and the common perception that membership in certain ethnic 
groups grants privileged access to goods, jobs and privileges, ethnic identity is one key factor in 
accessing and acceding to a patronage network. The second factor is longstanding membership in the 
SPLM or proximity to high-ranking party members and it is this second component that makes South 
Sudan neopatrimonial because patronage is exerted both through and parallel to state institutions 
that are themselves difficult to distinguish from organs of the SPLM party structure. 
Neopatrimonialism is however arguably not the most accurate approximation to the form of state 
privatization witnessed in the country. Instead, the best way to conceive of South Sudan’s 
neopatrimonial pyramid is as a substantial number of pyramids or nets of different sizes that each 
covers a certain region, town or ethnic group or clan. The size of the network and the amounts that 
are dispersed throughout the network are a reflection of the political clout possessed by the 
individual politician at the top of the pyramid. At the same time, the politician’s political clout is also 
a reflection of and conditional upon the size and strength of the local network of backers he or she 
can muster. 
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6.4. The swollen centralized state in South Sudan 
The tension between proponents of centralized government control in an effort to unite and develop 
the nation-state and those in support of more localized accountable and representative 
administrative structures has been a constant feature of African post-colonial states almost since 
independence (see Ch. 4.1.4). The issue of centralized authority versus federalism and devolution is 
also of particular interest with regard to this analysis of South Sudan’s statebuilding and 
nationbuilding efforts because it is situated at the cross-roads of both phenomena. While on the one 
hand being part of the construction of the state structure and the administrative edifice, 
decentralization and regionalism also touch on the core of national identity and the question to what 
extent sub-national loyalties and identities can conflict or coexist with a national identity tied to 
South Sudan as a whole. On the level of practical governance and state-society interaction, the 
question of decentralization and devolution of authority also encompasses the thorny issue of the 
place of traditional authorities in the state structure and to what extent and how they can coexist 
with the official ‘modern’ state structure.   
This chapter will therefore proceed from 6.4.1 a description and analysis of the conflicting realities of  
nominal political decentralization and actual centralization to two further aspects of decentralization 
that have at least equal bearing on the question of nationbuilding in South Sudan as they do on 
statebuilding: the first in 6.4.2 will be a discussion of federalism and regionalism, both historically 
and in the present, and its corrosive effects on national unity in the South; this will be followed in 
6.4.3 by an investigation of local government and the role of traditional authorities in the national 
power structure.  
6.4.1. Decentralization vs. Centralization in South Sudan 
As outlined above, a typical feature of postcolonial African nation-states has been an often 
complicated and conflict-laden history of dealing with calls for decentralization of government. 
Where these calls have been heeded by national governments, more often than not nominal 
decentralization has not in reality meant the devolution of resources and decision-making power to 
the regional and local levels. On the contrary, reforms billed as decentralization have frequently had 
the inverse effect of strengthening central government control over the periphery. South Sudan 
appears to be no exception to this typified scenario. In order to highlight the South Sudanese 
experience with the centre-periphery problem, this section will begin by focusing in 6.4.1.1 on the 
history and present-day legal and practical steps at implementing decentralization in South Sudan. 
Subsequently, in 6.4.1.2 criticism of the principle of decentralization in South Sudan will be presented 
and followed in 6.4.1.3 by evidence of the de facto centralization of political authority in the country.  
6.4.1.1. Decentralization in South Sudan 
Given the fact that South Sudan has never existed as an independent state and that the region has 
spent much of its history in the last 200 years as the variously neglected and exploited periphery of 
larger political entities (Ottoman Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Sudan), the call for decentralized 
governance has a long tradition. During the period of colonial rule, there was some reciprocal 
preference for limited localized autonomy as the British sought to rely on indirect rule for much of 
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Southern Sudan1423 and were not interested in extending a centralized bureaucracy to the South1424. 
After decolonization and Sudanization, however, Northern politicians did not keep their promise to 
install a federal system which would account for Southern concerns as “the centralisers held sway 
and have maintained themselves in power in Khartoum ever since”1425. Khartoum is so dominant in 
the political, economic and cultural life of Sudan that the moniker “one-city state” has been used to 
describe the country1426. Illustrating the absurdity of centralization in what was then the continent’s 
largest country, in the 1960s Juba had to order desks and office furniture from distant Khartoum 
although the wood used for the furniture was actually locally produced1427. Therefore, as John 
Garang put it in 1989, the way to address the key evil of injustice in Sudan was to “have a 
decentralized form of rule, whether these are federal states or autonomous”1428.  
Southern Sudan had already been the subject of decentralization efforts during the Southern 
Regional Government interlude between 1972 and 1983. Moreover, during that same timeframe, 
Southern Sudan also experienced rivalries between different factions that aligned along regional 
lines, triggering an acrimonious debate over redivision (kokora) that eventually led to the split of the 
Southern Region into three sub-regions, which was one of the factors behind the ignition of war in 
1983. After this rather unhappy experience with regional autonomy, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 finally re-introduced the principle of decentralization which was later enshrined 
in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan1429. Today, the independent state of South Sudan 
actually features ten states (eleven if you add Abyei) and the old debates have been refilled into new 
bottles. According to the Transitional Constitution, which has been the guiding document for the 
country since independence in July 2011, South Sudan is officially a republic that “shall have a 
decentralized system of government”1430. The Constitution goes on to point out the three levels of 
government (national, state and local government) that should each not interfere in the respective 
areas of authority of the other two levels, and mentions several state organs – the police, the prison 
service, the wildlife service and the fire brigade – that are all to be run on a decentralized basis.  
As with many other political terms, however, decentralized and decentralization mean very different 
things to different actors. Aeberli distinguishes between at least three different competing readings 
of decentralization in the South Sudanese context. The SPLM/A conceives of decentralization as a 
technical tool to facilitate governance and service delivery in local and outlying areas (Garang’s 
‘bringing the town to the people’). South Sudanese communities conceive of it as community self-
rule, a means to access state resources and a personalized local presence of the heretofore abstract 
state. And the international community in the form of UNDP, World Bank and donor agencies like 
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USAID see decentralization as a path to greater state effectiveness, which should make the state 
more Western and, by extension, more stable1431.  
The present-day subdivision into – in descending order of size and authority – the five layers of the 
national level, the states, the counties, the payam (group of villages) and the boma (single village) 
was gradually installed after the SPLM’s 1994 Chukudum Convention1432. But in fact, as part of its 
larger vision of New Sudan, the most recent SPLM Manifesto from 2008 still emphasized the need for 
devolution, federalism and decentralization. One of the goals of the New Sudan was thence:  
A decentralized system of governance that would bring power closer to the people, and is 
characterized by popular participation, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, consensus-
seeking orientation, fairness, effectiveness and abidance by the rule of law, so that the people of New 
Sudan are provided with the necessary conducive environment for accelerated socio-economic 
development and increased happiness.
1433
  
At the time, however, South Sudan had still been part of Sudan and the SPLM consequently keen on 
ensuring maximum autonomy in its realm, the autonomous decentralized region of Southern Sudan. 
A goal that is no longer equally high on the GoSS’s list of priorities now that it heads an independent 
sovereign state. Yet, in South Sudan there is more to decentralization than mere slogans that wax 
and wane in popularity along with their degree of political expediency.  
Decentralized governance has also had a long-standing and deeply ingrained tradition in the actual 
exercise of authority in many areas of the country. Community-based decision-making was typical for 
many ethnic groups, which did not know kings or other forms of central authority1434. This principle 
of dispersed decentralized authority is exemplified by Wal Duany’s characterization of power 
relations among the Nuer: “The traditional Nuer political system has no single recognized chief to run 
it and no exclusive judiciary to control it. Persons are divided among political units without any single 
administrative hierarchy of officials and without any single person to direct all of the common affairs 
of the society”1435. A 2004 study of customary law in Southern Sudan juxtaposes hierarchical 
centralized systems of authority as can be found with some groups in the South like the Zande, 
Shilluk and Anuak to decentralized systems among the Dinka, Nuer, Bari and Fertit “where local 
individuals (chiefs and sub-chiefs) or committees, normally of kinship networks, exercise core social 
and legal powers”1436. 
6.4.1.2. Opposition to decentralization 
In spite of these traditions of a decentralized archipelago of clans and tribes and the popularity of the 
decentralization and devolution slogan, there are critics that oppose the South Sudanese form of 
decentralization on principle. The former Minister of Education, longstanding SPLM insider and 
outspoken critic Peter Nyaba, for instance, remarks:  
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The present level of administrative decentralisation has been stretched to absurdity. Instead of 
rendering it easy to provide social services, the present system has made it difficult because most of 
the financial and economic resources are being diverted to remuneration and perks for government 
and public officials whose numbers have skyrocketed. *…+ If the state elite means business in state and 




Institutions of local government are effectively extremely weak and in their present state serve to 
undermine the build-up of a functioning state: “So far, decentralisation has served only to entrench 
ethnic elites at the local level while real power remains in the hands of the political elite in Juba”1438. 
Schomerus and Allen go even further in their criticism. For them, decentralisation in South Sudan is a 
cause rather than a remedy of conflict, 
because decentralisation is not pursued convincingly and is abused for local power struggles which 
cause violent conflict *…+ Momentum for increased administrative fragmentation is developing at the 
same time as decision power is firmly held at the centre, creating a situation in which decentralisation 
seems to primarily signify a localised power grip over resources, rather than localised political 
decision-making.
1439 
Even those in favour of decentralization in South Sudan caution that the GoSS’s first task before 
undertaking reforms and devolving powers should be to gather and map essential information (e.g. 
composition of population, economy, services) about the states that is currently lacking1440. 
Approaching the issue from a different vantage point, David Deng highlights the dangers for 
accountability that can come along with decentralization. During the CPA period, several judges were 
threatened and physically assaulted by county commissioners displeased with their rulings. As 
“*s+enior judges began to complain that decentralization was compromising the independence of the 
Judiciary”, after independence the judiciary was taken out of the hands of local government and 
centralized under the control of the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice1441. These forms of criticism may 
be justified but are in a way at odds with a reality in which power and resources remain in fact very 
much under the purview of the central government. In fact, former vice-president Riek Machar 
himself publicly called on the Minister of Justice to uphold the principle of decentralization while 
criticizing that “Southern officials and politicians had been imbued with the long-standing centralizing 
tendencies and cultures of the Sudanese state”1442.  
6.4.1.3. De facto centralization of authority: Juba rules 
Assessing the decentralization efforts in South Sudan to date, what has transpired is that words have 
not been matched by actions. Very little power, authority and resources are actually being devolved 
to the various sub-national layers of government and in the last year (since 2013) the country has 
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witnessed a further centralization, with power vested in a small group of Juba elites1443. When 
comparing the Interim Constitution from 2005 which established a federal decentralized system with 
the Transitional Constitution in effect since 2011, it becomes clear that the latter document has re-
centralized governance institutions, in particular by vesting substantial powers in the office of the 
president1444. The national government in Juba has shown itself to be extremely reluctant to 
relinquish any real power to the sub-national levels of government and the little funding that has 
been provided has generally evaporated into thin air before reaching the ground of local investments 
into improved services and infrastructure. The army, the country’s most effective institution, also 
remains under central control. The SPLA currently consists of ten divisions and four independent 
brigades. While nominally each division should be centred in one of the ten states, they are not in 
fact bound by state boundaries and are very much centrally controlled from SPLA headquarters in 
Bilpam near Juba1445. 
Beyond the question of the extent to which authority is being delegated from the national level to 
the lower tiers of government, the more mundane matter of funding is of vital importance to the 
success or failure of devolution. Historical continuities also show up in this aspect as an analysis of 
decentralization in the Sudan published right around the start of the second civil war in 1983 found 
the financing of local government to be the most crucial recurrent problem that persisted 
throughout different political and administrative regimes1446. Successive Khartoum governments 
have aspired to hegemonic control and omniscient centralized decision-making power over regional 
and local affairs1447 and consistently stymied local government by withholding sufficient funds 
necessary for local initiatives while constantly reorganizing the administrative structure without 
substantive change to the status quo of neglect and underfunding1448. Lavergne therefore deems the 
Islamist regime’s so-called decentralizing reforms of 1991 and 1994 as nothing but pseudo-
devolution. Local administrators are appointed by and respond to the national government rather 
than the local population as the true objective seems to be tighter control over the population by 
means of smaller units of administration1449.  
Very similar developments can be observed in contemporary South Sudan. As the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) stated in 2011, there is a sense that very 
little development has taken place outside of Juba and – to a lesser extent – in and around the other 
nine state capitals. “Much of the responsibility for the organisation and delivery of services already 
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lies with the states but they don’t have the resources to manage at local level”1450. Trickle down of 
government revenue to the lower levels of the state building, i.e. the states, counties, payam and 
boma does not occur as development is concentrated in Juba and Juba only1451. Most of the state 
capitals are in fact rather modest dwellings without the infrastructure and offerings that would be 
expected from an urban environment1452.  
The states’ and counties’ dependence on the national level is systemic and deliberate. Revenue is 
collected by the national government and then passed on to the states (making up 90% of states’ 
funds1453), though it is common that even less than budgeted actually arrives in the states. Almost all 
of the bloc transfers to the states and counties go into salaries, leaving little to discretionary 
spending and investments. Taking for example the approved budget for 2012/13, out of a total of 1.7 
billion South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) in bloc transfers to the states, only about 100 million SSP or 
5.5% were destined for capital investment compared to 59% for salaries and 35% for operating 
costs1454. As a result, the World Bank came to the conclusion that “*t+he low levels of own source 
revenues call in question the fiscal sustainability of local governments as presently organized”1455.  
6.4.2. Federalism, Regionalism & kokora 
Inside South Sudan, a wide gap separates the relative affluence and bustle of the capital from other 
towns let alone villages. Juba has much more to offer than any of the ten state capitals and the 
centralization of the country is also visible in the extent to which even the state capitals often appear 
disconnected from events in Juba. As a study on South Sudanese media concluded, “Upper Nile and 
Malakal, like all other state capitals, feel remote and left out of events”1456. Federalism is therefore – 
in South Sudan as much as elsewhere in postcolonial Africa and the world – a popular calling card for 
those that seek to improve the lot of the provinces and spread wealth and authority more equitably 
across the territory. This section will therefore first in 6.4.2.1 look at the degree of federalism and the 
actual functioning of the ten states of South Sudan before turning in 6.4.2.2 to the contentious 
history of regionalism in South Sudan and in particular the contemporary iteration of debates over 
regionalism and national unity affecting Greater Equatoria’s stance towards the rest of South Sudan. 
The section ends in 6.4.2.3 with a view on the multiplication of counties and contested county 
boundaries and what it means for the state structure. 
6.4.2.1. South Sudan’s states: federal system or arms of the executive 
The current subdivision of the territory of South Sudan into ten states (eleven if you count Abyei) is in 
fact an outgrowth of Northern Sudanese divide-and-rule strategies as it was instituted in 1994 and 
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thus in the earlier and more ideologically driven years of the Islamist regime in Khartoum1457. This 
structure was initially met with much resistance from the SPLM which feared that the restructuring 
was meant to undermine Southern unity1458 and only accepted by the Southern rebels at the 
conclusion of the peace agreement in 2005. In contrast, the post-Chukudum SPLM model of civilian 
administration in ‘New Sudan’ still stuck to the three old regions of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and 
Upper Nile1459 that had themselves been created – albeit looking back to a prior existence in colonial 
times – in 1983 in an attempt by former president Nimeiry to weaken the South’s political clout. 
As already alluded to in the previous section on the centralization of authority in South Sudan, the 
states are clearly wanting in rights and resources and one would be strongly amiss to call the current 
administrative arrangement federal. The president, who until the 2010 elections directly appointed 
governors, has the right to dismiss the now elected governors in times of crisis (he can himself 
determine what constitutes a crisis) and Salva Kiir has made repeated use of this provision (see Ch. 
6.2.2.3). Moreover, governors and state legislators do not have their own independent sources of 
revenue and depend on transfers from the national government1460. Oftentimes, though, these 
transfers do not make it to their point of destination as they are diverted along the way: “The central 
government’s transfer of public funds to states *is+ a key area for the mismanagement of funds”1461. 
Where this has been felt most acutely is in Unity State which is the main oil-producing state. 
According to the CPA oil-producing states should get 2% of total oil revenue and South Sudan’s 
Transitional Constitution raised that number to 3% but there is very little sign that the money has 
arrived or had an effect on oil-producing areas in Unity that also suffer from environmental 
degradation1462.  
During the CPA period, one way Southern states used to mitigate the regular shortfall in cash 
transfers from the GoSS was to ignore legal prescriptions and, contrary to the letter of the CPA, levy 
and collect a valued added tax and/or a goods and services tax on its citizens whose proceeds 
constituted up to 92% of state revenue in Western Bahr al Ghazal1463. In the present, this route is no 
longer open to them. There are also regional discrepancies because states differ in their capacity to 
create a sustainable revenue base independent of the goodwill of the national government. As a 
World Bank study found, Central Equatoria generates a much higher percentage of its revenues from 
its own sources in comparison to Jonglei or Lakes. The main reasons for this are the well-established 
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administrative structure in Central Equatoria and the fact that there are several urban centres in 
contrast to a predominantly rural-agrarian population in Jonglei and Lakes1464. 
Coming back to popular attitudes to states and federalism as a concept, a survey conducted at the 
time of independence came up with the result that respondents were in favour of even more states 
being created. The reasoning went that the more states, the more opportunities for jobs and 
income1465, i.e. each new state would have its own ministries, its own police posts, public tenders etc. 
that locals could vie for. Security and better protection for minority ethnic groups is another 
motivation epitomized by rebel leader David Yau Yau’s demand for a separate Murle state to be 
carved out of the existing state of Jonglei1466. These hopes and expectations notwithstanding, with 
regard to devolution and federalism, a different survey found that 35% of respondents preferred 
stronger state governments as opposed to 61% that preferred a stronger national government1467. A 
different angle on the further multiplication of states is forwarded by the journalist Jacob Lupai who 
sees parallels between South Sudan and Nigeria and argues that it might be advisable to follow the 
latter’s example in further subdividing the existing ten states so as to allow better representation for 
the many smaller ethnic groups in the country1468.  
Stephen Par Kuol, a former state minister, represents the opposite pole in the debate as he is 
convinced that in contrast to successful federalist countries like the United States, a federalist system 
in South Sudan runs the high risk of strengthening ethno-nationalism and leading to unequal 
treatment of South Sudanese of different ethnic origin1469. And opposition politician Justin Ambago 
Ramba believes that today, regional blocs inside the SPLM have effectively replaced other forms of 
political organization and contestation and become the de facto political regime in South Sudan1470. 
In Jonglei, for instance, the SPLM continues a practice from colonial times that the four highest posts 
in the state administration must be filled by representatives from each of the four regions that make 
up the state1471. These latter points are also critical in the more specific debate on – supposedly 
divisive – regionalism in South Sudan that the next paragraphs will address.  
6.4.2.2. Regionalism in Southern Sudan: Equatoria and the new kokora debate 
Regionalism in South Sudan is intricately linked to ethnicity. This applies in particular to Equatorian 
regionalism which in many respects is tantamount to a multi-ethnic coalition of smaller ethnic groups 
that seek to counter the (perceived) preponderance of larger ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, 
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Zande) in the South Sudanese state. The tradition of strong regional discrepancies within Southern 
Sudan in fact predates the acrimonious kokora debate over redivision, which shaped the final years 
of the Southern Regional Government before its dissolution in 1983. Joseph Lagu, the Southern 
rebels’ military leader from 1963-72, mentions in his memoirs that he took great care to have an 
equal number of representatives from each of the three southern regions come along to the Addis 
Ababa peace talks and that Anya-nya fighters destined to be integrated into the Sudanese army also 
hailed in equal numbers from each of the three sub-regions1472. During the second war, regionalism 
also bred bizarre coalitions: Equatorians in favour of redivision into three sub-regions established 
contacts and received support from Northern Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood; a relationship 
that even survived the introduction of sharia in September 19831473.  
Grievances among Equatorians can be traced to a number of factors. In contrast to the Anya-nya 
uprising against the Sudanese state during the 1950s and 1960s which had started in Equatoria and 
consequently had a large share of Equatorians amongst the movement’s most prominent leaders1474, 
the second civil war and the SPLA originated from Bor in Bahr al Ghazal and much of the SPLA’s 
leadership was Dinka or in any case Nilotic1475. There had been voices critical of the preponderance of 
the Dinka already in the 1970s and in Equatoria expressions of anti-Dinka sentiments and the 
portrayal of the SPLA as a Dinka army arose immediately after the end of the Southern Region and 
the start of fighting1476. Equatorians had been as a rule reluctant to join the ranks of the rebellion and 
showed distance or even hostility towards the SPLA1477.  
A large part of the population fled to Uganda when the SPLA advanced toward and eventually 
conquered swathes of Equatoria in the mid-1990s1478. More fuel was added to the fire when after the 
Bor massacre in 1991, many cattle-herding Bor Dinka fled south to different parts of Equatoria. 
Conflicts between pastoralist Dinka and mostly farm-owning Equatorians grew into more ethnically 
motivated fights so “that some local Equatorians believed that the SPLA was not there to liberate 
them from Khartoum, but to take over their territory”1479. In turn, some Equatorians came together 
in militias like the Equatorian Defence Force that fought against abusive SPLA units1480, while others 
rallied under the banner of the Anyanya II which claimed to struggle for Southern independence but 
principally fought the SPLA and received support from Khartoum. Equatoria also frequently acted as 
a regional bloc inside the SPLM/A structure. For instance, when Riek Machar rejoined the SPLM in 
2002 and took the number three position in the movement from James Wani Igga, there were 
rumblings in Equatoria that the number three position ought to be held by somebody from the 
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Greater Equatoria region1481. The current Governor of Central Equatoria State, which is home to the 
capital Juba, also voiced his support for federalism to be included in the permanent constitution1482. 
Moreover, some Equatorian leaders harbour long-standing resentment of Nilotics that are unlikely to 
dissipate anytime soon1483.  
While there were isolated comments during the CPA period, the true rebirth of the kokora (division) 
slogan as well as its detractors came after the independence referendum had been secured. There is 
much support for kokora – the redivision of the Southern Region in three separate regions with 
special rights for indigenous ethnic groups in 1983 – among residents of Greater Equatoria where 
many feel that the Nilotics, chiefly Dinka and Nuer, are taking over most high-ranking positions1484. 
Thus, in 2011 a conference of the three Equatorian governors that called for a federalist system of 
governance stirred strong emotions and responses1485. On the one hand, regionalism was portrayed 
as undermining the very unity that John Garang had fought for as “[t]he drawback in the long run 
after we have chosen to go regionalism, would be that we will never be Southern Sudanese but 
groups”1486. James Okuk, for instance, from South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explicitly links 
devolution to tribalism and warns “against decentralization of government power politics in South 
Sudan at the moment before achieving ‘detribalization’ first as this breeds serious detrimental 
tribalism in the process”1487. Rather than calming inter-tribal tensions, devolution to regions would 
merely create a new locus for strife:  
Advocates of decentralization, federalism or regionalism have one agenda in mind: the division of our 
society. They must not be allowed! Alas, they easily forget that experience has shown that when 




On the opposite side of the spectrum, Joana Adams, a South Sudanese commentator argues clearly 
in favour of federalism as opposed to centralism: “I can proudly be a South Sudanese and an 
Equatorian without contradiction, and being one does not negate being the other”1489. In her 
assessment, “*e+very Southern tribe is a nation by itself, occupying a distinct territory where they are 
sovereign. Therefore what South Sudan needs to do is to build a ‘super-nation’ – the nation of South 
Sudan”1490. Justin Ambago Ramba, secretary general of the opposition United South Sudan Party 
(USSP), likewise holds that tribalism, regionalism and uneven development are not the inevitable 
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products of a federalist system since they can be witnessed in a unitary state, too. The true culprits of 
tribalism are ethnic entrepreneurs that play on ethnic identity: “Just as a carpenter can use tools to 
produce many different products, so can those who manipulate the distribution of power and 
employ identity”1491. Adding an interesting twist to the debate about regionalism triggered by 
regional conferences in Greater Equatoria, Lual Deng, director of the Ebony Institute in Juba, 
conceives of federalism, which he advocates, as competition and negotiation between the three 
classic regions of the South: Greater Equatoria, Greater Bahr al Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile. 
Competition, however, is to take place inside the SPLM which he takes to be tantamount to the 
general public1492. 
6.4.2.3. County multiplication and boundary disputes 
As mentioned in the section on international boundaries, external borders are not the only borders 
affecting South Sudan’s claim to effective statehood. South Sudan’s internal boundaries also 
constitute a major point of friction. The lack of demarcation of internal borders between states and 
counties1493 and insecurity over rights, ownership and status of vital resources such as land and water 
contribute to conflicts among South Sudanese citizens1494. For instance, the three states Lakes, 
Warrap and Unity are engaged in border disputes over ownership of valuable grazing land and 
wells1495. Furthermore, since 2002 most counties, payams and bomas (units of local administration) 
have been subdivided, not only creating new institutions of local government but also forcing the, on 
occasion, contentious issue of border demarcation1496. Counties and payams are multiplying because 
communities seek to be directly represented and also hope to gain employment and profit in other 
ways from having their own administrative unit. A typical point of contention in rural South Sudan is 
when communities are spread across different counties. In 2004, for instance, a local peace 
conference in Central Equatoria between the Lokoya and Olo’bu peoples mentioned the fact that the 
Lokoya were split into Juba county and Torit county as a major source of friction1497. A recent report 
likewise pointed out how some conflicts over resources among agro-pastoralist communities in 
Warrap and Lakes states are sparked and driven by newly created administrative boundaries that cut 
through highly valued and valuable land1498. 
Although the SPLM installed a high-level committee in 2007 to determine all internal boundaries 
between states and counties, a final settlement was pushed off until after independence and has yet 
to come into existence1499. Thus, during the process of delineating constituency boundaries for the 
2010 national elections, ethnic groups reacted violently when they were divided by constituency 
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boundaries and in some instances physically assaulted GoSS personnel1500. Lack of cartographic 
material further contributes to disputes. In Eastern Equatoria, for example, intense pressure from 
local communities drove the state government to increase the number of payams from 53 to 751501. 
The anticipated legalization and thus fixing of communal land rights inherent in the Land Act of 2009 
has also contributed to conflicts between communities over the demarcation of communal 
boundaries – a struggle which often shifts to the centre as local parties seek support from associates 
in the government in Juba1502. Thus, in 2013, youth from Duk County in Jonglei appealed to the 
governor in Bor to halt attempts by the youth from neighbouring Uror County to annex parts of Duk 
County1503.  
6.4.3. Local Government vs. Traditional Authorities 
An essential question for South Sudan but also for the analysis of the trajectory of South Sudan’s 
structural development compared to other African states’ experience with decentralization is 
whether or not traditional authorities will retain their present-day status and to what extent they will 
be integrated into or excluded from the official state-sanctioned governance pyramid. Accordingly, 
this section is going to analyze in 6.4.3.1 the formal-legal structure of local government and then go 
on to depict in 6.4.3.2 the actual actors that prevail in local decision-making: chiefs and other 
traditional authorities. 
6.4.3.1. Local Government Act: paper vs. reality 
South Sudan’s Local Government Act is very precise in pointing out the underlying principle of the 
administrative division of authorities: “Principle of subsidiarity, where decisions and functions shall 
be delegated to the lowest competent level of Government”1504. In actual matter of fact, this 
principle of subsidiarity does not accurately reflect the workings of government and governance on 
the local level.  
Looking at the case of Equatoria at the beginning of the CPA period, Branch and Mampilly argued 
“that local government is the key level for understanding the potential success or failure of post-
conflict SPLA political consolidation, and, ultimately, peace itself in Equatoria”1505. This contention is 
based on the belief that as decentralization begins to function according to the principle of 
subsidiarity laid out above, almost all important decisions for the local populace will be taken by local 
government. In retrospect, this expectation has not been fulfilled as local government – if it exists at 
all – in many localities has not come to bear much influence on local realities. Instead, as already 
discussed in the section on customary law (Ch. 6.2.1.2), traditional authorities continue to have a 
prominent place in local political as well as judicial and social affairs1506.  
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To begin with, the legal basis of local governance remains vague when it comes to the clear 
delineation of tasks and responsibilities of the various actors involved in local government. The GoSS 
is adamant about including traditional authorities into local government structures. In their present 
state, however, legal provisions dealing with local government contain the potential for conflict as 
several provisions appear mutually incompatible: traditional authorities are said to be legitimized 
democratically even if in practice they often are not; both customary law and statutory law are to be 
the bases of legal proceedings; both state officials and chiefs are said to enjoy authority1507. Thus, the 
Local Government Act 2009 differentiates between two types of traditional authority – kingdoms 
(centralized) and chiefdoms (decentralized) – divided into chieftainships, sub-chieftainships and 
headman-ships1508. Moreover, the Act states that “*t+he Boma shall be the main domain of the 
traditional authority where traditional leaders perform their administrative and customary 
functions”1509 but in the same section provides for chiefs to be represented in the County Legislative 
Council1510.  
The fact that it is common knowledge in Juba that the Local Government Act was written by a 
member of a foreign development agency does not by itself disqualify the document but it sheds a 
light on the degree of ownership the South Sudanese government shows with respect to the Act’s 
provisions. A USAID report is much more critical in its assessment because the Act, among other 
things, “authorizes the delegation of authority without any restriction, this will make it more difficult 
to hold local authorities accountable for their actions”1511. Moreover, in practice, counties have 
minimal authority as state governors routinely decide over the heads of county commissioners and 
lack income as the state governments often do not distribute resources further down to counties. In 
turn, county governments play a very limited role in service delivery due to lack of funds, capacity 
and data about citizen demographics and needs1512.  
Another study discerned the biggest challenges to efficient local government as being: undefined 
physical boundaries, lack of engagement in decentralization by national and state governments, 
undefined roles and responsibilities, lack of qualified staff, insufficient funds, embezzlement of 
allocated grants and lack of infrastructure (including something as basic as office space)1513. Finding 
local state organs in their present iteration to be either predatory or incompetent, some 
international observers actually call on the international community to put aside the dogma of 
statebuilding and directly aid and fund local authorities1514. In fact, such forms of direct funding occur 
already in certain localities, only not in a systematic manner. A former local government official who 
had spent much of the second war in North America boasted that he had been able to use personal 
connections to international organizations to get funding for several important infrastructural 
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projects in his county1515. On the flipside, neighbouring counties without well-connected people at 
the helm do not see any of the same benefits which strengthens the contention that access to 
services and opportunities in life in South Sudan depends very much on chance and the whim of 
geographical location.  
There is a sense that due to the fact that the officeholders in local government owe their positions 
(and thus their salary) to higher-ups in the state capital or, more often, in Juba, county officials avoid 
calls for genuine devolution of powers for fear that they might anger their superiors in Juba and as a 
consequence see themselves removed from their posts1516. In this vein, the World Bank has set up a 
pioneering project to directly fund payam projects without including either the national or state level 
and even excluding county commissioners1517. The underlying and unspoken assumption being that 
all political appointees that do not respond to local people are a threat to siphon off resources that 
ought to go to local causes1518. Hence, the programme is a tacit admission that the state structure as 
presently constituted is not functional or even predatory and is not to be trusted. Finally, legislation 
can only be effective when it is known and understood but – as Martina Santschi observes – nobody 
in South Sudan has actually heard of the Local Government Act1519. 
6.4.3.2. Chiefs and traditional authorities in the power structure 
One of the underlying reasons for the failure to properly distinguish between the tasks and rights of 
state-appointed local government officials on the one and chiefs on the other hand may lie in the 
SPLM/A’s history of civil administration and interaction with traditional authorities. Under the British, 
chiefs had been designated and partly installed by the colonial administrators to serve as their prime 
interlocutors to the population at large1520. During the first war, chiefs had come under fire from both 
the government and the Anyanya rebels1521 but during the second war, the SPLA “based the 
administration of its liberated areas almost entirely on the old structures of Native Administration 
and the provincial governments of the old Southern Region”1522.  
Yet, chiefs and other traditional authorities today do not necessarily enjoy a strong standing in the 
power pyramid and in several areas actually have experienced a substantial weakening of their 
authority and prestige. Whereas Kuol found that “*t+he spiritual, symbolic significance and role of the 
chief has been enhanced during the war period”1523 and that the SPLA treated them with respect and 
even reverence, others have found chiefs’ authority under fire as a result of the long war1524. Thus, 
while the SPLM nominally revived native administration in those areas it controlled in the second half 
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of the 1990s, it interfered whenever chiefs acted contrary to its interests1525. A study on customary 
law from 2004 found that the war had eroded the power of chiefs who were clearly subservient to 
military leaders; along these lines martial law also took precedence over civilian law which had been 
in the hands of chiefs1526. Badal actually believes that the chiefs’ loss of authority during the war was 
a direct result of a deliberate SPLA strategy to weaken them1527.  
Especially the diffusion of small arms represents a challenge to chiefs as owning a weapon has 
undercut the power and authority elders used to wield over youth. As a result, chiefs’ ability to 
mitigate conflicts and fulfil their traditional role as guardians of the peace has concomitantly 
shrunken1528. This finding is echoed by John Ashworth’s words that “[i]n some areas elders and chiefs 
have less influence and young men with guns have more”1529. To give an example of these processes, 
in the Sobat Basin (which comprises the states of Jonglei and Upper Nile), the power of chiefs is said 
to have been eroded by the alternative power structures imposed by the SPLA and the Khartoum 
government as well as by the ‘empowerment through armament’ of local youths1530. Among the 
Murle, too, elders have advised their youths against joining David Yau Yau’s militia but have not had 
the clout to prevent many from going ahead nonetheless1531.  
Finally, demography and cattle also work against chiefly authority. As dealt with in more detail in the 
chapter on ethnicity in South Sudan, dowries that are to be paid in cattle are a fixture of pastoralist 
societies in the country. Due to the fact that the young men want to acquire more cattle in order to 
be able to marry, they are keen on raiding neighbouring clans for cattle whereas the older men, 
among them the chiefs, have less to gain from raids and in contrast are likely to lose more in revenge 
attacks. These diametrically opposed incentive structures are a reason why chiefs today tend to have 
less control over members of their group and often cannot vouch that everyone is going to abide by 
peace deals the chief has signed1532.  
But the reality of chiefly power in contemporary South Sudan is not accurately captured by a 
narrative of gloom and decline. Traditional authorities have not been passive victims of events but 
have been able to retain and in some cases carve out new niches for themselves in post-CPA South 
Sudan. Evidence of the ability to adapt to the changing circumstances of an independently governed 
South Sudan was that already in 2004 a gathering of chiefs adopted the Kamuto Declaration which 
called “upon the SPLM and Government of South Sudan *…+ to assist with establishing County, State 
and national forums for the Traditional Leaders and Chiefs”1533. The most important reason for the 
continuing relevance of traditional authorities in the state structure is, however, that most South 
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Sudanese have no personal experience of political processes and rely on chiefs to fulfil the function 
of mediator between the individual and the state1534. Attitudes towards local government may vary 
across the country but what Martin and Sluga observe in Yei in Central Equatoria is not in the least 
untypical: “Many returnees and residents from surrounding areas in Equatoria continue to associate 
statutory authorities at central, state and county levels with the political dominance of the SPLM and 
military rule”1535. And a representative survey from all ten states revealed that most South Sudanese 
were strongly in favour of including traditional authorities in the power structure on the local 
level1536.  
Local populations frequently prefer chiefs and traditional authorities to state agents not only because 
they are more familiar with them but also because the SPLM/A is feared as well as revered. The 
SPLM, on the other hand, is also in some ways indebted to traditional authorities and relies on them 
for services and rallying local support for the party. Echoing this sentiment, a high-ranking member of 
the SPLM stated that the South Sudanese government had wrongly sidelined traditional authorities 
who ought to be given a much more prominent place in the state structure as the embodiment of 
South Sudanese culture and in recognition of their contribution during the liberation struggle1537. 
Traditional authorities, even though only very few of them are paid by the government, have also 
been a practical asset to the South Sudanese government and instrumental in registering voters for 
the elections and the referendum1538.  
Another factor in the relative weakness of statutory local government is that mostly junior civil 
servants are sent out to the counties and usually lack in both administrative experience and local 
knowledge1539. Local chiefs tend to be far superior in getting meetings to go their way and local 
government officials are further at a disadvantage because the SPLA, with very few exceptions, has 
been unwilling to back up officials in cases of conflict. This reluctance to confront chiefs is 
presumably grounded in the fact that politicians’ level of authority is largely proportional to and 
based on their personal linkages to specific communities in the country. Hence, Edward Thomas 
pointed out how the SPLM was very much like their erstwhile enemy, the National Congress Party in 
that “both use traditional authorities in tribal systems as a principal means for engaging with the 
rural periphery”1540. 
An apt description of traditional authorities’ position in the governance structure of post-war South 
Sudan is therefore that “*t+heir ideal role *…+ has been one of speaking and converting between the 
ways of government and the ways of the community, including mediating the violence of 
government by deflecting it with their words and, if necessary, absorbing it in their own bodies”1541. 
A recent example of this mediating role – and in fact a sign of chiefs collectively flexing their political 
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muscle – was an appeal to have the governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal removed from his post1542. 
Therefore, it is largely accurate to say that “*t+ribal authorities that have been manipulated, 
militarized and sometimes even criminalized are still the main rural administrative presence in the 
peripheries”1543. 
What is very interesting considering the comparative approach of this investigation is that in trying to 
find the right system of integrating local government and traditional authorities, South Sudanese 
authorities and intellectuals have been very open in seeking advice from abroad, in particular from 
other African countries that have grappled with the compatibility of chiefs and the state. Botswana’s 
example of a strongly institutionalized chiefly representation in the form of a House of Chiefs proved 
especially stimulating for the South Sudanese debate on the issue as the Swiss-sponsored Gurtong 
project for a number of years ran a special website dedicated to the idea of a House of 
Nationalities1544, arguing among other things that it would serve to “counteract the tyranny of the 
majority, the democratic deficit”1545. As a consequence, chiefs and civil society representatives visited 
Botswana in 2003 and in 2006 expanded the study tour to include South Africa and Ghana in addition 
to Botswana1546. These exchanges continue in the present as (with Swiss aid) councils of traditional 
leaders (COTAL) are being established in most states of South Sudan1547.  
6.4.4. The swollen centralized state in South Sudan – at a glance 
It is quite clear that South Sudan is presently not a federal state whatever the constitution or legal 
documents may claim. Authority and especially resources are concentrated in the hands of a select 
few institutions and people that all reside in and operate from Juba. The states and even more so the 
counties are better portrayed as extensions of the executive, as local tools to carry out the national 
government’s bidding. They do not have the means to actively shape local or state affairs and, more 
importantly, are in reality accountable more to the national government than to their nominal 
constituents as the executive has the prerogative of dismissing and appointing officeholders largely 
at will. The presence and strength of chiefs and other traditional authorities on the level of local 
governance is testament to the weakness of their counterparts in the official structures and 
institutions of local government who are deliberately shunned by the higher-ups in Juba that prefer 
direct links to local communities. The role of chiefs in all of this is highly ambiguous as they are in a 
position of mediator between people and government. Chiefs have thus been instrumentalized by 
the executive and they have themselves instrumentalized the state and its representatives in a 
mutual barter for local and national influence that has circumvented and cut out the newly erected 
administrative edifice.  
However, these centralizing developments ought to be seen in the light of the specific circumstances 
South Sudan finds itself in. In a context of a general lack of state control over its nominal territory, a 
territory that the state moreover only very recently has begun to govern in a civilian as opposed to 
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military form of rule, the calls for decentralization are probably premature if the aim of statebuilding 
is to build a coherent state. While the national government is certainly lacking in terms of oversight 
and capacity, the state level is in fact much worse off given that most capable staff drifts towards the 
centre of authority in Juba. Even in an environment that – unlike South Sudan – does not have the 
acrimonious history of the debate over redivision (kokora), a debate still very much on people’s 
minds, delegating authority in a situation of building a cohesive commonwealth is probably not a 
good idea. This is especially true considering that Equatorian ethnic groups, though also in local 
competition amongst each other, increasingly try to speak with a unified voice in matters of national 
concern. Moreover, the strength of tribal affiliations that have come to the fore in the course of the 
often acrimonious procedure of county delineation and demarcation and that also shape political 
discourse nationally are a worrying sign for the cohesion of South Sudan as nation-state.  
6.5. The South Sudanese state vis-à-vis the African postcolonial state 
Looking once again at the South Sudanese state as it presents itself to the observing eye, it becomes 
apparent that the new state’s experience in many areas resembles quite closely the typified African 
state of the postcolonial era but there are also important divergences from the typology of the 
African state developed in chapter 4.1. As one of the objectives of this research project is to analyze 
South Sudan’s evolution in relation to this newly developed typology, this part seeks to work out 
where and in what facets South Sudan agrees with or differs from the typified African nation-state. 
The hybrid quasi state is the area in which the typology of postcolonial African nation-states and the 
case of South Sudan most closely align with one another. South Sudan clearly lacks a monopoly of 
violence, is unable to control its borders and faces several alternative violence actors on its territory, 
both national and international, state and non-state. The same goes for the non-performing aspect 
of the illegitimate state: the South Sudanese state is either not present at all and delegates tasks to 
NGOs or traditional authorities or, where it is present, does not fulfil its nominal tasks in, say, health 
care or education – though the extent to which the South Sudanese state absolves itself of the task 
of caring for its citizens is rather exceptional compared to the typified African state. The de facto 
one-party state or movement state in which party and state, SPLM and GoSS blend into one is just as 
characteristic for other countries that had to fight a war of liberation and where opposition is 
organized and finds expression primarily inside rather than outside the governing party. In spite of 
the lack of democratic accountability and tangible benefits, however, the government in Juba, in 
contrast to other governments in Africa, is generally deemed legitimate by the majority of South 
Sudanese because it is credited with bringing about independence from the North.  
Privatization of state resources by individuals usually high up in the state structure for the benefit of 
their (extended) family is equally a pervasive trait of South Sudan’s state structure as it is in the 
typified African state. Corruption manifests itself in most interactions with the state and is enabled 
and facilitated by the economic and budgetary dependence on oil. The country is thus subject to the 
same resource curse that affects other resource-rich countries on the continent and the same 
melange of disgust and resignation in popular attitudes towards corruption. In contrast to the large 
neopatrimonial networks of dependence that characterize the typified African state, in South Sudan 
most of the illegally appropriated state funds are funnelled either only to the extended family or to a 
very targeted localized group of supporters for each individual politician or power-broker. The same 
somewhat atypical collusion between local traditional authorities and politicians in Juba can also be 
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observed in the actual functioning of decentralization in South Sudan. Generally, like in a typical 
African state, authority and resources are concentrated in the hands of a small group of members of 
government in the capital and devolution only takes place on paper. Due to the weakness of local 
government structures, however, members of the central government see the need to maintain 
close ties to the people on the ground and sideline the official administrative structures in favour of 
chiefs which thereby reclaim some of the authority lost during the long war. This partial 
rehabilitation of traditional authorities as a semi-official part of the state is again akin to the typified 
African state. On the other hand, since the state is not present in the countryside, locals turn instead 
to traditional authorities, which is a typical trend in most African states. The multiplication of 
counties and other units of local government is equally a typical feature of contemporary African 
states and South Sudan also resembles quite uncannily the evolution of Nigeria and other highly 
ethnically diverse states in terms of continuous administrative subdivision into ever smaller entities 




7. The nation and nationbuilding in South Sudan 
The construction of a national identity and a concept of the South Sudanese nation that all or most of 
the nascent state’s inhabitants can adhere to, is a subject matter that does not only feature in 
external (academic) assessments of the needs on the ground but also plays a prominent role in 
proclamations, speeches and opinion pieces in South Sudan’s public space itself. The highly fluid 
political and social situation in South Sudan over the last few decades of war and the slow and 
uneven transition to a state of peace make the question of a common identity very salient. With 
independence attained the lack of an enemy may prove a major challenge to unity in South Sudan.  
At the same time, an overriding theme in much theoretical work on nationalism and nation-building 
is the high degree to which nations are constructed as opposed to natural entities. And as 
characteristically modern creations, national identities are also prone to radical and rapid change and 
transformation. The object of the following three sub-chapters is therefore to analyze efforts at 
nation-building and the actual national, ethnic, regional and other identities that impact political 
decision-making in South Sudan. Therefore, the first section 7.1 is going to look specifically at the 
content, success, obstacles and alternatives to state-driven nationalism in South Sudan. The second 
section 7.2 meanwhile will focus on politicized ethnicity and more specifically on alternative sub-
national loyalties like ethnic groups while 7.3 will look at the ‘new nationalism’ and at religion, assess 
the prevalence of xenophobia and politics of autochthony in the country and the impact of efforts at 
national reconciliation on national unity. The final section 7.4 is then going to compare and contrast 
South Sudan’s experience with nationbuilding and national identity to that of the typified African 
nation from Chapter 4.2.  
7.1. Inclusive state-driven nationalism in South Sudan  
Nation-building in South Sudan can be understood as the process of a newly created nation-state’s 
internal and external self-assertion – in other words, a means to demonstrate sovereignty on the 
domestic and on the international level. To paraphrase Jeffrey Herbst, nationalism can be a cheap 
alternative to ensure citizens’ adhesion to the nation-state in the absence of state capacity (both 
fiscal and administrative) to deliver benefits. The South Sudanese state’s leaders are keenly aware of 
the potential of a strong national identity and the dangers associated with its absence. Therefore, 
state nationalism, i.e. the attempts by the government and associated individuals and institutions to 
develop and propagate a national identity is crucial to understanding the shape and nature of the 
evolving nation-state in South Sudan.  
This chapter is going to approach the issue of South Sudanese national identity, nationalism and 
nationbuilding from several different vantage points. To lay out the topic at hand, the first section in 
7.1.1 will look into the history of Southern Sudanese alienation and exclusion from the Sudanese 
nation, which in part prompted the evolution of a collective South Sudanese identity. Subsequently, 
in 7.1.2 different components of the official narrative of South Sudanese state nationalism will be the 
focus of analysis as well as obstacles to its realization and propagation. The third section 7.1.3 
inspects forms of othering in the attempt to create a unifying national identity in South Sudan, which 
is followed in 7.1.4 by a brief summary.   
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7.1.1. From Sudanese nationalism to South Sudanese nationalism  
South Sudan’s history is a difficult concept once the historical gaze crosses the threshold of 2011 and 
investigates the pre-independence history of the region and its inhabitants. The matter becomes yet 
more complicated when what is at stake is the national history of South Sudan that is supposed to 
develop into a point of identification for the young state’s citizens. Yet, a critical feature of Sudanese 
as well as South Sudanese nationalism has been its top-down nature which is especially intriguing for 
South Sudan since it only obtained statehood in 2011. This section will therefore seek to illuminate 
the historical record of South Sudanese national history and collective identity by showing in 7.1.1.1 
the specific traits of Sudanese nationalism and in 7.1.1.2 how Sudanese nationalism excluded South 
Sudanese from the Sudanese nation. 7.1.1.3 then describes John Garang’s aborted pan-Sudanese 
vision for a united ‘New Sudan’ before the subsequent section turns to nationalism in contemporary 
South Sudan.  
7.1.1.1. Sudanese nationalism  
South Sudanese nationalism is intrinsically an anomalous case because Sudan, the country South 
Sudan seceded from, is itself postcolonial and Sudanese nationalism was shaped by anticolonial 
sentiments against the British and, to a lesser extent, the Egyptians. Sentiments that echo many 
South Sudanese’s feeling of antagonism against the state and nation of Sudan. Therefore, the first 
step to grasping and understanding the development and present-day shape of South Sudanese 
national identity or identities is to take in the long and varied history of deliberate alienation, 
subordination and exclusion of South Sudanese from the Sudanese nation.  
While Southern ethnic groups had been successful in repelling expansionist designs by the Funj 
Sultanate based in Sinnar in the 17th and 18th centuries1548, ever since the Turco-Egyptian conquest 
that begun in 1821 Southern Sudan’s history has been intricately linked with that of its Northern 
neighbours, who for long periods doubled as the South’s rulers. Since the last British colonial 
administrator left the country in 1956, Sudan’s political, economic and social fabric has been 
dominated by the riverain elite from central Sudan1549, an elite which is both proudly Arab and 
Muslim. 
Prior to the 20th century, a Sudanese national identity had not existed as people identified by ethnic 
or sectarian belonging. In much of the North, however, the unifying bond of Arab language and 
culture and Islamic creed, which had been fortified during the Turkiyya1550, helped to overcome these 
differences as Sudanese nationalism arose aided by the tariqat, the Islamic sects, in the years after 
the First World War1551. The origins of Northern Sudanese nationalism can be traced to the specific 
environment of Gordon College in Khartoum during the 1920s and 1930s where the groundwork for 
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Sudanese nationalism in an independent Sudan was laid1552. While it is debatable if it was in fact the 
colonial government which chose and established the group habitus of Northern Sudan’s dominant 
group as the essence of a future Sudanese nation1553, it is widely accepted that Sudanese nationalism 
blossomed and took root only in the areas of capitalist industrial development but left the South 
largely untouched1554. Still today, Arabs from the central region around Khartoum have 
overwhelming influence on the shape of the country’s cultural identity1555. 
For the Northern elite, the nation inhabiting the envisioned nation-state of Sudan was to adhere or 
at least aspire to an ideal embodied by Islam and Arab identity, which had to be spread to and 
superimposed upon the non-Arab and/or non-Muslim peoples of the Sudan1556. Northerners were 
looking to an idealized Islamic past for pride and inspiration and not to the African present1557. This 
backward-looking discourse concentrates squarely on the Arab conquest and the concomitant entry 
of Islam into Sudan which began with attacks on the Christian empire of Nubia in the 7th century1558. 
As a consequence, Northern Arabs are particularly eager to accentuate their Arabness in order to 
defy association with Africa and blackness, which are deemed backward and of inferior worth1559. As 
Riek Machar, vice-president of South Sudan from 2005-2013, argued in 1995: “The crisis of national 
identity is a creation of North Sudan which defines the Sudanese identity in Arab and Islamic 
terms”1560. 
Sudan has frequently been referred to as a bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and Arab North Africa 
but the bridge’s abutments have been built on sandy ground. As Toynbee wrote in the 1960s:  
The problem of the two Sudans is the problem of the two Africas on a miniature scale; and
 therefore the Sudan holds Africa’s destiny, as well as her own destiny, in her hands. If she can 
 succeed in reconciling the two elements in her own population, she will have piece of constructive 
 work for the continent as a whole. If the conflict in the Sudan becomes acute and chronic, this will 
 heighten the tension between the two Africas everywhere
1561
. 
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Clearly, Sudan has not succeeded in reconciling this difference. Alex de Waal emphasized how 
Sudanese nationalism was riddled “with an immense debt of suspicion to be paid off before any 
collective capital can be accumulated”1562. As a consequence of its violent and divisive history, there 
is a lack of symbols of national unity. The Mahdi’s rise and rule, for instance, are a measure of pride 
for many Northern Arab Sudanese whereas in the South the Mahdiyya is recalled with horror as the 
‘spoiling of the world’1563.  
Northern Sudanese, however, only rarely acknowledged the unease that their preferred narrative of 
Sudanese national history aroused in parts of the ‘national’ community, in particular in the South. On 
the contrary, Northern academics’ standard explanation for the ‘Southern Problem’ (readily adapted 
by Northern politicians) was that Britain was to blame for disrupting what had been a natural process 
of gradual Arabization and Islamization in Southern Sudan. Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad Ali, head of 
Khartoum University’s history department in the 1970s, even argued that general Charles George 
“Gordon was the first initiator of what is now called the ‘Southern Problem’” by forcing Northern 
Sudanese out of the Southern provinces as far back as the 1870s1564. In contemporary Sudan, South 
Sudanese that are Christian or Animist are frequently called ‘lost brothers’ who – that is the thinking 
– would have become Muslims were it not for the interference of white colonialists1565.  
However, the real reason why the national identity developed and espoused by the Northern riverain 
elite did not manage to win widespread acceptance in the South and other parts of the country 
(Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountains) is its exclusive, discriminatory, racist and forcibly 
homogeneous design which is utterly incongruous with the empirical reality of a highly diverse and 
plural country and society in Sudan. The political imbalance of power drove the sense that what was 
happening in the country was “a hegemonic attempt of the ‘Arab’ north to impose its political, 
economic and social identity upon the whole state of Sudan”1566. As Flint and de Waal point out for 
Darfur, the concern of the people was not about being or becoming Sudanese – generations of 
political and cultural change had accomplished that – but about the fact that the Khartoum 
government did not treat them as proper citizens1567.  
7.1.1.2. Alienation of South Sudanese within Sudan since independence in 1956 
This treatment of the population as subjects rather than citizens is especially relevant to Southern 
Sudan because “*e+xclusion from power and relative resource deprivation serves to heighten the 
cultural identity and solidarity of subordinate groups”1568. Southerners’ exclusion is far from a recent 
phenomenon. In fact, the problem of the South has arguably been an integral component of Sudan’s 
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very existence as a nation and effectively goes back to Muhammad Ali’s conquest of the Sudan which 
was driven by the explicit demand for ‘Negro soldiers’1569.  
The fate of the south was that common to peripheral regions, determined in part by geography, 
reinforced by colonial economic priorities and mismanagement, overlain by a legacy of slavery and 




In part, the narrowness and lack of inclusion of Sudanese nationalism can be blamed on the fact that 
control over Sudan was handed over rather smoothly from Britain to the urban nationalists as a 
result of British attempts to prevent Egypt from gaining control over the Sudan. “The ‘nationalists’ in 
the urban centres thus did not have to fight for independence, and did not seek to identify common 
interests and forge alliances with other groups throughout the country to achieve this end, as other 
African nationalists had to do throughout Africa in the 1940s and 1950s”1571.  
Northern intellectuals – much like many of their contemporaries in other newly created African 
states – were thus widely deluded in thinking that ethnic differences would simply fade away over 
time in the melting pot of one Sudanese identity1572. Accordingly, the Sudan’s endemic crisis of 
governance has been ascribed to “the contradiction of trying to rule what the rulers believe is a 
nation-state, in pointed disregard of the realities of a pluralist society which is the Sudan”1573. Yet, 
throughout its 55 years of existence Sudan has never been a genuine nation-state1574 as the attempt 
to impose cultural homogeneity throughout the Sudan’s vast territory failed dramatically. Not least 
because of “the obdurate refusal of northern Sudanese elites to allow the emergence of a 
postcolonial ideology of ‘Sudanism’”1575 to replace their parochial preference for Arabic identity.  
Instead, exclusion from the officially sanctioned idea of the Sudanese nation-state has contributed 
mightily to Southern Sudanese’s sense of commonality: “their shared southern Sudanese identity is a 
product of a history of integration into and exclusion from a nation-state dominated by northerners 
and Islamists who considered them primitive unbelievers”1576. Moreover, appeals to nationalism or 
religion are insufficient to mask and overcome the stark inequalities in access to resources and 
opportunities that are rooted in the extreme concentration of power in the centre1577. The pyramid 
of social stratification in Sudan was headed by an Arab-Muslim ruling class from the North, followed 
by an Arab-Muslim middle class along with some Western and Southern Sudanese and, finally, 
Northern peasants and urban workers together with nomads and marginalized Western and most 
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Southern Sudanese at the bottom1578. In the early 2000s, an anonymously published ‘Black Book’ 
spread and popularized the awareness of discrimination in Sudan by presenting statistics that 
documented the underrepresentation of marginalized ethnic and regional groups in Sudan’s politics 
and economy1579. Southern Sudanese economic discrimination actually dated to the colonial period 
when demand for wage parity was in fact one of the key elements of Southern activism1580. 
Apart from economic and political exclusion, however, racial discrimination played a major part in 
driving Southern Sudanese away from the Sudanese state and nation. “Those who are considered 
Arabs by the racialized state are treated as citizens and those who are perceived as non-Arabs are 
treated as subjects”1581. This designation of different degrees of belonging to the nation based on 
people’s ‘Arabness’ is an experience South Sudan shares with other countries along the so-called 
Afro-Arab border area that crosses the Sahel zone from East to West, with Mauritania an especially 
good comparison1582. In an epilogue to pre-secession Sudan, Sondra Hale argues that the constant 
everyday presence of racism in relations between Northerners and Southerners and other 
marginalized groups led to a “lack of a sense of belonging, unstable citizenship, and constant 
alienation”1583. An example are Sudanese passports that, controversially, contain information about a 
person’s skin colour but do not allow individuals to record their skin colour as ‘black’ because 
passports and other official documents only know the colour ‘brown’1584. A key factor in this respect 
is the mutual memory of slavery and slave raiding in the South, with abid (slave) a common colloquial 
term employed in the North to refer to Southerners1585. These perspectives can be traced to the mid-
19th century when “during the Turkiyya the slave population in the North was drawn very largely 
from the southern Sudan, and in the popular mind slaves and ‘blacks’ were synonymous”1586.  
The experience and memory of slave raiding thus does not belong to a distant past shrouded in myth 
but has had direct bearing on conflict in Sudan and on collective Southern Sudanese 
identification1587. Ibrahim, for instance, traces the roots of both the first and second civil war in 
Sudan to the extensive Nilotic slave trade that started in the early 19th century1588 and Dunstan Wai 
depicts Sudan in the first half of the 20th century as a country that exhibited “already a deeply rooted 
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mutual hatred and distrust between the people as a result of memories of Arab slave raids into the 
South before and during the Anglo-Egyptian military occupation of the Sudan”1589. The Mahdiyya 
certainly marked a tipping point for Southern attitudes towards the North and Northerners, which in 
Southern collective memory were henceforth considered threatening and a potential source of 
danger1590. Later, the use of extreme violence with which Southern Sudanese were confronted in the 
aftermath of independence only “deepened the identity cleavage between the two parts of the 
country and strengthened the image of northerners as colonialists in national garb”1591. Therefore, 
shortly before the independence referendum, Pagan Amum, at the time GoSS Minister of Peace and 
CPA Implementation, could rightly claim that “*s+ecession is favoured by South Sudanese because the 
Sudanese state has been built around excluding them – it was not built to realise their 
aspirations”1592. 
7.1.1.3. John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision 
The very fact that today we are speaking of an independent South Sudan that seeks to develop and 
popularize its own peculiar vision of nationhood and national history is not only owed to the failure 
of Sudanese nationalism but also the demise and disowning of the SPLM’s erstwhile ideological 
centrepiece: the vision of New Sudan. While the Anya-nya, in spite of a great number of internal rifts 
and divisions, had been united in their call for Southern independence, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement of John Garang fought on a radically different philosophical platform. “New Sudan” 
became the official aim and objective of the SPLM’s struggle and entailed a liberation and 
emancipation of the entire country rather than merely the South1593. Even the movement’s name is 
indicative of the focus on a unified Sudan as “Sudan People’s Liberation Movement” implicitly 
assumes that there is one Sudanese people that can be liberated1594.  
However, it is highly questionable that the shift away from secessionism can be attributed, as Leach 
believes, to the fact that “the few integration attempts made during [the SRG] period may have 
successfully altered concepts of identity for southerners”1595. Given his premature death in a 
helicopter accident in 2005, it is impossible to ascertain but it appears at least probable that the 
impetus behind John Garang’s proclamation of the New Sudan vision was at least in part motivated 
by strategic considerations1596.  
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For one, setting regime change rather than secession as the ultimate goal was certain to please the 
Communist Derg regime in Ethiopia, the SPLM’s foreign backers and sponsors up until 1991, which 
were faced with their own secessionist rebel army in Eritrea and were loath to encourage a 
precedent in the immediate neighbourhood1597. In addition, a national instead of a regional platform 
promised to be more attractive to marginalized groups outside of Southern Sudan, in particular the 
Nuba, Beja and Fur. In terms of creating a popular idea of a national group that Southerners would 
be keen to adhere to, New Sudan was not as successful because its precise contents were not only 
confusing but arguably detrimental to the maturing sense of nationalism in the South1598. Similarly, 
the shift from propagation of ‘New Sudan’, which on paper was still a core part of the 2008 SPLM 
Manifesto1599, to independence occurred very suddenly without communicative preparation and 
effectively meant that the movement deserted those members and allies of the SPLM that were left 
stranded North of the nascent border with Sudan.  
7.1.2. Official nationalism in contemporary South Sudan  
A crucial factor for contemporary South Sudanese is to establish, write or re-write their national 
history, which is to form the basis of a separate South Sudanese national identity to be disseminated 
throughout society, for instance by being part of school curricula. South Sudanese politicians and 
intellectuals are largely guided by the implicit or explicitly stated assumption of nationalism’s 
functionality; i.e. the growth of a national idea and identity is said to fulfil the dual function of a) 
establishing cohesion among inhabitants of a territorial unit, while b) providing orientation for the 
individual. Having established an independent state for the first time after decades of struggle, South 
Sudan is in a position where it has to replace the void left by the common enemy – the Arab North – 
with a national identity centred on a positive idea of collectivity. And indeed, the “government, 
through frequent presidential speeches and preparation/promotion of the Vision 2040 document, 
clearly places great importance on creating citizen’s ownership of the new ‘nation’”1600. The inverted 
commas surrounding the ‘nation’, though, are a good indication of the scepticism that abounds 
among international observers to what extent the peoples of South Sudan actually constitute an 
imagined collectivity.  
Such scepticism appears well-founded when we consider the substantial rift and break with the past 
that decades of war and the deaths and dispersal of millions of South Sudanese have entailed. In the 
words of Salam and de Waal:  
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The collective memory and social cohesion that maintained the cultural archive has been battered by 
decades of destruction and displacement. Old people, who are the living libraries of Southern Sudan 
cultures, have died without being able to hand on their lore and experience to the younger 
generation.
1601 
A second problem is the paucity of written records or other artefacts of the peoples and 
commonwealths that existed prior to the Ottoman conquest. While scholarship has gradually moved 
away from Arkell’s blanket claim that “what is known as the southern Sudan today, has no history 
before A.D. 1821”1602 and oral historiography and archaeological work is underway to unearth 
tangible traces of the past, there is still truth in Theobald’s dictum from the 1950s that “*o+f the 
humble, obscure lives of the southern Sudanese through the centuries, no written record 
remains”1603. 
In South Sudan, there is thus no easy choice of national historical narrative, nor is there agreement 
over which particular aspects and facets of history to choose and endorse. For one, throughout 
history Southern Sudan has never been a state or a self-governing entity with borders even remotely 
reminiscent of the current state. While the Zande, for instance, possessed a sophisticated 
hierarchical state structure in pre-colonial times, the reach and expansion of its realm never came 
close to covering the present-day state1604. Other ethnic groups like the Dinka and Nuer (the two 
largest ethnic groups) were and are acephalous societies with a dispersed horizontal structure of 
authority1605. Moreover, none of the ethnic groups in South Sudan is either large or strong enough to 
dominate historical memory to the exclusion of other minor ethnic groups. 
Before looking at which content South Sudanese state nationalism has chosen to endorse, a final 
preliminary word of caution about academic production of ‘knowledge’ in this field. Inferring 
contemporary (self-) definitions of ethnic groups and national collectives into the past is generally 
inadmissible given that these categories either did not exist or had very different meanings and 
connotations. Therefore, I agree with Justin Willis’ cautioning words in a review of Sarah Beswick's 
Sudan’s Blood Memory that when  
the jockeying for land, power and position in southern Sudan becomes more intense, some people will 
turn to this book for historical precedent and explanation. When they do so, they may deduce from it 
*…+ that ethnicity is immutable and conflict inevitable, and that the Sudan is irrevocably and multiply 
divided by its past.
1606
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grand migrations now told to explain the peopling of South Sudan”1607. Irrespective of the truth of 
this claim, the fact that it was uttered by one of the preeminent authorities on Sudan lends itself to 
being used by South Sudanese politicians, intellectuals, journalists to bolster irredentist claims to 
territory currently part of Sudan1608. As much as academics want to reach an audience beyond 
academia, anyone writing about South Sudanese history has to be aware that his or her assessments 
may serve to impact political events on the ground in ways unforeseen by the author.  
State nationalism in South Sudan has several noteworthy aspects that also work to structure this 
section: initially, in 7.1.2.1 the idealisation of Southern resistance and especially the SPLA’s heroic 
role in the ‘war of liberation’ will be the subject of interest. This will be followed in 7.1.2.2 by the 
multicultural ideal of unity-in-diversity before 7.1.2.3 looks at language politics and symbolism 
surrounding the official use of English, (Juba) Arabic and the vernacular languages.    
7.1.2.1. History of resistance and the ‘heroic war of liberation’ 
Finding an alternative to the ideal of ‘New Sudan’ is not an easy task for would-be nationbuilders in 
contemporary South Sudan. Although some had expected that as soon as independence was 
achieved, South Sudanese would be free of their inferiority complex and “experience total liberation 
from an identity crisis”1609, this identity crisis is still with South Sudan and South Sudanese in 2014. 
The lack of commonalities between the ‘pagan’ South and the Muslim North was not tantamount to 
unity or the presence of a collective identity among Southern Sudanese1610. Apart from fictional and 
mythological forebears of contemporary South Sudanese that some like to present as the kernel of 
South Sudanese history and identity, “South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical 
expression. *…+ The main glue that binds the country’s multiple ethnicities together is the history of 
their struggle for freedom and collective opposition to the north”1611. 
History of resistance by South Sudanese 
The most promising historical fact, the most common point of reference for a collective Southern 
entity are joint resistance to various colonial rulers and conquerors from Europe and North Africa. 
While Shilluk and Bari and later Dinka and Azande had been the first to come into close contact with 
Turco-Egyptian troops and traders1612, and attempts had been made to cope with the threat of slave-
raiders by way of cooperation and intermarriages1613, South Sudanese did not lack agency as 
spearmasters, prophets and other chiefs from across Southern Sudan resisted the successive 
conquerors of their land. Richard Gray marked the starting point of Southern collective resistance in 
the 1880s:  
                                                          
1607
 Johnson, Douglas H. A New History for a New Nation: The Search for South Sudan’s Usable Past. Keynote 
address given at the 9
th
 International South Sudan and Sudan Studies Conference Bonn, 23-25 July 2012, p. 6.  
1608
 To be clear, to my knowledge no such attempt has so far been made.  
1609
 Lokosang, L. B. South Sudan: The Case for Independence and Learning from Mistakes. Bloomington: Xlibris, 
2010, p. 85.  
1610
 Badal, Raphael Koba, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan”, African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 301, 
Oct. 1976, pp. 463-474, p. 465.  
1611
 Jok, Jok Madut. Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan. Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace, Special Report No. 287, October 2011, p. 2.  
1612
 Gray, Richard, “Some Aspects of Islam in the Southern Sudan during the Turkiya”, in Brett, Michael (ed.) 
Northern Africa: Islam and Modernization. London: Frank Cass, 1973, pp. 65-72. 
1613
 Santschi, Martina. State-Society interactions: From the Turkiyya to Independence. Paper presented at the 
56
th
 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Baltimore, November 2013. 
227 
 
By the 1880s some of the narrow horizons of traditional tribal animosities were giving way to a fierce 
united resistance against the alien intruders. In 1884 Dinka and Nuer, under the leadership of a 
prophet called Donlutj, attacked the Egyptian station at Bor, and the following year Dinka, Aliab, and 
Mandari pastoralists aided the local Bari in a fierce attack on the stations at Lado and Rejaf.
1614  
In language still reeking of colonial attitudes of superiority, the succeeding period of British 
administration at the beginning of the 20th century has been described as equally ridden with fierce 
resistance by Southern tribes “who, proud of their independence, were reluctant to give up their 
anarchical freedom in return for good government”1615. 
The degree to which these collective acts of violence resulted in a further-reaching sense of 
commonality and togetherness is however strongly contested. At the beginning of the 1970s, Gray 
claimed that a Southern Sudanese identity had until very recently only been a concept prevalent 
amongst a tiny elite faction of South Sudanese societies1616. Heraclides likewise believes that a 
consciousness of commonality among Southerners as black Africans only arose in the late 1960s 
whereas only a couple of years prior, Nilotics had referred to other Southerners as Jur mathiang, 
other people1617. Directly contradicting this stance is Francis Deng’s contention that a Southern 
identity was already very much in existence at independence in 1956 and shaped by both a history of 
resistance to slavery and by Christianity and as such stood in clear opposition to the North’s vision for 
the nation1618.  
Deng describes how Dinka identity is shaped by a collective memory of the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya 
which are remembered as the “time when the world was spoiled”1619. These memories then fed into 
the Torit mutiny in 1955, which subsequently sparked widespread anti-Northern nationalism among 
Southern Sudanese1620. During the ensuing Anya-nya rebellion, Southerners were therefore arguably 
already very conscious of the fact that they had been dominated by colonial powers since the 1840s 
and were thus fighting an anti-colonial struggle1621. Guarak, whose book is more advocacy than 
academic treatise, also emphasizes the resistance to the Mahdi by Shilluk and Dinka as a 
foundational moment and locates the birth of a distinct South Sudanese identity in the 1940s with 
the 1947 Juba Conference serving as the seminal moment1622.  
The reality beyond nationalist and other tendentious historiography is, however, likely to be more 
complex and a less mechanic trajectory from isolated ‘tribes’ through joint struggle to collective 
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identification as South Sudanese1623. Far from resisting merely ‘foreign’ invaders like the Egyptians 
and British, it may in fact be “in the common desire to protect the social relations and productive 
economy of family, village and cattle-camp from the expanding, corrupting forces of predatory 
government that a shared Southern Sudanese culture and memory is most apparent”1624. In the end, 
it may not matter as much who governs but the very fact that somebody is trying to govern them 
which sparks resistance among some South Sudanese.  
The ‘glorious war of liberation’ 
One way that the state attempts to promote the ideal of the nation and nationalism as the overriding 
sentiment for all citizens of South Sudan is by emphasizing what it portrays as the ‘glorious history of 
liberation’, i.e. the memory of the long period of civil war in post-1956 Sudan. On the one hand, 
there is clearly an element of self-serving propaganda involved in this pursuit. The government of 
South Sudan is dominated by members of the SPLM, whose leadership circle is in turn dominated by 
former or current soldiers and rebel fighters. Hence, promoting the ‘war of liberation’ as the essence 
of national identity and key moment in national history is meant to furnish the government with 
legitimacy while simultaneously buying some time for its policies to show tangible effects on its 
citizens’ welfare1625. In addition, the SPLA’s role as the leading faction during the last war against 
Khartoum is particularly accentuated, with prominence given to the movement’s leader from 1983 to 
2005, John Garang.  
This form of state nationalism is promulgated through various channels. Clearly visible forms of 
memorialisation are public monuments and structures that commemorate the war and the many 
that have died in its course. For instance, a giant statue of John Garang pointing ahead and upwards 
was unveiled on Independence Day in 20111626. John Garang’s mausoleum is meanwhile one of Juba’s 
largest structures and has become a sort of shrine that locals as well as foreign dignitaries flock to in 
shows of respect for the late SPLA leader who was far from universally loved when still alive. This line 
of memorial culture also finds expression in the national flag and national anthem. According to the 
official chromatic symbolism of the national flag (horizontal layers of black, red, and green), the 
colour red represents the blood the martyrs have shed for national liberation. In the national 
anthem, which was composed specifically for independence and selected as the winning composition 
after a nation-wide competition, one of the anthem’s three stanzas is entirely devoted to the fallen 
soldiers’ memory:  
Let us stand up in silence and respect 
Saluting our martyrs whose blood 
Cemented our national foundation 
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We vow to protect our nation.
1627
 
In addition to the physical manifestations of commemoration – especially important to a country 
with an illiterate majority – official celebrations and national holidays are tied into the fabric of 
heroism and war. On Independence Day in 2012, President Salva Kiir emphasized the people’s joint 
accomplishments and the sense of togetherness:  
We are not a people who fear the night and hide. We know that no matter how long the night, 
morning will always come. We joined together and fought for liberty and together, we earned it. We 




Next to Independence Day, the second most important holiday is Martyrs’ Day on 30 July, the day 
John Garang died in a helicopter accident in 20051629. In fact, Garang himself had begun this tradition 
of a martyrs’ cult early on during the second civil war when in 1985 he called the SPLA soldiers that 
died in the first battles in June 1983 that started the second civil war, “the first martyrs of the SPLA. 
Their sacrifices will remain in the annals of the revolutionary history of our great country”1630. On 
Martyrs’ Day 2008, Kiir hailed John Garang’s unique place in South Sudan’s history: “On top of this 
golden list is the Martyr of all Martyrs; our late leader, the icon of peace, the freedom fighter and 
founder of our heroic Movement, the SPLM, and Commander in Chief of the gallant SPLA forces, Dr. 
John Garang de Mabior”1631. And he presented his vision of what Martyrs’ Day ought to represent for 
contemporary South Sudanese three years later:  
To me personally, there is nothing material worth the sacrifices of our fallen martyrs other than 
working to build this nation for posterity. Nation building requires cohesion, hard work, honesty, and 
self-sacrifice. It is even more than that – it is building a national conscience! We are all now South 
Sudanese and being Fertit or Luo of Western Bahr El Ghazal, Pojulu or Mundari of Central Equatoria, 
Didinga or Acholi of Eastern Equatoria, Burun of Upper Nile or Murle of Jonglei, Dinka or Nuer, name 
them, what will only differentiate us is our cultural heritage. Unless we cultivate the spirit of 
nationalism, cemented by the blood of our martyrs, we cannot prosper. Therefore, I appeal to all, 
especially the younger generation, to cease from tribal tendencies.
1632 
The latter point is particularly crucial to look at because much of the official nationalist discourse 
appears directed against the designated enemy and obstacle to national cohesion: tribalism. This 
reasoning was even more transparent at the presentation of the South’s new national anthem. 
During the event South Sudan’s information and broadcasting minister stated that the anthem’s 
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“words like unity, harmony and peace that advocate for one tribe in the new nation *…+ should be 
kept at the fingertips”1633.  
Yet, the performative aspect of national holidays also bears the risk of ridicule and failure. Thus, 
during the independence festivities in 2011, it transpired that there were not enough chairs for all 
foreign dignitaries that attended the celebrations so that the SPLM’s entire senior command had to 
stand in the heat1634; an embarrassment which immediately after the country’s creation put into 
doubt the state’s ability to fulfil the high-flying dreams embodied in the official national vision. This 
recognition of the need to keep symbols of national pride and unity on a higher pedestal to prevent 
them from desecration also appears to be present among some South Sudanese officials. Soon after 
the melody of the new national anthem was made public, the government released a statement 
prohibiting the use of the anthem as a ringtone for mobile phones1635. The South Sudanese state and 
its (self-appointed) custodians occasionally use force to ensure veneration for the nation. As Nicki 
Kindersley observes, Freedom Square where Garang’s mausoleum is located has become one of the 
main spots where policemen enforce shows of respect for national symbols by arresting people 
whose conduct or dress they deem offensive1636.  
Finally, the fact that the SPLM takes sole credit for liberation of the South is problematic on a number 
of levels: (a) non-SPLA militias and other groups are bound to feel slighted and excluded while (b) we 
are likely to witness internal struggles between different factions and individuals in the SPLM over 
who contributed more to liberation and hence has a stronger claim to rule1637. This applies for 
example to the SSDF that at the time of its dissolution and integration into the SPLA after the 2006 
Juba Declaration was at least the SPLA’s equal in terms of military capacity and strength but lacked 
the political and diplomatic skill and agenda1638. Apart from militias that were on the other side of the 
trenches from the SPLA, a much larger group that is excluded from this particular vision of the nation 
are women. Despite large number of female fighters in the SPLA’s ranks and even an all-female 
battalion Katiba Banat1639, the archetypal South Sudanese freedom fighter is a masculine male1640 
whereas “the contributions and activities of South Sudanese female combatants and women 
associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG) remain largely unrecognized”1641. Clearly, then, 
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the memory and commemoration of the long civil war are hardly congruent and in various respects a 
problematic choice as the essence of national identity.  
7.1.2.2. Unity-in-diversity: a multicultural ideal  
The second pillar of state nationalism in South Sudan are variations on the theme of unity-in-
diversity. The Transitional Constitutions expounds on the matter by calling for “norms and standards 
of governance *…+ that reflect the unity of the people of South Sudan while recognizing their 
diversity”1642. Not coincidentally, a recent report on international consultations of a group of South 
Sudanese experts on traditional authorities was entitled ‘Unity in Diversity’1643. Jok Madut Jok, 
undersecretary at the Ministry of Culture and Heritage and renowned academic, is one of the 
concept’s strongest backers. Crucially, Jok believes in the political nature of the exercise: “a collective 
identity will need to be politically constructed, and it is the task of its leadership, government, civil 
society, and private enterprise to do it by turning South Sudan’s cultural diversity into a national 
asset”1644. In its most basic form, unity-in-diversity simply means the acceptance and recognition of 
the population’s diversity and hence an appeal to refrain from policies that would deny or counteract 
said diversity.  
Thus, often unity-in-diversity is but another name for an appeal to refrain from the language and 
practice of ‘tribalism’, ethnic favouritism and demeaning prejudices against other ethnic groups. As 
the South Sudanese poet Kuir Garang argues, “it’s high time South Sudanese started to see that too 
much focus on one’s tribal needs is the express lane to most of Africa’s frictional tribal nonsense and 
political instabilities”1645. Jok, for example, criticizes journalists that blame ethnic groups rather than 
individuals for wrongdoing and corruption because framing grievances with the government along 
exclusively ethnic lines prevents the rise of multi-ethnic coalitions that could serve to allow each and 
every tribe to feel like an equitable part of the state and the nation1646. Responsible journalism 
therefore ought “to calm the already volatile ethnic make-up of our country, with a view to forging a 
future of citizenship in the nation rather than in the tribe”1647. David Marial Gumke, Rumbek East 
County commissioner, likewise warns that “*u+nless we abandon tribalism and sectionalism in the 
country *…+ we cannot build a peaceful nation”. Instead of concentrating on the differences between 
different tribes like Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, Azande, Acholi and Bari, “we should all be united now and 
call ourselves South Sudanese”1648.  
This primarily negative conception of unity-in-diversity is also embodied in the SPLM’s Party 
Manifesto from 2008, which proclaims that “*i+n the Sudan people have moved in time and space 
and have become part of the Sudanese nation, and the character and identity of this nation must be 
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based on its reality, on its historical and contemporary diversity”1649. Unless the existing diversity was 
recognized, building a genuine nation-state would be impossible as such ambiguity would embolden 
“the local elite and power seekers, masquerading as nationalists, to seize and retain political power, 
and then proceed to pillage and render the people of their so-called nation-state destitute”1650. The 
‘citizenship-state’ should accordingly be devoid of racial, religious, gender or other forms of 
discrimination. Although these objectives still presumed a united Sudan they are equally applicable 
to the new state in the South.  
The Manifesto is, however, much less precise when it comes to the positive content of diversity and 
how it is supposed to be represented, respected and integrated into both the state structure and the 
national identity.  
The New Sudan belongs equally to all the peoples that now inhabit the country. Its history, its diversity 
and richness are the common heritage of all Sudanese. The process of national formation presupposes 
deep introspection into Sudan’s history as well as drawing from the experiences of other countries in 
order to form a unique Sudanese nation that does not have to take refuge elsewhere.
1651
 
The SPLM’s new constitution, drafted in 2012 and passed by the political bureau in 2013 but not yet 
ratified by the National Liberation Council, on several occasions makes reference to the central role 
that respect for diversity plays for the party. Thus, two of the SPLM’s guiding principles respectively 
read “Unity of the people of South Sudan based on historical experiences, respect for diversity, 
national and economic interest” and “Respect for diversity of South Sudanese cultural heritage, 
values and beliefs”1652. President Kiir, making liberal use of metaphor, interpreted South Sudan’s 
history as having “taught us something that our former rulers never learned: that being equal does 
not mean being the same. It is a history that brings our many peoples, tongues and ways together in 
strength like the many waters that flow into the mighty Nile”1653.  
Other proponents of unity-in-diversity are also not very forthcoming in offering concrete ideas how 
this ideal of cherishing and valuing cultural diversity is to be attained and realized in practice. As an 
alternative to the idealist concepts of Islamism, Arabism and Africanism that all deny the objective 
reality of diversity in Sudan in an attempt to impose a monolithic concept of unity on the nation, El-
Battahani proposes an ethnically-blind unity-in-diversity understanding of Sudanese national identity, 
which he considers more progressive and fair – yet he fails to give any indication of how this process 
is to be undertaken and what it would consist of1654. Peter Nyaba in contrast, at the time Minister of 
Education, is more sanguine in realizing that a new collective identity might entail conflict with South 
Sudanese traditions because the “erosion of tradition conjures a parallel process of and its 
replacement with a new more inclusive and progressive tradition reflecting the daily economic, 
political and cultural activities of our people”1655. Nonetheless, these appeals seem to fall at least in 
part on fertile ground as evidenced by survey findings from the NDI, which discovered that “*w+hen 
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asked whether they consider themselves South Sudanese first or a member of a tribe first, 
participants emphatically identify as South Sudanese, saying their blood was shed for that right”1656.  
A less obvious sign of the unity-in-diversity philosophy can be detected in the decision to anoint Juba 
as the new state’s capital1657. While the city had already been the seat of the Southern Regional 
Government from 1972 to 1983, Juba had been continuously occupied by the Sudanese army during 
the second civil war and was far from an SPLM stronghold. Hence, opting for a town in Central 
Equatoria where many inhabitants had been wary and suspicious of what they perceived as a largely 
Nilotic rebel army, composed of Dinka and Nuer, rather than going with the predominantly Dinka 
town of Rumbek can be considered a conciliatory gesture and a concession to the state’s multiethnic 
character1658. If that actually was the rationale behind the decision for Juba, then it mirrors the SPLA’s 
war-time strategy of deliberately appointing military leaders (say, a Bari) in areas inhabited by other 
ethnic groups (say, in Azande territory) to strengthen its claim to be a national army which 
transgresses ethnic boundaries1659.  
In this light, even the decision to hold on to the rather prosaic and bland “Republic of South Sudan” 
as the state’s official moniker can be taken as an indirect nod to the unity-in-diversity ideal. Several 
of the other names that had been floated and publicly discussed – Republic of the Nile1660, Republic 
of Kush/Cush, Azania1661 – were certainly much more evocative yet tended to be more exclusive in 
their implications. Cush with its well-understood reference to a pre-Islamic Christian past denotes 
the Christian predominance of contemporary South Sudan, whereas Republic of the Nile might have 
detracted from the vast lands that lie far from the world’s longest river.   
Finally, the founding or reactivation of certain national institutions is also linked to the idea (or 
wishful thinking) that they might contribute to a peaceful national identity bent on mutual 
understanding of different cultures. One such example are the National Archives (run by Douglas 
Johnson prior to 1983) whose contents survived the war in various cardboard boxes stored in 
basements and barns. At the moment, a small staff of South Sudanese aided by academics from the 
UK (Durham, Edinburgh) are busy sifting through, ordering, restoring and digitalizing its contents1662. 
The National Museum on the other hand is a new foundation which aims to contribute to 
nationbuilding by “presenting the history and diversity of the nation through objects, stories and 
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intangible traditions”1663. Its overall idea is to represent each of the 68 ethnic groups – problematic 
due to the lack of material on some of the smaller groups – and focus on audio-visual forms of 
presentation (accessibility for illiterates) and an interactive dialogue to introduce visitors to the 
museum and to other cultures. So far, the national museum is conceived as a travelling exhibition 
which is to start off, for financial and practical considerations, with stops in three cities (one for each 
supra-region): Juba, Wau and Malakal1664. Eventually, both the National Museum and the National 
Archives are supposed to be housed next to each other near Freedom Square in the very centre of 
Juba.  
The fact that both archives and museum are funded by foreign donors (principally Norway) and 
supported by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) is also an 
indication that unity-in-diversity is a vision of nationhood that South Sudan’s international, mostly 
Western backers very much agree with. Yet, in spite of these efforts scepticism about the degree to 
which people in South Sudan today cherish unity in diversity is in order: “In the era of two Sudans, 
the challenge remains: to widen the moral community to include all citizens and all dimensions of the 
cultures they inhabit. This is a vision of nationhood that has yet to find consistent expression, either 
in the north or the south”1665. 
7.1.2.3. Language politics: English versus (Juba) Arabic 
Language has typically played a central role in determining national identity and in spreading the idea 
of a collective identity separate from other groups. South Sudan has chosen English as the state’s 
official language of administration while six regional languages were designated as national 
languages – an act of largely ceremonial importance. The thing that complicates and politicizes the 
language question is the status, standing and use of Arabic. To better understand the present-day 
debates an overview over the historical evolution of language use in Southern Sudan is in order.  
The linguistic landscape of South Sudan – like many other contentious aspects that flared up after 
1956 – has its roots in the British colonial period and is tied directly to the effects of the Southern 
Policy. Prior to the arrival of the British, the language of government and thus the language of 
interaction with the occupying Ottoman-Egyptian forces had been Arabic. In a contemporary 
account, Tucker argued that the colonial government’s decision to make English the official language 
while also granting the status of working language to various vernaculars was based on the desire to 
prevent the further reach of Southern Arabic. The 1928 Beja conference convened to establish clarity 
over language use in the South, divided Southern languages in six groups with each group’s most 
widely spoken language chosen as a representative language: Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Lotuko, Shilluk and 
Zande1666. After independence, this policy was reversed and Arabic was made the language of 
education, which became a key point of contention for the first generation of Southern 
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politicians1667. The South Federalist Party already called for English as second official language in 
19571668 and in the following years “*l+anguage policy became a mode of resistance”1669.  
During the Southern Regional Government period, both English and Arabic were being used in 
education and administration although the Addis Ababa Agreement left the language question 
somewhat ambiguous by declaring “Arabic *…+ the official language of the Sudan and English the 
principal language of the Southern region”1670. After the Islamists’ 1989 coup d’état Arabic became 
once again the sole accepted tongue1671. Both in the media and other state-sanctioned publications 
non-Arabic languages as well as non-Arab cultures were marginalized and received very little 
recognition and air time1672. Following Sharkey, Arabisation in Southern Sudan failed because 
“government schools never managed to provide high-quality, broad-based Arabic instruction for 
students, or to make students feel like valued citizens, so that southern Sudanese came to regard 
Arabisation as a tool for subjugation”1673. Therefore, in spite of its low quality, during the 2nd civil war 
English language and vernacular “schooling in the South had become infused with the symbolism of 
resistance”1674. 
The long second civil war moreover led to a bifurcated language use where the language most 
commonly employed depended on which faction, the Sudanese government or the SPLM/A, held a 
given area1675. As a consequence, Arabic in effect continued to spread and become more widely used, 
especially among Southern refugees in Khartoum and certain Southern cities like Wau and Juba1676. 
At least of equal importance to contemporary South Sudan is the evolution and popularization of a 
pidgin dialect of Arabic, most frequently called Juba Arabic. Tucker already mentions pidgin Arabic’s 
prevalence in the 1930s1677, and it continued to spread in the post-colonial period due to military 
conscription and population displacement1678. Churches were also “key actors of the promotion and 
valorisation of Juba-Arabic in Southern Sudan”1679 but the most important contributing factor for 
Juba Arabic to become the most widely spoken language in the South was that it became the SPLA’s 
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lingua franca1680. What is critical to know about the use of Juba Arabic is that although it was never 
officially recognized going back to the early days of British rule in the South, “South Sudanese Arabic 
was *…+ given a privileged place in local administration from the outset, as well as retaining its 
association with the coercive forces of the state”1681. 
Thus, the government’s decision to anoint English as the sole official language1682 and to discontinue 
and phase out teaching in Arabic at all levels by 20141683 has massive ramifications for large sections 
of South Sudanese society and may in the long-run hamper relations between South Sudan and 
Sudan as each country’s younger generations will no longer be able to easily converse in the same 
tongue1684. In the present, however, this decision against Arabic on the most fundamental level 
means that Southerners whose main language is Arabic are at a severe disadvantage as it restricts 
their ability to partake of and participate in the new state. This not only affects the pockets of Arabic-
speakers mostly in Upper Nile and Jonglei but also the millions of returnees from the North that have 
received an education in Arabic1685. In one well-publicized occurrence, students at the University of 
Bahr el-Ghazal in Wau violently protested against the switch to English as it meant that many of them 
could no longer properly follow the courses1686. As a result, Juba University agreed to continue 
teaching some subjects in Arabic1687 (see also Ch. 6.2.1.3).  
On the other hand, Arabic speakers also face being ostracized by fellow South Sudanese. Returnees 
from the North, typically the Greater Khartoum area, are occasionally called jalaba1688, a pejorative 
term for Northern Arabs, while the nickname for the returnees’ settlement in Wau is ‘New 
Khartoum’1689. There have been calls for all Arabic names to be removed from Juba as they are said 
to be a reminder of the oppressors from the North1690. Outside of the debate over Arabic, the use 
and promotion of vernacular languages is also a double-edged sword when it comes to attempts to 
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promote unity1691. As Cook finds, the use of the local language for example in primary education is 
popular in largely homogenous areas, whereas it is a source of unease and worry in more diverse 
ones1692. Thus, radio stations in linguistically heterogeneous parts of South Sudan will often use 
English or (Juba) Arabic for most of its programmes which avoids favouring one local group over 
another but has the disadvantage that many people are not proficient in either English or (Juba) 
Arabic and therefore cannot access what is being said1693. Even if it is not deliberate, language in 
South Sudan is thus in several contexts an instrument of exclusion. Finally, a survey of South 
Sudanese elite opinion contains an interesting nugget of information that shines a dissonant light on 
the discourse of valuing national unity above all other goals. Asked which from a list of 24 factors 
would contribute most to generating economic growth in the country, ‘social cohesion’ came in last 
place1694. Nationbuilding may not be everyone’s top priority after all. 
7.1.3. Othering to create national unity and identity in South Sudan  
Both concepts of nationalism endorsed by the state – heroic liberation war and unity-in-diversity – 
certainly have followers among the South Sudanese population. At the same time, it is evident that 
the state is not only far from holding a monopoly of violence but is equally far from possessing a 
monopoly on the national narrative. Clearly, not every South Sudanese has fond memories of either 
the ‘liberation war’ or the role played by the SPLA in its pursuit. Hence, this third section is going to 
look at alternative concepts of what makes South Sudanese South Sudanese and how they are to be 
distinguished and set apart from the rest of the human race. The first part 7.1.3.1 will look at the 
continuing saliency of enmity to Northern Sudan and to Arabs more generally followed by two parts 
that look at possible positive conceptionalisations of South Sudanese collectivity: 7.1.3.2 is going to 
discuss Africanism and 7.1.3.3 will look into literature, arts and sports as potential unifying elements.  
7.1.3.1. Arabs – the old enemy is the new enemy 
Enmity towards Arabs persists in many parts of independent South Sudan. “Le sentiment sudiste 
tend à se définir plus par opposition au Nord que par l’affirmation d‘une identité sudiste propre. En 
forger une est une tâche titanesque, d‘autant qu’il n’est pas sûr que l’indépendance soit suffisante 
pour susciter le consensus nécessaire à la construction d’un nouveau Sud-Soudan”1695. To a large 
extent it appears that Gill Lusk’s assessment from twenty years ago still holds today. As worked out 
above (Ch. 4.2.1.2), the most efficient and efficacious way to strengthen in-group unity and collective 
identification with a common idea is to have or to create a clearly identifiable ‘other’ that is ‘not like 
us’ and is deemed hostile or inimical to the in-group.  
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Enmity and hatred of the Northern Sudanese regime and even of ‘Arabs’ as a generic category 
persists in South Sudan also after independence. Susan Soux’s quote about South Sudan gets to the 
heart of it: “Southern Sudan is defined in terms of a geographical area rather than as a nation. 
Inhabitants of the region identify themselves primarily with their tribes, sharing only a concept of a 
common enemy - the government in Khartoum”1696. Accordingly, many South Sudanese feel 
animosity towards all Arabs and tend to show little regard for Northern Arabs’ objective diversity. 
Moreover, Breidlid finds that Sudanese Arabs’ conduct during the war is not blamed on political 
factors but on cultural traits allegedly innate to all Arabs1697. Such an essentialist conceptions of the 
enemy is inherently a major obstacle to a peaceful rapprochement between the groups while – to 
turn the logic on its head – it is in fact highly conducive to building a bond among those self-defined 
as non-Arabs.  
Yet, in the absence of outright war with the North and the maintenance of an uneasy truce which in 
spite of skirmishes and short campaigns (e.g. Abyei, Heglig/Panthou) has reigned for almost a 
decade, this enmity does not suffice to unite South Sudanese and get them to neglect the substantial 
differences amongst themselves. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the idea of South 
Sudanese unity during the fight against the North is but a retrospective myth that does not catch on 
with many who lived through the war.  
Despite a shared history of struggle against the North, the people of South Sudan have not succeeded 
at any time in their history in forming a unified front in pursuit of their shared interests. The history of 
the armed struggle against the North is marked by incessant internal fragmentation.
1698
  
And even during the war, it was clear that in spite of the strength of anti-Arab sentiment and 
resistance to oppression, this was not sufficient to build a positive national consciousness among 
South Sudanese. This is also a testament to the shortcomings of South Sudan’s small class of 
intellectual leaders1699. Furthermore, it bears remembering that Arab and African are but political 
designations and not ethnic markers and that South Sudan, if reports are true, has actually applied 
for membership in the Arab League1700, which would make anti-Arab railing a form of self-loathing. 
Even the second half of the country’s name derives from an Arabic term, Bilad al Sudan, meaning 
‘land of the black’, a term that medieval Arab scholars used for the sub-Saharan territorial belt that 
stretches from the Atlantic to the Ethiopian highlands.   
Anti-Arab feeling also does not explain the growing territoriality of the national community in 
people’s imagination1701. In a survey from 2012, the National Democratic Institute found that a great 
majority of South Sudanese would support government action – including military force if need be – 
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to ensure Abyei’s inclusion into the South Sudanese state1702. Such a display of support and a 
willingness to risk a return to war is by no means a given considering that the country and its 
population is still reeling from decades of civil war. This result also confirms that solidarity and by 
extension collective identification is shaped by the new territorial borders: a much smaller 
percentage of South Sudanese was prepared to go to war in support of the SPLM-North or the 
Nuba’s armed struggle against the Khartoum government. Thus, supra-ethnic collective identification 
seems to be tied to the territorial idea of South Sudan more than to the anti-Khartoum (and 
oftentimes anti-Arab) SPLA coalition from the war years. 
7.1.3.2. Africanism 
Another form of othering in the name of the new South Sudanese nation is the concept of 
Africanism, which was spread and popularized by the SPLM/A during the second war as a counter to 
the pride in Arab heritage common in Northern Sudan1703. John Young observed in 2002 that 
Southerners vigorously emphasize their African culture in explicit contrast to the North and its self-
proclaimed racial and cultural superiority1704. In Southerners’ emphasis on African identity, there are 
lines of continuity from the Anya-nya to the present. Harking back to the 1960s, Joseph Lagu 
describes the Southern Sudanese rebels’ goals as follows:  
That our specifically African – as distinct from Arab – identity and the common aspirations which unite 
all our tribes in a common struggle fully qualify us for nationhood and the right to self-determination. 
That by rejecting the attempted Arabization of South Sudan and by adhering to our African identity 




The most recent – and importantly – first post-secession version of the SPLM Manifesto, which was 
drafted and passed parallel to the new SPLM Constitution is in some measure more forthcoming 
about the content and indeed the extent of diversity that is to be constitutive of being South 
Sudanese. In what reads like a deliberate juxtaposition to the Arab identity proffered by the Republic 
of Sudan, South Sudan’s Africanness is repeatedly emphasized:  
The SPLM, rooted in its African culture and heritage, shall steadfastly lead, promote, and maintain 
South Sudan as an African Nation. We are first and forever African. We have chosen our path to 
collective and individual development cognizant, and justly proud of our African identity. We are 
determined to build upon and adapt our great African heritage.
1706
 
The urge to base South Sudan on a historical African paragon appears to be so strong as to 
overpower plausibility and historical fact. For instance, Albino Deng Ajuok, an assistant to John 
Garang’s widow Rebecca Nyandeng, explicitly calls on African historians to highlight the feats of 
African civilizations prior to the arrival of Arabs, e.g. the empires of Egypt and Kush1707. The former 
governor of Lakes State, Daniel Akot, sees South Sudanese culture as part of a wider African culture 
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and therefore as culturally separate from other parts of Sudan1708. These strands of thought also go 
back to John Garang who (in quotes related by Ajuok) states that  
If we visit the corridors of history from the biblical Kush to the present, you will find that the Sudan 
and the Sudanese have always been there. *…+ It is necessary to affirm and for the Sudanese to remind 
themselves that we are a historical People, because there are persistent and concerted efforts to push 
us off the rails of history.
1709
 
Thus, in the run-up to the referendum, a public debate over the name of the future state arose, 
which prominently featured the proposal ‘Republic of Kush’1710. The first draft for what would later 
become the National Anthem also referred to Kush instead of South Sudan1711 and one of South 
Sudan’s airlines is called Kush Air 1712. The ancient Kingdom of Kush was a contemporary to the 
Egyptian Pharaonic Empire (Kush was the Egyptian word for ‘regions of the black’1713) and briefly 
ruled over much of the Nile valley in the 6th century BC. Support for the name was based not little on 
the fact that Kush had existed prior to the Arab conquest of Northern Africa and thus plays into the 
anti-Arab sentiments among many South Sudanese. However, all archaeological evidence points to 
ancient Kush’s location in present-day Sudan and not South Sudan1714; not to mention the flimsy 
basis for postulating an ethnic, cultural or linguistic relationship between Cushites and today’s South 
Sudanese. Moreover, Northern intellectuals have also laid claim to Cushites as the forebears of 
Northern Sudanese1715.  
While the appeal to ‘Africanism’ is certainly a way to fill the conceptual void of what it is to be South 
Sudanese in a non-oppositional manner (i.e. when defining South Sudanese not merely in opposition 
to another group: Northern Sudanese Arabs), there are various problems with this term as well. For 
one, ‘African’ is at first sight a very inclusive concept but it may in fact be so inclusive as to lose all 
specific meaning. If all of Africa is African then what is distinctly South Sudanese about being African? 
The only way this conundrum can be resolved is if one understands ‘African’ in this context not as a 
positive denominator but an anti-Northern, anti-Arab ideal that is just as “idealist, ethnocentric, and 
of a totalitarian-authoritatian *sic+ nature”1716 as the racially charged Arabism and Islamism of the 
North. Victor Lugala, a South Sudanese writer and journalist, for example says that “*a+ South 
Sudanese is someone from an African identity, who has African roots” but then justifies the 
insistence on Africanness as a response to Northern denigration: “In Khartoum, they used to tell us 
we had no culture”1717.  
                                                          
1708
 Akot (2006), p. 77.  
1709
 Ajuok (2008), p. 134.  
1710
 Kwot, Chol de, “Why Republic of Kush should be adopted for the county in waiting?”, New Sudan Vision, 25 
January 2011, http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2312:why-
republic-of-kush-should-be-adopted-for-country-in-waiting&Itemid=44 (accessed: 4 October 2011). 
1711
 Martell, Peter, “A song for south Sudan: Writing a new national anthem”, BBC News, 12 January 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12164171 (accessed: 14 September 2011). 
1712
 For more information on Kush Air and bookings see http://www.kushair.net/.  
1713
 Smidt, Wolbert, “Schwarze Königreiche von der Antike bis zur kolonialen Unterwerfung”, in Chiari, 
Bernhard (ed.) Sudan – Wegweiser zur Geschichte. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008, pp. 17-25, p. 17.  
1714
 Török, László. The Kingdom of Kush: handbook of the Napatan-Meroitic civilization. Leiden: Brill, 1997.  
1715
 Abd AlRahīm (1970), p. 234.  
1716 El-Battahani, Atta. Peace Without Unity: The Dilemma of Reconciling Divergent Perspectives in 
Post-Conflict Sudan. Berlin: SWP Report No. 4, 2008, p. 7.  
1717
 Quoted in Copnall (2014), p. 26.  
241 
 
7.1.3.3. Literature, Arts, Sports 
Literature has been one of the primary vehicles to spread and popularize the idea of the nation in 
European countries. In South Sudan, on the other hand, a national literature is only just getting 
started. The main medium of artistic discourse are songs that are sung by each ethnic group and 
more often each clan and that also function as a form of narrating a group or an individual’s history 
by placing the group or personal story in the context of who and what preceded it1718. Songs can also 
narrate attacks by and battles with other ethnic groups1719. As much as stories of heritage and 
especially ancestors matter to individual South Sudanese in defining themselves and their place in 
the world, this does not hold for other people’s ancestors, which makes this form of vocal artistic 
expression rather less useful for a national narrative compared to the hagiographies common among 
West Africa’s griots (see Ch. 4.2.1.1).  
In terms of literature proper, in 2013 a collection of writing by eight South Sudanese writers was 
published1720 but it is too early to say anything about its (probably negligible) impact on South 
Sudanese debates over national identity. Older writers with ties to South Sudan are Taban Lo Liyong 
who grew up in Uganda but published a collection of poems devoted to (mostly) Southern Sudan 
(The Cows of Shambat: Sudanese Poems) and currently works at the University of Juba and the late 
liberation poet Sirr Anai Kelueljang whose most important (and controversial) work was The Myth of 
Freedom and Other Poems from 19851721. Additionally, South Sudan has been the subject of very 
successful novels by foreign writers – the three most prominent being Dave Eggers’ What is the 
What1722, a not-quite-autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng, a ‘lost boy’ and refugee from Southern 
Sudan in the United States, the famous rapper Emmanuel Jal’s co-written autobiography War 
child1723 and Deborah Scroggins’ Emma’s War1724, the story of British development worker and late 
wife to Riek Machar, Emma McCune – although these books hardly constitute ‘national’ literature1725. 
Certainly, the GoSS has to date not pursued a conscious strategy to utilize South Sudanese artists to 
promote its vision for the nation.  
Much as in many of the thoroughly secularized nation-states of Western Europe, sports may play a 
substantial role in unifying the people around a common emblem of support and adulation. There is 
already a sense of supra-ethnic nation-wide pride in individual athletes like the long-distance runner 
Guor Marial who competed in the 2012 London Olympics or Luol Deng, born in South Sudan, who is a 
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basketball star in the NBA1726. The national football team ‘Bright Star’, though not very successful on 
the pitch, is expressly non-tribal. As team captain Justin Lado stated: “No one in this team feels … 
Nuer, Dinka, Bari, Murle and the rest. We are one body aiming at one goal”1727. On a more day-to-day 
basis, athletic competitions in South Sudan can be the sites of get-togethers of South Sudanese from 
all walks of life. Recognition of sports’ unifying potential extends to the political scene. On the 
occasion of a football match between Christian and Muslim teams, Bidal Moses, MP for Yei, explicitly 
said that “football has no religion and should be used to unite the communities”1728. Yet, the case of 
wrestling matches highlights that sport can also divide and spoil unity. There were rumours in 2010 
that a Dinka team had won based on biased refereeing while in 2013 the successful Mundari team 
felt that its success against a Dinka team from Jonglei went unreported1729.   
7.1.4. Nationbuilding and state nationalism in South Sudan – at a glance 
While it is still relatively early in the process of nationbuilding and the construction of a national 
identity in South Sudan, it is already possible to give an analytical overview over the forms that South 
Sudanese state nationalism has taken or – in other words – which instruments, images and narratives 
the political class has chosen to embody South Sudanese national identity and which alternative 
visions are being put forward. One thing that has become abundantly clear is that there is a broad 
consensus among elite South Sudanese that nationbuilding is of vital, even essential importance to 
the success and survival of the Republic of South Sudan. Even mundane events like a fashion show 
are advertised as contributions to nationbuilding and a way to overcome prejudice and internal 
strife1730.  
In spite of this recognition, there are, so far, a number of trends that bode not exactly well for a 
successful, i.e. genuinely popular state-driven nationalist project. For one, the driving impetus for 
South Sudanese nationalism has been discrimination and deliberate exclusion from the Sudanese 
nation, which has from the start made the question of South Sudanese national identity a reactive 
rather than proactive issue. This has been compounded by the fact that collective action by South 
Sudanese qua South Sudanese (as opposed to as members of an ethnic group or clan) have been 
armed struggles against various groups of external invaders. On top of that, the SPLM’s ‘New Sudan’ 
vision until shortly before independence in 2011 effectively blocked a genuine public debate over 
what constitutes the South Sudanese nation.  
As such, the nation-building project is entirely backward-looking as patriotic appeals focus on the 
nation’s past. Due to the lack of a genuine historical paragon and despite attempts to resuscitate the 
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notion of pre-Islamic Kush as an imagined ancestor to present-day South Sudan, the majority of the 
focus lies on the war of liberation against Northern Sudan. Death is ubiquitous in this backward-
looking vision of the nation as the martyrs’ blood drips from the lips of politicians and the pens of 
journalists, poets and political entrepreneurs alike. It is not a coincidence that death and the memory 
of the dead play such an integral part in nationbuilding because there is very little that is offered as a 
vision for the living.  
The problem with the officially sanctioned concept of unity-in-diversity is that it is not only incredibly 
vague and hard to grasp for political-mobilizing purposes, it also leaves largely unanswered the 
question what really constitutes unity and why unity is necessary or preferable to going it alone. 
Attempts to acquaint citizens with the country’s diverse cultures – e.g. the national museum and 
national archives – are still in their infancy and the lack of communication infrastructure as well as 
the low quality and coordination of education and curricula further hamper the spread of a message 
of national unity. South Sudan also clearly follows the standard path taken by the majority of its 
African predecessors as English has been retained as official language but the political decision to 
banish Arabic has already led to fissures and disunity in a multilingual society shaped by mass 
displacement.  
Given the weakness of positive bonds in building a nation and instilling a sense of nationalism in the 
state’s citizens, South Sudanese elites and public debate have also tried to achieve unity at the cost 
of designating a group of people residing either within or across the country’s borders as the enemy, 
as the national group’s antithetical other. Oftentimes, this other is ‘the North’ or more specifically 
‘the Arabs’, a sentiment that climaxed during the oil standoff with the Republic of Sudan and the 
attacks on Heglig and Abyei. Africanism, i.e. the propagation of South Sudan as quintessentially 
African is also to be understood in a negative and oppositional stance to Sudan’s self-conception as 
an Arab nation. In addition, even this short period of time since autonomy and then independence 
indicates that in spite of the widespread pride over independence, appeals to nationalism (or 
religion, for that matter) are unlikely to overcome discontentment over the lack of economic 
progress and visible material inequalities in the long-run1731.  
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7.2. Political ethnicity as a challenge to state nationalism in South Sudan1732 
The resurgence of ethnic groups as political players across much of sub-Saharan Africa is one of the 
most important aspects to be analysed in the course of nationbuilding. This holds with even greater 
force for countries like South Sudan that sport highly diverse populations where the presence of 
assertive ethnic groups is perceived as a challenge to the state’s monopoly in commanding allegiance 
and defining the scope and content of the national community. In turn, ethnic groups and ethnic 
identities in South Sudan are faced with hostile political rhetoric but continue to structure the lives 
and loyalties of many if not most citizens. In addition, the experience of war has significantly altered 
the nature and notion of ethnicity in South Sudan. Therefore, this chapter is going to assess the 
extent to which ethnicity and ethnic identity play a part in shaping political discourse and life in South 
Sudan.  
Ethnic identities, in the South Sudanese context generally subsumed under the heading ‘tribalism’, 
continue to hold great sway and pose a major obstacle to the notion of a preponderance of the 
national over alternative identities. When ‘tribalism’ is mentioned in this text it is not an 
endorsement of the concept1733 (and hence generally hyphenated) but an acknowledgment of the 
widespread use of the term in South Sudanese debates. Leaving these finer points aside, ethnicity as 
a political determinant is unquestionably a dominant feature of both the political discourse and the 
political system of South Sudan and therefore commands close scrutiny. As Idris points out, “the 
South contains an array of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups united by shared geography rather 
than a collective national identity”1734. But the exact number of ethnic groups – figures typically given 
hover between 60 and 70 – is difficult to determine let alone ascertain since there is no agreement 
over what constitutes a ‘tribe’. Lienhardt believed that the Dinka’s “cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity is striking; and despite regional variations in dialect, custom, and some aspects of social 
structure, they may *…+ be treated on the whole as a single people”1735, whereas Guarak, for 
instance, argues that Dinka, Nuer and Bor ought to be understood as collections of ‘tribes’ because 
the linguistic differences between them are too significant1736.  
The subsequent subsections will deal in 7.2.1 with the widespread rhetorical condemnation of 
tribalism in South Sudanese public discourse, then in 7.2.2 focus more specifically on the charge of 
‘Dinka domination’ and the Dinka-Nuer rivalry before turning in 7.2.3 to the salience of ethnicity in 
political parties and formal political settings. Finally, in 7.2.4 the importance of ethnic ties and ethnic 
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enmity on cattle raiding and the exemplary case of Jonglei will be discussed in some detail; 7.2.5 
sums up the topics.   
7.2.1. Tribalism as the enemy of the nation-state 
Going through opinion pieces in different South Sudanese online journals, in radio transcripts and in 
political speeches, it is rare to come upon an example that – even if it is not the main thrust of the 
argument – does not at least mention ‘tribalism’ in some form or other1737. And when tribalism is 
mentioned it is usually vilified as the South Sudanese nation’s archenemy. Given the fact that South 
Sudan is home to more than sixty ‘tribes’ with no ethnic group in a numerical position to establish 
majority nationalism reminiscent of European nation-building, fear of tribalism as a divisive factor is 
hardly surprising1738. Thus, Jok Madut Jok points out that “South Sudanese realize that the current 
ethnic composition of the country could be a liability if it is not carefully managed, especially as it 
influences everyday governance”1739. There have in fact been calls to outlaw the use of derogatory 
names for other ethnic groups as well as the glorification of one’s own ethnic group e.g. as “a tribe 
that was born to rule”1740.  
The Transitional Constitution actually contains the provision that ministers should “be selected with 
due regard to the need for inclusiveness based on integrity, competence, ethnic and regional 
diversity *my emphasis+ and gender”1741 and the public debate that both preceded and followed 
South Sudan’s first significant cabinet reshuffle in 2011 tellingly highlights the prevalence of ‘tribalist’ 
discourse in South Sudanese politics. Long lists of members of the administration along with their 
ethnic identity were circulating in the media in an attempt to either demonstrate or refute ethnic 
bias in public appointments. For example Jacob K. Lupai, who regularly contributes to several media 
outlets, lamented that 12 out of 32 national ministers and 7 out of 15 government advisors were 
Dinka1742. In the end, the president’s decision to appoint a cabinet that appeared to pay more note to 
equal ethnic and regional representation was widely hailed. A focus group survey found that most 
South Sudanese approved of Kiir’s focus on proportional regional representation in the cabinet’s 
composition, while almost half of respondents declared that tribal diversity should trump 
qualifications in the selection process for public jobs1743. The continued salience of such thinking was 
on display after the sudden cabinet reshuffle in mid-2013. Immediately after the names of the new 
ministers became known, the prolific blogger PaanLuel Wël compiled a list that calculated the 
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proportion of Dinka, Nuer, Equatorians and others and compared it to each group’s overall 
population share1744. 
There is moreover a general sense that peace dividends are tied to ethnic belonging and generally do 
not reach many places outside of Juba1745. Youths in particular sense that opportunities are strongly 
tied to personal and tribal connections rather than qualifications1746. This is summarized by survey 
findings from 2011:  
Tribalism has three features according to participants: imbalance of power, unfair government 
employment practices and tribal conflict. The perception of most participants is that one tribe, section 
or clan usually occupies the majority of top positions in government both at the national and state 
levels, though which tribe, section or clan is faulted for practicing tribalism differs by state or level of 
government.
1747 
‘Tribalism’ can also be an efficacious tool for political entrepreneurs to establish a political power 
base, especially in the run-up to elections. “This happens in two ways: some local politicians aimed to 
strengthen their power base by emphasising their tribal affiliation in opposition to another local 
tribal group. Or, tribal connections are used to emphasise direct lines to the central government”1748. 
Backing up this generalized contention are South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, displaced by the 
fighting since December 2013, who roundly blame political elites for instrumentalizing and 
politicizing ethnicity1749.  
Insecurity, which many see as the greatest long-term threat to South Sudan’s stability and viability, is 
closely connected to the ‘tribalist’ discourse because of insecurity’s propensity to play out along 
ethnic fault-lines1750. ‘Tribalism’ has thus become the default explanation for local violence, even if 
violence is in many cases grounded in a mélange of struggles over political power and resources or 
disaffection with government decisions. South Sudan’s Minister of the Interior, for example, 
admitted that local administrators give weapons that they have seized during disarmament drives to 
members of their own ethnic group1751 and the spike in violence during the CPA period has been 
blamed on deliberate instigation by powerbrokers that seek to profit from the unrest1752. Some 
substance to this general claim is given by a study of Ikotos County in Eastern Equatoria where 
inhabitants complained that government officials condone cattle raiding by members of their own 
ethnicity while pursuing members of other ethnicities that acted in the same manner1753.  
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Former governor of Jonglei State Kuol Manyang’s exhortation to new graduates of the police 
academy that they “are now police of the nation not for the tribe”1754 does little to assuage these 
fears. One instance that shows the failure of such appeals is the trinational Karamoja area (South 
Sudan, Kenya, Uganda) where policemen are torn between competing loyalties to community and 
state and are therefore unable to maintain security in a situation where most crimes like cattle 
rustling are community-based1755. Another illustration of policemen’s ethnic bias was the wave of 
ethnic violence in Wau in December 2012, sparked by reports of the killing of six Dinka farm workers 
in nearby Farajallah. During the riots in Wau where Dinka attacked non-Dinka neighbourhoods, 
several police officers are said to have joined in the fighting based on their ethnic loyalties instead of 
working to separate the sides1756. 
At the same time (and keeping in mind the problematic nature of these polls), a national opinion 
survey in 2013 appeared to refute the hypothesis that in South Sudan ethnic loyalties prevailed over 
other ties. Asked about their identity, 42% said they considered themselves only South Sudanese, 
24% felt more South Sudanese than their tribal identity (e.g. Bari, Azande, Dinka), 22% felt as much 
South Sudanese as tribal, only 7% felt more tribal than South Sudanese and a mere 3% felt only 
tribal1757. Therefore, the analytic utility of ethnicity as a concept, especially in so far as it relates to 
outbreaks of violence, has been hotly contested and called into question. In a sweeping criticism of 
the common usage of ‘ethnic group’ in relation to South Sudanese violent conflicts, Rolandsen and 
Breidlid argue that  
the notion of ‘tribes’ or ‘ethnic groups’ in South Sudan is largely a colonial construct forged from a 
plethora of local socio-political relations. What in the media is referred to as ‘tribal warfare’ is a more 
recent phenomenon. Since the independence of Sudan in 1956, war and partisan politics have 




A particularly interesting case for the salience of war and state boundaries on the evolution and 
alternation of ethno-national identities are the Nuer that live on both sides of the border with 
Ethiopia. While Ethiopian Nuer identified more with Sudan during the colonial period (due to better 
schools), during the Anyanya War (out of solidarity against the ‘Arab’ government in Khartoum) and 
at the time of Sudanese refugee camps in the 1980s (to take advantage of educational opportunities 
provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR), many Nuer rediscovered their 
Ethiopian identity during the Communist Derg era when job and livelihood opportunities improved 
substantially and again in the country’s current ‘ethno-federalist’ system that provides affirmative 
action programmes1759. This example illustrates the often opportunistic appropriation of national 
identities by ethnic groups in South Sudan and the surrounding region.  
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Yet, ethnic identity, its emotive power and thus its ability to be activated in cases of conflict is not a 
mere brainchild of South Sudanese commentators, international media and academia. An incident at 
Juba University in 2013 illustrates very well the extent to which ethnic identity does matter1760. 
Playing football on the university grounds, an argument arose between Dinka and non-Dinka 
students that got out of hand and led to a physical altercation. Later that night, a student leader 
alerted friends of his in the police who proceeded to raid the student dorms and beat up anyone that 
was not Dinka. Major protests and boycotts ensued with the result that the university remained 
closed for half a year. Clearly, for these students in this situation membership in a specific ethnic 
group took precedence over other identities (like being South Sudanese) and the resulting violence 
was directed at people specifically because of their ethnicity.  
7.2.2. Dinkacracy: Fear of Dinka domination & rivalry between Nuer and Dinka  
The term ‘Dinkacracy’, gleaned from an article from South Sudan News Agency1761, is but a more or 
less inventive neologism to capture a charge that goes back at least to the later years of the Southern 
Regional Government from 1972-1983. Dinka, numerically the largest ethnic group in the country, 
are said to dominate government and hold a number of government posts far in excess of their 
population share. While it is notoriously difficult to trace the exact origin of ‘Dinka domination’, it 
became a popular slogan of Equatorian members of the SRG that largely backed Joseph Lagu and 
opposed the leading Southern politician Abel Alier, an ethnic Bor Dinka, who was perceived to lead a 
Dinka bloc1762. Hamid, for instance, believes that the 1978 elections in the Southern region that 
ousted Alier and installed Lagu as the head of the SRG “was more of a protest vote against the status 
quo, which also reflected the local fears and considerable suspicions of minority Southerners about 
domination by the Dinka, the largest single tribe in the South”1763. Certainly, though, Johnson is right 
to point out that “*t+hroughout the late 1970s and early 1980s there were many Southerners who 
claimed the region was threatened by ‘Dinka domination’”1764.  
Today still, smaller ethnic groups fear domination of the government by the Dinka as well as 
territorial expansion of Dinkaland1765. According to Riak G. Majokdit, the South Sudanese nation will 
not prosper “if big nationalities, such as Nuer, (Naath) Dinka (Muonyjang), Azande or Colo *…+ abuse 
their God-given numeric [strength] to dominate small nationalities politically, economically, culturally 
and socially”1766. A columnist at the South Sudan News Agency also traces the root causes of internal 
conflict in South Sudan to alleged Dinka domination in political affairs and deems the SPLM politburo 
“a rubber stamp used by one ethnic group (Dinka) to dominate others by using their numbers to 
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impose decisions on others”1767. Elhag Paul, a frequent commentator on various websites, similarly 
accuses the government of ‘Dinkocracy’ and failing to deliver unity and peace1768.  
Security concerns generally matter a lot as evidenced by strong resistance to SPLA disarmament 
campaigns. The fear of domination by both Dinka and Nuer is especially prominent among smaller 
ethnic groups and has also triggered military mobilization: Ismail Konyi’s Pibor Defence Force, for 
instance, was first of all a Murle army. The same is true for the Equatorian Defence Force that sprang 
up among Equatorians in response to SPLA abuses of civilians1769. Furthermore, the fact that 9 out of 
10 police commissioners in South Sudan and the majority of the police’s higher ranks are ethnic 
Dinka has not gone unnoticed and has only fuelled the perception that the police is ethnically 
biased1770. As a consequence, the sentiment expressed by a Shilluk youth leader (quoted by Brosché 
and Rothbart) is not uncommon: “Salva Kiir is not the president of South Sudan; he is just a big Dinka 
chief”1771. Testimony to president Kiir’s increasing reliance on Dinka as his support base was the 
gradual transformation from 2012 onwards of the Presidential Guard from a multi-ethnic force into a 
unit predominantly filled with Dinka youth1772.  
The course of the second war and the different local patterns of occupation by the Sudanese 
government, by the SPLA or by other militia forces also play a sometimes underrated role in 
contemporary attitudes towards certain other ethnic groups. Thus, many Azande did not join the 
SPLA’s anti-government rebellion and fled their homes (often to Zaïre/DRC and CAR) when the SPLA 
seized their territory in the 1980s1773. Due to the often unresolved status of land ownership and the 
issue of returnees, relations in the CPA period were characterized by continuously high tensions 
between Azande and Dinka1774, with the latter said to be favoured by the SPLM/A. Branch and 
Mampilly also allude to the fear and resentment among smaller Equatorian ‘tribes’ towards what is 
considered a purely ‘Dinka’ SPLA1775. An example is Budi County in Eastern Equatoria where 
disaffection with Dinka SPLA soldiers’ behaviour erupted into violence and even led to the creation of 
an ethnic Didinga militia, which only fully reintegrated into the SPLA in 20061776.  
At the same time, the continuing conflict between Dinka and Nuer over predominance in the new 
republic is a major factor in ethnic mobilization and in shaping the landscape of politics and security 
in South Sudan1777. One of the earliest British colonial records already testifies to hostility between 
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the two groups as the Dinka “complain bitterly of the spoliation of their herds by the Nuers, and 
state that many of their children, now growing into manhood as Nuers, were torn from them in the 
constant raids of the Nuer tribe”1778. On the one hand, Dinka and Nuer who both belong to the class 
of acephalous societies1779 and whose “attitude to authority is one of touchiness, pride, and reckless 
disobedience”1780, on the whole have a more positive outlook on the direction the state is headed 
in1781. This might be linked to their strong foothold in government institutions and positions of 
power. On the other hand, Dinka and Nuer are locked in a contest over access to the levers of power 
in the state. Alden et al. describe how members of the largely Nuer South Sudan Defence Forces 
feared ‘Dinkanization’ and vehemently disputed the claim that Dinka were numerically the country’s 
largest ethnic group1782. And even if many blame the vicious South on South violence after the 1991 
Nasir split on overly ambitious political leaders1783, the legacy of at least half a century of Dinka-Nuer 
conflict1784 and what at a certain point resembled a Dinka-Nuer war still lives on in collective 
memories and attitudes.  
The SPLA army is mostly not seen as a neutral arbiter, a fact partly grounded in recent history. Thus, 
the early part of the second war (1983-4) saw a series of extremely violent assaults by Bor Dinka 
members of the SPLA against Nuer1785. At the same time (throughout the 1980s), mostly Nuer 
Anyanya II forces, which were opposed to the SPLA and collaborated with the Khartoum government, 
would attack Dinka and Nuba recruits on their way to SPLA training camps in Ethiopia1786. What is 
more, during the Dinka-Nuer war from 1991-99 – headlined by SPLM leader John Garang (Dinka) and 
Riek Machar (Nuer) – and largely as a consequence of external factors, i.e. combat strategies that 
targeted women and children, the hitherto rather fluid concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity 
among Dinka and Nuer1787 became more rigid. Thus, “contemporary Nuer men and women, in 
particular, have moved away from a performative concept of their ethnic oneness to a more closed 
and fixed primordialist concept based on procreative metaphors of shared human blood”1788. 
Although it needs to be added that during the entire second civil war there was also substantial 
violence among members of the same ethnic group. Abdallah Cuol, a Nuer leader of the Anyanya II in 
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the mid-1980s, fought against Nuer that were part of the SPLA1789. Fighting between Lou and Jikany 
Nuer and between Lou and Gawaar (all of them are Nuer clans) was a direct result of the split within 
the SPLM/A in 19911790. Paulino Matiep, another Nuer Anyanya II leader allied to Khartoum, attacked 
other ethnic Nuer and deliberately forced them off oil-rich areas around the turn of the century1791.  
The civil war that broke out between different factions of the SPLM/A in mid-December 2013 has 
often been framed in international as well as some South Sudanese media as a quasi-ethnic conflict 
between Dinka and Nuer. That appears to be only part of the truth. While Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, 
the two figure-heads in what amounted to an intra-party power struggle between the president and 
his former deputy, are (Bor) Dinka and Nuer respectively, it would be a crass caricature of actual 
loyalties on the ground to say that allegiance to either camp perfectly aligned with ethnicity1792. This 
is not to deny the ethnically motivated violence that erupted in Juba against members of the Nuer 
community and similar reprisals in other parts of the country by armed Nuer against ethnic Dinka, 
most notoriously in Bor1793. But here again, violence did not perfectly align with ethnic identities. 
When Bentiu, the capital of Unity State, was conquered by the SPLA-in-Opposition in April 2014, 
ethnic Nuer that did not come to greet the (mostly Nuer) rebel fighters were killed on the spot1794.  
A sad epilogue to the tale of ethnic violence at Juba University in 2013 (Ch. 7.2.1) is that Nuer 
students stopped attending classes after the alleged coup for fear of their lives1795 while Nuer 
students at Rumbek University (Rumbek being a majority Dinka town) went hiding in the UN base1796. 
The United Nations found rebel forces deliberately targeting ethnic Dinka (and, in Upper Nile, Shilluk) 
while government forces targeted Nuer both for their ethnicity and because all Nuer were deemed 
complicit with the rebellion1797. It is an open question whether, as the South Sudan Human Rights 
Commission believes, the targeted killing of Nuer and Dinka respectively was a sign that the political 
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leadership had temporarily lost control over the armed forces1798 or whether it was – as UNMISS sees 
reasonable grounds to believe – a deliberate policy devised by the politicians and thus “at least in 
part, planned, deliberate and guided by policy directives from a superior level”1799. What is certain, 
though, is that the crisis highlights how easily political conflicts in South Sudan become conflated 
with ethnic violence1800, not least because the outbreak of fighting gives cover for individuals to kill 
and rape with impunity and act out personal grudges1801. A gruesome reminder of how quickly moral 
boundaries become obsolete during civil war were radio transmissions by Bentiu FM that called on 
rebel forces to kill and rape members of other ethnic groups1802; almost exactly twenty years after 
Radio Mille Collines called on Hutu to kill Tutsi during the Rwandan genocide.  
7.2.3. Political parties and ethnicity 
Ethnic discourse and ethnic favouritism play out in the political arena in two different but closely 
related forms. For one, opposition parties are not expressions of an ideological current or a class 
cleavage but are structured along ethnic lines. Lam Akol’s SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), the 
largest opposition party which split from the SPLM in 2009, is predominantly Shilluk and the 
emergence of new parties outside the SPLM will in all likelihood also be based on ethnicity rather 
than a political programme1803. Most anti-government militias can also be counted among these 
opposition movements since they only differ in the means they have chosen to articulate and 
promote their agenda and not in the substance of standing and fighting for the interests of an ethnic 
clientele. Crucially, however, these movements and parties do not perfectly correlate with the ethnic 
groups they claim to represent. Taking the case of the SPLM-DC, the Shilluk king publicly distanced 
himself from the party1804 (quite possibly because the SPLM-DC and Lam Akol in particular represent 
a challenge to his authority). The issue is, however, not as straightforward as it may at first appear. 
While people organize along membership in an ethnic group, the reason why they become active and 
even militant more often than not is economic hardship and deprivation.  
A development that is even more relevant for the political and overall future of South Sudan is the 
fact that the SPLM, the government party that commands a level of support akin to non-democratic 
single-party regimes, is anything but a monolithic bloc (see Ch. 6.2.2.2). Instead, the SPLM is best 
understood as a sometimes uneasy coalition of various ethnic and regional groupings that vie for 
power, influence and resources inside the party structure. As Crisis Group warned in a 2011 report, 
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internal party dynamics can easily aggravate existing ethnic tensions because “ethno-regional fault 
lines within the party mirror divisions among the population more broadly”1805.  
Critically, the SPLM-in-Opposition faction that broke away from the SPLM after the December 15th 
2013 incident explicitly justified its secession by accusing president Kiir of relying solely on supporters 
from Warrap, his home state, and of having moved decision-making “from the party think tanks 
(SPLM leadership) to *a+ regional bloc in which ethnic lobbies play great roles”1806. In the course of 
fighting, however, the SPLM-in-Opposition – a term coined initially at a December 6th 2013 meeting 
of in-party opposition to Salva Kiir shortly before the outbreak of violence – has itself become 
increasingly identified with Nuer demands and Nuer grievances as the vast majority of fighters are 
Nuer while the overall opposition to Kiir has splintered1807.  
Thence, the debate over ownership of liberation also finds expression in the ethnic politics of South 
Sudan, especially in regard to the question which of the ethnic groups suffered and thus contributed 
the most (in terms of blood) in the course of liberation. “While many Equatorians argued that their 
communities suffered disproportionately during the First Civil War, many Dinka felt the same was 
true for them during the Second”1808. Former members of the SSDF militias that fought the SPLA 
during the war before being integrated into the army after 2006 face a similar conundrum. Although 
they claim to have fought for Southern self-determination and independence long before the SPLA 
did, militia members have to fend off charges that they were sell-outs and stooges for the leadership 
in Khartoum1809.  
7.2.4. Cattle and the nation – Raiding and localized violence 
For South Sudan’s pastoralist peoples, cattle are the most important unit of wealth and worth and 
one of the integral aspects of everyday as well as spiritual life1810. Social capital among the Dinka, for 
example, is largely mediated through ownership of cattle, which is not only an economic and 
livelihood resource but represents an integral part of social, religious and political life1811. Cattle is the 
currency that bride price is paid in and thus essential for a man to get married, which is in turn an 
inevitable step to attain full manhood. Yet, unless one belongs to a well-off, read: cattle-rich family, 
there are only limited means to get cattle. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that cattle 
raiding is endemic in South Sudan and appears to have existed in albeit changing form for several 
centuries. Raiding is not confined to the herds of rival ethnic groups as intra-ethnic raiding is in fact 
not uncommon. Recent years have, however, seen a rising number of reports indicating a fusion and 
overlap of motives for violent raids.  
A good example of an area where cattle raiding and ethnic confrontations are very much linked is the 
Toposa region in the extreme south-west of South Sudan on the borders with Uganda and Kenya. The 
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Toposa have long been outside of the reach of government and during the second war were heavily 
armed by Khartoum to fight the SPLA which they did with success. Raiding cattle is an integral part of 
life among the Toposa and in particular for young men. Yet, the fact that large numbers of cattle 
were raided from the Dinka is problematic for the Toposa because now Dinka feature prominently in 
the GoSS1812. Modernity has also begun to gather a stranglehold over cattle raiding. In contrast to 
what was once a highly ritualized, open and communal rite between warrior-men that typically 
resulted in little loss of life, today’s raiders knowingly run the risk of killing women and children and, 
in a sign of commercialization, sell on raided cattle rather than integrating them into the herd1813.  
Yet, the area of South Sudan where cattle raiding has escalated to the point of ethnic hatred and 
genocidal rhetoric is the state of Jonglei. The new country has witnessed massive communal violence 
between the Murle and Lou Nuer in Jonglei state. Violence between Lou Nuer and Murle reached its 
first post-CPA peak in 2009 when approximately 1000 people died as a result of fighting. A 
particularly vicious cattle raid attack in March 2009 on Likuangole in Pibor County that killed, among 
others, several hundred women and children, “is seen by many as the point when the brutality of 
inter-ethnic fighting increased markedly”1814. The more recent round of reciprocal violence started 
with attacks and cattle raids and subsequent revenge attacks in June 2011, mobilizing the youths of 
both ‘tribes’ and again killing several hundreds. Among the Nuer, distrust of the government to 
ensure their protection has led to the resurfacing of the ‘White Army’, an organization from the civil 
war which had been suppressed by a disarmament campaign in 20061815. The Murle, on their part, 
have long been outsiders in the Southern theatre and already formed an alliance with Khartoum as 
far back as 1963 from where they received weapons to fight anti-government fighters1816; an 
arrangement that continued in the second war when the NCP-government sent arms to the Murle 
for raids against Dinka and Nuer1817. 
Médecins Sans Frontières reported that the tribal fighting in 2009 in Upper Nile and Jonglei differed 
from previous instances both in the extreme degrees of violence as villages were targeted rather 
than cattle camps and in the fact that women and children were the main victims of attacks1818. The 
spiralling violence in Pibor county of Jonglei state between (principally) Dinka, Nuer and Murle is 
driven by political and material exclusion but has also increasingly led to gratuitous violence against 
women and children1819. One of the contributing factors is a widely held prejudice which accuses the 
Murle of routinely abducting children to make up for the Murle’s chronic infertility. While not only 
stirring on Lou Nuer and Dinka groups, such “stigmatisation of the Murle and their alleged reputation 
have antagonised local communities, as well as exacerbated the Murle people’s perceptions of 
themselves as being politically and economically marginalized”1820. Cattle raids have thus evolved to 
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be not only about bounty but also about mutual ethnic animosity and the desire to kill or maim 
members of the other ethnie1821. In rhetoric at least, the Lou and Jikany Nuer White Army’s final 
solution to Murle attacks is genocide: “we have decided to invade Murleland and wipe out the entire 
Murle tribe on the face of the earth as the only solution to guarantee long-term security of Nuer’s 
cattle. There is no other way to resolve Murle problem other than wiping them out through the 
barrel of the gun”1822.  
7.2.5. Politicized ethnicity and ‘tribalism’ in South Sudan – at a glance 
African nationalism has the object of creating a hierarchy of identities, with the national identity (e.g. 
being South Sudanese) in most circumstances trumping and dominating other identities and 
allegiances a person may have (e.g. being Dinka, from Bor, male, grown-up, etc.). Ethnic identities 
play a major role in the politics and nation-building efforts of the nascent nation-state in South 
Sudan. If we recall Bhaba’s phrase that the nation is only realized in the mind’s eye then the eyes of 
South Sudanese nationbuilders are fixed on ethnic loyalties and ‘tribalism’ as the negative folio of 
what the nation and its citizens ought not to be like. There are constant appeals to transcend 
ethnicity for the sake of national unity and some informal quotas for ethno-regional representation 
are observed in the allocation of high-ranking posts in the SPLM and in government.  
This official mantra notwithstanding, ethnicity is a marker of identity and difference that has long-
standing relevance for many South Sudanese and is therefore also easily activated and utilized by 
political entrepreneurs that seek ulterior motives (power, resources, influence) by playing the ethnic 
card. Many people in South Sudan, especially those living outside the cities, have very little 
interaction with the state, which is one of the major reasons people turn to communitarian 
structures like clans or ‘tribes’. And where citizens interact with the state, access to jobs, resources, 
justice etc. is perceived to be tied to membership in the same ethnic group as the official in charge. A 
state of affairs that triggers a self-perpetuating spiral of popular perceptions leading to a reliance on 
ethnically based relationships rather than alternative forms of organisation and (self-) identification. 
Moreover, throughout the war in the 1990s and continuing with more recent cattle raids, the 
concept of ethnic identity has hardened among many groups and concomitantly led to gratuitous 
violence based on ethnic hatred rather than solely for reasons of prestige and cattle. Nationally, 
Dinka are widely held to sit atop the pyramid of influence closely followed by the Nuer; a fact for 
which both groups are frequently criticized by smaller ethnic groups, especially from Greater 
Equatoria. In spite of their privileged standing in particular among the security forces and the army, 
Dinka and Nuer struggle over power in the country. Even if the ongoing civil war’s principal causes 
are political, the very fact that many South Sudanese perceive the war as delineated along ethnic 
lines has dire consequences for national unity. A problem in the state’s dealings with ethnic conflicts 
is also that the government does not target the root causes of conflict but merely seeks to squash its 
outgrowth, e.g. by way of disarmament1823. 
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7.3. ‘New nationalism’ in South Sudan: Autochthony, Religion, Reconciliation 
Autochthony has become one of the less catchy catchwords of academic debates as well as political 
discourse in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa and beyond1824. Yet the phenomenon it is meant 
to encapsulate is one of the most straightforward questions of politics that is instinctively intelligible 
across continents and cultures. Who has been here first? Who has settled in a given location before 
anybody else (or: before any of the other groups presently residing there) and therefore has a 
legitimate claim to ownership, to rights and privileges that are tied to their status as first-comers? 
The other side of the autochthonous coin is that those that are deemed not to belong and to have 
arrived after the ‘original’ inhabitants can be excluded, discriminated against and displaced. 
Belonging is further complicated by the cross-cutting cleavage of religion and by the absence of 
justice and reconciliation for past crimes which can both counteract and intensify the new forms of 
nationalism and communitarianism in South Sudan.  
To shed light on the relevance of these issues for the situation in South Sudan, the subchapters 
underneath will in 7.3.1 look at the connection between belonging and land rights, in 7.3.2 at the 
consequences for those deemed not to belong, i.e. xenophobia, racism and exclusion, and discuss in 
7.3.3 the contested issue of citizenship and nationality legislation, in particular in the dyadic 
relationship with Sudan. 7.3.4 will focus on Christianity as a unifying and dividing element in society 
and, finally, 7.3.5 will list and discuss South Sudan’s attempts at national reconciliation and how it 
relates to nationbuilding in the country before 7.3.6 gives a brief summary.  
7.3.1. Belonging to the land – “the land belongs to us” 
Genealogy plays a crucial role among most or all of the ethnic groups and sub-groups that inhabit the 
territories of the Republic of South Sudan. Whereas Sudanese ‘Arab’ ethnic groups take great pride in 
ancestors’ lists or nisba that are meant to prove a forefather that hailed from the Arab peninsula and 
preferably had a connection to someone of Muhammad’s lineage1825, most South Sudanese groups 
have oral traditions – typically transmitted through songs1826 – that speak of the group’s migrations 
and previous places of settlement. Lesch characterized the debates among Sudanese intellectuals in 
the 1990s as shaped by the logic of autochthony, i.e. they “present one group as authentic and seek 
to delegitimize the lineage and territorial claims of other groups”1827. Northerners accentuate their 
Arab heritage and claim that Southerners migrated to Sudan from East Africa. Southern intellectuals 
in contrast argue that most Southern ‘tribes’ originate from Northern Sudan and that almost all 
Sudanese are African rather than of genuine Arab stock. The transient and swiftly changing nature of 
these narratives can be seen in how quickly Islamized Dinka acquired an imagined Arab lineage1828. 
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The logic of autochthony is also present among South Sudanese groups and arguably predates the 
colonial period. As an individual’s identity is strongly linked to his or her ancestors1829 – 
contemporary Nuer, for instance, generally know twelve generations of their patrilinear ancestors1830 
– and ancestors, though invisible, are still part of the family and community and “have favourite 
dwelling places, like shrines, cattle byres, houses, etc.”1831, the place and land where the ancestors 
lived is of great importance to most South Sudanese. Looking specifically at the Western Ngok Dinka, 
Stephanie Beswick describes a precolonial tradition that differentiated among clans according to a 
first-comer versus late-comer dichotomy. Longer residence entailed rights of domination over those 
that arrived more recently1832. Provided that Beswick is right with her assertion, then the continuing 
stalemate over the region of Abyei is a curious case of diachronic continuity. The Abyei Boundary 
Commission in 2005 found that both Misseriya and Ngok Dinka each have narratives of autochthony. 
Misseriya consider Ngok Dinka as late-comers and guests and Dinka chiefs therefore subservient to 
the Misseriya’s Nazir whereas the Ngok Dinka claim to have been living on both sides of the Kiir/Bahr 
al-Arab river since before the arrival of the Misseriya. In both cases, the fact that the other is deemed 
a latecomer to the territory is taken to imply lesser rights to the land in Abyei1833.  
Such disputes also matter hugely in other parts of the country. In Condominium days, the British had 
instituted a system of land rights that was tied to ethnic homelands or dar1834. Each dar was 
controlled by the chief/sheikh of one ethnic group that supposedly had particularly strong ties to the 
land1835. The ethnicisation of land rights had the implication that members of other, smaller ethnic 
groups could be excluded from using the land1836. During the Second War, the SPLA in theory 
favoured the traditional, i.e. colonial system of communal land ownership as opposed to individual 
land ownership. A system of communal land ownership was officially sanctioned and codified with 
the Land Act of 2009. According to this logic of collective as opposed to individual belonging, most 
returnees were adamant to return to a particular place in Southern Sudan, their place of origin, 
which was tied up with the ability to legitimately access resources, most notably land1837. But on the 
ground, allocation of land to returnees proceeded much slower than necessary which (along with the 
hardship of rural life) has driven many returnees to the cities1838.  
Far from relegating land disputes to a place of lower priority, the Land Act has actually exacerbated 
local conflict over land while adding importance to individuals’ and groups’ assertions of identity and 
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belonging1839. Sureau tells of the case of Lucy who had been living in Torit, the capital of Eastern 
Equatoria, since the mid-1990s but had her plot seized because she was originally from a village 40 
km away and did not belong to the supposedly original community of the Latuko1840. In the Sobat 
Basin, on the other hand, different Nuer clans (Jikany and Lou) spent much of the later stages of the 
second war fighting against each other, which glossed over the fact that both had effectively 
colonized land that used to be settled by the Anuak, displaced to refugee camps or to Ethiopia1841. 
Another example is the area around Yei where many mostly Dinka internally displaced persons 
settled on land deserted by the fleeing local population and many soldiers later on refused to cede 
occupied land to the original owners1842. In Yei – as elsewhere – courts and police have shown great 
“reluctance to deal with land-grabbing by serving and former soldiers”1843. Similar stories have 
emerged from Jonglei where many Dinka that were displaced here during the war use a narrative of 
victimhood (and the backing of the SPLA) to lay claim to the land1844. Thus, communal land ownership 
has led to a situation in which both sides in a dispute over land now present (pseudo)historical 
narratives that highlight that their group had been there first1845. To give an example, in a dispute 
over whether Kasengor payam belonged to Eastern Equatoria or to Jonglei, the MP for Kapoeta East 
county narrated the local Jie community’s migrations from the 14th century onwards all the way until 
1935 when they “were forced to relocate to Boma after the intervention of the Italian 
administration” in order to prove their belonging to his county1846.  
Boundary-making has therefore become not only a matter for the national government in its 
relations with neighbouring states but intimately moves and affects millions of South Sudanese: 
“Within Southern Sudan the prospect of a more precise definition of the north-south border is also 
inspiring a more rigid definition of internal ethnic boundaries”1847. Little wonder then given the high 
stakes involved in gaining political office that ethnic groups also violently resist administrative 
subdivision that would lessen the strength of their own ethnic group vis-à-vis others. During the 
demarcation of constituencies for state assembly and national elections, there were violent reactions 
including assaults on government personnel. These outbursts affected Central Equatoria and Upper 
Nile in particular1848, two areas characterized by great ethnic diversity and the lack of a numerically 
dominant group. Martina Santschi relates the example of a chief in Central Equatoria who stopped 
and confiscated questionnaires during the 2008 national census as he was afraid that his community, 
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which had had to flee and relocate during the war, would be assigned to their payam of residence 
rather than to the payam for which the community claimed ancestral rights1849. 
The most prominent example of a clash between different conceptions of belonging and its 
implications for access to land is, however, the splurging capital Juba (also the capital of Central 
Equatoria state) which has had to cope with a massive rise in the number of inhabitants since it 
became the capital of the South in 2005. As a result, market prices for land have soared1850. While the 
local Bari community insisted on customary rights to land and were supported by the (non-Bari) 
Central Equatorian government as a means to limit the central government’s influence, the GoSS laid 
claim to plots based on the language of developmentalism and the overriding imperative of (literally) 
building institutions for the new state. As Badiey shows, these disputes and mutually conflicting 
discourses were also present among the common people.  
As Juba’s diverse residents disputed plots of land in the town’s contested neighbourhoods, invoking 
their plight as victims of the war, their role as vanguard of the liberation movement, their superior 
education and skills, or their residency in Juba during the difficult war years, they too made claims that 
reflected competing visions of the state and of citizenship.
1851
 
An emphasis on belonging to win economic benefits is also present in those areas of South Sudan 
that are home to oil fields. In their study on two counties in Upper Nile, Grawert and Andrä observed 
how local groups organized according to origin and tried to capitalize on their status of originating 
from the territory to receive preferential treatment, especially in getting employment from the local 
oil company1852. Those same areas of Upper Nile are, however, also the site of developments that run 
counter to the emergence of localized autochthony clusters. Between 1999 and 2002, large areas 
were forcibly cleared by the Sudanese Army and Dinka militias allied to the SAF. As a result many 
locals had to move to the few nearby semi-urban settlements which grew rapidly1853. In the post-war 
period, returnees to this area moved to the cities (e.g. Paloic and Renk) as did other South Sudanese, 
spurred on by the construction of an all-weather road which “has a clear influence on population 
settlement, i.e. is attracting movement of people away from the riversides and leads to the growth of 
new settlements”1854.  
Given such a complex environment coupled with the general insecurity surrounding the evolution of 
the nascent state has meant that belonging is more of a process subject to change and renegotiation 
than a fixed state of being. In the Uganda-Sudan borderlands, for instance, nationality remained 
important during the war years as Sudanese refugees self-identified as Sudanese and expected to 
repatriate eventually1855. While returnees variously counted on their language, their Sudanese voter 
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cards but also cultural traits like a particular way of plaiting one’s hair as means to prove their 
identity and right to belong, the entire process of repatriation should “be viewed as a gradual 
transition over a number of years that allows for people to gradually re-negotiate their ability to 
belong at both a local and national level”1856. Belonging clearly is not a unidirectional process. It 
generally does not suffice to consider yourself to belong; you also need to be considered as 
belonging by your peers1857, which leads on to the global scourges of xenophobia, racism and social 
marginalization and their local variation in South Sudan.  
7.3.2. Xenophobia, racism and social marginalization  
Over the last decades of the 20th century, Sudanese Arabism had become increasingly tinged with a 
racial note that was directed against the peoples in the South as well as the Fur, which were both 
deemed too dark-skinned to be full citizens of Sudan1858. South Sudan’s independence was therefore 
driven not little by the urge to escape and purge racial discrimination from the state’s interactions 
with its citizens. Thus, the 2008 SPLM Manifesto declared its goal of establishing a citizenship-state 
devoid of “racial, ethnic or separatist connotations”1859. Racism, xenophobia and intolerance are, 
however, also to be found in the new Republic of South Sudan and stand in many ways for the darker 
side of nationalism and the politics of indigenousness.  
7.3.2.1. Xenophobia  
Already during the war, the SPLM relied on the common enemy to provide the unifying bond among 
culturally diverse Southerners and occasionally resorted to blatant racism against Northern 
jalaba1860. Among some of the South’s ethnic groups, for instance the Dinka, there are prevailing 
feelings of cultural exclusivity and superiority to all strangers that may lend themselves to 
xenophobic attitudes1861. Indeed, in the last few years, xenophobia against non-South Sudanese living 
and working in South Sudan appears to be on the rise. This affects for instance the pastoralist 
Mbororo (also known as Fulbe) that originally hail from West Africa and today live across most of 
Central Africa and are habitually suspected of collaborating with armed militias1862. In Western 
Equatoria, clashes with Mbororo are in fact among the most common forms of violence in the 
state1863. 
Apart from oil, microenterprises in trading and services make up the bulk of non-agricultural 
economic activity in South Sudan with most of these businesses run by Kenyans, Ugandans and 
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Northern Sudanese1864. Small traders and merchants are particularly affected by xenophobia as 
hatred of foreigners often appears to be fuelled by envy of their economic success. Thus, Kristof 
Titeca depicts how the main beneficiaries of cross-border trade (mostly small trade in foodstuffs and 
clothes) between Uganda, DRC and South Sudan are Ugandan traders that exploit the price 
differential between the countries. These same traders are frequently the targets of hatred and 
abuse by South Sudanese who feel robbed of what they deem their profits1865. Along South Sudan’s 
border with Uganda, for example, the perception abounds that benefits of trade accrue solely to 
foreign nationals, which has led to occasional violence against foreign traders1866. 
With killings of fellow compatriots along the transport routes as well as in Juba becoming increasingly 
commonplace, the Eritrean diaspora communities organized a protest march in December of 20121867 
while the Ugandan parliament officially complained about harassment of Ugandan traders doing 
business in South Sudan1868. And in what was alternately perceived as xenophobic jingoism or an 
effective policy against petty crime, South Sudan expelled all Ugandan boda boda (motorcycle taxi) 
drivers in September 20131869. In some instances, geopolitics complements envy and greed as drivers 
of xenophobic outbursts. Eritrean traders and their shops appear to have been deliberately targeted 
during the post-December 2013 violence based on rumours that Asmara was supplying weapons to 
Riek Machar’s rebel faction1870. Conversely, after Bentiu in Unity State near the border with Sudan 
was captured by troops loyal to Machar, Darfuris were deliberately targeted and killed by rebel 
fighters because they were thought to assist the South Sudanese government1871.  
7.3.2.2. Internal exclusion – returnees, women, youth gangs 
Deliberate exclusion and aggressive othering is, however, not restricted to foreign nationals as 
evidenced by cattle raids that are increasingly inspired more by ethnic hatred than by the prospect of 
economic gain1872. Discourses of autochthony, instrumentalized by politicians, have become more 
prominent after the CPA. As Latigo observes,  
there has been a growing discourse on issues of ‘indigenousness’ as people increasingly define 
themselves in relation to strangers - the emerging ‘stayees’ vs ‘returnees’). debate. This discourse is 
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said to be heavily exploited by politicians for their own gain, for instance through limiting political 
competition by using the label ‘foreigner’.
1873  
Furthermore, issues of cultural homogeneity and a perceived ‘clash of cultures’ become intertwined 
with other identity-based matters of contestation. A driving force for such conflicts – as in fact for 
many other issues in contemporary South Sudan – is the mass phenomenon of displacement and 
return that has shaped the last decades since at least the start of the Second War. By some 
estimates, up to 80% of the population were affected at one point or another. In turn, a large 
majority of South Sudanese are ‘returnees’ even if not all of them conceive of themselves as such. 
For one, in the context of persistently high food insecurity and vulnerability to external shocks like 
floods or drought (even in peacetime almost half of all South Sudanese were severely or moderately 
food insecure1874), the mass influx of returnees into the country along with rising commodity prices is 
a strain on the food security of both returnees and host communities1875. 
Yet, beyond economic and livelihood challenges, anxiety over the maintenance of cultural 
homogeneity also plays a part. Many South Sudanese ‘stayees’ feared the onslaught and imposition 
of alien mores and customs due to the arrival and settlement of returnees that had lived abroad for 
an extended period of time. Women returning to their rural communities after the war were 
generally perceived as more free than local women, which sometimes precipitated conflict and 
restrictions on women1876. Dress is mentioned as a key distinguishing aspect as “*m+iniskirts and 
more sexually forthright women were commonly associated with East African countries”1877 as 
significant sections of South Sudanese society consider the behaviour and dress of the younger 
population as a provocation and challenge to traditional cultural norms. These findings are 
corroborated by a report that “in October 2008 and January 2009, in Juba and Bor respectively, some 
young women and men were arrested by the police for wearing very tight jeans and short skirts”1878. 
On the other edge of the scale, returnees from Khartoum and the North in general are sometimes 
pejoratively called jalaba and stigmatized as ‘Arabs’1879. Locals in Wau, for example, baptized a 
settlement which is mostly inhabited by returnees from Khartoum “New Khartoum”1880 (see Ch. 
7.1.2.3.). This is particularly harsh for those generations of youth that were raised in the North and 
often neither speak English nor have a good command of ‘their’ communities’ language1881.  
While Western dress may be the most outwardly visible sign of difference1882, it stands in for more 
severe shifts in behaviour that have repercussions for such essential features of South Sudanese life 
as marriage and dowry; features that are closely linked to the power and wealth of male heads of 
households. Based on research in the Kenyan Kakuma refugee camp, Katarzyna Grabska shows how 
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life in the camp has altered gender norms and youth interaction, including a greater openness for 
marrying outside one’s own ethnic group1883. For the Pari community (originally from Eastern 
Equatoria), in contrast, the prolonged stay in the multinational environment of the Kakuma refugee 
camp actually strengthened group cohesion and identification1884. Either way, many returnee couples 
face severe constraints due to the fact that bride wealth used to be monetized in Kakuma whereas 
clans in South Sudan insist on dowry being paid in cattle1885. In Khartoum, on the other hand, South 
Sudanese were not only subjected to harassment and discrimination from the state but members of 
South Sudanese communities themselves policed each other’s conduct, for instance by restricting 
mobile phone use, to avoid the loss of cultural integrity (and male power) in the diaspora1886. Thus, 
returnee youths even more than other sections of society tend to try their luck in the urban 
settlements, not only because of the general dislike for agricultural labour but also for its more open 
and liberal social climate1887.  
On the other hand, the vast numbers of returnees to South Sudan and the secondary internal 
migration to the few cities and hence an ongoing rapid process of urbanization1888 best visible in the 
capital Juba and in the well-connected areas of oil development1889, are processes that may actually 
lay the groundwork for a positive or negative collective South Sudanese identity. Rather than leading 
to exclusion, the common experience of displacement – however different it surely was for each 
individual – could be the kernel of a national identity. The necessity to adapt to new, often not overly 
welcoming surroundings might actually be an asset for would-be nation-builders.  
Finally, a convenient other for the self-definition-by-dissociation are social deviants that fall out of 
the standard norms of accepted and acceptable behaviour in South Sudan and are therefore easily 
disparaged by wide sections of society. Youths in South Sudan not only challenge traditional norms 
and authority by their lifestyle choices but also through collective violence and crime. Youth gangs 
constitute a substantial problem in urban areas of South Sudan, in particular in Juba, where they are 
the manifestation of “the disintegration of family units and social exclusion”1890. It is not surprising 
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that some form of youth movements should emerge as the population is extremely young1891 and the 
youth bulge is not met by sufficient opportunities in social, economic and political life for the 
younger generations.  
7.3.3. Contested citizenship 
The formal expression and basis for all the debates over belonging and autochthony is citizenship, 
which is also on an individual level the precondition for inclusion into more intricate debates over 
land, rights and national identity. In spite of South Sudan’s independence, Sudan’s legal framework 
as well as its de facto approach to handling matters of citizenship impact directly on South Sudan 
and, more importantly, on hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese1892. The key cause for the post-
secession difficulties is to be found in the hierarchical conception of citizenship embedded in both 
Sudanese and South Sudanese law according to which descent and therefore ethnicity form the basis 
for nationality1893. 
South Sudanese citizenship is predicated on descent although there can be mitigating circumstances. 
The 2009 Referendum Act, which functioned as a blueprint for post-independence citizenship 
legislation, declared eligible to vote anyone who was 
1) Born to parents both or one of them belonging to one of the indigenous communities that settled in 
Southern Sudan on or before the 1st of January 1956, or whose ancestry is traceable to one of the 
ethnic communities in Southern Sudan, or, 2) permanent resident, without interruption, or whose any 
of the parents or grandparents are residing permanently, without interruption, in Southern Sudan 
since the 1st of January 1956.
1894
 
In other words, South Sudan grants nationality to anyone born on its soil or anyone who is of South 
Sudanese ‘tribal’ descent.  
Across the border to the North, the Sudan Nationality Act has been revised and altered several times 
since its inception in 1957 and was last amended along with the signing of the CPA in 20051895 and 
again in 2011. The most recent amendment of the Sudanese Nationality Act provides that anyone 
who has de facto or de jure acquired South Sudanese nationality will automatically lose his or her 
Sudanese nationality (section 10(2)). The same applies to those whose father has acquired South 
Sudanese nationality (section 10(3))1896. Sudan moreover chooses a particularly strict reading of 
South Sudan’s nationality law to strip even those residents of Sudanese citizenship that had but one 
great-grandparent born in South Sudan1897. Southerners living in the North generally qualify as 
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‘second-class citizens’1898 and, in contravention to the CPA, sharia law has been applied 
indiscriminately to all residents of Northern Sudan1899. In practice, these provisions mean that 
residents of Sudan that qualify for South Sudanese citizenship are automatically stripped of their 
Sudanese citizenship, regardless of whether they seek to obtain South Sudanese citizenship or 
not1900.  
This is a monumental problem for many people of Southern descent that have often lived in the 
North for decades and, all things equal, intend to stay on due to better economic and educational 
opportunities than in the South1901. “Being in the capital for years, many IDPs prefer to seek local 
integration – even if life in Khartoum comes with a high level of marginalization – rather than to 
return to uncertainty”1902. Bronwen Manby in 2012 calculated a figure of between 500,000-700,000 
Southerners in the Republic of Sudan that face arrest, statelessness and expulsion due to the lack of 
a politically amicable solution between Juba and Khartoum, the absence of South Sudanese consular 
services in Khartoum and the passing of an April 2012 deadline to regularize one’s citizenship and 
residence status1903. As a consequence of their state of legal limbo, many people had by then also 
lost their jobs or property titles1904. There are also thousands of Northerners living in the South facing 
a similar plight1905.  
However, there is evidence that Sudan can be pragmatic with citizenship laws when it comes to 
ensuring the supply of cheap Southern labour. El Gizouli argues that the NCP government’s 
willingness to relent on citizenship rights for South Sudanese and negotiate over the ‘four freedoms’ 
in 2012 can be traced to an acute lack of agricultural labourers in the North as Northerners are 
escaping the hardships of farm work for the vague hope of the current gold rush1906. On the other 
hand, there are also complaints about the process of proving citizenship and attaining nationality 
documents inside South Sudan as many people lack birth certificates and are harassed by those in 
charge1907. In a sadly ironic reversal of Sudanese racism, Ferenc Marko mentions the difficulties some 
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lighter-skinned South Sudanese had in obtaining national identity cards in South Sudan because the 
officials in charge considered them ‘not black enough’1908.  
7.3.4. Christianity 
Religion has played an ignominious role throughout Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial history. 
Northerners’ sense of superiority towards Southern Sudanese rested not only on racial categories but 
was strengthened by the gulf between Muslim and non-Muslim populations which made the latter 
variously the targets of exploitation (e.g. slave raids) or proselytization. The 1983 sharia laws and the 
Islamist take-over of the state under Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front after 1989 marked a 
further break with the letter of the preceding secular constitutions. Since 1998 Sudan has had an 
Islamic constitution, positing Islam and sharia as the insurmountable pillars of the state1909. 
Moreover, the longer the civil war raged, the greater the prominence of religious themes and 
identities in the outward presentation of the struggle between the Sudanese government and the 
SPLA, with Khartoum receiving an influx of radical Muslims from abroad while evangelical Christians 
from Norway and the U.S. supported the SPLA1910. The issue of religion also proved divisive during 
the CPA negotiations so that the debate over the place of religion in the state contributed 
significantly to the agreement that split the country into two1911.  
Christian churches likewise made an important contribution to the divisive nature of postcolonial 
political and societal relations in Sudan. Though not officially sponsored by the British colonial power, 
missionary schools were effectively granted a monopoly of education in the South, which was closed 
off to Northern traders and Islamic madrassas due to the Closed Districts Ordinance until the late 
1940s1912. In present-day South Sudan, Christianity has become the majority religion – even if 
followers split into different creeds ranging from Catholics to Anglicans and various Evangelical 
churches – but its role in politics and in particular in the definition of the nation is yet to be fully 
determined.  
Crucially, Christianity in Southern Sudan has been entangled in the liberation struggle. While 
missionaries had not been particularly successful in converting substantial numbers of South 
Sudanese prior to Sudanese independence1913, this changed through the course of the two wars. 
Whereas Ali Mazrui had in the late 1960s still depicted the religious dimension of the conflict as the 
“confrontation between local Islamic authority and expatriate Christianity”1914, the expulsion of all 
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Christian missionaries in 1964 had the inverse effect of strengthening Christianity in the South 
because the growth of an indigenous clergy also led to an indigenization of Christianity1915. 
Christianity definitely became associated with the liberation struggle during the Anya-nya era, which 
for many Southerners bore an eerie resemblance to the Mahdiyya1916. While church organisations, in 
particular the World Council of Churches, were vital in negotiating between Southern rebels and the 
Khartoum government in the run-up to the 1972 Peace Treaty1917 and resistance to sharia law had 
been a driving force of resistance to Khartoum1918, the real boost to Christianity came after 1990. 
When the SPLA lost its Ethiopian Communist backers in 1991 it became more open to Christianity 
and, especially after Operation Lifeline Sudan, came to see churches as potential allies1919 – even if it 
was mostly a tactical move and Christianity did not play a key role in shaping the ideology of 
resistance1920.   
This happened at the same time when the fundamentalist Islamist regime in Khartoum introduced a 
religious note into the war narrative and propaganda1921. But people also turned to Christianity to 
seek refuge and solace from the intra-South violence as tens of thousands of Dinka and Nuer 
converted during the 1990s1922. In fact, some church leaders during this time “felt let down by the 
GOS and the SPLAs alike”1923. And it is certainly true that acceptance and respect for Christianity grew 
because “local churches were among the few actors that stayed and suffered with the local 
populations during the civil war”1924. Thus Harragin points to the perceived utility (health care, 
education) of Christianity that drove Dinka conversion1925, whereas Hutchinson observed that for 
many Western Nuer “Christianity came to symbolise the possibility of political equality, community 
development and self-enhancement in the context of the increasingly vicious Islamic jihad being 
waged against them from the North”1926. Refugees also made up a large contingent among 
converts1927. Accordingly, contemporary prophets, some of whom engaged in the fighting, employ a 
syncretic mix of spiritual and magic rhetoric so as to comply with the increasingly dominant Christian 
monotheism1928. Accommodating this rapprochement is the fact that Christianity in South Sudan is as 
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a rule not too dogmatic as “there is scope for personal interpretation and integration with existing 
beliefs”1929.  
As a result, Christian symbolism and Christian language have become very popular as a way of 
describing or relating political issues, including national history. The spread of Christianity throughout 
the long civil war may have played a part in the drive for Kush or Cush as the name for the country 
because Cush is actually mentioned in the Bible. Some writers also liken the South Sudanese’s four 
decades of armed struggle to the forty years the Israelites spent in the desert. In this scenario, John 
Garang represents Moses1930, which is only fitting since he died shortly after signing the CPA and 
never saw an independent South Sudan – much like Moses himself never returned to Judea. In 2005, 
in a speech accompanying the signing of the CPA, John Garang himself claimed that Moses had 
probably had a Sudanese wife, that the White Nile was one of the four rivers in paradise and that his 
home village Wangkule was therefore part of Garden Eden1931. Another story from the Bible that is 
treated as an analogy to the South Sudanese’s experiences of persecution, displacement and exile is 
the story of Joseph whose brothers hated him without reason, who had to escape abroad and who 
was jailed in Egypt, yet never – and herein lies the lesson for contemporary South Sudan – sought 
revenge or retaliation1932.  
There are also occasions when clergymen show a very pronounced self-confidence and conviction in 
the centrality of the church to South Sudanese nationalism. Nicki Kindersley mentions an influential 
bishop who proclaimed that “before there was a political party in this country there was a church” 
and that “the genesis of South Sudanese nationalism was in the church”1933. Some church leaders are 
also in a position to speak truth to power as the priest in Salva Kiir’s church in Juba openly criticized 
the president during Mass1934. In early 2013, the Presbyterian Church of South Sudan actually called 
on the government to reverse the separation of state and religion enshrined in the constitution while 
Riek Machar, himself a member of the Presbyterian Church, proposed to replace strict secularism 
with the clarification that there is no state religion in South Sudan1935. Clearly, in a situation of 
ongoing tensions with Sudan and given that there remain substantial pockets of Muslims inside 
South Sudan (especially in Bahr-al-Ghazal)1936, even the appearance that Christianity was merging 
with the state apparatus could be seen as inflammatory and deeply worrying to non-Christians and 
secular Christians alike. On the other hand, church efforts can also mirror and go hand-in-hand with 
state objectives in constructing a unified nation. One such example is the Catholic Church nationwide 
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pastoral project conducted in the run-up to Southern independence which went under the slogan 
‘One Nation from Every Tribe, Tongue, and People’1937. 
7.3.5. Justice and Reconciliation 
Striving for national unity and cohesion may not require a universal bond with those who are 
deemed fellow members of the same nation; feeling something less than hatred and a mortal grudge 
may, however, indeed be necessary. That is why in a country that has seen so much internecine 
warfare over the last couple of decades, justice and reconciliation have such an important role to 
play and are intricately linked to the project of building a South Sudanese nation. Yet, thinking about 
justice and reconciliation in South Sudan, it is hard to say who is to reconcile with whom. Dinka with 
Nuer? Anyanya II with the SPLA? Equatorians with Nilotics? Child soldiers with their recruiters? 
Soldiers with civilians? Moreover, as the war lasted for more than two decades, there are two 
decades worth of deeds, of atrocities, of human rights violations that might be included and many 
purely local grievances that do no resonate on the national level. In fact, things do not stop with the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement or even with the Juba Declaration in 2006. As violence continues 
throughout many parts of South Sudan, in particular but certainly not only in Jonglei where a special 
reconciliation committee was convened in 20121938, justice and reconciliation can, might and ought 
to be sought for events that only just occurred.  
7.3.5.1. Churches and people-to-people reconciliation 
In what amounts to arguably the most substantial contribution of civil society to peacebuilding in 
South Sudan, the churches took over the task of reconciliation during the war and remain an 
important if not undisputed actor in the present. During the latter stages of the war, the New Sudan 
Council of Churches (NSCC) was instrumental in guiding people-to-people peace negotiations 
between Dinka and Nuer at Wunlit in 19991939. The SPLM/A and several Nilotic traditional leaders 
recognized the NSCC as a neutral arbiter in 1998, thus jumpstarting the process that led to more than 
forty NSCC-led people-to-people conferences1940. In addition, “there is recognition by SPLM/A that 
the reconciliation is happening in spite of it”1941. Even though churches remain in many places the 
only indigenous civil society organization and are (after radio) the most common source of 
information for South Sudanese1942, following the CPA the church has lost some of its standing as a 
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peacebuilding actor as many church leaders took up jobs in the GoSS and with NGOs1943. After a 
massive Murle attack on Lou Nuer in August 2011, President Kiir decided to rely on the services of 
the South Sudan Council of Churches to help bring an end to the circle of retaliatory violence1944. As 
this example shows, however, church mediation is not always successful as violence resumed soon 
thereafter while the chief negotiator, Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul Yak, was deemed partial to Dinka 
interests and was rejected by both conflict parties1945. Recently, in response to the fighting in the 
country since December 2013, the Catholic church has declared “Forty Days of Prayer, Fasting, and 
Charity for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan” for Lent 20141946. 
7.3.5.2. Official reconciliation efforts 
As it stands, the CPA also included a chapter that called for a “comprehensive process of national 
reconciliation and healing throughout the country”1947. Several other voices insisted on the role to be 
played by restorative as well as retributive and punitive forms of justice since these are common 
forms of dealing with death and other calamities in South Sudanese societies1948. The Juba-based 
Sudd Institute, for one, sees a preventive component in coming clean over past crimes between 
South Sudanese because “*s+weeping them under the rug in the hope that they will be forgotten has 
only meant continued outbreaks of communal violence in revenge”1949. The public also appears to be 
much more in favour of some justice and compensation (e.g. cattle) for war-induced sufferings as 
opposed to government officials who in the majority seek reconciliation without justice1950. A 
journalist I spoke to who was in principle very open toward reconciliation admitted that as both of 
his parents had been killed in fighting between Southern militias, he could not forgive unless those 
responsible were held accountable and punished1951.  
A Rift Valley Study from 2006, however, advocates that we should apply different standards to the 
reconciliation process in South Sudan than to any normal instance of post-war justice. According to 
their reasoning, one has to be careful when applying international standards of justice and morality 
to local circumstances where different modes of dealing with what would be considered war-crimes 
in the West prevail. This has, for instance, been the case in several of the reconciliation meetings 
from 1999 onwards that have allowed for the reintegration of former enemy fighters (after the 1991 
Nasir split) into the SPLM/A as community survival was awarded greater importance than individual 
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accountability1952. In 2014, Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa and lead AU mediator 
between Sudan and South Sudan, and well-known Ugandan academic Mahmood Mamdani argued 
along the same lines that courts could not bring peace to a post-war situation like South Sudan’s1953.  
Complicating the matter of accountability for past crimes is a series of amnesty provisions that 
stretch back to the first civil war and the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Accord. SPLM and splinter groups, 
who both committed severe human rights abuses in the aftermath of the Nasir split in 1991, made 
sure to include broad amnesty provisions in subsequent peace deals thus preventing any 
accountability for past crimes1954.  
Hence, the official state-sanctioned national reconciliation process is in line with Mbeki and 
Mamdani’s reasoning and counts on reconciliation as the sole pillar to forgiveness1955. In what turned 
out to be a very controversial decision, former vice-president Riek Machar was charged with 
initiating and supervising national reconciliation and he appointed his wife Angelina Teny as the head 
of the newly founded ‘Initiatives of Change South Sudan’, which was supposed to guide the 
process1956. Machar, of course, as head of the Nasir faction was responsible for ordering the Bor 
massacre in late 1991 when “troops who were moving from homestead to homestead looting 
property, food and animals, killed over 2,000 Dinka civilians”1957; an atrocity that is among the most 
well-known in South Sudan and for which Machar has repeatedly apologized1958. Whereas some 
praised Machar for the courage to admit to his guilt, others saw his stewardship of the process as a 
calculated move to increase his countrywide popularity in the run-up to elections1959 and a ploy to 
build up an anti-Kiir bloc with support from the Greater Upper Nile region1960. 
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As the rivalry between Salva Kiir and his deputy became more pronounced in early 2013, Machar was 
relieved of his duties as head of the commission and the reconciliation process stalled1961. At the 
same time, in a duplication of structures not uncommon in South Sudan, the president created a 
Committee of National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation whose composition – in contrast to the 
commission – was free of politicians, included only religious authorities and was to follow a “spiritual 
agenda to reconciliation”1962. While the Committee’s mission statement is impregnated with a 
Christian tune of forgiveness and atonement, mentions weak and fallible human beings and a long 
process of physical, psychological and spiritual healing, it also contains the recognition that the 
continued presence of war leaders in positions of power “is not only the most difficult obstacle to 
reconciliation; it complicates the restoration of justice, rule of law, and security”1963. Should funds 
eventually become available, the idea is to start local processes of gathering information about 
grievances and then design local responses that ideally should emanate from traditional South 
Sudanese forms of justice1964. My interlocutor gave the example of Dinka reconciliation which hinges 
upon the killer paying blood money to the family of the victim, then a white bull is slaughtered and 
both the killer and the victim's brother eat from a specific organ1965.  
The latest stage in South Sudan’s own initiatives at reconciliation was launched in the midst of civil 
war in April 2014. The newly founded National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation, which in 
addition to the two bodies mentioned above (South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission; 
Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation) also includes the Parliamentary 
Committee for Peace and Reconciliation, is supposed to reach out to all sides and help with peace 
negotiations1966. The issue of justice also crept into debates over a settlement of the violence that 
has engulfed parts of South Sudan since mid-December 2013. Ambassador Joseph Ayok Anei from 
South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisions a process in which those guilty for the ‘coup’ will 
be tried and then pardoned by president Kiir, in analogy to how Pope John Paul II forgave Mehmet Ali 
Ağca who had tried to assassinate him1967. And Salva Kiir himself, in a speech he gave in Juba in 
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February 2014, singled out the examples of Mandela’s South Africa and Kagame’s Rwanda as models 
of reconciliation in which forgiveness trumps retaliation1968.  
Considering the weakness of South Sudanese justice and law enforcement institutions, David Deng of 
the South Sudan Law Society and Elizabeth Deng call instead for hybrid courts composed of national 
and international staff on the model of East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. These hybrid 
courts would seek redress for the crimes against humanity committed in various stages of conflict 
and set a critical sign that the current state of impunity is not going to last1969. The majority of human 
rights organizations, however, preferred the African Union’s leadership in the process of establishing 
which crimes had been committed during the fighting since December 20131970. Importantly, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria and head of the African Union South Sudan 
Commission of Inquiry that took up its work in March 2014, insisted that accountability for crimes 
committed during the fighting in South Sudan was high on their agenda and that they “will leave no 
stone unturned to ensure that, as much as possible, we are able to ascertain who is responsible”1971. 
These debates highlight the two key aspects of justice and reconciliation in South Sudan: there is 
strong demand for such a process on all levels of society but the country in its present state still relies 
on – and has to rely on – external assistance and stewardship of the proceedings. 
7.3.6. ‘New nationalism’ in South Sudan – at a glance 
The politics of belonging has taken hold in South Sudan where the government’s land policy has 
forced the issue by linking land rights to communities. Communities therefore have to prove their 
original residence in a specific location while overlapping claims from adjacent communities 
frequently lead to fights over boundaries. Mass displacement has made it even more difficult to 
ascertain ethnic boundaries and in fact ethnic belonging by both individuals and entire groups that 
have lived through long stints of life in the Diaspora. In a country where vast numbers of people were 
themselves strangers in a strange land, xenophobia is running high as foreign merchants and traders 
are targeted for their wealth while others are blamed for their country of origin’s policy towards 
South Sudan. In addition, returnees are the object of exclusion and othering as women returning 
from East Africa or the West are deemed too free-spirited while those returning from the North are 
defamed as Arabs and many youth are seen as exponents of a counterculture. Fending off 
newcomers and/or returnees with different customs and social behaviour enables male-dominated 
authorities like chiefs to maintain their authority. Altogether, South Sudan already exhibits those 
facets of the new exclusionary nationalism that it took other post-colonial African nations decades to 
develop and foster.  
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Christianity has become the dominant religion in the country since the last war and in its often 
syncretistic interpretation plays a vital role in most people’s lives. While the state is pointedly secular 
in response to the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Khartoum, the clergy – 
though split in different denominations – is the strongest civil society organization and on occasion 
challenges the government. After being of critical importance during the negotiation of intra-
Southern peace around the year 2000, however, the church has lost some clout since the CPA period. 
Generally, belonging to some collective group other than the South Sudanese nation seems to take 
precedent for many if not most citizens in an environment of insecurity and little state presence. This 
retreat from the nation is amplified by the failure (to date) of efforts at justice and reconciliation 
which is grounded in the personalities chosen to run the process (Riek Machar), the understaffed and 
underfunded structures, the overreliance on the churches and especially on the fact that the 
government appears intent on achieving reconciliation without justice.  
7.4. The South Sudanese nation vis-à-vis the African postcolonial nation 
Nationbuilding and national identity in South Sudan, even more than statebuilding and the state, 
exhibit parallels to the processes of nationbuilding witnessed in the typified African country of the 
postcolonial period. While there are certain peculiarities due to the specific form of independence 
struggle not from a European colonial power but from Sudan’s northern half, the truly intriguing 
deviation lies in the sequence of developments related to national and sub-national loyalties and 
identities in Southern and now South Sudan.  
South Sudanese state nationalism has so far been unsuccessful in finding traction in the population 
much like in the typified postcolonial African state after independence, which equally pursued an 
inclusive idea of the nation. In the eyes of most citizens of South Sudan, the territorial state has not 
(yet) proven itself worthy of adherence while othering and the designation of enemies from within 
and without are more successful than the positive vision of ‘unity in diversity’, a slogan common to a 
number of highly multiethnic and divided African countries (e.g. South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria). 
Blaming the former colonizers in the immediate post-independence period – in South Sudan’s case 
the Northern Sudanese or ‘the Arabs’ instead of a European country – is also consistent with the 
typology.  
South Sudan as a post-liberation country shows the typical strong focus on commemorating the 
‘liberation martyrs’ in speeches, statues and the national flag1972 but nonetheless differs from the 
typified post-liberation state. While unlike in Zimbabwe there is no hierarchical strand in South 
Sudan’s memorial culture and the true dividing line is between those that ‘held a gun’ and those that 
did not, the personal cult surrounding John Garang and the focus on the SPLM/A to the neglect of all 
other militias makes it less egalitarian than a country like Eritrea. The predilection for adopted 
predecessors whose historical and geographical traces fade into myth – the empire of Kush/Cush and 
Azania – also reflects similar postcolonial processes of christening the nation in Goldcoast (Ghana), 
Dahomey (Benin), French Soudan (Mali) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 
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Ethnicity and ethnic loyalties define politics and society in South Sudan and like the public diatribes 
against ethnic loyalties resemble the typified African state even if oftentimes sub-ethnic loyalties 
(e.g. to section, clan or extended family) or supra-ethnic loyalties (e.g. to greater Equatoria) matter 
more than ethnic groups as such. In recent years, ethnic groups have become less open to outsiders 
and defining boundaries, physical and conceptual, against other groups that do not belong has 
become more prevalent just as in other African states. Outbursts of xenophobia against foreign 
traders as well as the rising importance of autochthony and first-comer status and an exclusionary 
conception of local and national belonging, driven in part by the state’s land policy, are also alike.  
Quite atypical, however, are the central role of the church in civil society and of conversion during 
the ‘liberation war’ as well as the vast number of Southern Sudanese that were displaced either 
internally, to neighbouring countries or outside the continent, which constitutes an anomaly in terms 
of national cohesion. For instance, the linguistic situation in South Sudan is quite unique and differs 
considerably from the typical African state in that choosing the colonial language English as official 
language exacerbates internal rifts as it benefits those displaced to English-speaking countries to the 
detriment of those South Sudanese that are fluent in Arabic or Juba Arabic. Returnees from abroad 
are also occasionally lambasted for their alleged immorality or are accused of having fled while 
others fought gun in hand. Comparing South Sudan’s justice and reconciliation process to the typified 
African post-conflict case is not yet possible since the process (or rather: parallel processes) have not 
yet gotten underway although the central role of the church and of ‘spiritual leaders’ does stick out.  
Alas, the most significant divergence from the point of view of the typology consists not of the 
substance of South Sudanese nationalism and nationbuilding but in the sequence in which the 
different facets of nationbuilding occur. In the typical African postcolonial state, nationalism was 
initially inclusive but dismissive of ethnic loyalties, followed subsequently by a failure of state 
nationalism and a resurgence of political ethnicity and finally the emergence of exclusionary ‘new 
nationalism’ and discourses of autochthony on the local and national level. South Sudan in its current 
state of development does not stick to the chronological blueprint of nationalism and nationbuilding 
of its African peers and antecedents. Instead, South Sudan is home to all three trends of post-colonial 
African nationalism and national identity construction (inclusive state nationalism, ethnic resurgence, 
discourses of autochthony) at the same time and exhibits elements of each in its official policies, 
public discourses and observable actions on the ground parallel to each other1973.  
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
Having moved from the nation-state as it arose in Europe to a typology of the postcolonial African 
nation-state and then to an in-depth depiction of South Sudan through the lens of this typology, it is 
incumbent upon us to take a step back and return to the research interest and the research 
questions that were posited at the very beginning of the thesis to both assess whether the approach 
taken was sensible and to attempt an answer or answers. Thus, 8.1 will revisit the research questions 
and the methodology employed to answer them based on how useful and warranted they have 
shown themselves to be during this investigation. Then, in 8.2 I shall summarize the picture of the 
South Sudanese state and nation as it has been painted with the colour palette provided by the 
categories of the typified sub-Saharan African state and nation. 8.3 will thereafter discuss the 
reasons why South Sudan and the typology align and differ in certain respects and draw some more 
general inferences for our understanding of nationbuilding and statebuilding, nationalism and 
statehood. Finally, 8.4 will reflect on what this all means for the direction of future research 
regarding statebuilding, nationbuilding and their interconnectedness as well as some passing thought 
on South Sudan now and in the coming years.  
8.1. Research Question and Methodology Revisited 
The objective of this work has been twofold: to establish a distinct type of African nation-state that 
differs from the European and Western model of the nation-state and can help further our 
understanding of African political systems and realities and possibly also guide policy by statebuilders 
and nationbuilders on the continent and elsewhere. The second objective has been to situate South 
Sudan, the prodigal son of African statehood, in relation to the experiences of its African peers in 
forming states and nations. In other words to analyze South Sudan’s record as an aspiring nation-
state vis-à-vis the typology of the African nation-state as opposed to comparing South Sudan to an 
ideal-typical European nation-state. In the course of this study I have operated with a number of 
axiomatic assumptions about the centrality of the nation-state, the utility of studying state and 
nation separate from one another, the objective existence of a disctinct African type of nation-state 
and the ability of the anomalous case of South Sudan to enhance and modify our theoretical grasp of 
states and nations in contemporary Africa.  
One issue that cropped up is the use of the nation-state as central unit of inquiry. There has been a 
longstanding trend in the analysis of political systems away from the state towards either greater or 
smaller units of collective action and collective belonging. Regional integration and especially the 
globalization of economic and trade links, followed by cultural globalization massively aided by rapid 
advances in communication technologies have seemingly rendered the model of a territorially 
bounded nation-state with a cohesive population whose main frame of reference is the territorial 
state outdated, passé, ‘so 20th century’. But the study of sub-Saharan African countries has clearly 
shown that it is necessary to bring the nation-state back in because the nation-state remains the 
model for politicians, intellectuals, businessmen and ordinary people alike. Even where the state is 
hardly present or is contested by alternative actors, these alternative actors still seek out and 
operate within the framework of territorial states while people do in fact self-define as nationals of a 




Furthermore, the decision to analytically separate the analysis of state formation and statehood from 
the evolution of nationbuilding and national identity could be seen as controversial since in the same 
breath I postulate the relevance of the nation-state to political affairs on the African continent where 
hordes of anthropologists are busy finding the persistence or emergence of forms of authority and 
organization beside the nation-state. However, the typology of the African nation-state and in 
particular the contrasting example of South Sudan have shown that statebuilding and nationbuilding, 
though part of the same process of establishing a unified commonwealth, can be studied in isolation 
since they are in fact not as dependent upon each other as sometimes suggested. This is a point that 
I will get back to in some more detail in the theoretical take-away section in Chapter 8.4.  
The third premise in need of argument and proof is the choice of constructing a typology of the 
African nation-state. There is no a priori reason to presume the existence of a distinctly African type 
of nation-state. And even if the European nation-state is acknowledged as an unsatisfactory 
comparison and measuring stick for politico-social formations on the black continent due to the fact 
that Europe’s evolution took centuries and emanated from inter-state wars and competition rather 
than being externally imposed by alien colonial usurpers, it might be surmised that comparisons with 
post-colonial countries in other parts of the world would amount to an equally fitting typology of 
post-colonial as opposed to sub-Saharan African nation-states. The answer to this kind of critique is 
two-pronged. For one, the specific historical conditions of state formation and nationbuilding in 
Africa – experience of European colonization, externally imposed territorial grid, independence at 
roughly the same point in time (1960s-1970s), systemic continuities with colonial political systems 
and the lack of historical nations in the newly formed states – amply justify a separate study of sub-
Saharan African nation-states. This is not to say, and this is the reply to the second point, that a 
comparison or shared typology of postcolonial states from Asia, Africa, Europe and so on could not 
be fruitful as well. Such an approach is simply not the focus of this specific investigation, among other 
things because of the concentration on the contrast to a single African case study: South Sudan.  
Finally, the choice of the case study that the typology is designed to test (while the singular case of 
South Sudan is meant to reciprocally test the typology) could also be construed as problematic. Some 
of the factors I just enlisted in support of the distinctness of African nation-states do not prima facie 
apply to the world’s newest state. South Sudan may have experienced European colonialism under 
British rule but the secessionist movement for self-rule was directed against the postcolonial 
Sudanese government in Khartoum. Moreover, South Sudan’s independence came almost exactly 
half a century after the first wave of postcolonial state formation and thus in a markedly different 
geopolitical, ideological and technological climate than most of its peers. Nonetheless or rather 
exactly because of these somewhat different external circumstances and conditions, comparing and 
contrasting South Sudan to the typology of the postcolonial African nation-state has been particularly 
gainful. Looking at a latecomer to independence through the lens of the typified experiences of those 
that came before may tell us something about the continued validity and worth of the typology for 
the present and future as well as highlight areas where changes may be needed. Conversely, 
assessing the very recent and short-term developments in South Sudan through categories that draw 
on the hindsight of several additional decades of post-independence statebuilding and nationbuilding 
help to understand the trajectory of South Sudan as an aspiring nation-state much clearer than when 
the country is studied in isolation. 
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The typology is by necessity based on secondary literature produced by the global academic 
community over the slightly more than half a century since the onset of African decolonization (with 
a few earlier writers also included) and is therefore also not only a typology of the formation and 
evolution of African states and nations but also a reflection of scholarship on African states and 
nations. Because South Sudan has attained independence and statehood (nationhood remains an 
open question) much later than other African countries, it shines a light on those facets of African 
statebuilding and nationbuilding that are still of relevance today compared to the 1960s. First of all, 
however, it is necessary to rehash the current shape of South Sudan’s nation-state as seen through 
the eyes of the typology.  
8.2. The Nation-State in South Sudan and Africa – main findings at a glance 
The two preceding chapters 6 and 7 have depicted South Sudanese statebuilding and the state and 
South Sudanese nationbuilding and the nation along the lines and from the perspective of the 
typology of the African postcolonial nation-state developed in Chapter 4. In order to properly assess 
South Sudan’s current state of building a nation-state and at the same time to determine the utility 
of the typology of the African nation-state here developed, it is instrumental to recapitulate the way 
South Sudan’s aspiring nation-state appears through the lens of the typified categories of statehood 
and nationhood in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. The result of this analysis is the following 
characterization of South Sudan’s contemporary status as an African nation-state. 
Hybrid quasi state 
South Sudan is clearly a hybrid quasi-state as evidenced by a number of facets the state has exhibited 
since the creation of the Government of South Sudan in 2005 and continuing after independence in 
2011. While official recognition for the state of South Sudan was prompt and nearly universal, the 
South Sudanese government is not physically in control of large parts of its nominal territory and in 
many places has to compete with alternative actors of violence: domestic militias like David Yau 
Yau’s in Jonglei that are in part proxy forces for the Sudanese government, Ugandan troops, the 
United Nations Mission, cattle raiders. The state’s borders are neither delineated nor demarcated 
and the state does not control who is transiting the borders but is itself not constrained in crossing 
the border to do business (DRC, Uganda) or to support proxy forces in Sudan like Darfur’s JEM or the 
SPLM-North. Civilian disarmament has so far failed as citizens respond to continuous insecurity and 
the state’s indifference and its inability to protect them by arming themselves and forming (often 
ethnically delineated) self-defence groups.  
There are several key reasons for South Sudan’s hybrid quasi-stateness which is very much in line 
with the typified African state. The SPLA was a very successful guerrilla force but has so far not 
succeded in transforming itself into a regular army and a functioning police force. The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s failure to include a wider selection of actors and militias, the 
continued sponsorship of anti-government militias by the consistently hostile regime in Khartoum 
and Juba’s willingness to reintegrate and thus effectively reward rebellious units and their 
commanders for their insubordination have kept the incentives high for groups and militias to take 
up arms against the state. The hybridity of physical control over territory and the absence of a 
monopoly of violence are further shaped by the lack of roads and other infrastructure, the stillborn 
nature of civilian disarmament efforts and the massing of security personnel in certain locations 
(Juba, border areas) and their concomitant absence in many especially rural localities. Altogether, the 
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South Sudanese state’s international and domestic sovereignty are very much in doubt and the 
current civil war has raised doubts even among former staunch supporters if awarding international 
recognition to the South Sudanese state was such a good idea after all.  
Illegitimate state 
Not only is the South Sudanese state not physically present in much of its territory, it also does not 
properly represent its citizens. South Sudan is therefore a non-performing state whose legitimacy is 
fragile and presently on the wane. The South Sudanese state is either not present at all and delegates 
tasks to NGOs or traditional authorities or, where it is present, does not fulfil its nominal tasks in, say, 
health care or education. The army, the country’s most established and well-endowed institution, is 
unable to police the state, and the other branches of the state that receive a much smaller share of 
the budget also do not fulfil their functions. The judiciary is understaffed, ill-trained and in many 
places outside the cities non-existent, its place taken by customary courts. Service delivery, in 
particular health and education but also food and agricultural supplies are still largely provided – if at 
all – by NGOs and funded by foreign donors while the state sector is plagued by lack of capacity and 
low and irregularly paid salaries unattractive to skilled members of the diaspora. While the state and 
the SPLM government, both often interchangeable in popular perception, enjoyed broad legitimacy 
after having attained independence for the South and parliamentary and presidential elections were 
held in 2010, the political arena is far from democratic. Opposition parties are harassed, civil society 
beyond the churches is weak, the press pursues self-censorship and the overpowering SPLM is torn in 
a vicious contest between personalities and ethno-regional groupings that has led to a bloody civil 
war since December 2013.  
While a de facto one-party state or movement state in which party and state, SPLM and GoSS blend 
into one and where opposition is organized and finds expression primarily inside rather than outside 
the party is characteristic for African countries that had to fight a war of liberation, the state’s 
legitimacy is an area where South Sudan has seen the most flux in the last years and in fact months. 
Had this conclusion been written in early December 2013, the assessment would have been that 
while accountability, transparency and respect for human rights are severely underdeveloped, while 
there are grave democratic deficits and dissatisfaction with the government’s performance is 
growing, the state as such is legitimate in the eyes of the large majority of South Sudanese for having 
attained independence from the North. The situation after many areas in the South have fallen prey 
to the egregiously brutal civil war of 2014 is by necessity unclear – for instance, no opinion surveys 
have been conducted since the alleged coup in December 2013 – but disillusion with the state is 
likely to have risen considerably. Such an outcome would constitute an unusually swift fall from grace 
for a post-liberation state and regime in comparison to South Sudan’s and the SPLM’s African peers. 
At the same time, it is instructive to learn how much the language of democracy has become 
ingrained in South Sudan’s political discourse; not only among the politically interested class of 
mostly urban citizens but also as rhetorical justification by Riek Machar and others for waging an 
armed rebellion against the allegedly undemocratic and therefore illegitimate government of Salva 
Kiir. The state’s unpopularity is further fuelled by the cavalier attitude with which officials reroute 
state resources into their own pockets while most of the population sees very little development.  
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Privatized neopatrimonial state 
South Sudan in its current state is a privatized state in which corruption and privatization of state 
resources for personal benefit are very common as even the president himself admitted. The state is 
privatized but privatization is only in part done with the purpose of sustaining a neopatrimonial web 
of dependent and dependable clients to maintain control of the state. Rather, much of the goods and 
resources that are siphoned off thanks to the gatekeeper position of those in charge of the state 
machinery flow into private luxury consumption for the extended families of those in power (high-
ranking members of GoSS and SPLA) whereas the connection to local followers is more individually 
organized and less a structural component of the SPLM’s governance system. Most of the privatized 
funds are part of the state’s oil revenue but land is increasingly becoming another attractive asset, as 
are teak wood and gold and in fact the still small sector of non-oil tax revenue. 
While the privatization of state resources is consistent with the typified African state, patronage and 
neopatrimonialism do not function in the same manner in South Sudan as they do in other African 
countries. South Sudan does neither have the wide inclusive net of patronage characteristic of 
African states with large territories and frail infrastructure like the DRC nor does it feature a network 
targeted directly at one specific regional or ethnic client group like for example the Kikuyu in Kenya. 
What can be found are a large number of parallel structures of interdependence between an 
individual at the top in Juba or – less often – in a state capital and his or – less often – her home area 
which can range in size from a neighbourhood to several counties or even an entire ethnic group. As 
the case of South Sudan thus differs in some important respects from the typology, I will get back to 
the issue in the theoretical reflections in 8.3.3. 
Swollen centralized state 
Centralization and a swollen state apparatus in the capital Juba characterize the state of South 
Sudan. This concentration of institutions and formal power is unsuccessful, however, in actually 
centralizing authority in the national government because its arm does not reach outlying parts of 
the territory. This apparent paradox originates from the fact that the state structure is nominally 
decentralized but very little actual power and decision-making are actually devolved to states, 
counties, payams and bomas. Lower level office-holders are in reality accountable to their higher-ups 
in Juba and not to the people they supposedly represent or govern; a state of affairs that has 
intensified after independence when president Kiir increasingly relied on a small coterie of loyal 
followers and among other things sacked two elected governors that were deemed disloyal. The 
administrative centralization is complemented by a concentration of economic activity in Juba which 
is the site of most economic development, attracts large numbers of internal migrants and has as a 
result outgrown multiple times the small settlement it had still been in 2005.   
Critically, chiefs are the most interesting actor in the state’s power structure: having lost influence 
throughout the long war, traditional authorities have in recent years regained some of their standing, 
in part in collusion with SPLM elites in Juba that need chiefs’ backing as their political support base in 
the countryside. From the bottom up perspective, locals turn to their traditional authorities because 
the state is not present in the countryside and not overly trusted, which is typical of South Sudan and 
of most African states. South Sudan also resembles quite uncannily Nigeria’s evolution in terms of 
continuous administrative subdivision into ever smaller entities from a single region to three regions 
to ten states. The multiplication of counties and other units of local government that frequently lead 
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to localized conflict is equally a typical feature of contemporary African states. Likewise, true 
devolution of powers and genuine federalism have become rallying cries for regional and national 
opposition to the central government in Juba, extending beyond the heartland of such appeals in 
Greater Equatoria to other parts of the country. Regionalism and other related forms of centrifugal 
tendencies not only put into question the state’s internal coherence, they equally raise the issue of 
national coherence.  
State-driven inclusive nationbuilding 
South Sudan’s nationbuilding efforts are faced with numerous obstacles, some inevitable and some 
man-made. Born from resistance and exclusion, South Sudanese identity is a response to negative 
othering and the only historical basis for unity and a collective identity are successive wars of 
resistance. State nationalism also concentrates on glorifying the long war of liberation and especially 
the SPLM/A’s role in the fight that eventually led to independence. However, this commemoration is 
highly problematic because much of the fighting was internecine, members of rebel groups other 
than the SPLA are not acknowledged and the mostly civilian victims are not properly recognized. The 
appeals to multiculturalism as the positive content of the country’s national identity have not gained 
much traction whereas its negative counterpart – campaigns against tribalism – dominates official 
discourse. The traditional ‘othering’ from the war-times persists as the popular dichotomy Africans 
vs. Arabs is employed as a means of self-identification that is built on negating and dissociating from 
Arabness. Electing to go with English over Arabic as the sole official language also contributes to the 
perpetuation of anti-Northern reflexes which particularly affect returnees from the North.  
The linguistic situation in South Sudan is quite unique and differs considerably from the typical 
African state. While choosing the former colonial power’s language (English) as the new state’s 
official language is the standard route in postcolonial Africa, in the specific circumstances of South 
Sudan this decision exacerbates and creates internal rifts and conflicts rather than stymies them. Due 
to the fact that many South Sudanese lived in the North and were educated in Arabic while many 
that stayed in the country during the war only speak local languages or Southern Juba Arabic, this 
decision divides rather than unites the people and is bound to pit one group against the other as 
mostly those that were refugees in East Africa and other English-speaking countries benefit. 
Moreover, in the context of African post-liberation countries, South Sudan appears to take up an 
atypical middle position in how it commemorates the liberation war fighters. Zimbabwe on one end 
of the spectrum strongly differentiates between different degrees of ‘liberation heroes’, Eritrea on 
the other edge of the scale maintains an egalitarian ideal in its official memory of the war of 
secession from Ethiopia. While there is no hierarchical strand in South Sudan’s memorial culture and 
the true dividing line is between those that ‘held a gun’ and those that did not, the personal cult 
surrounding John Garang and the focus on the SPLM/A to the neglect of all other militias puts it 
somewhere in between the two poles. What is readily apparent, though, is that state-driven 
nationbuilding has not rooted out ethnic loyalties in the country.  
Politicized Ethnicity  
Both ethnic group identities and politicized ethnicity play a large role in South Sudan. There is a 
widespread belief that the Dinka dominate the army and the government and that jobs and positions 
in the administration are tied to membership in the ‘correct’ ethnic group. Political parties and most 
importantly the SPLM itself align along ethno-regional fault lines while concepts of ethnic identity 
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have hardened and genocidal rhetoric and gratuitous violence against members of other ethnicities 
in the course of raiding are more common – proven by the atrocities committed since December 
2013. Ethnicity is widely decried among political and intellectual elites as the main impediment to 
national unity and an efficient functioning state. Diatribes against ethnic loyalties, which continue to 
shape most people’s sense of themselves more than the national identity, are thence as much part of 
contemporary South Sudan as of the typified African state; something that also applies to the 
salience of ethnicity in formal politics.  
However, in some subtle yet important points the South Sudanese case diverges from the typified 
narrative of politicized ethnicity in Africa. More often than not, it is not the supra ethnic identity that 
matters most to the individual and his or her political mobilization but a group that is either smaller 
or bigger. The Dinka and Nuer, the country’s two largest ethnic groups, not only do not know a 
centralized authority but are split amongst themselves in a substantial number of clans (for instance 
Jikany and Lou for the Nuer and Ngok and Bor for the Dinka) which is where the real loyalties lie – if 
not in even smaller sub-units that comprise for instance the extended family or the cattle camp. On 
the other hand, in Equatoria ethnic identities are crucial for the individual and the family but when it 
comes to political organization and representation, the regional identity as Equatorians is more 
important, not least because otherwise each Equatorian group on its own would be too insignificant 
in size to have much clout. Moreover if survey results can be trusted, ethnic identification does not 
stand in the way of attachment to the nation of South Sudan. The relevance of ethnic loyalties thus 
appears very much tied to situational circumstances which applies with added force to the politics of 
autochthony and other exclusionary practices in the country.  
Exclusionary ‘new nationalism’  
Exclusionary new nationalism is very much present in South Sudan. By tying land ownership – and 
citizenship more generally – to membership in communities who ‘originally’ owned the land, the 
GoSS has unwittingly strengthened this exclusionary stance. While returnees have been generally 
well-received, those coming back from East Africa are sometimes accused of loose morals while 
those from Khartoum are cursed as jalaba. Xenophobia against merchants from neighbouring 
countries (Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea) is also very common. In contemporary South Sudan Christianity is 
the majority religion, often coexisting with traditional beliefs, and Christian imagery is very popular: 
for example the idea of historical continuity with Biblical Kush. But although the churches played a 
vital role in providing services and helping with intra-Southern peace efforts during the war, the 
South Sudanese state is, for now, deliberately secular due to the experience of forced Islamic 
proselytization. The contemporary role of churches is thus as an important but not integral part of 
national identity. Critically, there has not been any violence or overt discrimination against the 
Muslim minority in South Sudan.  
South Sudan’s politics of autochthony mirror those of the typified African state yet the conditions 
that give rise to them at the same time raise some question marks. Whereas in countries like 
Cameroon the designation of land ownership to original inhabitants was done deliberately, the view 
from South Sudan is more blurred as it appears that the decision-makers are torn between promises 
from the war period, international consultants, economic growth plans, local chiefs and foreign 
investors. As a result, opting for communal land ownership with all its concomitant consequences 
does not look like an overly conscious choice just like the push for new counties by local stakeholders 
forces the hand of higher-ups in the South Sudanese state. Hence, it would be useful to look into the 
283 
 
degree of intentionality behind state policies that drive or trigger exclusionary rhetoric and practice 
on the local and sometimes also on the national level. The numerous national reconciliation efforts 
have so far not led to any substantive results in part because of lack of funding and political support, 
in part because accountability for past crimes was not to be included since many who allegedly 
committed human rights abuses during the 1990s are still in positions of power. Alas, some form of 
justice and reconciliation seems inevitable if state and nation are to achieve a level of unity for 
otherwise grievances are certain to boil over at some point and breed new victims as well as new 
perpetrators.  
8.3. From South Sudan to Africa – Theoretical reflections on state and nation  
One important conclusion to be drawn from the juxtaposition of South Sudan’s statebuilding and 
nationbuilding with the typified African nation-state is that South Sudan’s evolution to date in more 
ways than not abides by and thus affirms the validity of my typology of the African nation-state. 
Nonetheless, certain aspects of the South Sudanese state and nation diverge from the typified 
African nation-state, in particular facets of the illegitimate state, the privatized neopatrimonial state, 
of state nationalism and political ethnicity. Rather than going through each diversion one by one, this 
section aims to highlight and develop some ideas about the African state and nation and thus about 
the typology of the African nation-state that arise from the comparison of South Sudan to its 
continental peers.  
Seeing how and to what extent South Sudan’s state and nation fit into and – in some fields – go 
counter to the typology of the African nation-state raises a number of questions not only for South 
Sudan but also for the typology itself. Since the typology is based on an aggregation of the 
experiences of all countries from the African continent (excluding the countries of North Africa that 
belong more to the Mediterranean-Arab world), it is legitimate to ask why and how a case study for a 
single country could warrant a rethink for the typology as a whole. First of all, to clarify any 
misunderstandings it is certainly not the case that each and every aspect in which South Sudan 
diverts from the standard path of the typified African nation-state warrants a redrawing of the entire 
typology. Yet, it is my firm belief that the case of South Sudan is illustrative of a number of things 
about the African nation-state typology that are worth taking a second look at.  
As it turns out, the case of South Sudan raises more substantial and further-reaching issues for the 
conceptualization of nation, nationalism and nationbuilding on the continent than is the case for 
state and statebuilding in Africa. Therefore, the first section in 8.3.1 will look into the historical 
conditions and matters of sequentiality in regard to phases of nationalism and nationbuilding in 
Africa and 8.3.2 will expand on the issue by analyzing the relevance of mass displacement on the 
creation of national unity. 8.3.3 will then summarily discuss interlinkages between different facets 
and categories of statehood before 8.3.4 returns to the connection between wars and nation-
statemaking in Africa.  
8.3.1. Sequence of nationbuilding and historical timing  
Possibly the most interesting divergence from the point of view of the typology consists not of the 
substance of South Sudanese nationalism and nationbuilding but in the sequence in which the 
different facets of nationbuilding occur. In the typical African postcolonial state, nationalism was 
initially inclusive but dismissive of ethnic loyalties, followed by a failure of state nationalism and a 
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resurgence of political ethnicity and finally the emergence of exclusionary ‘new nationalism’ and 
discourses of autochthony on the local and the national level. As a latecomer to independence and 
decolonization and in the wake of prolonged conflict, South Sudan has chosen – aided or nudged by 
the international community embodied by the U.S., Norway, UK and other Western countries – to 
pursue a parallel strategy of building a state and building a nation.  
In the short period since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement came into force in 2005, the 
Government of South Sudan and the South Sudanese as a people have gone through all the 
successive periods of nationbuilding and nationalism in a typical African state – only compressed and 
occurring parallel to each other. What emerges therefore is that South Sudan in its current state of 
development does not stick to the chronological blueprint of nationalism and nationbuilding of its 
African peers and antecedents. Instead, South Sudan is home to all three trends of post-colonial 
African nationalism and national identity construction (inclusive state nationalism, ethnic resurgence, 
discourses of autochthony) at the same time and exhibits elements of each in its official policies, 
public discourses and observable actions on the ground parallel to the others. 
Regarding the evolution of nationalism on the continent, the case of South Sudan points to the 
likelihood that the successive periods experienced by the typified African states since the 1960s do 
not have any predictive value for a latecomer like South Sudan where all of these successive trends 
can be observed simultaneously. Apart from the different geopolitical environment, the most 
important factor for the radically changed opportunity structure for would-be nationbuilders in the 
present are technological advances, especially in communications (mobile phones, for example) and 
the fast pace of urbanization on the continent. Thus, rather than conceiving of nationalisms in Africa 
as a chronological and thematic ladder (or slide, depending on the perspective), a renewed focus on 
the parallel persistence of inclusive with exclusive state nationalism and inclusive with exclusive 
concepts of ethnic and local identity might unravel a more diverse and, more importantly, more 
accurate picture of African postcolonial nationalism and processes of national identity creation. 
Contingency of historical circumstances is a key factor that limits the predictive value of the typology 
of the African nation-state in particular in the field of building a national community. The contingency 
of specific developmental trends of African nation-states to the era in which they occurred is thus an 
important theme that emerges when South Sudan and the typified postcolonial African nation-state 
are juxtaposed. Oftentimes these circumstances have changed so dramatically and indeed 
irrevocably that one would expect a different trajectory and result of state-formation and 
nationbuilding. The three most obvious variables that have undergone drastic change are the 
geopolitical climate (from Cold War to unipolar world order to China and India’s entry to the 
continent), globalization of the world economy (especially expansion of trade and globalization of 
production chains) and technology, above all communication technology that has begun to radically 
alter access to information as well as cultural and political orientation and organization1974.  
Some other developments have clearly changed the underlying conditions for a nationbuilding 
project in the geographical territory of South Sudan. On the one hand, road networks remain either 
non-existent or in bad shape, which precludes inter-personal communication1975 and thus one of the 
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key factors in developing a sense of national belonging. Even where road and railway systems exist, 
they are still oriented towards Khartoum which for many in northern South Sudan is considerably 
closer and easier to reach than the capital Juba1976. To some extent, mobile phone use is making up 
for it (a third of respondents claimed to own a mobile phone in 20131977) while television and 
internet may sooner or later start to reach areas that have so far relied entirely on radio and word of 
mouth communications. Some research has already found that the introduction of the mobile phone 
to South Sudan has had a major impact on communications between scattered extended families 
and begun to alter rural-urban relations1978. General education is also a key factor in this regard as its 
low quality and uneven and uncoordinated standards (as shown in Ch. 6.2.1.4) stand in the way of 
schools functioning as a breeding ground for the dissemination of national consciousness. Hence, 
technological advances, especially mobile phone use, and rapid urbanization may in the coming years 
drastically change the conditions for nationbuilding compared to African countries that attained 
independence in the 1960s. 
8.3.2. Mass displacement: a challenge to nationbuilding theory? 
The vast number of refugees and displaced Southern Sudanese in itself constitutes an anomaly that is 
unmatched by any other African postcolonial state, including the much-tormented Democratic 
Republic of Congo. What stands out about the refugee situation in South Sudan is not only the nearly 
all-encompassing degree and long duration of displacement but the fact that the lives of those 
displaced inside Southern Sudan differed drastically from those that fled to Greater Khartoum whose 
experience was in turn nothing like what South Sudanese lived through in refugee camps in Ethiopia, 
Kenya or Uganda and certainly unlike the life of those that settled in Canada, Australia, the UK or the 
U.S.  
The extraordinary displacement suffered by the majority of South Sudanese at least once in their 
lifetimes has created a unique situation, which can nonetheless grant insights into the way 
statebuilding and especially nationbuilding may evolve in Africa in the future. For one, returnees 
have generally gotten used to a more urban lifestyle and after a stint in their ‘home area’ have in 
large numbers moved on to the cities which have been growing at a fast pace. Urbanization is thus 
partly an outcome of displacement and creates the environment for a melting pot of ethnic groups 
into one nation of South Sudan; a possibility unthinkable for the remaining majority that lives in 
often inaccessible and remote villages. The tragic conclusion from the house-to-house searches for 
Nuer in Juba in December 2013 is that urbanization, displacement and return do not in themselves 
create unity but can in fact facilitate mobilization along ethnic lines and, in the end, ethnic cleansing. 
Moreover, on a more general level, the feasibility and also desirability of creating a strong national 
identity and vibrant (state) nationalism is to be called into doubt considering the pernicious side-
effects it can engender: xenophobia and exclusion of all sorts of groups that are deemed to be in one 
way or another deviant or queer. Furthermore, hailing from a country that has experienced first-
hand the horrors man does to his fellow creature in the name of the nation, I would surmise that 
Herbst’s calculation that for African states nationalism is a cheap alternative to delivering actual 
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benefits and services is in some cases fallacious as the price of relying on nationalism for cohesion 
may turn out to be very steep, indeed. Likewise, it is highly unlikely that delivery of services from 
education to health care to law courts and provision of livelihoods is going to drive attachment to the 
nation in the short- or mid-term. In that sense, statebuilding and nationbuilding may not be as closely 
connected to one another as they are sometimes made out to be – a question I will get back to in the 
coming section 8.4.2.    
8.3.3. The mutual linkages between different facets of statehood 
The distinction between the four categories of African statehood in the typology has generally 
proven itself as a useful tool to understanding both general trends on the continent as well as the 
specific and in historical terms exceptional case of South Sudan. The analysis of South Sudan’s 
statehood has, however, brought up some interlinkages between these categories.  
The recent political crisis in South Sudan but effectively many of the political manoeuvres by the 
SPLM/A since 2005 illustrate how for some African countries the questions of democracy and 
democratization not only impact the state’s lack of legitimacy but also its quasi-stateness. Changing 
concepts of national sovereignty in the light of the United Nations’ “Responsibility to Protect” 
doctrine of 2005 – which is largely derived from the lessons learned by the international community 
from the failure to halt genocidal violence in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s1979 – and the direct 
involvement of some Western powers in African statebuilding efforts, especially in post-conflict 
countries, mean that a failure to uphold democratic standards, civil liberties and human rights may 
incur high penal costs all the way to foreign intervention.  
The crucial caveat is that this applies only provided a) the state is economically and militarily weak, 
e.g. a large regional power like Nigeria is not under threat as opposed to puny Guinea-Bissau; b) the 
country is of strategic importance, e.g. Djibouti due to its location opposite Yemen at the entrance to 
the Red Sea or Mali due to the threat of Islamic terrorism but probably not landlocked and resource-
poor Burundi; and/or c) Western states, above all the U.S., France or the UK take for various reasons, 
for example colonial past, a particular interest in a given country such as Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia or 
Côte d’Ivoire. In justifying its armed rebellion with president Kiir’s undemocratic actions, the SPLM-in-
Opposition thus appealed as much to an international audience as to the people of South Sudan1980. 
And Salva Kiir’s recent attempts to reach out to Russia right at a time when criticism from Western 
countries and the threat of sanctions is mounting shows that the political class in Juba is well aware 
of the double-edged sword that democratization can be for a small and weak state in an 
interdependent world.  
The other aspect that sticks out in the analysis of the South Sudanese state is neopatrimonialism. 
Neopatrimonialism is generally a good and useful concept to grasp the working of the political 
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system and of relations of power and authority both on the level of high politics as well as in more 
local settings in African postcolonial countries. The South Sudanese example illustrates, however, 
that in certain resource economies that largely rely on revenue streams from abroad, the idea of the 
gatekeeper state may be a more useful and accurate description of political realties: in South Sudan 
as well as in Angola, Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea state capture for personal enrichment and outright 
theft of state resources (captured in the concept of ‘kleptocracy’) may be a better explanation than 
the pyramids of patron-client relationships that characterize many if not most African states.  
Additionally, in the sense that state resources are used for direct contacts to chiefs in specific parts of 
the country, the neopatrimonial state partly overlaps with the characteristics of the swollen 
centralized state which in the absence of the tools of centralized control over all of the state’s 
territory maintains a hold over local affairs by establishing direct patron-client links to localized 
traditional authorities. As such, a neopatrimonial state may be causally related to the swollen 
centralized state because patron client relations are necessary to control outlying parts of territory 
that otherwise would be outside governmental reach due to the (often deliberate) incapacitation of 
statutory local government structures. 
8.3.4. War and the African nation-state 
One way in which the typology might be revised is in its focus on war as a driver of unity and 
cohesion. Wars do not play the same integral role in statebuilding and nationbuilding on the African 
continent as they did in Europe and that is unlikely to change given the prevalence of civil wars and 
other forms of large-scale violence that shun the classic Clausewitzian instances of interstate fighting. 
Civil wars and other forms of violent conflict internal to the nation-state’s territory are quite to the 
contrary both a sign of the failure to build a cohesive national identity and population and an 
indication that the state is unable to provide security and establish a monopoly of violence. Such 
types of war also catapult people into positions of power and influence that have only risen to this 
rank because of war and because of their participation in war, which has proven to be a less than 
optimal form of selecting a country’s leadership. Apart from being a testament to the weakness of 
the state and the nation, civil conflicts are also their cause and may preclude the rise of a nation-
state in the future. War in postcolonial Africa (and possibly beyond) is hence a very fragile basis upon 
which to build a community and a commonwealth, i.e. a state and a nation.  
But war and violent conflict are not only harmful while they are happening. The case of South Sudan 
suggests that basing national identity and official historical memory on commemoration of a war – 
even if the war’s outcome was a victory – can literally backfire. Clearly, this applies with added force 
for cases where a country’s population was more or less evenly split during the war as 
commemoration then divides the people into winners and losers, into those that fully belong and 
those that do not. But even where most parties to a war can claim to have been among the winners – 
in South Sudan, after all, almost all militias at least declared to be fighting for Southern 
independence – attempts by the governing party or other state elites to monopolize the role of 
heroes of war or heroes of liberation drives a wedge through the population. Thus, the sense of not 
being recognized for their role among former members and adherents of South Sudan’s SSDF finds its 
expression among the people of Matabeleland in Zimbabwe, the Igbo (Biafra) in Nigeria and 
members of Renamo in Mozambique. These matters are further complicated by the absence or 




8.4. Outlook on further research & South Sudan’s development trajectory 
In the final section and indeed the final paragraphs, I want to get to a number of issues that this 
study has brought to light and that, in my estimation, ought to receive further attention in future 
academic research as well as in the practice of policy-makers. The first in 8.4.1 is a general 
recognition of the need and at the same time an appeal for more comparative studies of African 
states and nations and indeed African political systems more broadly. Second and lastly, 8.4.2 is 
going to look at the relationship between statebuilding and nationbuilding in South Sudan and Africa 
and what this may tell us for South Sudan’s near and mid-term future.  
8.4.1. A need for more comparative research 
A very general conclusion that I draw from this research project, the intensive research on academic 
sources but also from the experiences from attending and presenting at numerous conferences is 
that the study of African states, nations and nation-states warrants and demands more comparative 
works than are currently being undertaken and that go beyond the ideas and concepts of the failed 
state. There is certainly something to be said for in-depth local studies (oftentimes conducted by 
anthropologists) that uncover, for instance, how power relations actually work on the ground or how 
people really conceive of themselves. However, there is a definite lack of works that make use of 
these in-depth studies to conduct comparative yet qualitative studies that focus on certain aspects of 
the African state and nation and that provide a better and more thorough understanding of the 
macro-state of African nation-states. Such comparative works, in spite of the arguments brought 
forward in the introduction, need not be restricted to the continent but should eventually cross the 
borders of continents and academic disciplines. Just as legitimate therefore as the call on academics 
and others to ‘provincialize Europe’1981 in their thinking and their approaches is the call to globalize 
and thus normalize Africa by treating the continent just like any other. 
A side-effect of a more equitable treatment of world regions that would arise from a wider 
comparative approach to global forms of statehood and nationhood would be to lessen the 
inherently normative and in some cases even pejorative sound of the categories used in the 
typology. The neopatrimonial state, for instance, recurs not only in name but also in content to a 
new, hybridized form of a type of political organization that Max Weber deemed typical of pre-
modern, traditional societies. Attesting a country to be a neopatrimonial state therefore does not 
only contain a factual statement about the way power is organized by using the state’s resources to 
give out benefits to a core group of loyal supporters but it also says that Gabon is a less developed 
state, actually: less of a state than the typical nation-state based on an idealized version of a Western 
European-North Atlantic amalgamate. Similar things can be said for the idea of the quasi state, 
whose name makes clear that a state fitting this classification is not quite worthy of being called a 
state at all. Illegitimate, undemocratic, swollen are each and all attributes that carry a negative 
connotation and the resurgence of ethnicity and the ‘new nationalism’ are each, in name as in 
meaning, testament to the failure to live up to a ‘true’ national ideal of collective identity, unity, 
common characteristics and a shared vision for the future. 
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8.4.2. The relationship between statebuilding and nationbuilding in South Sudan & 
Africa 
As set out in the introduction of this dissertation, statebuilding and nationbuilding have become 
integral components of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. The state’s 
institutions are to be strengthened so that the state can provide for its citizens and thereby establish 
a link between the two, a link that is further fortified by a sense of belonging to a greater unit that 
shares a common past but, more importantly, a common destiny. Crucially, this duopoly of favourite 
solutions to the plight of former warring countries has extended beyond post-conflict countries to all 
those states that are deemed to be frail or dysfunctional to fulfil what are deemed its core functions: 
security, services, accountability.  
Regarding this catechism of statebuilding and nationbuilding, the case of South Sudan raises another 
issue that partly transcends but partly affirms the typology of the African nation-state in the decision 
to treat state and nation as interrelated but independent variables. In other words, the example of 
South Sudan points to a view of statebuilding and nationbuilding as distinct processes that need not 
be thought of or pursued in unison. This moreover raises the question if nationbuilding really matters 
in and for South Sudan or, more precisely, if a cohesive national community is really necessary for 
the creation of a functioning state. On the one hand, there is the widespread notion that the 
presence of prepolitical norms in society, a civic ethos and a level of interpersonal trust – captured 
for example in Putnam’s dubious concept of social capital1982 – are necessary for institutions to work 
and to be filled with life. However, these prepolitical norms cannot be created overnight and 
arguably have more to do with cultural norms than with nationalism and national identity.  
Building a nation and a cohesive national collective is an omnipresent feature of public speeches, 
opinion pieces and academic production in and from South Sudan. The two pillars of official state 
nationalism – the positive concept of unity-in-diversity combined with the negative diatribes against 
tribalism and the commemoration of the war of liberation and especially the war’s martyrs – are 
typical of diverse multiethnic countries and of countries that have emerged from a war of liberation. 
Yet, both have failed so far in uniting South Sudanese. Even after the immediate ethnicisation of 
what was originally a personal political rivalry and power contest between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar 
this does not mean that South Sudan’s nationbuilding efforts are doomed per se. The swift evolution 
of telecommunications (mobile phones), the beginning of national curricula and schooling and the 
rapid urbanization are all features that create enabling conditions for a more cohesive imagined 
community of South Sudanese than was possible only a few years back.  
I would however argue that South Sudan’s attempts at nationbuilding have not only so far been 
unsuccessful in taking root but, if unchanged, are unlikely to do so in the future. The definitive 
answer to the most successful way of dealing with ethnic diversity in the construction of state and 
nation in Africa has not yet been delivered. It does appear much clearer, though, that the 
multicultural ideal informing the concept of unity-in-diversity has not succeeded in countering ethnic 
and other sub-national loyalties from coming to the fore in the continent’s multi-ethnic countries and 
certainly not in South Sudan. Secondly, the non-inclusive form of officially remembering and 
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commemorating the war of liberation as the kernel of national history and national identity divides 
South Sudanese into multiple layers, each layer belonging to the nation to different degrees.  
Moreover, the bond and unity forged by war and by fighting side by side may be unrivalled by more 
civil links like football or wrestling but it is also this very bond that unites people to do horrible things 
to others. The German writer Peter Weiss’s words about the fatal attraction of marching together in 
uniform rings true for present-day South Sudan: “thus a force compelled me to the common bond 
with this marching, the force of the insane idea of a common fate”1983. A much more vital component 
to a more benevolent and inclusive form of unity would be a genuine process of national 
reconciliation though it is doubtful that this will amount to much as long as those at the helm are 
themselves implicated in war crimes. 
Hence, contrary to some analysts that claimed after the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 that 
statebuilding in South Sudan had been unsuccessful because of a lack of efforts to build a nation and 
a national vision alongside the newly created state institutions1984, I would argue that at least in the 
case of South Sudan the construction of functioning state institutions and the construction of a 
collective national identity are parallel processes that are not causally or sequentially related. It 
seems doubtful that the National Archives, the National Museum and like institutions will really bring 
South Sudanese together and prevent further ethnically based bloodletting and it may well be 
sufficient for South Sudanese to only feel South Sudanese when united against a common enemy or 
juxtaposed to nationals from other countries. It is additionally questionable whether it is truly helpful 
to overcharge any institution and event – the national football team, a wrestling competition, even a 
fashion show – with the task of supra-tribal nationbuilding. Arguably statebuilding in South Sudan or 
elsewhere does not require nationbuilding. South Sudan can evolve into a functioning (whatever that 
means in detail) state without becoming a nation-state1985. To turn this around: most Eritreans are 
arguably happy to have won independence from Ethiopia and to live in a territorial nation of Eritrea. 
What many are probably less content with is the authoritarian state they have to live in. 
Energies might be better spent trying to create workable mechanisms of empowering local 
government or establishing an actual federal system to deal with the intricacies of reaching citizens 
in a country as large as South Sudan where there is little infrastructure and the population is still 
mostly rural and dispersed. Continuing to build the state’s institutions will in any case be necessary in 
the future even if currently international organisations from UNMISS to UNDP to FAO and the 
manifold national bodies have switched their focus from development to preventing mass starvation 
in South Sudan. Once, or rather, if and when the immediate threat of famine recedes and if and 
when an interim government that includes the current rebels will have been formed, questions 
about the shape of the future state are certain to re-emerge inside and outside South Sudan. To 
some extent this is already happening as several South Sudanese politicians and commentators have 
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voiced their support for a devolved, less centralized federal state structure as a means to preclude a 
renewed outbreak of internal strife, ethnic or other1986. However, this is unlikely to be the silver 
bullet to solve all that ails the political system of South Sudan as not only the army’s and the SPLM’s 
centralizing traditions but also the insecure regional environment may compel South Sudan to retain 
– for now – most of the levers of power in Juba. 
Thus, one of the important questions for the future of the South Sudanese state is whether the 
current state of institutional performance should be seen as a stepping stone for the gradual 
extension of state authority which will proceed proportional to the expansion in capacities1987. Or, 
alternatively, whether the South Sudanese government will pursue a strategy of “successful state 
failure”1988 and rid itself of the costs and administrative burden of providing social services by 
permanently outsourcing them to NGOs and international donors while expending all resources and 
energies to its own survival in power. It may be in this respect that statebuilding and nationbuilding 
in South Sudan overlap most acutely. As long as South Sudan remains a hybrid quasi state with 
questionable legitimacy that lacks functioning institutions, is largely privatized and concentrates 
power and resources at the centre, propagating and fostering the state’s vision of nationalism and 
national identity among the South Sudanese people is going to be rather daring challenge. The idea 
of the territorialized national community is a lot less convincing when the state itself is unable or 
unwilling to territorialize its presence and authority and there are few tangible points of contact 
between the individual and the imagined national community of South Sudan.  
For the time being, however, other worries are at the forefront along the shores of the Nile. In 
December of 2013, civil war erupted in Juba and has waged in several parts of the country but 
especially in Central Equatoria, Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei. More than a million South Sudanese 
have been displaced, more than ten thousand killed and famine and disease threaten those living in 
refugee camps and in war-affected areas – about a third of the population. At the time of writing 
(June 2014), a peace agreement had been signed in Addis Ababa by the two rival leaders, Salva Kiir 
and Riek Machar, calling for a transitional government to be established within three months1989. But 
given that the first ceasefire agreement in February 2014 faltered almost before the ink had dried 
and that both sides claim to have been pressured into signing a deal by the Ethiopian president1990 
and continue to trade accusations, scepticism is well-founded. Rather than ending with a peak into 
the crystal ball to predict what the future may hold for South Sudan, I simply hold out hope that very 
soon the people of South Sudan will no longer die of bullets, cholera and starvation and it will seem 
less preposterous to spend time discussing the South Sudanese state, nation and nation-state. 
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